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Tlie New Ikmpshire PreBidential Primary of 2968 vas a unique political event.
The opportunlf.y to account for bow that event occirred r.ay also be unique. The
author brings to this study something more than the perspective of an observer
or reporter. He vas, with several others, an organizer, motivator, strategist,
and total participant in that campaign from its inception until its corclusion.
To this account he brin^;8 a point of view of New Hamp^fhire politics that provided
a practical br.sis for developing the strategy of the campaign and seeing that the
plan was executed. As a political scientist, he brought to the .1568 campaign
earlier political e^^pericnce in New ha^pGhire as well as an applied synthesis
drawn from his exposure to the literature of his discipline. In his mind he
continually related his studies to hi:; experience to shape the political effort.
It is from this dual perspective thst he diev the concept of the campaign and
that he nov; offers this account,.
In the preface of his bock, The KauaiTement of Elec qtLJ?gjgi]^^£i-lg.* Robert
Agranoff \<Toce:
This book is devoted to tne principle that political science
does have scraethlng to contribute to those who are interested
in. practical politics. Too often the practitioner has ignored
the academic as unconcerned x^'-ith the real experiences and prob-
lems that politicians confront on a day-ro-day basis, (xiii)
He went on to bemoan the fact that there are fevr studies of elections and the
ones there are are "of elections held long ego." To bridge tlie gap between stu-
dents and cainpaigner.3
,
Agranoff feels, "...it seewed necessary to compile, for
the ccmpajgncr, that which is relevant fiom the past quarter-century of research
V
into carapuigns, clcc-Mons, voting, political parties, commmilcations
, end other
Bocio-politxcal procesBcs..." Uiii) . To help iu tuis bridge building a x,ew
case study in orGei.
.
A case otudy of a ctmpaign that was tianageJ by a person
jrcanding on the bridge who feels that the case study and analysis that follows
strengthen the structure.
In this case study care has been taken to develop the material from what
was experienced and what influenced decisions during the span of the campaign.
The author has attempted to re-create the selected events of the campaign ay they
happened rather than from the perspective of hindsight. la this way the struc-
ture of the bridge becomes more evident. For the reader familiar with Agranoff'r
"quarter century of research" one will find evide/ice of the impact of that mate-
rial in the strategy and decision-making of the cam.paign. For the campaign
participant that reader will sense the relationship between the science of poli-
tics and the imprecision of the art that the worker feels. For the scholar the
case study offers an account of a campaign, resembling a docuiaentary , that can
be probi-d and questioned with the recognition that the details have been pre-
cerved and the subtle interactions recorded.
This profile shows that McCarthy's New Hampshire success came not from an
after the fact evaluation but as the consequence of a series of pre-planned stra-
tegies suited to New Hampshire's unique political environment. The impact of
the campaign was isimedinte. McCarthy had von what was he.ld to be a ^significant
victory over President Lyndon B. JoJinson. How that victory '.jas accomplished,
what i^le-pH v>ere taken, how t>).e campaign evolved, and how the confrovatatlon was
ccatf^J -is tba setting of this case study, what went on in the organizers' minds,
vi
vhat InLonr.a^.ion Uicy bad end used f:o make their decisions , vhat evpiicB thoy had
to renci: to with thcii; stiatc-^jy, vhat campaign techniques were used have been re-
viewed in order to select those that respond to the questions of impact and ef-
fectiveness.
The irony of the event was that the successes of the campaign came iuspite
of the fact that Lyndcn Johrson was rn undeclared write-in candidate in New
Han'pshire. ]?riraai.iec were viewed as of limited iniportancc to the re-nomination
of an i.xicuii'.hent president and thus it \.'a£ thought posKiblc to avoid direct par-
ticipation. The advantagec of incurabency and a campaign operated by surrogates
would be sviffici.ent to denonstrate party unity.
One conatqueucs of the 1968 primary experience was that when the 1972
preriidential priner/ season came nroutul, President Richard Nixon did not hesi-
tate to participate actively. He broke tradition and announced his re-election
inLeatlonfi early in 1972, He then entered the New Hampshire presidential pri-
mary and came to Ilf^-w Hampshire as a candidate. Taking nothing for granted,
the Nixon sLratcgy of insuring both his re-nomination and his re-election led
to his downfall when carried to the extreme — Watergate.
It must be noted that for the leaders of the New Hampshire xicCarthy cam-
paign the decision to challenge the incumbent president of their ovTn party was
a difficult one. As the author contends, that like himself, many of the indi-
viduals both inside and outside of New Hampshire had to make difficult choices.
To become involved in a campaign against the re-nomination of an incumbent
with
wnom many, if not moFt, had some measure of respect, was most
difficult. The
cross pressure of President Johnson's civ^l rights efforts,
legislative program
vli
ro end poverty, his concern for the problems of the cities, and his emphasis on
educatJoual and cniployBient equity presented those who were to become his politi-
cal challengers v/ith wrenchins personal decisions.
To lend their nauies
,
energy, their experience, and their personal political
capital to a challenge based on a deepening concern about the impact of the ad-
rainistrntion's Vietnam war policy called for deep personal examination of one's
values, a measuring of the consequences, and finally a commitment. For some it
meant becoming involved in the McCarthy campaign. For others it meant sticking
with the President to work from the inside to modify his administration's foreign
policy. To others the choice was made on personal priorities. Domestic accom-
plishments and the trend Johnson had set were more important than the skirmish
in Vietnam, or the opposite, v/here one argued that Vietnam involvement had made
further domestic advances improbable inspite of the "guns and butter" rhetoric
of the administration.
The personal docis ion-making that brought together the formidable organiza-
tion that eventually became the McCarthy campaign must not be overlooked as an
important part of the 1968 political context. For this case study it will be
necessary to note its ii-iportance £S both an accomplishment of the Nevj Hampsliire
campaign and an aspect of the impact of '-hat campaign and to direct readers to
other accounts: (^.ee bibliography). Th-; depth of personal commitment, ££• trans-
lated into poliricai energy, while not unique in Axnzcican politics, v.'as certainly
an important contribiat i on to the success of McCarthy in 1968. It is hoped that
the analysis survives with the above notation and the recognition that every
political ciimpaign has its commited participants. The autlior more than recognized
viii
that in 1968, at Icaof as It begati in New JlampGhire, the commitment vati less to
the candidate himf,t;ij:, than to the issues and concerns wliich ho repreeente.d.
This difference may account for the intensity and unusual breadth of participation
in the cair.paign but thi.'f difference is not felt to invalidate the subsequent
analysis.
Observing the centh anniversary of 1968 the American Broadcasting Corpora-
tion prepared a documentary of the events of that year entitled, "A Crack in
Time." The program, iilred during the spring of 1978, v/as a summary of the bead-
line events of 1968 beginning v;ich Senator McCarthy*s surprise showing in the
New Hampshire presidential primary. To go beyond headlines and to assess the
total political, social, institutional impact of that year or even of tl\e New
Hampshire presidential primary reaches beyond the scope of this study. For the
record and perhaps to challenge other researchers, it is worth noting at least
some, cf the political consequences of McCarthy's New Hampshire success.
Briefly, svd not in order of importance some of these are:
1. Ineffective anti-Vietnam war protest was organii;ed into votes
v/hich Ted to the de-escalation and eventual end of United
States military involvement in Vietnam.
1. An incumbent president was challenged effectively in a primary
which contributed to his decision not to seek re-election.
3. The presidential primary as an institution and as a viable
route to a presidential nomination was not only recognized
but vridcly instituted.
A. The pres;idanrir.l nominating proc>-ss was tho.-ough.Ty exam.ined
and Gxtr'n:;ivaly reforraed to assure timeliness, equity, and
openness.
5. A revived sense cf the vitality of American political insti-
tutions and processes came as the result of widespread parti-
cipation in the campaigns and a commitment to see reform
carried to logical conclusions.
ix
6. A convoraence between the practitioners of politics and the stu-
dent o of political science bej^an lending to a greater apprecia-
tion of ones contribution to the other.
7 V The etiirncme abyss \<novm as the "Generation Cap" began to close
as political activities led to shared experiences and attitudes.
p.. Double standards for the sake of national security chat led to
official secrecy, a lack of accountability end a presumption of
official perogatives were challenged. Widespread institutional
and societal reforra has resulted.
Kevlewing the foregoing and recalling other events of thau time, has the
effect of pushing time back. It may be presumptuous to raark such widespread
change back to the McCarthy Kew Hampshire primary of 1968 » but whether it is or
not Gomething happened at that time that did serve, as ABC television felt, to
be "A Crack in Time.'"
The ar.Gumptloa that the event itself was significant, not only a point of
departure for. charge, but as au important political happening is the principal
justlf:! cation for this study. The contribution of this work is intended ior the
student of pclitiCT. and to urge an appreciation for the campaign in the e.lectoral
process. Ihe historical significance of the event should be seen as enriching
the value of the study for those who might choose to examine the genesis of an
era of significant societal change.
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Eugene J. McCarthy entered the New Hampshire presidential primary in 1968
as an obscure U.''. Senator supported by a cadre of unknown individuals. He
ran against an incumbent President of his own party wlio was sufficiently
assured of renominatijn and popular iiupport that he did not become an active
candidate.
March 12 j 1968, Senator McCarthy captured i^l perceiit of the Deniocratic
Forty vote against ^^S percent for the incumbent President. Senator McCarthy
also attracted enoiigh voters to elect twenty of the twenty-four covivention
delegate seats aJ.loted to New Hampshire. This case study documents how this
electoral succef-s was accomplished.
The author was one of the principal organisers of the campaign. He
brings to the case study an extensive background in New Hampshire politics
preceeding the McCarthy candidacy. This perspecti-ve coupled with his sL.udies
an et political scientist offers a unique view of a benchii'.ark political event.
The conceptua] background for tlic study is an assessment of the view of
political science toward both presidential nominating process and political
campaigning. The author finds that 1968 serves as a watershed between an era
xl
when politic! scientists viewed with distaiu presidential primaries In favor
of the brokoraj^e function of nominating conventions and saw political cam-
paigns as coatributins little ..ore than entertainment to the electoral process.
The studj reveals how the McCarthy organizers responded to events and
opportunities in their quest to attract a candidate and then to produce votes
for thot candidate. The scone shifts from that of a small New England state
to the national and international stage as both the campaign and events inter-
act to produce an electoral result. Issues, candidates, organization, strategy,
and campaigns are pursued in a way that reveals interactions that are lost to
both the strict empiricist and the journalistic observer.
The headline events of the campaign are not simply recorded but are
placed in a context that shows the nature of the contribution of each to the
resu.lt. The candidate McCarthy, the iscues of v^ar, credibility gap of the
Johnson administtation, generation gap of the late 196C's, conditions of eco-
nomic oncer Uainty, end the misconceptions of New Haiiipshire politics are
recorded and analyzed a-s each functioned within the campaign.
The nature of the coalition of individuals that first, became the McCarthy
organization, and second became the McCarthy vote, is carefully assessed. The
strategy that guided the organization of the campaign is pursued to deraonstrate
how a campaign was organized and how closely thiC result matched the intentions
of the strategiGtc-;. How the strategy v.'as implemented, vzhat techniques w'ere
used to reach voters, what messages were developed to con)municate the issues
nnd personality of tlie campaign, and how the print and electronic media re-
R^ponued to these efforts are documented to substantiate the strategy.
xil
To test the validity of the. campaign as an inCIuenclng factor on the
voter's decision, an empirical test of effectiveness was used. A puzzling
observation was made. McCarthy attracted more votes aiuong Democrats residing
in predominantly Republican voting diistricts than be. did in predomiaantly
Democratic voting districts. A careful analysis of this observation found
that while the strategy called for an emphasis upon primarily Democratic voting
districts, the socio-economic status of the voters in Republican districts per-
mitted then to absorb the non- transferable information costs more easily and to
make the vote decisions without direct campaign contact. The analysis went
further to measure the effectiveness of quantif ifible campaign techniques as
contributors to a vote decision.
The impact of McCarthy's candidacy in New Hampshire was both immediate and
of continuing duration. President Johnson withdrew from contention. De-
escalation ox the Vietnam War began. Social conflict began to subside. Of
continuing impact have been major changes in the presidential nominating pro-
cess, wider participation of individuals in public caciGiou-malcing , an openness
in public affairs, and finally, an appreciation for the contribution that cam-
paigning makes to th?. electoral process.
1968 marked profound political, social, iuotitutional
,
cultural, and even
economic change in the United States. McCarthy's New Hampshire surprise may
be. said to have tcixlied off a decade of change thf- consequences of which may
not be fully understood for a generation. The purpofje, of this study is to
document and analyze that p<. riod prior to March 12, 1968 in a way that permits
others to examine both the campaign and the consequences that have become its
descendents.
xlll
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CHATTER I
THE CONTEXT FOR A CASE STUDY
P r e 3 iden t ia 1 Caud :i.d a te Selection
Determining how the head of the executive branch of the federal government
vjaB to be chopen produced one of the more farous coinpromlses of the Constitutional
Convoation. The Convention delejiateG deb3.U:d betv^een methods which Included
direct election by the people, election by the .-tatc governors, election by
Congress, nnd election by an electoral ccliege. Election by Congress was
favored in two votes b> the Convention. Argmaentc that such a selection method
would 1,1-kc the president subservient to Congress and thus weaken the office were
eventuall:/ pursuasive. Toward the end of the Convention a famous compronilse was
concluded. The president would be elected by an electoral college with member-
ship apportioned in accord v/ith representation in the Congress.-- The key acpect
of the cotiproraise v^as to be that selection of the actual electors was to be
placed in the hands of the states to determine.
2
Fortunately, the fledgling Constitution and the government that it con-
tained were not faced with an jinmediate test of the presidential selection com-
promise. George Washington v/as selected by the Electoral Collegia as the first
President. As his second term was ending the test of the succession system began.
The first rteps in a continuing trend toward the democratization of presidential
selection began v/ith the action of the etates. Scon after the adoption of the.
Confitltuticn the states individually adopted the process of direct election of
presidential elector.^. What had been intended by the Constitutional framers to
be. a deliberative model for presidential selection was quickly changed to that
1
of a representative nodel. The republican form of gov.rn.e.. that the fra.ers
had created wich the Constitution began to change. Among the steps in this
mutation vas the i.odif ication in the process of presidential selection. Instead
cf a gathering of notables, representing various interests, much like the framers
themselves, there emerged a pattern of voter mandated Electoral College represen-
tatives. The trend toward
-democratizing presidential selection was underway.
A Constitutional Convention that feared royalty, that was uncertain about
direct democracy, and skeptical about political parties, found that in less than
eight years after the adoption of the Constitution, a measure of democracy had
been inserted to overcome the deliberative model of the Electoral College. By
1796 political parties had emerged representing differing philosophies concern-
ing the role of the federal government. Both of these trends seem to have miti-
gated against the rival of the most feared of all tyrannies that of royalty.
With the end of Washington's second and final presidential term in 1796
the backers of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson had split to form their
own parties: from that time until 1824 the candidates for the presidency were
deteiTDined by caucuses of the respective party members in the Congress. The
caucus was the next step in the democratization process. Another institution,
the political party, not desired by the framers came into being and used the
congressional caucus as the means to validate a party role in the presidential
selection process.
To reach beyond the clique of congressional power » Andrew Jackson's sup-
porters advised assembling a national convention to demonetrate Jackson's grass
roots popularity. This first convention was the model for all subsequent conven-
tions. Delegates vere elected from the various states to convene for the pur-
pose of noMinatiug a caudiuaco for the presidency. Delegates were apportioned
among the states in accord with their representation in the Electoral College
and chosen according to the state party's ov^ti system.
The values of deliberation, bargaining, and direct democracy
were reflected in the structure of the nominating process in
a proportion wnich ren.alnad approximately static, at leastIn form, until the end of the nineteenth century.
3
The convention provided a means to facilitate communication between inte-
rests and sections of the nation that would not be rivaled until the invention of
the telegraph, the mass circulation newspaper, and the telephone. Delegates
gathered in convention, could bargain for the protection of their regions and
their economic interests. For more than seventy years conventions of delegates
selected by state party caucuses or conventions determined the respective party
candidates. With increased mobility, made possible by the railroad, and coramuni-
caticn, made possible by electronics, a new challenge for democracy occurred.
Candidates could travel and meet not just delegates but voters. The interests
could organize on behalf of their o\m needs. The convention, once seen as a
major step toward democratization of presidential selection itsell faced wide
criticism as being a step child of the trusts, monopolies and giant national
interests. From the Populist struggle of the late nineteenth century arose a
demand for direct participation in the presidential nominating process.^
A nev; wave began to grow. Joint pressure from late 19th century Populists
and Progressives led to another modification in the nominating process. Without
constltuticiial mandate the parties had formed and a process for the selection
4of vroi^idcnrn luid been created, Nov time procees would be n>odified to allow
:nore exteasive popular participation. Unlike the earlier reform, the nominating
convention was not scrapped. In the states vhn.re the Progressives and the Popu-
lists gained political strength delegate selection became the target. Depending
tapon the political strength of the Progressives and their ability to wrest power
from the old guard, delegate selection primaries were enacted during the period
1900-1910.-'^ la some states delegates were selected directly by primary open
only to members of the respective political parties (i.e., New Hampshire).
Others set no party membership requirements for participation in primaries
(i.e.» Wisconsin). Others permitted some delegates to be selected by primary
while others were selected by convention or appointment by elected office hol-
ders and party leaders (i.e.. New York). The high water mark of the early
twentieth century democratization effort was reached when nineteen states
adopted primaries prior to the 1912 contest for the presidency.^
The penalty for not having allowed the primary reform to extend further was
quickly brought to the attention of the Republican Party leadership by the end of
that political year. V.laen former President Theodore Roosevelt challenged the in-
cumbent President, William Howard Taft, for the nomination, he amassed broad
popular support but was unable to gather sufficient convention delegate votes
to displace Taft as the nominee. Roosevelt rejected the convention decision and
rau as a third party candidate. The split among Republicans made it possible
for VJoodrov Wilson to gather sufficient electoral votes to become president at
the eoise time the country was casting a majority of its votes for his opponents.
Con«.cntlng on the vonsequences of the 1912 election, Louise Overacker wrote,
"If the primary had been in more General ur.e in 1912, Roosevelt probably would
have been the ncirdnee of the Republican Party and the schiBin of 1912 would
have been avoided."^
Almost as an anti-climax three more states enacted primary legislation
prior to the 1916 presidential elections. With the debacle within the Republican
Party in 1912 and its failure to defeat Wilson in 1916, the First World War, and
post-war desire for "normalcy", the wave of progressive reform receeded. The
primary would not be eliminated from the nominating process, but since it had
failed to dominate presidential candidate selection at its peak, it was gradually
circumvented by modifying legislation. Ignored by candidates, disregarded as a
result, and always produced far less than a majority of the convention votes
needed to nominate a presidential candidate. Although more than one half the
states did, on occasion, elect convention delegates by direct ballot or solicit
a presidential preference ballot, the much heralded democratization of the Pro-
gressives languished for more than fifty years. In the interim, sectional poli-
tics and resurgent party organizations managed to keep presidential nominating
politics sufficiently close to the will of the populace to prevent a renewal cf
the earlier call for reform.
During the period between 19A5 and 1968, the remaining presidential preference
primary laws were gradually wit tied away. Incumbent Presidents avoided the pri-
maries retaining contact with the public via modern media and with the party
leadership through the perquisites of off5.ce. President Truman ones called
presidential prinaries "so much eyewash" and refused to participate in them.
The presidential prinuirles that did survive caused minor embarrassments during
the post war period. The New HajDpshire presidorxtial primary of .1952 is credited
with launching the presidential candidacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and ending the
aspirations of Robert Taft. The Democratic primary in the same state and that
same year saw Senator Estes Kefauver challenge President Truman who had not then
announced his intention of not seeking a second full term. 8 Few other primaries
were contested as the respective candidates maneuvered like soldiers through a
minefield, to avoid triggering disaster at the hands of a capricious public
while at the same time attempting to demonstrate vote getting strength.
In 1S60, only sixteen states and the District of Columbia retained some
fom of presidential primary. John Kennedy entered six of these and campaigned
aggressively in three: New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. When the
political year of 1968 began states with primaries had dwindled to fourteen
excluding the District of Columbia. Not since John Kennedy's success in select-
ing decisive primary contests had the primaries led to a convention decision and
then only when accompanied by broad state-level party leaders' support.^
Students of presidential nominating politics tended to down grade the im-
portance of presidential primaries as being of little importance to the ultimate
conveuticn decisions. As rebuttal to the Progressive^ arguments in favor of
direct participation in presidential candidate selection, scholars tended to
favor the brokering function of conventions composed of party leaders, elected
officeholders, sectiouai delegations, and some directly elected delegates.
Thsfcie studciits saw the co-aveution as a vital institution capable of incorpori^t-
ing diverse views within one decisicn making setting and producir^g not cimply a
ncm.e for f.hc- presidency, but also a unified party capable of electing that
candidate. AgainsL thl. view were those few who recalled the failurcn of the
conventious to reach a unifying consensus. 10 The selections of the Republican
Conventions of 1912, 1936, and 1964. and the Democratic Conventions of 1920
and, eventually, 1968, were scattered points in the primary proponents' favor.
In her study of the presidential primary, Louise Ovcracker wrote in 1926:
It should be noticed that the primary has served the usefulpurpose of forcing canoidates to use more open methods and
of abandonins subterranean methods in the primary states.
In conclusion, we may say that although the presidential
primary- has seldom controlled the decisicn of the conven-
tion it has often affected the course of national politics
.... The effectiveness of the presidential primary as an
Instrument of control over the convention is licited by the
fact that it is not in operation in all cf the states, or a
considerable majority of them.^^
With that work, the decline of the institutional reformist sentiments of the
early tv7entieth century, and the restoration of party leadership in the Populist-
Progressive states the primary was left as evidence of the good intentions of a
historic but misguided reform effort. The proponents of the convention, as a
gathering of party leaders unemcumbered by the direct participation of the elec-
torate in their deliberations, created their own straw man to counter advocates
of v/ider use of the presidential primary option. This straw man was the national
presidential candidrte uoi^inating prijuiry. If direct participation in the selec-
tion of a presidential nominee was what the reformers sought, then a national
preference primary should be the logical objective cf those favoring widespread
public participation in the selection of presidential candidates.
Public support:, ior a i^ational primary has remained high giving credence to
the arguments put forth by those arguing the virtues of convention decision
making as opposed to a national prlitiary.i3 The debate between proponents of
the intra-party brokerage function of the national convention and concept of a
national primary, left the surviving system of state primaries without either
proponents or students. The hodge-podge of preference primaries, delegate selec-
tion primaries, open or closed primaries continued without proponents nor careful
analysis.
While it is not the purpose of this section to provide a comprehensive re-
view of the presidential primary institution, it is important to establish the
condition of that Institution as the political year of 1968 began. Little seri-
ous attention had been given to the process of nominating presidential candidates
since Louise Overacker and Charles Merriam's work in the 1920's.l^ Jaraes W. Davis
analyzed the presidential prij-aries in hifj 1967 vork but neither the earlier
studies nor the later ones, prepared prior to 1968, comprehensively evaluated
the consequences of a nominating system that contained a separate selection system
for each of the fifty states. It was not until after 1968 that the disarray of
the nominating system was discovered. -^^
As Louise Overacker observed after the devastation of the Republican Part>
in 1912, the same might be said of the Democratic Party in 1968. As with 1912,
the speculation as to a different result will continue. The importance of the
presidential primary had been neglected by students and uiiderestimated by even
8uch astute politicians as Lyndon B. Johnson. Louise Overacker 's question con-
cerning 1912 had even more meaning following 1968 than it did in the earlier
-9-
context. If the reforms that have occurred in the presidential cnndldate selec-
tion process since 1968, had been in place in 1968, would Eugene McCarthy have
been the Democratic Party' e naminee? What can be said is that without the re-
forms that came, after 1968 George McGovern and Jl^y Carter would not have been
the nominees of the Democratic Party.
The New Hampshire Primary
The New Hampshire presidential preference primary has retained significance
by being the first such event to be held in a given political season. The
choices offered to the voters take two forms. The first is the presidential
preference section of the ballot. The voters may select or write-in the candi-
date of their choice. This so called "beauty contest" has no connection with
the delegate selection portion of the ballot. Names of state residents are
listed in the delegate selection portion of the ballet and run for delegate or
alternative delegate slots as apportioned to the state by the respective Demo-
cratic or Republican National Committees. A delegate or alternative delegate
candidate's name is listed viith place of residence and candidate allegiance.
TABLE 1.01: PROLIFEPJ^TIGM OF PEESIDENTIAL PRUIARIES 1968-1976^^
COVERAGE 1963 1972 1976
Number of states using e primary for selecting
or binding national convention delegates 15 23 29*
Number of votes cast by deJ.egates chosen or
bound by primeries 983 1,862 2,183
Percent of all votes cast by delegates
chosen or bound by primaries 37.5 60.5 72.6
*Does not include Vermont which held a non-binding presidential preference
poll but chose all delegates by caucuses and conventions.
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T);reo. opLio.s are available .o the candidates. The person may run as an Indepen-
dent:, run as favorable to a candidate, or, vith the permission cf the candidate,
run as pledged to the candidate. Participation in the primary election was
liiulted to those vho had either declared a party preference upon registerins to
vote, had voted in a previous party primary, or those independents who had not
either declared a party preference or had not voted in an earlier primary. 17
The New Hampshire prer^ideutial primary is an cx.ample of just one system. In
1968 it had no duplies ue..
Primaries and Pre-Conventlo^n_j^o 1 i tic
s
V.O. Key, Jr., reflected the pre-1968 attitude toward presidential ncminat-
ing politics when he wrote:
The process of nomination of a presidential candidate begins
lo-ag before the convention in campaigns to sell a potential
cav:didate to the party to obtain the selection of delegations
instructed tc support him at the convention. These precon-
ventlon maneuvers fit no set pattern and cannot be easily
described in general terms. -^^
No predictable route was identified for a candidate nor was an entry point to
the contest, such as a presidential primary, listed as the beginning. If sell-
ing the candidate to che convention would be adied by showing a vote attractlr^,
capability presuiuably a candidate should enter a primary. If the candidate's
vote getting power were sufficiently demonstrated, i.e., winning an elective
office, then convincing party leaders as to one's presidential stature would be
more important than wasting time in a primary contest. In fact, Key noted that
preconvention manuevers could be best understood "...if they were observed with
an awareness that the task cf the convention is to unite the party in support
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of a presidential candidate . "1^ The emohaqlK nn rp^»^r^^.111^ pn sib o letainins t>r creating a unified
party are clear in Key's view.
The character of the preconvention caiBpaign to round up
support for aspirants for the nomination thus becomes afunction of the tensions and cleavages within the party.
Durable bases for conflict exist within each party. 20
The prJmnry was net viewed by Key as vxi.Vlng a significant contribution to the
evaluation of a candidate or to the objective of securing a nomination. The pri-
mary as a part of the nominating process, had receeded to such a low level of
regard that even as perceptive an obsei-ver of American politics as V.O. Key Jr.,
did not identify it as important to the success of a potential presidential
nominee
.
Louise Overacker characterized presidential primary campaigns as having
three stages: the preparation or stimulation period; the active campaign for
presidential preferences and the support of delegates, and the post-primary
activities. 21 While not unlike the activities for any campaign she connected
these pre-convention efforts to the option of the primary. V.O. Key, Jr.,
writing decades later, noted five pre-convention aspects that tended to structure
his analysis of the nominating process. First, he looked upon tha pre-convention
campaign as a rehearsal for the presidential campaign itself. A candidate needed
to show his skill at maintaining the dominant coalition within the party in order
to accomplish the same when facing the general electorate. 22
Secondly, the possible presidential candidate faced a tactical problem that
being when to announce a candidacy. A valid consideration for the candidate was
also whether or not to promote a draft, that is to be solicited as a candidate
rather than seek the office directly. Should this strategy be used prior to the
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convention or should the candidate wait until all other candidates had faded and
the convention would draft.23 while a draft luight be an attractive alteriaative.
without Key's third activity, that of enlisting the support of state and local
political leaders, such a result would be merely a fantasy. Any candidate,
avowed or subrosa. to succeed in a convention would need at least the recognition
if not the active support of the political power structure of the party. 24 This
obligatory tactic could be accomplished with a direct appeal or via Key's fourth
pre-convention ritual, appealing to the wider public. 25 Appeals to wider publics.
Key noted, presented certain hazards. Candidates are advised to make policy
speeches on current issues at "widely separated points in the country to let
themselves be seen and heard and to gain national attention." But to make
speeches could not only gain supporters but also make enemies. Key reminds.
One speech may be enough to demonstrate that a man cannot
capture popular favor, and his boom is deflated early in
its career.
While risking one's presidential aspirations on the political stump is a
serious step, but obligatory in Key's mind, entering presidential primaries of-
fer similar uncertainty without the obligation.
A question of strategy that vexes managers of v7ould-be
nominees is whether to enter the presidential primaries
that are held by about half the states from Jiarch to May
to select convention delegates. An early victory in a
pivotal state may win the delegation and impress the
party in other states with the aspirant's vote-pulling
power. On the other hand, a defeat may bring the boom
to a premature and. Yet a refusal to enter the primary
may bo interpreted as a manifestation of lack of confi-
j 27dence.'^'
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While not: ^eJ co'.npel''od to t-i^tT .m-' c -m -i -i j
^ ^ J ic /^i--£...,',.n;Ui-.l V'vin^rri.i« was cenululy a valid
option, cnc.rm, ,.i.^rie. vas ccncUt,lou.. l,y the .hen con.c.po.ary view as to
how presidential rri.arie. functioned. Key rejected that view when he .^ote:
Since the primary choice is to a large extent sovcrned bytae wishes of 'J.e state organi::atior., it; would oe rash toenter a primary unless the candidate hay vhe
-„pper^
the organization or of an important faction, or ^cll tl^the could defeat the state machine.
He Height veil have added to his concluding phrase "...or whether defeating the
state machine would be in the interests of his ceudidac.y Concedins sone i.o.por-
tance to presidential primaries Key noted that pri..ariee probably make some men
presidential hopefuls who would not have been considered as such in earlier dsys.29
To conclude, as late as 1968 Key's account of the route to the presidency
was the prevailing reality. Presidential nominations were a perquisite of the
political parties. State party organizations, national party leadership, and
party elected office holders were managers and keepers of the pr-sidentia], 5elec-
tion process. Party cci:-ventions and the selection of party nominees were vehicles
by which sectional conflicts could be ameliorated in order to maintain electoral
coalitions. Since no great politically divergent issues were evident during the
post war period to disrupt the alignmencs or to challenge the processes of coali-
tion building or maintenance, no serious pressure for change in the nominating
process was seen. Even the sectional conflicts over ci\il rights legislation
that threatened the Democratic Convention of ]948 or the conservative take over
of the 1964 Pvcpublican Convention were not reflected back as evidence of a need
for nominating process reform. Not until the McCarthy challenge in New Hampshire
and the subsequent lessons of the 1968 Democratic National Convention was the
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selection method for presidential candidates given the complete exa.l.atlon that
led to the delegate selection reforms of the 1970's. With Jl^y Carter's nomina-
tion via the nevly established priiaary route in 1976. it see.s fair to conclude
that first, primaries are once again in the ascendency as a part, if not the
major part, of the presidential non^inating process, and secondly, no candidate
for the presidency will be able to avoid entering .t least sone of the primaries
in the future. Understanding the background of this political system change is
at least a part of the reason for the case study of the 1968 McCarthy candidacy
In New Hampshire. The democratization of presidential selection that bc^in in
1796 reached a new plateau in the 1970' s. While the possibility of a national
primary remains as part of the democratization debate the proliferation of pri-
maries seens to have, in part, lessened its vibrance. In its place has emerged
a scheme of staggered regional primaries leading to the convention validation. 30
The debates will continue but unquestionably a major reform has been accomplished.
A Context for Presidential Nominating Campaigns
In 1S68 instead of a candidate seeking a constituency, an issue with an
implied constituency went looking for a candidate. Along with the search for a
candidate went a search for a contest, a place appropriate for the contest, and
people to organize a campaign. Along the way much was learned about the American
political system. The microcosm of the New Hampshire primary provides a glimpse
of how this change was begun.
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James W. Davie vnrlr.lng in the middle 19608 uoted that politics were becom-
ing nationalized. 31 that process he saw two pbenomena emerging. The first
which was in distinct contrast to the views of his academic colleagues, concerned
the role of the presidential primary. The second, while less clearly stated by
Davie, is manifest in the first.
Political scientists and newspaper commentators have been long
preoccupied with the mechanism of the presidential primary —
the types of laws, the scattered election dates, the advisory
mandate of many primaries, and the limited number of states
holding such elections. They have mistaken the form for the
substance of the primary system. It is no longer important
whether there is a mandate binding the delegates to vote for
the winner of the primary. The vital point is that a presiden-
tial candidate challenge and defeat rival contenders in the
primaries to demonstrate to uncomiaitted convention delegates
and the American public that he, the candidate, is a powerful
vote getter. 32
The thesis which Davis espoused contrasted sharply with that offered by
Nelson Polsby, Aaron Wildavsky, Paul David, and other proponents of the broker-
ing function of the nominating convention. Davis identified the importance of
the campaign in the context of a direct and meaningful appeal to voters, voters
that could participate in a presidential primary. In contrast David, Goldman
and B<' in wrote:
A nominating campaign is a connected series cf operations; it
Involves a great deal of talk, but it is made up of much more
than talk. Like a military campaign, it involves movement,
supply, attack, defense, and all requisite maneuvers. The
candidates and their managers are continuously involved in
decisjons and expressive acts. The voters, on their part,
are given an exposure to persons and events as well as to the
words the candidates say, 33
"Exposure" is the key concept in the David, Goldman, Bain thesis. Opportu-
nities to "display personality" and to "discuss issues" were the central elements
of the nominating route outlined by Davis. 3A \Jhile Davis would contend that ex-
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ponuro in the context of a meaningful political event, such as a presidential
primary, would have greater meaning, David, Goldman, ai.d Bain would write:
"...changing patterns of nominatins campaigns are increasingly under discussion.
Much of the discussion focuses on the presidential priiaaries, with proposals to
curtail their influence as well as to extend it* "35
As a reference fcr their position that the presidential primaries did not
contribute meaningfully to the ultimate nominating decision, the authors quoted
a prevalent view.
In the course of a television interview on June 1, 19.58,
Adlai Stevenson commented that the presidential priiuary
"is almost a useless institution." He went on to note
the difficulties iTTiposed on governors and other busy
executives when required to campaign in the primaries.
He cosrmenf.ed on the small turnout in most primaries, and
on the confusion and lack of uniformity in the rules.
Stevenson concluded, "Finally it is terribly expensive;
it's exhausting physically; you burn up yourself, you
burn up your ammunition, you burn up your means. I
think that it's a very, very questionable method of
selecting presidential candidates and actually it never
does. All it does is destroy some candidates . 36
Stevenson's comments and what David contended were "Sober afterthoughts"^?
following the 1952 and 1956 priinaries, led to the repeal of primary laws in
Itlnnesota and Montana, Those preparing candidacies for the 1960 presidential
contests discussed a v;ay to avoid the hazards of the primaries.
...The presidential aspirants, by mutual agreement, vi'ould
cut up the primary states among themselves according to
geographical or iaeological divisions. . .only one candidate
would enter in each state. The alternative would be to
Ftay out of primary states and let them elect favorite
sons.
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While the. 19C0 aMdates seemed to fear contested primaries, what appears
most interesting io ^ commitinent to seek popular support for a candidacy while
at the same time, shying avay from primaries as a means of organi..ing that support.
Presidential caudidates needed to be tested prior to nomination but a valid test
was not seen as being a primary. With the exception of James Davis's contention
that primaries did serve an important function, others favored what appears to
be a combination of party responsibility for nominations and an assumption of
voter interest, i,e., national commitment, outside the confines of an electoral
context.
The Intensification of campaigning for popular support that
has already occurred may rest on underlying changes in sen-
timents and conditions that are too powerful to resist. At
any rate, public criticism of the primaries is noteworthy
for the lack of any tendency to question the desirability
of campaigning for popular support. It seems to be taken
for granted that some appeal to the people is required to
assure the legitimacy of the nominations, and that popular
mandates, to the extent that they exist, must be given
weight in the nominating choice as a condition for popular
favor in the election campaign to follov7.39
Somewhere in the extensive analysis of the nominating process conducted by
David, Goldman, and Bain the connection between campaigning for public support
and campaigning in a presidential primary was lost. Louise Overacker's chide
concerning the 1912 election did not register in the analyses of the 1950s and
1960s. Perhaps there lust were not enough primaries to offer the range of con-
tests that vould make the presidential primary a meaningful contribution to the
nominating procest;. If they could be avoided without political cost to a preai-
dential candidate then they could not be considered as being meaningful to the
ultimate decision. To many observers the presidentiel primaries were simply
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capricious minefields, veil .a.kcd, to be entered only
.ith kuowled^e of the
ri.ks and to be avoided if at all possible. When a candidate entered the prWy
minefield, as did John F. Kennedy in 1960, he did so with great precision.
Kennedy entered New Hampshire to show he could attract votes and to test his
organization. Wisconsin was entered as a test of his midwestern - large indus-
trial state appeal and his ability to campaign against his Minnesota opponent-
Hubert Humphrey. West Virginia was entered to test voters' reaction to the
barrier of his Catholism. After those three popular appeals, Kennedy went to
the brokers. Lyndon Johnson avoided the primaries as did Stevenson in the same
year. Both hoped their national reputations would secure support from the un-
committed, non-primary state delegations. Their tactic failed.
miat emerged from 1960, to spite of the contentions of those opposing the
use of the presidential primary, was the route to the presidency that James
Davis would later describe. Before leaving this subject it is important to
note another aspect of the view of politics prevalent at that time. Political
scientists were taken by the idea that the American political party should be
intrinsically integrated as a vehicle for national policy positions and as a
means by which adherence to those positions could be assured. Those party
organizations and those officials, elected under a party label would be expected
to support the party position, carry out the party program, and stand before the
public with a commonly ennunciated party program. Sectional differences would
fade, a national political jyarty structure would emerge, end a clear distinction
between national party philosophies vculd bf; evident. The choi es would be
clear between candidates representing the parties. Elections would produce
party iriiindated policy charges.
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Reflective of this discussion io the desire of .any political scientists to make
candidate nominations a function of the party. Instead of permitting a candidate
to appeal directly to the voters via a candidate selection primary, a would-be
candidate would have to demonstrate his or her allegiance to the party, its
headers, and platform before being permitted to carry the party label into an
election. Summarizing the view relative to presidential primaries Paul David
wrote:
The issues of the primaries and of their relationships to
the party organizations are far from generally resolved,
but once strong tendencies to curtail party responsibility
for candidates selection seems to be undergoing reversal. 41
The common element that emerges from the preceeding discussion is the inj-
portance of some popular appeal by a presidential candidate. While many reject
the presidential primary as a way to direct that appeal, James Davis sought to
establish some rules that would shape a candidate's attitude toward the primary
route to the presiciency. His rules V7eie:
1. A combination of several presidential victories against
strong opponents, blended with solid organizational sup-
port in a number of populous convention states, will
usually give a candidate such an imposing lead that he
can't be overtaken.*^
^
2. Winning uncontested or contested presidential primaires
v/ithout some corcmitted delegate support in states elect-
ing delegates by party convention is a futile exercise
and will not open the door to the nomination. ''3
3. Once defeated presidential candidates campaigning for a
second chance must let voters in several primary states
pass judgement on their candidacy before asking the
convention to nominate them again.
4. Opposing a first term president in the primaries is
fruitless, for the incumbent is never overtaken.
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5. The preslaential candidate must be. careful in choosing primarycontests to try to avoid serious defeats; but, at the sLetime he must appear to be a fearless candidate, prepared totackle ail comers in the primaries. ^6
Davis made a persuasive case for using the primary route to a nomination.
In hie view entering primaries was obligatory as a means of testing a potential
nominee, reviving a defeated nominee, and manifesting a candidate's popular appeal,
To hLr. the flaw in the analysis of those advocating party responsibility and con-
vention brokering, was the lack of a measurable, accepted, and structured public
appeal that could rival the recognition of a presidential primary contest. Shap-
ing such an appeal would be the challenge. As the democratization of the presi-
dential nominating process has continued there appears to be no substitute for
the process where citizens case votes.
P^olit ical Science and Camp aigns; An Une.a sy Marriage
The party responsibility debate that dominated political scientists' think-
ing during the 1950s and early 1960s not only reduced serious discussion about
the role of presidential primaries, but also diverted attention from examining
the rcle of campaigns in elections. The argument follows that if parties were
properly charged with the responsibility for candidate selection and adherence
to party platforms, then election campaigns become much less significant as
translators of the party message. The print and electronic media could carry
the r.ev7E of the party based upon the statements of its candidates, its leaders,
and the details of the party's stated positions.
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Whil. rhla sqenario was attractive to the, political rationalist t«o other
Images of the political process were beElm,lnB to develop. The fir.t «as the
one that would preoccupy political sclentlsta to the present, voting behavior.
The other was the evolution of the modern political campaign, which went ataost
un-noticcd by political science.
The earliest voting behavior studies employed sophisticated research methods
in a sociological context to profile voting behavior. ^7 ^hese studies were cri-
ticized because they failed to consider the psychological reality of the voter
and to place the elections in an appropriate political context. As the metho-
dology evolved with it came an under stand.ing of the relationship of present
Influences and past experiences on the way individuals perfom politically.
This became the main objective of voting behavior research. The conceptual
bridge that advanced voting behavior research was the definition of "party
identification. "^9 What wa^ discovered was that "party identification" is
"...a psychological identification, which can persist without legal recognition
or evidence of formal neabership and even without a consistent record of party
support. "50 Taken with socio-economic status as background descriptions of the
Individual voter and related to a present political need to make a choice, the
voting behavior researchers found that the individual could orient oneself to
make a voting decision.
What becomes important between a review; of voting behavior and the role of
carapaigns is that party identification helps sort political images for the voter.
The objects of elections are party linages, candidate characteristics, and percep-
C -I
tions of issues.-'-^ These are the "proximate" forces that may influence election
outcomes.-^
The survey research model, that attracted behavlorallsts' attention, was
seen as a way of explaining election outcomes by focusing on the dominant vote
determinant, party ideutitication. With such a powerful variable operating to
explain an election outcome, it became less necessary to discover and analyze
other contributing variables of a voting decision.
The literature that developed around the party identification vote determi-
nant, concerrzed itself with elections where party labels were evident. Conse-
quently, in elections where prxrty labels were absent, i.e., ncn-partisan elections
and primaries, other factors riight be of Importance in explaining election out-
comes. Because of the predictive power of party identification and a general
disregard for non-partisan elections, the importance of many campaign variables
(e.g., canvassing, direct mail, types of media, or direct candidate contact) vras
not assessed. In fact, it might be said that the preoccupation with party iden-
tification as a principal explanation of vote outcome has tended to mask the
importance of these other influences.
Subsequent research has begun to identify the importance of campaign vari-
ables as determinants of the vote decision. Among these, as mentioned above,
are the role of the candidate and the effectiveness of particular campaign tech-
niques. Neither of these general groups of variables are solely dependent upon
a party identification mechanism. This situation becomes especially evident when
party identification is removed from an electoral contest as it is in the non-
partisan or primary election. The literature that has evolved concerning such
elections has tended to identify alternative explanations for voting behavior.
Both bi-variate and
.ulti-variate analyses have been conducted to assess the
individual effectiveness as well as the relative effectiveness of campaign
techniques. This evolvxng experizuental research has begun to explore those
other than par.y identification factors that contribute to vote decisions.53
Voting behavior research of the 1970s has determined other characteristics
of the voter's field that relate significantly to election results. Both short
and long-term influences of party iaentification and irnP.ediate political events
have been assessed as well as rates of participation, characteristics of elec-
tions, and the institutional aspects of elections, to mention a few. While
considerable attention has been paid to the behavior of the voter in partisan
contests and some also to the vote in non-partisan elections, little attention
has been devoted to presidential primaries. This results partly from the low
esteem such events were held from 1945 to 1968 by political scientists and
partly from the relative insignificance of the contests. There were few states
with primaries, the pre~1968 and especially pre-1960 impact of the primaries on
presidential candidate selection was limited, and, further only a small number
of delegates were selected by the primary states. The result was that what at-
tention the presidential primaries did receive cair-.e as part of the journalistic
tradition. Even these accounts were encompassed in a comprehensive discussion
of the total presidential election campaign. The details of such contests were
lost or blurred as the limited discussion of a particular primary became almost
a footnote to the ultimate contest. ^'^
In addition, other trends were also becoming evident. While voting be-
havior research was making significant progress in helping to explain the
American voter, the advocates of party responsibility were losing ground.
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A. the .an^e tixuo thac party Identification was being revealed as an Important
determiner of voting behavior, loyalty to th3 institution of the political party
and to the stated philosophies of the party was declining.55 ^ less intensely
committed partisan was emerging which undercut those seeking to subsume political
images and objects within vertically integrated national parties and those seek-
ing to explain voting behavior or the basis of party identification. What
emerges is a more fluid portrait of the voting public .4:ich increases the like-
lihood of intra-party contests. As party loyalty declines, so does party unity
and those aspects of political attachment that mitigate against family fights
within the ruberlc of the political party. The primary election, whether presi-
dential or otherwise, is an institution that works as a safety valve for venting
such conflicts. As a result of a combination of factors and trends electioneer-
ing is no longer centered in the party organization but has now entered the era
of the candidate centered campaign. The party no longer plays the main role as
the organizing intermediary in the campaign; as the style of campaigning shifts
to mass media, advertising, and public relations. 56 xhe result is that candidates
create their own organizations to attract voters. The primary offers the candi-
date a route around or through the party. Modem mass media have reduced, if
not all but eliminated, the information translating function of the party, while
the socio-economic complexity of modern living cross-pressures the voter to an
extent that the party as a single source of vote instruction is no longer rele-
vant. 57
Vnu>t the conta.porary literature of cmapalgn management tells us is that
while .oxne political scientists vere exploring voting behavior and others urging
the reformation of the .Wican political party, at the same tlr.e, candidates
were organizing, outside of the party, direct appeals to the voters. To do this
those vith experience drawn from advertising, public relations, organization
managen^cnt, rnotivational research, as primarily applied disciplines, were being
drafted by the candidates to organize the political campaigns. 58 As a result
an experiential literature has been produced by those who aided candidates to
chart their pciitical destinies outside the institution of the party. 59
Campaign management evolved as an eclectic profession drawing broadly from
sociology, psychology, political science, and economics. The amalgum relies
most heavily upon the application of the social sciences as transmitted into
various professions such as public relations counseling, advertising, motiva-
tional research, marketing, and organizational raanagement. From campaign case
studies, and accounts of campaign tactics that worked or failed, has evolved a
guide to campaign organization that is reaching the point where tests for effec-
tiveness may be made. The marriage remains uneasy because the background for
conducting such research is still not well understood. Documentary evidence
of caii:paigns tends to be fragmented, concentrating more on the campaign head-
lines rather than upon the subtitles of the campaign's field. 60
Robert Agranoff writing in his important study of election campaign manage-
ment, summarized why he felt caiupaign processes and management have been neg-
lected as product research subjects for political scientists. He noted first
that It \jiis assumed that "party organizations, were the exclusive agents for
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election campaigns"' and that when voters were staunch party supporters, "the
greater e.pha.ls in electioneering was the mobilization of the faithful behind
the ticket" — something party organization did well. 61
His second point was that "campaigns are short-term operations." As result
ca:.paigns are not a "continuous or evolving process. "62 j,, ^^^^^
i8 that the significance of a campaign is not always known at the beginning nor
does a serious campaign lend itself to experimentation in a manner that would
allow analysis of the effectiveness. The applications and the research modes are
not easily maintained during the heat of a campaign contest. The manager must
manage at the expense of possible research opportunities if the campaign is to
be more than an empirical test. Nothing can be worse than for a candidate to
discover that the election was lost because of adherence to a research objective
rather than the objective of winning the election.
Agrnnoff's third point is that "campaign personnel (party workers, volun-
teers, managers, and candidates) change from campaign to campaign." This lends
"inexperience and discontinuity — few records are kept, procedures are rarely
codified, and techniques are passed on haphazardly . "^3 vJhen the election campaign
is over the workers have traditionally either gone on to be reapers of the rewards
of the victory or have returned to the pursuits they abandoned to join the cam-
paign. Only rarely have participants taken the time to reflect on their campaign
experiences in a way that would provide the researcher with useful insight as to
how campaigns are managed. Only recently, with the advent of the political cam-
paign managemeiit specialist, has there evolved a recorded technology of campaign
management.
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As Agranoff points out as his fourth observation.
-Campaigns are usually
characterUed by an aura of secrecy and self-interest because it is thought
advantageous to keep one's strategy and techniques within the organization, "64
The similarities between traditional campaign management and the practice of
witchcraft cannot be overlooked. As a cadre of campaign management professionals
has emerged, and now with the existence of an increasing number of campaign
management consulting firms, sharing trade secrets has become a part of estab-
lishing the professional character of the practice.
Agranoff
-s fifth observation holds that "until recently, a functional body
of scientific knowledge for the purpose of gaining insights and making useful
inferences for planning campaigns did not exist. "65 3^^^^^ p^^^^ ^^^^
Agranoff credit the change to the "development and application of technology in
the form of television, computers, and opinion polls..." to this advancement.
To him "...campaign management has more closely resembled a cottage industry
rather than a business availing itself of modern technology . "66 xo a consider-
able degree this consequence can be laid at the doorstep of political science
for having disregarded the role of campaigns in the political process.
Agranoff concludes:
The advent of campaign technology has produced a corps of
nev7 technologists concerned v/ith the art and science of
campaigning. These new campaign specialists are develop-
ing a new technical field of applied campaign management.
Thus, new political forces and advances in knowledge and
technology are contributing to an emerging tradition of
campaign, managemen t . ^
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^S::=12^L^ll^±oI_tho^olitical Campaign
In the 1950s one of the most perceptive observers of American political pro-
cesses, V.C. Key. Jr., wrote of elections:
Presidential elections constitute decisions of fundamental
significance in the American democratic process. The troop-ing of millions of voters to the polls s-.Tnbolizes self-rule
and legitimizes the authority of government. But beyond
such mystical functions of the electoral process, elections
are pivotal decisions which in turn control many lesser
determinations in the name of the people.
He went on to categorize types of elections:
Some elections.. .express clearly a lack of satisfaction with
the performance of the crowd that has been in charge Other
elections may be plausibly interpreted as a vote of confidence.
More commonly the electorate may bring in a mixed verdict;
come voters are happy with the course of affairs and others
are deeply dissatisfied. Even these confused elections may,
in their situational context, be meaningful decisions a'
series of elections may fix the contours that guide the
broad flow of public policy. Specific elections may give an
unmistakable mandate for a change of direction. Others may
approve a newly instituted order of affairs. Still others'
may record a majority of support for the status quo but the
mumblings of the minority may be a portent of a growth of
discontent. ^9
This categorization led Key to his important theory of critical elections.
Key's observations are important to the McCarthy in New Hampshire case study in
two V7ays. First, Key reveals with his theory the prospect of important societal
change-producing political events. Secondly, he opens to question the then
asstimed relationship between voting behavior and politics. This opening may
be seen as the door through which contemporary attention to campaign management
has walked. The "mystical" nature of what leads to these events remains as an
underlying theme of Key's writing. The study of campaigns is beginning to shed
some light on this discussion of the political process as well. As Key wrote:
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A concept of critical elections has been developed to cover atype ol election in which there occurs a sharp and duroble
electoral realignment between parties, although the techniques
as employed ao not yield any information of consequence abouttne mechanisms for the majntenance of a new alignment, onceit has formed.''-'
While the theory may be useful as a general means of organizing types of elections
Key conceded that "the actual election rarely presents in pure form a case fitting
completely any particular concept." He then observed that "In truth, a consider-
able proportion of the study of electoral behavior has only tenuous relation to
politics. "71 At this point it might have been possible, to show a connection be-
tween electoral behavior and politics. It may be that this link is the political
campaign as students of campaign management now contend. Key stood back from his
observation puzzled, "...what characteristics of the electorate or what condi-
tions permit sharp and decisive changes in power structure from time to time?"72
There are three types of voters in Key's view, the "standpatters, the switchers,
and new voters." The vray these voters respond tends to deteraine election out-
comes. 73 How these voters were influenced to participate in elections escaped
his analysis. Part of the problem was Key's view, and that of others, concerning
the role of the political campaign. The studies conducted to profile Key's three
voter types relied upon pre-election and post-election surveys. In fact, much of
the analysis depended upon pre-election surveys V7hich reflected voting intentions
rather than the actual vote.''^ An attempt to determine the function or impact of
the campaign did not enter the analysis. In part. Key reflected this view when
he wroce, "An American presidential campaign is one of the most awesome spectacles
known to raan; the fate of a nation may hinge on the outcome of what seems to be a
donnybrook among demagogues and Madison Avenue types. "^5
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Observing further Key did concede a role for the political cau.palgn, but
offered little that would assist In analyzing the functions of campaigns.
Campaigns are likened to the appeals of opposing counsel to
a jury. They are said to be a means of educating and inform-ing the people about candidates and issues. They are classed
along witn soap-selling operations as systematic manipula-
tions of the mass mind. They are treated as a ceremony hy
which a party obtains popular consent to govern. They are
cynically dismissed as a ritual through which politician,
tools of the interests, profess a love for the people andhumbug them. A presidential campaign may contain all of
these elements, but whatever its precise nature, it moves the
electorate to a determination of who shall govern. ''^
While Key and others could not overlook a major artifact of American politic
they tended to treat the electoral campaign more as an artifact than as a substan
tive element of the electoral process. When discussing campaigns, Key reflected
the prevailing attitude cf the time which ranged from a view of campaigns as pure
hucksterism to a more respectful view of campaigns as having a mystical quality
that somehow contributes to electoral decisions. What he did contribute was a
categorization of campaign methods that revealed aspects of the electoral role of
campaigns.
A presidential campaign may be thought to be the work of a
tightly knit organization §pread over the entire Country
and directed by cunning men wise in the ways of managing
the multitude. In truth, the campaign organization is a
jerry-built and makeshift structure manned largely by
temporary and volunteer workers who labor long hours
amidst confusion and uncertainty.^''
With this statement, Key introduced both a note of humanity and realism to the
campaign. Reduced from the august and yet raised from th'e depths of deroogogery
it was now possible to sort out the contents of a campaign.
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A prime necessity In the management of a presldenti -,1 .
level ot tlie party organization to permit the execution of !coherent and considered campaign strategy. 78 °^
^
Two basic ingredients of campaigns emerge, "management- and "strategy." Charles
Merrlam had discussed both much earlier but in a different context. To him
"...campaign management does not rest with organization, speeches, literature
and canvasses..." but "it undertakes the tasks of influencing groups of inte-
rests of various types by various means. "79
m part, this contention is supported by Merriam's view of the manager as
one who seeks to Influence groups. The "campaign Merrla:. saw was not one that
reached directly to the voters but one that In the name of party and candidate
sought to "...reach the nests and groups of voters through their leaders great
and small, and by means both direct and devious, as occasion may require. "^0
To Merrlam the campaign manager was not the contemporary strategist and tacti-
cian of a campaign, but rather a person with "superior acquaintance with men
and Interests, quick and accurate evaluation of them, untiring energy, diplomacy,
shrewd judgment, prompt decision, coolness and balance amid wild confuslon. . ."^1
While there is a certain universality concerning the qualities of the manager,
Merriam's Image of a manager as one who bends groups and Interests to a politi-
cal cause shapes his view of a campaign. One may conclude that "organization,
speeches, literature, and canvasses" for him are the hucksterism of American
politics.
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EaU. campaicn consistB of two parts. One is directed uponan appeal to ti.e co..:non interest, or the theory that thereare no ciassoc, no races, no religious, no sections, uospecial interests, but that the common interest of all willbe the criterion by which each voter will decide his party
allegiance. The other section of the caaipai^n is based
upon the opposite theory that the whole electorate is made
up cf a long series of special interests which must be
shown their special advantage in the support of the parti-
cular party a7;d its candidates in order to obtain their
support . °^
The mechanisms of a political campaign x.ere, in Merriam's view, "organiza-
tion, propaganda, and finance." The organir.ation was of the "regular nationalis-
tic groups, and specialized groups (lavo'ers, doctors, etc.)." The propaganda
mechanisms were the press, demonstrations, or meetings, radio, canvassing, and
the "conference," the latter being his charactj:ri2ation of campaign management.
Finance, as a campaign function he allocated as strictly a party activity. But
as has been noted above, his true image of a cantpaign was one of direct pursua-
eion of blocks of voters by reaching their leaders.
Key began to break down Merriam's campaign elements reflective of the post-
World War II shift from party dominated politics to candidate organized campaigns.
To Merriam's list of campaign activities Key observed a considerable change. The
campaign leadership now was seen as being responsible for "planning the broad
lines of campaign strategy." Strategy that included speech writing, wide ranging
propaganda activities, a changing role for media as television emerged as signi-
ficant, major iiitra-party communication and mobilization efforts as stimulated
by the candidate and finally, the involvement of non-party organizations. 84
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For a nation emerging fro. the victory of World War II it was not surprising
tc find the rhetoric of political management resembling that of a military cam-
paign. "Com^uentators on politics have borrowed frora the military the concept of
strategy/' Key wrote. "A presidential campaign, as a military campaign, may be
conducted in accord with a broad strategy or plan of action." The plan Key al-
luded to was to "fix the principal propaganda theme to be emphasized in the cau.-
paign," to define the chief targets within the electorate," to "schedule peak
output of effort," and to "set other broad features of the campaign." The cam-
paign strategy, Key commented, would serve as a "...framework to guide propa-
gandists, speech writers, funding, scheduling, and activities of organization. "85
The ultimate comparison to politics as military strategy came with a book en-
titled Politics_Batae_Pl^ "The inexact science of reaching the voter and
prevailing upon him to choose "the right marf or make 'the right decision' is the
social science of political campaigning . "87 This statement rather than the no-
tion of politics as war demonstrated the changing concepts of campaigns. Beyond
the use of an effective campaign strategy the authors identified "the desire of
the winning side - the side that most fiercely wants to win; sometimes the side
that has been 'out' the longest; the side that is roost driven, most determined,
most dedicated. David beat Goliath, and Alexander conquered the world of his
time "88
From Key's observations the campaign strategy began to take on significance
that would be important as political scientists and political campaigners began
to converge. If the impact of campaign efforts were to be evaluated then the
specific activities would have to be not only identified but placed in a context
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capable of vaUc, measurement. At one U.,e U „a. „eld that the "active ca.pai,„
be.l,. When the candidate or his friends put hi. forward as an avowed contender
for the nomination." As the next step "an organisation of so.e Uind is essential
....someone
.ust arrange for filing the candidate's na„e. for pre-pri.ary meet-
ings or speeches, and for the distrlhution of literature." And. finally, ".here
must be some central headcuartcrs to which inquiries may be addressed, if nothi,^
more. "89
Lans
Key noted that often the outlines of a campaign strategy are "scarcely
visible amidst the ncl.e and confusion of the campaign." The strategic pi.
Key saw were sketchy. "The preparation of a reasoned and comprehensive strategy
requires more of a disposition to think through the campaign in its broad out-
lines than often exists around a national headquarters. -90 Key's focus remained
on the political party as the presidential campaign's strategic planner rather
than on the candidate or candidate organization. But his observation about the
plan itself was perceptive. "Once the plan is made, its execution requires an
organization sufficiently articulated to respond to general direction in accord
With the plan..." Of more importance he noted, "And even when a campaign is
blueprinted in advance, a flexibility must be built into it to take advantage
of the breaks and to meet unexpected m.oves by the opposition. "^1 The ability of
a carefully drawn campaign plan to anticipate events and to accommodate the un-
expected has become an Important principal of campaign management. Agranoff
noted, "campaigns must be planned, but sufficient leeway must also be allowed
for contingency tituations. Campaigns must not only consider what they will do,
but also what an opponent is likely to do."92
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A study of the 1964 campaign organization of Lyndon Johnson and Barry
Goldwater deunonstrated the contrast between the military-like model used by
Goldwater and the more flexible campaign plan that guided the Johnson candidacy.
Goldwater'
s
Image of a successful campaign was of national decisions being made
at the top of a pyramid, "with each decision-maker cognizant of their role, rank
and responsibility. "S3 In the model, defined as the "comprehensive ideal model,
each step of the campaign would be precisely planned and researched, and once
the plans were set, they were to be faithfully executed. The Implementation
would be similar to a coordinated blitzkrieg of air power, landing force, in-
fantry assault and decisive armor.
What the researchers found was that the rigidity of the model made it diffi
cult to reach operational campaign decisions, information needed to make strate-
gic decisions was excluded if it had not been included in the original plan,
and that decisions once made were hard to enforce. The conclusion was that a
campaign plan analogus to a military strategy locked the managers into pre-
arranged decioions they were unwilling to adjust. The level of detail and the
operating complexity of the plan left no room for resiliency . ^5 The Johnson
campaign, on the other hand, did offer operational flexibility within a struc-
ture of overall management. Objectives could be set but in such a way as to
perniit modifications that could take advantage of opportunities without jeopard-
izing the ultimate goal.
Key recognized that there were what he described as "Situational Limita-
tion on Strategy."
The characteristics of the situations within which presiden-
tial campaigns operate set limits on, or conditions, the
kinds of strategy that may be employed in the battle for
the voters' at f cctions.
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Wl.ne. as Key noted, "campaigns have thel. unlovely aspects, the .ores of
the democratic order .s well as the particular circumstances of individual cam-
paigns place bounds on the types of strategy that .ay be profitably pursued."
Like Merria.. he noted the importance of groups' targets - classes, races, and
religions but unlike Herria... he went further to reflect the evolving
.ode of
the then contenporary campaign. To group targets he added "geographical targets"
to be followed by a discussion of the concept of campaign timing and resources
allocation. 97 This final addition was the concept of the campaign theme. A
campaign strategy had created a "dominant theme or themes" for a campaign. The
theme would be used to capsulize the campaign meaning and objective. "It extends
to the creation of a tone or a spirit for the campaign, an auro that envelopes
the entire operation and gives a distinctive character to the undertaking in all
its details. "98 with the notion of timing and of theme. Key reflected the impact
that the public relations, advertising, media, and organizations management profe
sions were having upon politics. He noted that "public relations specialists"
had developed the Eisenhower campaign strategy of 1952.99 ^he documentation of
their effort, written by Stanley Kelley, Jr. and titled Professional Public
Relations and Political Power
, was an early effort to reflect the impact of this
new actor on the political campaign stage.
Kelley found that from advertising and corporate public relations management
had emerged several organizations that had become skilled in the organization of
political campaigns. The success of these cultures had led to a shift in the
emphasis of a firm from politics as a sideline to political campaigns as a major
component of a practice. The firm that led this transition was the California
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based fin,, of whlf„Uer an, Baxter. Fon,eci In the 1S30= a., . p„bUc relattons
consulting organization, by the 1950. they had evolved to the point „h«re thelc
reputation had been .ade in politics. Their success coincided with the
.edia
revolution of the 19.0s and 1950s that was especially evident on the West Coast.
For Khitaker and Baxter political campaigns were a business, not Just a sideline
of an advertising agency or the periodic activity of a volunteer but a business.
Their tenet was:
for'^L^^v TTr'' ""^"^^^
campaign, to get a dollar's valueeve.y dollar spent, just as we would if we were merchan-dising commodities instead of selling men and measures. Weuse campaign funds, not to dispense favors, but to MOULDPUBLIC SENTIMENT, to present our candidate, or our issuein the most favorable light possible.
'
As the public relations and the advertising specialists, and, more recently,
the campaign management specialist, came upon the scene the image of the tradi-
tional electoral functions of the party, the partisan workers, and the campaign
faded. As Kelley pointed out, "...the public relations man is in part, calling
attention to the rapid growth of population, the rising level of popular educa-
tion, the achievement of universal suffrage, changes that together have increased
the d-fficulty of settling political issues by understandings reached among mem-
bers of a limited ruling group." As importantly he observed that the "...deve-
lopment of the mass media of communication has brought a fundamental change in
politics. "102
The public relations professional began to introduce to political campaign
management a methodology that contained empirical research antecedents. At the
same time as Key wrote of campaign strategy, behavior ial research was converging,
outside political science, in the applied practice of the market researcher and
public relations specialist. Key observed:
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that are supposed to embody the wisdom of political expe-rience as guides to action. 103
-L-ixicai
Described by Key as the "Art and Artifice in Campaigning" he left the cam-
paign in a .ystical state. Rather than examining the various campaign techniques
to sort out those that were effective from those that are repeated because of the
dictates of tradition, he classified activities without documenting according to
Impact. The un>itaker and Baxter message that it was possible to allocate dollars
in a carapaign on the basis of predictable impacts was beginning to prevail as the
preferred method of the contemporary campaign manager. Campaign planning was
begirding to fox-m as a means of allocating scarce resources, (money, energy, and
people) to accomplish specific electoral objectives. Commenting on this change.
John 1^. Bailey, then Democratic National Chairman, said, "The key elements of
v^inning politics are sound planning, strong field organization, and communication,
that carry your campaign into the minds and hearts of the voters. Communications
means more than making noise. It means actually transferring your ideas and emo-
tions to the electorate. "104 What the modern campaign manager was seeking was a
guide to effectiveness so that if a campaign could not do everything it could at
least pick those tactics that offered the greatest potential impact.
Key's approach war to chronicle the collection of time-honored tactics and
candidate dileniinas. ^-^^ Key did note the importance to campaigning of the commu-
nications revolution. The first use of political television, he noted, coincided
with the advent of the first modified New Hampshire presidential primary of 1952.
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He saw the dramatic advances cc^unlcatlone teC.ology aa profoundly altering
the character o£ the campaign and perhaps also changing as veil the "fundamental
basee of political power. "^^^
As for the. impact of campaigns. Key observed, "the hard knowledge about the
interaction between campaigner and voter is thin, yet enough operative inquiry
has been done to help put the role of campaigning in perspective." He condi-
tioned this observation by noting that the efforts of campaigners are "limited
by the loyalties of the party faithful." He held that as much as three-fourths
of the voters remained loyal to the same party's candidate from one presidential
election to the next. 108 ^hile the number of voters converted during one elec-
tion campaign may be small. Key realized that this swing vote could be suffi-
cient to change an electoral result.
The state of carapaign impact research had reached the point where it was
possible to identify three campaign effects. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet's
1944 study, The Peoples Choice had found that campaigns produce re-enforcement
activation and conversion results. Re-enforcement was found to strengthen the
loyalty of partisans and motivate them to participate. Activation alludes to
the effect of the campaign upon those who are indifferent at the beginning of a
campaign but are eventually induced to vote. And finally, conversion is the ef-
fect of the campaign upon voters who were inclined to do something other than
participate as the campaign suggests, l^'-* Each successful campaign must observe
the three effects in both its strategy and the tactics that are used to imple-
ment the strategy. Instead of recognizing the contribution to the understanding
of campaign methodologies, Key expressed a fear as to the consequences for
AO
^^eru..n po.U..cs .e^l.,., ^.e„ of c^un.caUo.s ca„p.,,„
techniques; Key felt t. identify wUh 'fair precision" the effects of ca.-
palonlne could lead to "a complacent vie. of the state of the practice of demo-
cracy." The result, he suggested.
.i,ht be that the "capacity of the people to
govern themselves and of popular Institutions to shape questions for popular
decision
.ill... be subjected to far .ore severe tests than they have been in
the past." Dependence on the niedla was thought by Key to be the root of
this concern as the voter was asked to react to problems beyond one's Mediate
experience.
The controllers of the media, as well as political campaigrerscome to be equipped with both instrmnents and propaganda terh-'niques more suited to manipulation of the mass from central
'
points of power. These and other tendencies will doubtless
make the maintenance of civic intelligence of profound con-tinuing significance. ll'J
This fear has not been realized partly because no one was able to corner
the market. "Central points of power" have emerged, to some extent, as Key found
but countervailing forces have tended to retain a balance within the political
process. As experience has increased, instead of leading to greater simplifi-
cation, and manipulation, the result has been some considerable dispersion of
decision-making, greater participation, an appreciation for the complexity of
the electoral process, lessened prospects for manipulation, and an increased
appreciation for the public ability, even willingness to evaluate and respond
to information beyond one's ovni experience. This result came in no small part
from the events of 1968 led by the McCarthy candidacy in New Hampshire. That
venture helped shape the marriage between political eclence and campaign manage-
meiiL. Each showed the failures and the contributions of the one to the other.
41
on Uu. one
...e U.e p.ospects for a par., ao.ina.eci political process can.
-
a. en. a.
... U. no.lon o. electorate as .eln. Irrevocably
.eter.lned
by past evidence o. political behavior. On the other side the relevance of the
ca.pai,n, its ability to process information anc, to focus decisions in a way
that would elicit voter response began to e.erge. The view of the campaign as
hucksteris. with little to contribute to national decision-.aMng began to de-
cline. The empirical studies of the political scientist and the applied expe-
riences of the campaign manager began to converge. A new group of political
process students and practitioners also shared an appreciation for the validity
of each others view and ability to contribute. The result has been an increas-
ing sophistication about campaigns and their relationship to the electoral pro-
cess. This sophistication has not led to increased capability to manipulate
a sheep-like public but rather an unusual sensitivity to the capacity of the
public to respond to issues, candidates, arguments, and complex choices. Mo-
dern campaign management contains, as Agranoff writes, botli art and science.
^
It is difficult to plot the precise causes of the change that has occurred
in both the attitude toward and the structure of the modern political campaign.
For reasons other than a fascination with politics, many skeptics were prompted
to become involved in political campaigns in 1968. Those individuals, many
social scientists, shed their distain for partisan politics in order to express
their concern about the directive of national policy. The war in Vietnam, the
urban civil disorders, a perceived social and institutional disintegration
forced many to face a difficult choice, find a way to express concern or stay
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out an. sua-er the consequences. Per
.,any who had never entertained the thought
of being involved In politics participating in a 1968 campaign „a.s the lesser „£
several evils. Because participation was so widespread and deeply telt in 1968.
the impact upon social disciplines was also widespread. For political science,
the deter^iniso of the behavioralists seeoed less absolute and predictable. A
populace could be motivated by political events, even by a political campaign,
to violate long held tenets of political behavior.UZ The New Hampshire presi-
dential primary success of Senator Eugene McCarthy sparked many changes; among
them was a change in the perception of the political campaign and its place
within the electoral process.
The Contemporary Campaign; SomP Introductory Comments
..
Fascination among academics with John F. Kennedy's tradition defying cam-
paign for the presidency in 1960 led to a recognition that a technology of cam-
paign management was evolving. The brief campaign organization manual prepared
by Kennedy worker and former publicist Lawrence O'Brien began the shift from art
to science. The manual was a how to organize statement but it contained impor-
tant ,-.u!iimation3 drawn from voting behavior studies welded with experience and a
sense of the political art.
Overcoming formidable odds to win in 1960, the John F. Kennedy organizers
and especially their tactics gained an immediate popularity among the campaign
practitioners. The next to contribute to an emerging body of campaign manage-
ment literature was Stephen C. Shadegg, an Arizona Republican leader and organizer
of Barry Goldwater's senatorial campaigns. His book. How to Win an Election;
The Art of Political Victory . -^--^-^ was much less a how to organize manual than was
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eve-
0'B.l.„.s, shados« cchined a sopUlacicated understanding o£ pu.Uc relations
atrategie. with a perceptive view „f political processes and behavior. The
result.
.Hc^.t.o_W,^a^ctlcn. not only explains wh.t to do m a ca..palgn.
out when and why the advised tactics should he employed. Shadegg challenged
his reader to be acre than a practitioner of a cookbook of political recipes
but to reach to the art. If not yet the technology, of campaign „anage.ent. He
asks his reader to develop an understanding of the political process represented
by the campaign. Fro. that understanding Shadegg challenged the reader to d
lop a conceptual and intellectual understanding of the campaign dynamic. In
his 5-ntrocluction he wrote:
...I can document the following conclusions:
Only a very few successful candidates have any real under-
standa.ng of why they were victorious.
The segment of the population which is least interested inpolitxcs decides the outcome of most elections.
The party organization can help a candidate tremendously
but, it cannot elect him.
Party labels are misleading and party registration is
never the key to a candidate's strength.
Millions of dollars are wasted in every political contest.
Elections are mote often lost than won — by that I mean
the error or mistakes committed by the loser have a more
profound effect upon the outcome than does the positive
performance of the winner.
There is no surer way to lose an election than to think
you have it in the bag.
Virtue in politics is not its own reward. And while the
big issues count, more often than not the little things
make the difference between defeat and victory. ^^'^
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As an introduction to the McCar^hxr ^^^^ j-ne. rthy campaign of 1968 in New Hampshire it
would be possible to stop riRht hero i i .P xg e and begin the case study. Shadegg's eight
obse^ations are decunented by the events of tha. campaign. To leave the
Shadegg discussion at this point would noc serve to illustrate the change in
campaign n.nage.ent fro. art to technology or fro. generalist to specialist.
When he wrote 3hadegg noted that "all sorts of people get asked to manage
political campaigns'' but ^^^^ 'Vv.^>-^ ^H 8 . Chat theie aie axmost no professionals In the field."
He observed that with the 'exceon-m, ^^f n,„ption of the national conmittees of the parties,
there Is no full-time e^ploy^ent opportunity." With "AS.OOO people running for
office every two years" and the "wise candidate has a manager." there are "no
schools for candidates or for campaign managers." There are "thousands of
excellent text books on political science, but there is very little written
about campaign management . "l^^
To begin to fill this considerable void, Shadegg wrote and others have
begun haltingly to follow. With a nod toward the discipline of political
science, Shadegg offered to analyse campaign management, campaign techniques,
and procedures. What he promised were "opinions and conditions" not "theory."
His basis was not "abstract discussions," but techniques "documented and sup-
ported by... use in actual political contests ranging from Massachusetts to
Arizona. "11^' A brief review of the importance of the "undecided" voter as
playing the pivotal role in elections introduced Shadegg's concepts and ex-
amples of effective campaign activity. shadegg produced the first list and
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cant-
er
thorough Ci.cu3sion of th. i.p„„a„.. of U.e campaign manager. i„age of the
dldate. campaign expectations, tiding, knowing the opposition, targeti,^ vot
populations, organising the campaign, using public opinion surveys to develop
ca.>pai8„ strategy, and .odern co^unication technology. He concluded with the
practical advice don't "...let the. steal" the election fron, you.U8
With each subject he developed approaches that had been successfully used.
Illustrated each with appropriate examples, and indicated what was of generic
'
value to subsequent campaigns. The work was concise, experiential and offered
a new discussion to the earlier how- to-do-it and anecdotal accounts of campaigns
Shadegg offered a rationale that demonstrated his own synthesis of the other cur
rent work on voting behavior, motivational research, marketing, conmunicatlons
.
and political institutions. While the work fell short of establishing the tech-
nology of campaign management, it did provide a contextual background for the
next steps.
Following Shadegg and stimulated by the events of 1968, has evolved an
increasingly sophisticated literature on campaign management led by Robert
Agranoff's book The Management of Election Campaigns, published in 1976. As
if in response to Shadegg 's complaints there are now campaign management con-
sultants who have sufficient business to occupy themselves with campaign assign-
ments on a full-time basis. A national campaign consultants organization has
been established which holds conferences, and runs seminars in campaign manage-
ment techniques, financing, and communications as well as serving an increasing
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body^of recosni.,..d practUioners of campaign „a„a,c..„t an. candidate counsel-
ing, candidate, ate now teachins £ot the professional political consultant
in increasing nu..bers when not too Ion, ago. as Shadegg noted, the function was
being filled as a seasonal sideline of so.e public relation or advertising £ir„s,
CHART 1.02
Number of Campaigns in Which Professional Services WereProvided 1960-1970. (143 finns renorced actlvUies
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The public relations counsel was the generalists, the immediate prede-
cessor of the specialist, the campaign management counselor. The contemporary
campaign, Marjorio Randon Hershey found, "...is not composed of generalists but
of specialists." She observed that the "candidate and the manager play recip-
rocal roles. The activities of each depends upcn the activities of the other. "^^'-
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In addition to the manager there are other specialists in campaigns, the fund
raisers, the publicists, l:hc organisers, the schedulers, ana others who have
coznc to fill rather definite niches in almost all serious campaign efforts.
As Kershey noted, "no matter how broad their interest in politics may be.
persons who become actively involved in cam.pai8ns tend to specialize. They
specialize because it is an efficient method of handling election tasks and
because they are more interested in some aspects of campaigning than others. "122
As a transition to what has become known as a technology of campaign
management, it is important to note that the context for the technology has
Important social characteristics. Hershey notes. "...We see both traditional-
ism and the spread of innovations in campaigning. Both can be explained by
looking at campaigns as a learning process." She suggests that, "the diffu-
sion of new campaign methods is part of the process by which new and underdog
campaigners seek successful models of campaigns on which to pattern their own
efforts." She concludes, "...behaviors that work will be retained, and be-
haviors that fail V7ill probably be dropped..." Learning is a form of adapta-
tion, she notes, in which both campaigners and campaigns adapt. "It adapts
not only to its environment but to ihe experience, attitudes and personality
traits of the candidates and managers. "123 ^^^^ ^^le campaign, its partici-
pants and its constituency are part of a social field that must be understood
as the context for analysis. What subsequent work begins to tell us is that the
learning process can be accelerated and some of the mistakes and waste avoided
by testing the efficiency and the effectiveness of the techniques of the cam-
paign.
A8
As the latest work on campaigns and with the stated objective of "...bring
in, together political trends, knowledge, and experience...- Robert
..granoff be
summarizes the state of campaign management.
Vr'^ll^'l T ^™^-^^P^rt,s in other fields of management,it contains both art and science. It is predicated on th^following assumptions:
1. That one must understand campaigns and attendant poli-tical processes before one can manage them;
2. That management of campaigns involves a blend of thebest information obtainable and the wisest judgmen^
about that information;
3. That campaign strategies and campaign tactics are
situational — one must understand the situation and
supply relevant knowledge;
4. At present, campaigns are among America's most poorly
managed enterprises; and,
5. They can be better managed with information and insight . "'-^^
The case study follows that is intended not only to chart the evolution of
a campaign but is intended to demonstrate the nature of both the art and the
science of campaign management. It responds to Agranoff's assessment that "A
campaign is a coordinated effort to achieve seme objective, such as electing
a candidate to office, connecting various operations that organize and use en-
vironmental, human, social, and material resources . "^^^ It is this connecting
function that has the potential for bringing the political scientist and the
campaign manager together. A dependency of one discipline upon another profes-
sion offers the chance to respond to Agranoff's five assumptions that will lead
to a better understanding of the electoral process and to management of more
A 9
efficient c^pal^^ns. The observation that offers this opportunity is that,
•in election campaigns the campaigner tries to win by connecting operations that
deal with idio.orpWlc forces: basic premises about the nature of the constituency,
political resources, assets and liabilities, and advantages . "125
Methodolop.ical Notes
As primarily a case study, the account of the 1968 McCarthy Canvpaign in New
Hazupshire has two r^ethodological antecedents. Both are drawn from the research
approach described as participant observation. The approach evolved from the
anthropological field studies of the past several generations where researchers
joined communities to record their social and cultural characteristics. With
the evolution of the discipline of sociology, the participant obserx^er methodo-
logy of anthropology, primarily a descriptive methodology, was used as a basis
for a scientific analysis of social and cultural phenomenon. Precise rules for
the conduct of field research and data collection evolved which offered the
observer the chance to quantify, compare, and to evaluate the social and cultural
phenomena that were experienced through participation within social communities.
through several generations of researchers and field studies it is now
possible to state three principal axioms with corollaries of participant obser-
vation methodology.
Axiom 1: The participant observer shares in the life activities
and sentiments of people in face-to-face relationships. 127
The axiom places the obser\-er not in the traditional scientific role of a
neutral observer but expects the obser^rer to share in the live activities of the
social community being observed. V.Tiat distinguishes the researcher as a partici-
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pan. observer is an expected scienUfic role of "conscious and systematic shar-
lr.g..."l^^« The participant shares in the "lifo activities" of a group of person
with the research objective of observing, quantifying, and analyzing the conunu-
nity. Not simply participating for the sake of participating, nor observing in
a detached manner, but accounting for the characteristics of the social group
by systematically recording, even quantifying the social behavior shared and
observed. From this axiom comes a corollary.
The role of the participai;i!t-observer requires both detachment
and personal involvement . "^"^^
The researcher joins a social community for the purpose of study which re-
quires a certain detachment but to be totally detached would rot produce the
opportunities for evaluation that come with personal involvement. In most cases
involvement means more than joining a community, but actually finding and assum-
ing a proper role ~ one which offers the maximum opportunity for participation
that will produce thorough and accurate observations.
Axion 2: The participant observer is a normal part of the cul-
ture and the life of the people under observation. 130
The researcher must find a role, a site within the community, that is not
"forced" or "artificial" to the "ways of the people unde.- study." The objective
is to study the nonaal processes of the life and culture of the community and
not to distort that culture by introducing the research objective in a manner
that would be disruptive. To some, proponents of participant observer research,
this implies some concealing of the observer's research objective in order to
keep that objective pure, while to others stating the research objective becomes
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par. «.e Uo„e..„
.He confidence
.uUdln« pro.es. of c.ea.in^
.ho research
eonfe... Po. eaC,
.esea.cHe. „UM.„ a s.ud. sf.uaf.on
.He ,„es.fo„ of „He.he.
to announce
.he observer aspec. of
.he ac.ivi.y and .he In.ended research is
funda.en.al. Each par.iclpan.-oBserver
.us. ans.er
.he ,ues.io„ for oneself
and .hen rela.e accordingly to the comunl.y being studied."!
The corollary of the second axiom s.ates:
The scientific role of the par.lcipant observer Is interdepen-dent with his social role In the culture of the ob.4rvea"5f
The participant observer Is a social scientist who distinguishes oneself as an
observer of social co»uni.ies conducing that observation through the use of
scientific
.ethodologles and analyses. The participant observer Is obligated
to design a s.udy.
.ta.e hypo.heses. and evolve an evalua.ive context .ha. responds
to the situa.lon being obser-.ed as veil as .o .he require-nents of sound scientific
methodology. Unlike .he scientist working fro. a laboratory, the participant ob-
server rccogni.es
.hat the dual role is an interdependent role which produces re-
search strength that might otherwise not be available If one were detached from
the other.
Ine final axiom validates the methodology as a contributor to a further under-
standing of society.
Axion 3: The role of the partitipant observer reflects the
social process of living in society. 133
The rer.earch objective of the participant observer extends beyond understanding
the social and cultural characterisitcs of a particular community. It is from
these understandings that it becomes possible to broaden the understanding of
social processes for all communities. To distinguish between the artist using
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a local sctti,^ for the basis of a social account and the work of the social
scientist is that the "latter seeks certainty outside oneself by following rules
and procedures for verifying one's findings." While the process for interpret-
ing the "collective s>^bols is an intuitive process (as much as rational)" it
is a "process that can be scientifically verified . "l^A
It is from these axioms and corollaries that the scientific method of the
participant observer descends. To summarize, Severyn T. Bruyn wrote:
Since the observer plays a natural, interdependent role inthe culture he studies, sharing in the life and becominginvolved in the activities of the people he observes, new
methooological problems are necessarily set up to be solved
which have not been previously encountered. Unlike the
traditional empiricist, the participant observer must view
a culture just as the people he is studying view it, includ-ing reflecting on the social process in which he is inwardly
engaged. Tn-'s means he sees goals and interests of peoplem the same way that the people see them, not as functions
or experimental causes as would the traditional empiricist;
it means that he sees people in the concrete reality in
which rhey present themselves in daily experiences, not as
abstractions as would the traditional empiricist; it means
he senses that these people act freely within the scope of
what they see as the possible, not as determined agents of
social forces as the traditional empiricist would see them.^^^
What the methodology of the participant observer presumes is that the re-
searcher enters a social situation for the purpose of study. Participation is
incidental to that research purpose and is extended to facilitate the research
objectives rather than to contribute inordinately to the condition of the social
community. Given this as a precept, it then becomes possible to organize for
research, within the setting, an empirical evaluation that responds to the prin-
cipals of such research. Hypotheses are drawn, data is collected and analyzed,
hypotheses tested, theories drawn, and results verified. The principals sought
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arc those which a.uess sc„e universal character £ron, the cooMuaity rese.rch.d
Which When tested in other settings „ay be found to be valid as descriptors o£
social condition.
cam-
event
The problem with this strict methodology when applied to the McCarthy
paign case is that participation dominated obser^-ation until after the
was completed. The author did not enter the campaign with a research motive, but,
rather, with a political objective. He did not plot a research direction, nor
organize a sequence of observations, nor assume a role for the sake of observa-
tion. His objective was to organize and manage a political campaign designed
to have a political result. Only after the fact did he consider the contribution
that a thorough accounting of that campaign might offer.
While the methodological requirements of a participant observation study
are less stride than those of classic empirical research, even these requirements
exceed the evaluative possibilities of the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign.
This, however, does not mean that the author must reject the methodology of the
participant observer but it does mean he must place his study in either its own
context or in a context that has been recognized previously.
To help with this task Bruyn has described a series of sociologically impor-
tant studies that do not fit his methodological structure as "the stylistic study."
To define this term Bruyn writes:
Although the scientific process predicts what appears to be
an unknov/n future, it does so within closed systems; and,
although it purports to study change in the world, it does
so by abstracting laws or patterns of phenomena which are
historically repeatable and are based upon the relatively
pemanent character or structure of the world. This is
reality discovered through the scientific tradition.
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leallty in its studies. Therefore, another type of resea>-chhas earned a pl.ce of special value within the field 1 tlmstudy which does not follow the systematic traditions ofscience, but rather has a particular style of its own Itfunctions to reveal new meanings in data as well as1^;w
meanlnsful posGibilities in theory.
Bruyn lists as styles found in past studies as being: romantic, realistic, poetic,
factual, analytic, satiric, i ournalistic
. and existential . ^37
^.^^^^
has described the final three; satiric, journalistic, and existential appear to re-
late most closely to the case study of the McCarthy campaign. Satiric studies have
tended to account conditions in "total institutions" and to use an informal style
to relate the conditions and circumstances of those housed in institutions, as
Bruyn notes.
^ ^^^^^.^^ ^^^^^^^ ^ political campaign might be analogous to
an institution and to account for the activities and behavior of those within cam-
paigns in the satirical fashion of certain participant obseirver studies, seems
reasonable.
Secondly, the journalistic style is especially well suited for accounting,
as a case study, a political campaign. Although Bruyn contends that "journalistic
reporting shows no Interest in the sublteties of satire... it is nevertheless the
same in its interest in commenting socially on affairs of everyday life."139
Reporting becomes an important aspect of the analysis of the McCarthy campaign.
Developing the stream of events, the inter-actions, and the consequences fits
well into the journalist's demand that facts are the gist of the news, the who,
vhat, v/hen, where, and sometimes the how of the reporter.
Thirdly, Bruyn notes that "authors of research studies have recently begun
to report their ovti existential orientation, that is, their own personal interests
and relationsb.-ips with their subjects."^'^^ This latter perspective is important
In the account of the McCarthy campaign since the author does feel his own
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sltuauon and circuastanc. led to hi. participation In that political venture
If his situation had been different, so .i,ht either hl.s involvement and even
the outcome. He also suggest, that the existertial situation for himself and the
decision procesH which he experienced
.ay well have described the situation of
many others who became Involved in the McCarthy candidacy, vmile the study does
not presto to draw existential generalizations fro. the particular role of the
author, it does suggest that such generalizations
.ight be drawn if the existen-
tial question v/ere pursued.
lo summarize his definition of the stylistic study of social phenomena Bruyn
VTrites:
The stylist ideally finds his home more in the cultura] world
of man than in the structural world. He assumes that thephenomena he studies have quality and are rich in meaning.He assumes that what he studies contains innumerable possi-bilities for interpretation, of which his is only one. He
assumes that man's nature is of infinite variety' and that
man is to be explored in this light. 1^1
While this may be a satisfactory description of a less constrained researcher
within the sociological interpretation of participant obsex-vation, it does not
account for a political science perspective. To provide a context for a politi-
cal study of the McCarthy campaign sort and to suggest a methodological antece-
dent that does recognize the range v/hich Bruyn reports, is difficult. The
closest that one can come is to the first study of a presidential cam.paign
written by Theodore White in 1960. ^'^2
White observed as a journalist and political analyst. He participated as
an associate of the principals, especially as a friend and counsel to John F.
Kennedy. He brought to his v7ork a refreshing Insight uiilch came from his
familiarity with the institutions and processes he was observing. While prin-
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percep-
cipally a Journalistic effort, the case study th.t he produced contained
tions of the political processes that functioned during the political year o.
I960, these insights provided a useful basis for subsequent studies of elections
and electoral processes. It is this .odel that seeas to fit the case study
objective of the 1968 New Hampshire McCarthy campaign. It is a .odel that recog-
nizes the perspective of participant observer as stylist, the author's own
existential perception, while reaching further than UnUte reaches, co test, em-
Plrcally. questions that are not answered in tne recounting of the observations
and events. The case study of the McCarthy campaign must of necessity, be ec-
lectic in its methodology. Its purpose is to describe in detail as a journalist
might, but also to describe as a participant observer would do with greater
precision than the journalist. Its purpose is also to explain events and to
examine outcomes. Finally, the study will conclude by empirically testing
hypotheses in order to explain observations that otherwise would escape explana-
tion or be misunderstood in their implications.
To demonstrate through Bruyn's words how this methodology applies, the fol-
lowing quotation, as revised by the insertion of a few words (in parenthesis),
concludes
:
The larger truth will appear in the judicious combination of
those partial perspectives which, on the one hand, can pre-
dict the behavior of man (political behavior), on the other
hand, can enlighten his (the political) world of choice by
disclosing its variety, thus increasing his (society's)
freedom of (political) action. Man is truly a paradox
steeped in irony (as are man's political processes). He
is predictable and he is unpredictable (as are man's poli-
tics). He is individual and he is communal (as are man's
politics). He is, indeed, richly endowed (as are man's
politics). 143
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THE POLITICAL BACK(;r,,UND FOR n,,w IIAHPSHIRE 1968
A political event, like the McCarthy pre-convention campaign in New
Hampshire, has many, perhaps even thousands of beginnings, as many in fact,
as the individuals who become involved in the campaign. The beginning for
.>any occurred with the returns of the New Hampshire Presidential Primary
on the evening of March 12, 1968. For those who were involved in making
that evening possible, the beginnings occurred long before March 12th.
^
Later it would be said that many were caught up in the events and were
moved by changing conditions to join the movement, but in the early stages
what was to become the McCarthy campaign, and even later the "New Politics"
m.ovement, was made up of persons who deliberately took a different direction
from that of their friends, neighbors, colleagues, and even families.
un-
At the time these personal decisions were made, the goals seemed
obtainable. No incumbent president had been denied a nomination in modern
2
times, and no essential policy embodied by an incumbent president had been
changed as a result of renomination challenges. The objective for those who
were concerned about the state of national affairs in 1967 — to get the
president to change Vietnam policy or to replace the incumbent as the nominee
of the Democratic Party ~ was not considered to be politically realistic.
The personal decision to oppose, politically the policy and/or the President
became a decision of personal vindication, almost an act of private absolution,
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ln.re., or i.„ui-...rt.,8l,., frustration »n.l. perhaps. Implied complicity with
contcnporary
.vents, people sought methods to ..bsolve themselves, to clea,,
their hands, r.ot merely by expressing their opposition to policies and actions
they did not like but by actually creating organizations through which they
might be absolved.
In the back of many minds was a lingering question reflecting a lingering
guilt: would our children in the future ask, "Where ^.ere you during 1967
and 1968 when the war in Vietnam was being escalated? l^eve did you stand on
that war? What did you do to affirm yourself as an .\merican capable of
speaking out and working to change such policies? How did you spend those
years? Were you the quiet generation of your youth (the i950's) or the progeny
of a new quiet generation? What did you do to grasp control of your destiny?"
Newjjampshire Political Demographics
Although New Hampshire is a small state with an estimated 1968
population of 700,000 persons, the distribution of that population and the
diversity of its information sources makes it politically unique. To
many political observers that very diversity is a microcosm that reflects
and represents the political dynamics of the United States.
By working within the political process of this peculiar state and
gaining experience with the variety of its political and voting populations,
the future McCarthy campaign leaders came to knov; the breadth and limitation
of each political -'^Ituatioa From the fire of the several campaign experiences
of the 1960's, a generation of New Hampshire Democratic Party activists
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booa.ne aware of the extent to which a political situation was elastic,
capable of manipulation, and when a situation would bo unresponsive, it
least in the context of a campaign. They learned that the rules, mostly
unwritten, for each electoral event were distinct, each campaign, for each
office, and each election (local, statewide, primary or general) produced
its ov.n particular political ethos. An ethos that had to be understood in
order for an electoral objective to be reached.
For presidential primary politics the state conveniently divides into
Democratic areas and Republican areas. Democrats tend to be concentrated
in the states 13 cities and larger urbanized to.^s, while the Republicans
are dispersed to the suburban towns and rural areas. The first Congressional
District is the more urbanized of the two and contains an almost equal share
of registered Democrats and Republicans. Its information sources tend to be
Intra-stace daily and weekly newspapers and radio stations. Television is
Boston-based as are several regional newspapers, principally the Boston
Globe. The population of the first district is relatively dense with major
growth centers occurring adjacent to the Massachusetts border. The area of
the district is approximately one third of the total state.
The western and northwestern cities and towns of the 2nd Congressional
District are dispersed over a much larger geographical area and tend to be
more isolated than those of the more dense 1st District. The economic ties
and incdia sources of the 2nd District are less linked to Boston and more
to their own regions. Vermont, New York State, Maine, and even Canada
provide the external media that supplements the coverage of the radio and the
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lUstrtcfs daily and weekly press. As an example, the newspaper with the
largest circulation in Berlin, the state's most northerly city, is the
Lewiston Sun, published in Lewiston, Maine.
The combination of geography, both physical and political, as well as
economic and social demographics produce from .he relatively small New Hampshire
population an unusual microcosm. It is both urban and rural, working class
and middle class, provincial and cosmopolitan. There are strong religious
and ethnic ties, deeply held political traditions and areas of great change.
VJhile the state contains only a small non-white population ethnic rivalries
of several generations in length have produced social responses not unlike
those experienced between racial groups. For reason of location, tax policies
(the only state without a sales or an income tax), preference and available
land, New Hampshire's growth and patterns of social change have tended to
keep pace with those of the nation. As the years have passed, instead of being
less representative as a microcosm it has tended to maintain its position.
For this reason and for the reason that it holds the first in the nation
presidential prim.ary, it has maintained its stature as an import.mt political
bellweather.
New Hampshire Politics: Pre 1968
New Hampshire's Presidential politics duplicates its state traditions.
Political credits have often been amassed through working for the right
candidate (the eventual winner) in the Presidential Primary and then cashing
these credits in for jobs or favors should the candidate actually win.
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TO
.naxl.„i.e
.:his strategy. New Hampshire created, on purpose or by accident,
its Presidential Primary which, by its very existence, gave New Hampshire
politicos the chance for direct contact with potential presidents. Through
this contact and appropriate political work a political tie could be established
The better debt payoffs are the federal rewards, such as postal jobs, judge-
ships, contracts, and access, those who wanted such jobs or rewards tend
to support the perceived winner - the frontrunner. Under such circumstances
Ideology is an inconvenience. The appropriate role is that of the broker or
facilitator. The local political operative puts oneself in the position
of delivering votes, rather than trying to influence policy.
For the majority of New Hampshire's urban Democratic party organizations,
delivering votes was accomplished by contacting and then appropriately
rewarding, promising to reward, or actually paying for the services of the
individuals who made it their business to produce "the vote." The model was
not unlike that of urban machine politics in other cities; only the scale
was different. As insignificant as 3,000 to 4,000 Manchester votes might
be when compared to the output of Tammany or a Daley machine, under the
magnifying lens of tl.e national media. New Hampshire's early returns have
always meant more than their actual numbers.
The New Hampshire Presidential Primary
The New Hampshire Presidential Primary is a product of Yankee frugality.
The early date is set to coincide with the first Tuesday in March, the same
day as the annual to'-^m mseting. Two elections on the same Jay saves con-
siderable time, HiOTioy, and results in a larger vote.
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partie.- representaUvs to the Hotio^X Conventions by popula,: vote rather
than State convention. 3y act of the 1948 New Hampshire Legislature, the
presidential preference section of the ballot was added, which has since
beco,„e kno™ as the "beauty contest" - a poll of the electorate's choice
of Presidential candidates.
The addition of the presidential preference section of the ballot
ended the localized popularity contest for convention delegates. Before
1948, delegate candidates popular in the State at the time of the election
usually represented their party at the National convention, regardless of
their personal preference for President. By adding the preferential section,
the in,portance of the Presidential candidate and his delegate candidates
transcended the local popularity of the state's politicans.
The presidential preference section of the ballot made the New Hampshire
primary a national attraction. A presidential candidate could benefit from
the publicity of New Hampshire's "first in the nation" primary and do so at
relatively little cost.
Several factors make New Hampshire a key State also. The first is the
early date of the Presidential Primary. The second is the relatively high
voter participation. The third, although a rural New England state by image,
New Hampshire, is, in fact, heavily Industrialized, second only to Connecticut
In the percent of its population holding industrial jobs. The fourth,
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candidates since WilUa™ McKinley. According to a stud, by Professor
Robert Dls>™an of the University of New Hampshire, ^ the barometer counties
reflect the thinking of the American public and do so on almost every index
that political science can devise. Therefore, It is possible to state and
show by voting patterns that New Hampshire's nine other counties do not
deviate greatly fro™ the nor. of Strafford County, the bellweather county.
The politics of the .ass .edla transforms the trickle of New Hampshire
votes into an avalanche of national significance. Dwlght D. Elsenhower and
Estes Kefauver did It first In 1952. Richard Nixon saved his political neck
in the 1956 New Hampshire primary, and Insured It in 1960 and 1968. John
F. Kennedy scored an initial triumph by gathering his unheard of 40,000 vote
total in the Democratic primary.
Others have seen their political hopes die in the voting booths of
this prin,ary. Robert Taft suffered a defeat at the hands of the Eisenhower
people in the 1952 primary. Although Harry Truman chose to ignore the New
Hampshire primary, the 1952 boost given to Kefauver may well have influenced
the President to make his final journey to Independence, Missouri. In 1956,
Harold Stassen made an attempt to dump Vice President Richard Nixon from the
ticket by urging the candidacy of Massachusetts Governor, Christian A. Herter,
A 73,000 write-in vote for Richard Nixon ended Herter 's chances and also the
politJcal career of Minnesota's "boy wonder," Harold Stassen.
In spue or the national implications of the early primary, it 1« still
.
New Hampshire phenomenon. The organization, strategy, issues and methods
need to fit the Mew Hampshire political mold. The results bear the mark of
the state's electorate, and when it comes to the Presidential Primaries that
electorate is at least as sophisticated as any other.
New Hampshire has a large and accountable weekly press. The small
circulation papers reflect the political activities of the people in the
local communities. Their greatest impact is on the way local affairs are
conducted and by conveying certain conmmity social norms and mores. Coverage
in a weekly paper, on a regular and favorable basis, can be ot great assistanc
to any political candidate.
Six of New Hampshire's seven daily newspapers are responsible, moderate-to
liberal Republican in tone. They are distributed geographically in seven
urban centers und
,
with the exception of one, maincain regional circulations.
In no case is there more than one daily newspaper in a given city. Both the
Associated Press (AP) and United P. ess International ('JPI) maintain wire
service offices in the state. One or both of the services is purchased by
all the daily papers and radio stations.
The exception mentioned above is the Manchester Union Leader. Owned
since the mid-1940' s by William Loeb, this paper has continually supported a
series of right-wing and conservative causes. The paper is consistently
partisan and will use all the tricks of "yellow journalism" to support its
75
positions. u l,as Jo.,, been a„«ho«a to sensible political discussion
and Journalistic responsibility. Skillfully propagandist ic
, the paper
has perfected the f.ont page editorial and adjusted its news stories as best
.serves Its Interests. President Kennedy said, while speaking in Manchester
during the
.960 campaign, that he though there ,„lght be a .ore irresponsible
newspaper in the nation than the Manchester Union Leader , but he had never
seen it.
The UnicM^ I^der has an uncertain impact on New Hampshire politics. It
claims a state-wide circulation in excess of 60,000 papers. At least half
of this circulation is in the state's largest city, Manchester. UT^ether
Mr. Loeb is an arbiter of Presidential candidates is questionable. Ke does
however, frequently determine the issues of a political contest.
The 1960 Kennedy Delep.ate Stratef^y
The 1960 Kennedy strategy for New Hampshire was to begin assembling a
New England block with as tight a delegate to candidate tie as possible. This
meant that a carefully selected slate of "pledged" to Kennedy delegate
candidates would have to be placed on the ballot and then elected. Those
seeking the spoiler or broker role contended that to be "pledged" was
antithetical to the concept of a self -nominated
,
freely elected, and voter-
selected delegation. A pledged delegation to the Los Angeles Convention would
have no room to maneuver and, therefore, could not effectively barter for the
Interests of New Hampshire. On the other hand, a delegation composed of
representatives elected as "favorable" to the nomination of John F. Kennedy
would have room to maneuver should the Kennedy candidacy weaken as the con-
vention approached.
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Tl.o 1960 Kennedy primary was not the autcnatic victory that It appeared
once th3 votes were counted. Although no serious opposition materialized
during the weeks prior to the March election, the problem of turning out a
significant vote, when almost no contest existed, was the first test. The
second test was to put life into the New England delegate bloc strategy by
electing the full slate of pledged to Kennedy delegates. On both counts the
Kennedy forces, led by Bernard Boutin and William Dunfey were successful.
An unprecedented 40,000 votes were cast for John F. Kennedy and the total
pledged slate of Kennedy delegates was elected. The Kennedy candidacy had
passed through the exceedingly hazardous waters of the New Hampshire Pre-
sidential Primary not only unharmed but battle-wise and confident as well.
Kennedy's New Hampshire leaders, Boutin, Dunfey and others who had helped
gain the victory played important roles in other pre-nomination contests.
They were eventually to hold numerous state and federal offices as testimony
for their services and ability.
During that same presidential primary the role of New Hampshire's
most powerful state-wide newspaper, The Manchester Union Leader , became
clear. The newspaper, a durable critic of John Kennedy and the Kennedy
family did all in its power to torpedo his presidential candidacy at the
New Hampshire stage.
Long an opponent of party endorsements and pledged delegations, the
Manchester Union Leader supported the disruptive-to-Kennedy activity of the
Democratic Party old guard. Their strategy was to slate "favorable" to
Kennedy delegate candidates in opposition to the "pledged" slate picked by
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The Nev Hampshire Kennedy leadership. The presidential candidacy of a
Chicago ball-point pen manufacturer, Paul Fisher, was identified by the
Unicn^^eader as a major and substantive challenge to the Junior Senator from
Massachusetts. The Unic^Leader even prompted its surrogate, the Governor,
Wesley Powell, to charge Kennedy with being "soft on co^^unism" and encouraged
Powell to announce that Kennedy would have to exceed a 20,000 vote total in
order to justify the continuation of his candidacy beyond New Hampshire.
Kennedy responded by calling upon Vice President and presidential candidate,
Richard M. Nixon, to repudiate the remarks of his New Hampshire campaign
manager. Governor Wesley Powell, and to advise Powell to apologize for his
intemperance. Nixon responded that Powell was not speaking for him and
that he, Nixon, certainly did not share Powell's opinion of Kennedy. The
.hazards which William Loeb, (the Manchester Union Leader's publisher and
frequent editorialist) had placed in Kennedy's path were successfully navi-
gated. Kennedy carried the Democratic preference ballot by 20,000 more votes
than Governor Pox^ell said would be required to be a significant vote. The
Kennedy "pledged" slate of convention delegates was also elected.
The results accomplished for Kennedy in New Hampshire by the young
and aggressive new Democratic activists in the 1960 Presidential primary
further reduced the liveliness of the "Old Guard" New Hampshire Democrats.
During the next few months they would become themselves strong supporters of
President Kennedy's nomination and election. The irritation of that 1960
primary contest would remain and the experience would be one that would
return in 1968 to bother its principal New Hampshire leader, Bernard Boutin.
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The status quo in Northern New England is not paradise, but it is
knowi condition. Change ns n n,-.i i' ^ -; ^ ^
i
^n n^, a a political promise is only attractive in New
Hampshire when the status quo has itself become uncertain. Hard work is
perceived to insure not only survival but a modicum of prosperity. Sudden
riches are not part of the northern New England experience. Conservative
governraents, churches, schools, and philosophies have dominated as the
institutional backbone of New Hampshire for too long to respond to a sudden
call for change. m the 1960 presidential election, political change for
its o™ sake was not seen es a virtue in New Hampshire, l^.atever desire
there was within the state to change national leadership it was not strong
enough to overcome the habit of voting straight Republican Party ticket, nor
was it strong enough to overcome an underlying resistance to electing a
Boston Irish Catholic, President of the United States. That year, 1960,
Richard Nixon carried New Hampshire by a wide margin while H. Styles Bridges
for U.S. Senate smothered his opponent, Dartmouth Professor Herbert Hill
and Wesley Powell, Governor, proceeded to swamp even the spunky candidacy
of Bernard L. Boutin.
The 1964 Presidential Primary
The 1960 presidential primary contest of John F. Kennedy had been
instructive to the future McCarthy campaign organizers in terms of managing
delegate selection and campaign organization. The 1964 version of the
New Hampshire presidential primary provided a further education in campaigning
but this time from the contest on the Republican side of the ballot.
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The contest wns between two announced and a.resslvely campaigning
candidates. Nelson Roc.ereller and Barry Coldwater, and two unannounced
absentee candidates, Henry Cabot Lodge and Richard Nixon. The latter
two were represented by s.all local organisations trying to stir up a
write-in vote for their respective candidates. When the votes were counted,
Henry Cabot Lodge's organization had succeeded in attracting enough write-in
votes for the non-candidate, then Ambassador to Vietnan,, to win the contest
and elect a full slate of delegates to the 196A Republican convention.
The election was instructive to those who would eventually organize the
1968 McCarthy can,paign both in terms of the result and the organizational
methods. It would also influence those who would manage President Johnson's
candidacy and even those campaigning for Republican candidates.
The Rockefeller vote followed the pattern of a friends' and neighbors'
vote coupled with support among liberal organization Republicans. The town
of Hanover recorded a strong vote for Rockefeller as evidence of their
friendship and his association with Dartmouth College. Berlin, in Coos
County, was carried by Rockefeller. An industrial Democratic city, Berlin
was affected by a resurgent liberal Republican organization which responded
to the wishes of an announced and campaigning candidate rather than the
independent spirit of a write-in. Rockefeller also found support in the
upper middle class towns where a sophistication, either intellectual or
cultural, encouraged the voters to overlook the issue of divorce and re-
marriage.
80
Senator Goj dv;.i tcr c-irr-toH t ,e^. l.d thJrtoun or Mnnchost.r's fourteen wards,
and most by substantial pluralities Oih...i ic... ther co„„„„niti9s In which Powell had
had strong organizations also gave Goldwater considerable support. The
was Poweirs most ardent supporter until its disaffection withh- in 1,«. ,he split between the Ni.on and Coldwater votes revealed that
Poweirs support was dissipating and that the Coldwater strength was less
related to the pull of his prominent supporters, but rather to the effectiveness
of the Unlon^_L evader.
The Lodge vote was a .ore difficult pheno.enon to identify. It was
partly a negative vote and partly a neutral vote. There are .any New Hampshire
voters who are nominally registered as Republicans in order to vote in the
Republican primaries. For .ost of the past 40 years the Democratic Party
has been unable to elect its candidates to .ajor office. Only once prior
to 1958 had a Democrat been elected Governor and that was in 1922. The
gubernatorial election (the only elected constitutional office) was decided
.in the Republican primary. Moderates, who in other states would be Democrats,
registered as Republicans to vote In that Republican primary.
This bloc of moderate swing voters would not vote for Goldwater and
many would vote against him. Many in this bloc also held a deep dislike
for Wesley Powell and, therefore, would not vote for a candidate receiving
his endorsement. Nixon had not been an appealing candidate for the moderates,
especially since his defeat in 1960 and again in 1962. New Hampshire swing
voters also have a high regard for the power of their votes and will attempt
to direct support where they think their vote will have the most impact.
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The Lodge vote In New „a„pshlre ca.o fro™ the ecnunltles in „hich
considerable independenee has been shown in recent years. The Democratic
Party had received an increasing vote in these co^unitics as the internal
Republican Party c.^nflict irrrp^Qf^ri tu uncreased
.
The best example of voter independence
was the City of Concord. In the 1962 Republican primary, incumbent Governor
Powell lost in Concord to his opponent, John Pillsbury, by a considerable
-.argln. m the general election, Concord gave the Democratic candidate,
John W. King, a good majority towards his convincing victory. Lodge
carried every ward in Concord by large margins in spite of the work of both
the Rockefeller and the Goldwater comir.ittees
.
The New Hampshire voter had weighed the alternatives, had rejected the
advice of the state's most prominent elected Republican leadership and the
campaigning of the announced candidates, to write in the names of Henry
Cabot Lodge and Richard Nixon on their presidential primary ballots. The
Lodge organization had detected a vacuum developing in the candidate field,
(something that former Governor Powell also saw somewhat later) and they,
with considerable imaginatioii, devised a strategy to suggest an alternative
to the undecided voters. Without much money, with little time to prepare
...
„^,^„
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
endorsements and Rofkc*"cn pr ' ^ .... • .-Kc._ iic s campaigning had failed.
T..e vou.
^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^
RepuM.eans. The Ti... U,e eonse.vaUve pa„, lea.e.s an. u,03e
estabU,„™en. vote..
.espon.e. to s.,,esUo.s of ..o.,
support of Senator Gol .lvj-i
f
at- tkw iuwater. These voters were ^r^it^^-^^scattered throughout the
sta.c
.u.
.e„.ea .o p.e.o™,„ate
...re .He conservative estaMish.en. of
Republican party was the strongest.
The seeond Moc of voters were those of the .ore Uheral Republican
estahiish^ent. These voters and their leaders tended to support the candidac.
of Governor Rockefeller and to receive the endorsement of the liberal Re-
publican press for their activities in the state. Li,e the conservative
,
Republican establishment vote, this vote was widely dispersed throughout the
state but «as strongest in those communities where the newspapers and the
leadersliip had been relatively more liberal.
Neither of these two blocs would play a role in the 1968 Democratic
party or have p.irticular influence on what occurred that year. The con-
servatives would vote for Richard Nixon and the liberals tended to support
Governor Romnoy and then to write-in the name of Nelson Rockefeller. It is
the last two voter types that are of interest.
83The flrai: o£ these vorc the vci »r^. . ita s who responded to the susgestlon of fo
r - - ---^ «^on o„ the.lot. Xhese vote., tended to predominate in the hi,h eWation co„,™Uies
,
the >Wh,,,,^JM^
^^^^ ^
^^^^
than ten years until a sniit- ^r ionplxt m 1961. Powell had attracted an antl-establish-
-nt KepuhUean vote In h.3 prl.ar, contests and had won his two ter.. as
governor with the support ot
.overlc. Be„oerats £ro„ these Union leader domi-
nated co^unltles. The strong Powell eo^nltles also tended to he of middle-
lower socio-economic status.
Loeb eould not overcome Powell's residual appeal and failed to hold
Powell's loyalists for his candidate Barry Goldwater. Powell's vote bloc tend-
ed to be the mavericks of New Hampshire politic- an,l fk., tF i x tic, d, therefore, not persons
closely aligned with either political party.
Although the 1904 Republican presidential primary did not show Powell's
strength among the maverick Democrats, it had been these same
.averieks who
had elected him tvlee over his Democratic gubernatorial opponent Bernard L.
Boutin. When Powell endorsed John King in the 1962 gubernatorial election
this bloc shifted to King. The anti-establishment views of these Democrats
would be found again In the 1968 Democratic presidential primary. Without
Governor Wallace as a presidential candidate (a politician much like Powell
in his appeal) these mavericks shifted to McCarthy, a candidate they perceived
as anti-establishment.
The final Hoc of voters were those independent Republicans that contain
Democrat-like liberals, non-organization Republicans, and tended to be of a
higher socio-economic status. These were the Lodge voters who were able to
make a vote decision with a minimum of campaign provided information, and to
register that decision in the more demanding manner of the write in and
8^f
3e,oceio., or Oelesaca candidate.. These voto„
.heir co ,
, , ,
t nmunitles
.
and their similar Drnocr-.-iucuocra. . voter counterparts are of particular i^.. .F-iiLxc i i importance to
-.e e.pla„a.o„ o.co„e X,.S p.esiden.ai p.i.a..
.He Oe.oe.a-
tic party.
in sn^a.,
.He
.epuHUcan p.es.den.iaX p.i.a.. ,ave
.He o.se.ve.
.„o
basic lnslsH.s
.o .He d,na„lcs sucH elee.lon.. THe U.S. „as .He
.ac.lc
whlcH U,e
.odse c.anl.e.s Had used .o a...ac. a vo.e
.Hel. candidate. THe
were especlall, attractive to .Hose organizing ca^.paigns for 1968. Secondly
the way tHe voters Hro.e into HloCs and How tHese Hloeks responded to cHan-lng
political conditions attract considerable Interest. IHe posslHilitv
.Hat Demo-
cratic voters „lgHt respond, like tHe Republican voters Had responded, to tHe
various options, indicated a potential In the Democratic electorate to produce
a surprise result like tHat which tHe Lodge organizers Had accomplished. THe
19M presidential primary was a reference Point that Helped the campaign plan-
ners of the 1968 primary to Judge the potential of their strategies. Xt gave
them new options that, because they Had worked in 1964, might be made to work
again In 1968. Without that reference point much of what happened in 1968 might
not have happened. To experiment, as the Lodge organizers experimented, would
have been much too risky given the issues that were at stake. There had to be
some feeling that an effort to test public opinion on the war issues would be
politically viable. IHe Lodge success was a political reality. .Something like
it might work again was the conclusion of those considering options for 1968.
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as the
ro .a... o.3e.ve. an.
...e.lv.s.s
U,a. „a.s capaUe o.
.,„c.„,
.He desUn, „o. on., o.
.He naUon
... aUo o.
his poUUcal pa„,;
.Hac He could co„„ol
.Hose „Ho Had produced His legisla-
tive victories.
A creeping cancer „as beginning
.0 nibble a. .He facade of
.oHnson's
leadership. Karl, m 1963 .He .ili.ar, build-ap in Sou.H Vie.na„ Had beg.n
AS .ho casual.ies increased, draf. ,uo.as grew, „ar e.pendi.ures cue .he fund-
ing of .He Grea. Socie., progress and .He credibill.y of .he ad.inis.ra.ion be-
gan
.0 decline. Those who had worked for
.he elec.ion of Lyndon
.,ohnson
peace" candida.e in 196.', ques.ioned the wisdom of
.Heir loyal.y.
Through
.he spring, su^ner. and fall of 1966, many of .He Congressional
Class of 1964 maintained
.Heir loyalty .0 .he administration they had supported
during .he previous two years, expecting that some break would occur in Vietnam
policy.
The rising insecurity among politicians and the public took several signi-
ficant fonns in New Hampshire. The first was that in the 2nd Congressional Dis-
trict, Eugene S. Daniell, a former Franklin Mayor, State Senator, State Repre-
sentative, and 1960 Congressional candidate, announced his candidacy for Congress,
The unusual part of his announcement was that he would run in opposition to the
continuation of the war policy in Vietnam.
In addition to the two Congressional seats to be filled in the 1966 elec-
tion. Governor King would be seeking an unprecedented third term and, Thomas
Mclntyre, (elected to a short-term U.S. Senate seat in 1962). would stand for
election to his first full term. 1966 was to be the high watermark of the New
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Hampshire Domocratir Parr-v t^-tev, iIn .rcy „xLh l„cun,bent candidates in Congress, the Covet-
-^3 .«lce. U.S. se„«e, and .ot
.^U-e seats o. tHe Oovernofs ConncU
«-i,en.s candidacy, avowed oppcsUlon to the administration's poMc, in Viet-
nam and possioie nomination wonld
.e an emhatrassment to the unit, tht.st o.
the New Hampshire Democratic Incumbents.
At that stage the opponents to the war in Vietnam were viewed as a ragged
fringe of anti-social malcontents who had little faith in the eapaict. of
Lyndon aohnson to control the Vietnam situation and to manage U..S. involvement
The same was the case in Now Hampshire. With the exception of Banlell. who had
an extensive though controversial political hi-torv ^h. . •i^uxxLx i n b y, t e scattering of dissi-
dents
.ere, for the .ost part, non-political, politically inexperienced, with-
.
out party ties, and with M.i.ed organisational interest or capaicty. Fro.
the perspective of the Democratic Party organisation these malcontents, repre-
sented by Daniell, could not be allowed to disrupt the Party's drive to consoli-
date the 1964 electoral gains. To create the unity ticket a Nashua attorney,
William Barry, was drafted to challenge Daniell for the 2nd Congressional Dis-
trict nomination. This he did successfully. Daniell and the Anti-war activists
were once again shunted to the fringe of New Hampshire politics.
On election night King was re-elected Governor by his Manchester friends
and neighbors and Mclntyre was re-elected by approxiiaateiy the same margin as
the Governor. The list District incumbent Democrat, J. Olive Huot, lost his
seat to Louis Wyman who he beat in 1964. Huot would be one of the 40 plus mem-
bers of the class of 1964 to be defeated that election eve. The Barry contest
in the 2nd Congressional District never got beyond the blush of the primary
victory. Lacking resources, manpower, a sufficiently clear image, Barry lost
by more than two to one to the incumbent Republican.
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ne.ocr... lost their scats In the Governor's Council and rescued their
former minority position in both houses of the- Legislature.
Election eve 1966, produced a quantum increase in the depth and
breadth of the Vietnam dissenters. Lyndon
.ohnson had not succeeded in
producing the Vietnam miracle that might have saved at least some of
the outstanding members of the Congressional class of 196A. During the
last weeks of the fall campaign, Lyndon Johnson seemed to be running away
from those Congressional loyalists who had delivered the landmark legis-
lative calendar of the 89th Congress. Instead of staying to help with the
political fight or to produce the Vietnam policy change, the man who had
appeared omnipotent, the consummate politician, the creator of the 1964
landslide, vanished from the political stage. In fact, during those final
weeks of the campaign, he seemed to retreat inside the White House. Toward
the end, Johnson actually left the country on a tour of the Pacific. When
his power was needed most at home, and in the face of a pre-election
faith in his ability to make politically right the gloomy international
situation, Lyndon Johnson, by his withdrawal, symbolically jump.-d ship.
He was leaving the sinking class of 196A alone while he, their skipper, fled
to safe ground.
For those political activists who had accepted the notion that Lyndon
Johnson could manage Vietnam with restraint and that he would protect
the political fortress of the DemocraLic Party, election eve 1966 was a
major blow. Those who supported William Barry against Eugene Daniell, those
who accftpted the party unity strategy for the re-election of Senator Tom
Mclntyre began to feel that they had been duped, not only had they been taken
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In by the id...-,
„, the . tv .......gy . bu,: cv...n „,or. by the arcu,„c,u th.,c those
Who were re-electe., In New Hampshire
.cfle<:tej Che state's support of the
administration's „ar poliey. An added conse,ueneo was the fear that those
who were re-elected, King and Melntyre, wo..ld Interpret their suecess as
the result of their unquestlonlns support of the administration's policies
m Southeast Asia. To bring the. back to a happier political day In 196^,
when they joined Lyndon Johnson on the pjatfor™ in Manchester, and applauded
their President's commitment to keep our boys out of Vietnam, would be a
difficult, even Impossible, task.
The chronicle of the escalation of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam
from late 1966 through 1967 has been recounted, examined, and dissected in
numerous accounts.^ Those accounts do not need to be re-stated except
as personal recollections of events that influenced individual decisions to
actively oppose the war policy and, eventually, the leadership of the New
Hampshire Democratic Party.
During the 1966 election year, the administration's war rhetoric
increased. Deliberate allusions to the memories of a period of national
unity which had accompained United States participation in World War II were
used to cloud the public consciousness of the Vietnam war. Increased draft
quotas, escalating war costs, increasing casualties, and a growing uncertainty
as to the utility of that war policy countered point by point the adminis-
tration's attempts to wrap U.S. involvement in a blanket of patriotism.
Skepticism, distrust, and disillusionment were re-manufactured with each full-
color television evening news report from Vietnam. A steady rise of protest
was also being broadcast from the nation's universities and colleges as student
protests increased.
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Many had thought ««.t the defeat of Senator Barry Goldwater by
the landslide vote in 19f^A hnA ). v • iU64 ad bur.ed once and lor aU the slogan,
"Extre,„ls„,
in the defense of liberty is nn vin« " o • i -..Ts o ce. Quickly they began to realize that
extremis, in the defense of administration war policy was acceptable, and
With it they began to feel that extremism ir defense of personal liberty
.ight also be necessary. m fact at one point during this period, old phrases
re-discovered in early state and national founding and organizing documents
were dusted off for reconsideration. As an example, the New Hampshire Con-
stitution, one of the nation's oldest state constitutions, contains a section
headed;
.'The right of revolution." ' U^en all else fails, the article im.plies
revolution is an acceptable policy when used to secure liberty and human
rights-at least in the State of New Hampshire. During the months following
the 1966 elections, it was clear the high watermark of the Democratic Party
In New Hampshire and the "Great Society" had been reached and had passed.
Disillusionment and frustration began to sink in as those who had labored
to bring the New Hampshire Democratic Party its successes faced 1967.
Governor George Wallace Visits New Hampshire
The first evidence of the depth of the frustration came in the Spring
of 1967 when Governor George Wallace of Alabama visited New Hampshire to
sound the starting gun for the 1968 presidential primary. While not an
avowed candidate for the presidency. Wallace had run as the candidate of the
American Independent Party in 1964. He had attracted impressive crowds and
recognition in his forays into the industrialized north. New Hampshire seemed
a logical first stop in a renewed effort to attract votes and thereby to
influence national civil rights and social policy. The Manchester Union Leader
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paper
'
s
.--«o.-.s aod rollUcal constituency could bo expected to ,^ c cc respond well to aaU.ce
.....
.0. „e.p....e.
. 3ucce3s.u.
..,.te.te3t.„,.
" encoo„,e K.U.ce to enter t.e We„ „.„,3Hi„
P--s«e„t..,
^ ^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^
votes Of the politicaUy alienated, frustrated, and confused.
^or t.e Spr.n,
,967 New Ha.ps.fre trip Wallace scheduled a visit ending
speech at Oart„,„uth College. He had heen to nart.ooth several years earlier
and had received a friendly if not serious response. He had charged his
ivy league audience „ith cuips ahout Oart.outh's Ivy league rivals, life on
an isolated campus, aud his standard speech of anti f.H ii^peecn t - ederal government, anti-
intervention states rights theses. It was a show, a southerner outside the
south saying things that see.ed
.ore for entertainment than to be taken
seriously. To northerners during the early 1960's
..llace was an outrageous
oddity of little consequence outside his own state. He had not begun to
threaten the politics of the north as he would in subsequent years.
The Dartmouth Wallace visited in the spring of 1967 was quite a
different Institution than he had visited earlier. The civil rights movement
had been taken seriously in the veir^ ^inr^o K-to i-) xu Ln y a s s ce his earlier visit. Dartmouth
had enrolled a significant number of Black students. Wallace had become a
tnajor national political force. The war in Vietnam was now reaching the
college student. Wallace now represented a solid political threat by his
anti-civil rights position and his support of the war in Vietnam.
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W.nacc was p.rCnctor lly Introduced hy the editor of the l)onxJ2irJa,™th
and then began his us.al speech. The 1967 Dartmouth Audience was tense, not
^
receptive to Wallace's attempts at humor, and, while not obviously hostile,
were cool to his performance.
Part of the Wallace style was to confront heckling by baiting the
hecklers. A part of his notoriety came from the success of this technique-
especially before regional audiences and most especially before the national
television cameras. Although the heckling, response and increasing agitation
of the audience made interesting theater, it did not make good politics in
New Hampshire. Wallace brought his speech to a somewhat abrupt close, refused
to answer questions, and left the stage. The audience, both inside and outside,
listening to snatches of the speech through open windows, were upset by the
chain of events. A large crowd formed between the building and the street
where Wallace's two cars x^ere parked. Leaving the hall, Wallace was rushed
to the car inside a phalanx of his guards and the local police. The crowd
surged around the cars, climbed on them, and prevented Wallace's quick escape.
Photographs and television clips of the exit showed two slowmoving
cars, covered with students, being rocked and trying to get away from the
hall to the Green and Main Street. This task was ultimately accomplished, but
not before local police and college officials had some exceptionally
nervous moments.
Wallace left New Hampshire that night. National television and the
national press devoted considerable footage and space to the incident.
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«iven ev.,u.uU,.,„ WaM.ce neve, re.un.ed
ever „,s
.«enUon. Ha. ,.e„ for scHea.X.n, v.sU an., perhaps,
.e,,„„,„,
an early presidential drive In New Hampshire, these were dashed by the
reception he received in Hanover.
The fact that Wallace did not eventually enter the 1968 New Hampshire
presidential primary was important given subsequent analysis of the election
results and the level of frustration with conventional political choices
harbored by .any New Hampshire voters. Whether Wallace would have attracted
a winning vote against President Johnson is not possible to know.
^'^^^-^I^-^nlZolitic^^ Hampshire
If there is one prevalent characteristic in New Hampshire politics, it
is opposition to controversy. Perhaps because the state's media does not
make the elements of a controversy intelligible, controversy and the con-
troversial rapidly lose the attention of the voting public. In simple terms,
if someone is said to be "controversial" and then behaves in a controversial
manner, the level of public uncertainty increases and the credibility of the
person or the issue represented by the person declines. New Hampshire's media
situation is such that political reporting tends to be highly personalized.
Personality is far more important to the New Hampshire body politic than
are the issues which a person espouses. To a considerable extent this condition
is attributable to the small size of the state and the inconvenience that
issue polarity presents in the conduct of daily affairs in small communities.
Credibility is a function of acceptance, for whicli the avoidance of controversy
is necessary--especially controversy generated by the Manchester Union Leader
.
93
in the
one.
.-, public P«r.„.. is Identirie. as controversial an. URel. ,„
-""..aiU>, U,ea U.at po,-.„„
.e„.s lo.e „.,i.iUt.. i„ «
,,,,
is what happened to Wallace 1„ Hanover that April
.vcni„,„ Ke beca
controversiai as a re.ult of bis perfonnance. A possible president
eyes of New Hampshire citizens, sbould not bebave that way or elicit that
kind of response. U1,ile not fully understanding tbe clients of tbe contro-
versy, they were disposed to throw the baby out with tbe bath water.
Presidential candidates, at least in New Hampshire, have to look like presi-
dents, speak like presidents, behave like presidents, and earn the respect due
a president. With al.ost complete disregard for what is actually said or for
what the candidate represents, the instinctive, al„,ost physical response to
personality prevails. George Wallace did not .eet that measure on bis spring
trip to New Hampshire in 1967, and somehow he got tbe message that it would
be unproductive for him to come back. By skipping the 1968 New Hampshire
Presidential Primary, be, conceivably became a major factor in its result.
In January 1968 Robert Craig found that Wallace held a 5Z rating which was
higher than McCarthy's at that time. Given subsequent analysis of the
McCarthy vote It is probable that McCarthy attracted much of the potential
Wallace vote (see Chapter XIV). If Wallace had become a candidate in New
Hampshire in 1968 he might have severely reduced McCarthy's vote.
SHIFTING POLITICAL SANDS
What had appeared to be fringe dissent on Vietnam during the prc-1966
election period bad, by tbe Spring of 1967, tbe appearance of a sustained
commitment to see Vietnam policy changed. Political action groups that had
long sought to change national policy on Issues of nuclear weapons control,
military Influence ou foreign policy, and tbe expansion of the military
establishment, now nlilfted their emphasis toward stopping the war in Vietnam.
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They did so with the obiectlve of hr1n,>^,„> kt b lngaig about cnanges In United States
policy. Converting fringe dissent into a political fore.
-0 was underway.
An essential part of this conversion was speculation as to what avenues
the protest should ta.e to be effective. Petitions were circulated
advertisements placed, solicitations for funds and supporters conducted, and
-llings to influential groups and persons distributed. Drives to send
letters to congressmen and senators were organized and other tactics, all
designed to demonstrate the concern of the public, were tried. Vigiis, marches,
teach-ins, debates, forums, articles, books and prayers were conducted,
written, and sent forth. Even as desperation led to raids on Selective Service
records, draft avoidance, desertion, exile, and even personal injury, the
impenetrability of the polic>^akers, the ambivalence of Congress, and the
steady escalation of the war was frustrating! y evident.
Throughout 1967 the dissenters, now called the "peace movement," flailed
at the political system without impact. Strategies were confused. Options
were unclear. Leadership was scarce and limited in appeal. Other than two
United States senators, Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening, vocal opposition
from higher office was limited and timid. None of the leaders with national
constituencies had expressed their opposition to the point of breaking with
the administration on Vietnam. Vice President Hubert Humphrey was an
enthusiastic apologist for the administration. Senator Robert Kennedy, though
critical and snide, would not adopt a confrontation posture. Few others had
the stature to make a difference. It seemed too early to expect a coalition
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or <0.ccu.„ ofricl,U to confront the President. To be elective, such a
coonuon «„,la have ho. to arise iron, within tao President's ov,n party. Even
fro,,, the pent of view of an incu..ent senator, the powe,- of the president and
his administration is considerable. For a senator anticipating a re-election
ca,„pa:-.£n in the fall of 1968, keepins things in order within one's own house
and party was of utmost importance, but from the perspeetiv. of a congressman,
who must face the voters every two years, the power of the presidency is
awesc.m.e. For a congressman the nec-sity to express and maintain loyalty
is of the highest order. T„ lave an impact on the mutually relnrorc'ng
sequences that shape the dynamics of the American political system, public
opinion wedges had to be driven between the Congress, the President, the party,
and the electorate. The flr,» structure of rewards and favors, confidences
and re-enforcements that supported the scheme of ,»utual reliances had to be
cracked.
Ey the end of 1967, the foundations began to shake. Elected officials
who as recently as one year before hadn't been concerned with the war a; c'n
issue, began to
-ense the shifting sands not only under thair o .n feet but
especially as reported by those close associates elected officials rely upon
to do their fund-raising, election, and re-election work. It was still too
early for the high office holders even to contemplate abandoning the ship of
Lyndon Johnson.
Below the high officials are those individuals who, through their
political skills, hard work, money, considerable time and energy sustain those
holding the offices. Thesp are the workers, the friends, the professional
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c.oU.-,oucs. u,e lav
...rtn.rs. the husl.,ess aBsoclato=. the bankers, the
union leaders, the Industrialists, and the „,any others who have aceess to
those in public office. When the sands of public opinion shift, they shift
first and with the strorsest effect upon those diverse individual who are
the interpreters, the translators of the political mood. From trusted
voices are heard the first hints of political trouble. It is in these
circles that the discussion of options beco„,es meanxngful. These are the
individuals who are likely to know the options, understand the risks, con-
template the possibilities, and organize within the constraints of the
political system.
When, toward the middle of 1967, it was evident that few elected officials
of the Democratic Party would be willing to risk splitting with the administration
over the war in Vietnam and thus threaten the system of mutual reinforcements,
another cadre of converts began to join the peace movement. These were the
same people whose importance to the political system was their willingness
to work at the day-to-day business of politics. An increasing number of
thes-. politically sensitive individuals, such as Richard Goodwin, Bill MoyerG,
John Gardner, and Roger Hillsman, began to research the options offered in
the political system and to speak out against continuation of the Johnson
administration's Vietnam policy, mat prompted them x^as first, the result
of not being able to convince their elected friends to come out against the
war politics; secondly, the result of pleas from their elected friends to
demonstrate that there really was anti-v/ar support in the home state or
district; and third, out of personal frustration over a Vietnam loss or the
sting of the generation gap conflict that was growing over the war issues.
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A. staae n„.,ny h,.<, c„,„e to the conclusion tlu.t the use of pressure
aoainst l.-.divlCual con,r<.ss,„on senators was not particularly effective
One or tvo congressmen or even a senator or tvo would respond by being
critical of the administration's handling of the war. Very few, however
could maintain this position with enough Intensity to have even a marginal
effect, certainly the bloc of com.,ltted war opponents In the Congress capable
Of attracting converts and having an impact on policy did not exist. The
likelihood of a bloc forming In the Congress from within the party of the
President was small especially since the election year of 1968 loomed ahead
on the calendar. Congress felt that the President held the power with
respect to the war. Many congressmen and senators were in awe of that power
and felt vulnerable should they assert opposition to how the President was
handling the war. A change In policy, a victory in Vietnam, or a major
intervention by China or Russia, they perceived, would undercut their own.
election prospects. Getting too far away from the pack for a congressman is
an exceptionally rare and unsettling experience-especially when the pack is
led by the President of one's own party.
Recognizing how difficult it would be to change a large congressional
bloc, those considering political options began to direct their attention
to the up-coming presidential election.
Organizing to take hold of the political machinery had promise. In
many states, even before the nominating process reforms of the 1970's, the
political party structures and the electoral process were open and penetrable,
in others, as would be discovered, the party structures were not protected
by law and had become closed or so atrophied as to be almost unusable.
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Detcrmlnu.i' the structure of oarh state'- nro.,- ( l . iuai ..La o piesJdeutial nominating process
was the first requirement.
:ion or
In either case, whether moving into an accessible party organizat
developing new organizational vehicles, an acceptable and legally reinforced
system was available. To go outside this system, or to neglect to examine
tins system as the vehicle for political action meant one would have
to not only create new organizations, but subject these to tests of legality
and community acceptance. By using the same organizational tools and
structural arrangements that elected Congress and the President, and then
putting these tools to a different purpose was at least legally acceptable.
To build barricades and organize ad hoc revolutionary committees seemed
extreme when on any night a citizen or group of citizens could meet to
organize a campaign or attend a local party committee meeting. If a citizen
could not influence the committee decisions he could go off and establish his
own ad hoc organization and accomplish almost the same objectives as the so-
called party regulars. Even in 1968, there were legally set time-locks
opening and closing political system doors that led to party organization
and candidate nominations. All those in opposition had to do was learn the
laws, determine the sequence and schedule of political events, and organize
to participate. The system was so penetrable that the exclusions and con-
frontations that would lead to extra-legal and even revolutionary tactics
were unnecessary.
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Tln-ouKh Ll,o fall of 1967, Lyndon Johnson appeared uninfluenced by the
arguments of the opponents of the war. Those few n.e.bers of Johnson's party
m high office, such as John Gardner, who were staunch opponents were being
systematically excluded fro. either their offices or the prerogatives of office.
Opposition within the administration was not wise if officials wished to
retain their influence if not their Jobs. Even opposition to the war policy
anywhere in the political structure of the Democratic Party was viewed as
disloyal, devisive, and possibly traitorous.
Eliminating opponents to the war from the party tickets as was done in
New Hampshire in 1966, now moved several steps further to exclude dissenters
from party offices and councils. Until then, Lyndon Johnson had been
successful in diverting, disrupting and disregarding the mounting opposition.
He was, for all intents and purposes, invulnerable. His presidency was secure
from the threat of dispute from the Congress because the Congress was controlled
by his party. He was not vulnerable to the voters because they could not
affect him outside a regularly scheduled election.
Lyndon Jchn^on had one weakness: the election of 1968 was drawing
closer. Johnson had a lengthy hristory of political quick-steps. He had
survived and prospered through years of legislative offices where his skill
at balancing the needs of his Texas constitutency with the requirements of
congressional leadership had made him a legend. It appeared that the peace
movement had tried all of its tactics except those that would strike the
politica] nerve of his system. If votes could be cast that would show
disapproval for his handling of the war, and at least have some of these
votes counted directly against him, then Lyndon Johnson could be made to react.,
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To work, the votes would have to be cast in ..nH.^ .oc a political context that Lyndon
Johnson undetstood.
2lL^i.Ojlg_ and Alternatives
In 1967 evaluating the options led in^ediately to the presidential pri-
ories that would be conducted in 15 states. The proble. with primary elec-
tions is that, in order to .ake the syste. work, there :nust be a candidate in
opposition. Although the procedure varies fro. state to state, it is difficult
if not impossible, to register protest in a presidential primary without at
least a na.e to vote for or to write in. So.e statesS list all possible can-
didates and require a disclaimer of candidacy on or before a certain date priox
to the primary election in order to have a name removed. Other states9
required those wishing to have their names listed on the ballot comply with a
filing procedure. Only one state, Wisconsin, in 1968, offered the voter the
option of voting "no" to the names listed on the ballot. A vote of "no" would
be a rejection of all the candidates listed.
Early in 1967, anti-war groups in Wisconsin began orgakizing with the
objective of identifying the "no" option as a protest vehicle for those oppos-
ing the war. The option met all the requirements of a political protest; it
did not. however, represent an alternative. A significant "no" vote would
show the size of the opposition to the war and the lengths to which they would
go to manifest their concern. What it would not show was a commitment to a
viable political alternative. The possibility that such a vote would be dis-
regarded or only peripherally considered by the President and Congress was high.
The movement, however, lent a sense of political responsibility to those con-
sidering protest options within the political system. Those organizing
lo;
the Wisconsin effort rocoived a ,reat deal of publicity on the possible
Impact of a large "no- vote. This speculation was the 1967 genesis of news
reporters' preoccupation, throughout the presidential primary season, with
vote size and significance. In each event, in each primary, a magic number
had to be determined, how i.any votes would have to be cast for the "no"
option or for candidate "X" in order to be large enough to be considered
significant opposition to President Johnson. Playing the numbers was a Strang
but ultimately important part of the 1968 political game. It made possible
the less than majority win which gave the opposition an important advantage.
In New Hampshire, the site of the nation's first presidential primary,
the search for alternatives was underway early in 1967. Eugene S. Daniell,
the defeated 1966 primary contestant for the 2nd district congressional nom-
ination, had renewed his anti-war activities shortly after the first of the
year. The politically skillful Franklin lawyer, noted as a stump speaker and
press release writer, announced the formation of a committee to draft Senator
Robert F. Kennedy.
Daniell had been contacted by a New York City group headed by a New York
City psychiatrist named Dr. Martin Shepard. Without contacting with Robert
Kennedy or any close Kennedy family supporters, Shepard was on his own. The
effort had the distinct ring of an amateur venture. Shepard financed the
operation from the receipts of a weekly New York City cocktail party. Its
visibility was dependent upon Dr. Shepard 's ego and penchant for press release;
Shepfird had heard about Daniell as the result of the anti-war position
he had taken in 1966, and sought him out to organize the Draft Kennedy drive
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conco,.,..,
,,„ou.
,-o..U.., Of a polU.c,
.ct.„„ base, on
.o
draft
.„ ,.„„ini„,, snbjoct. In fact, both lacked a sense of „o„ to organise
effectively. The, were content to issue p.ess releases, raise a few dollars.
meet others with like interests and r^^.rely on the coverage their respective press
releases for impact.
in the early stages of any political year, the n,edla is hungry tor scne-
thlng to report. Especially in a year when it was certain that Lyndon B. Johnson
vould seelc reno.lr.ation and would not face serious opposition, anything that
varied the set the.e was attractive. At the same tl.e. «ch of what would
heeo,„e politically interesting in the Republican Party was beginning to for™.
Shepard and Daniell gave the hungry reporters some political hard news to
report, and news that was appealing in its populist disregard for usual political
conventions. Both Shepard and Daniell were eminently quotable, and both were
not above using their self-generated forums to criticize administration
handling of the war.
Precisely because both Shepard and Daniell were self-motivated operators
who were quick to spot an opening for a printable charge, both were incapable
of attracting an effective following. Shepard 's cocktail group remained
about the same size for weeks at a time, while Daniell 's potential disciples
were put off by his lack of interest in building an organization and his
frequent press release diatribes.
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H Kober. Kennedy had
.,:,y intention of
.parking or subtly approving
.
prl.ary-orle„ted draft, that thought was ,ulcUly snuffed out hy the aetlvl-
tles of Shepard and DanleH. Their repeated letters and press statements
caning for his candidacy „ere set aside by Robert Kennedy. Eventually, the
irritation of the press prompted and forced Robert Kennedy's hand. He wrote
to both Shepard and Danlell disavowing their activities and stated that he
would not be a candidate, drafted or otherwise, in 1968.
A political option which, pertops, Kennedy would have liked to have kept
open in order to apply greater pressure on the administration from the Inside,
had to be closed. The timing and the auspices of the draft venture forced
Kennedy to reveal his position long before It was advisable. Kennedy's flat-
footed public and private denial of the Shepard-Danlell overture did not
discourage them.
Even V7ith the Kennedy denial, Daniell still had several options open.
Since his mission was to express protest against the war, the availability
of popular name was enough. He stated early in his effort that his objec-
tive was to manifest dissent on the administration's war policies. Without
a "no" option, like that in Wisconsin, Daniell needed a name. He said he would
file a slate of delegate candidates favorable to the nomination of Robert
Kennedy. In spite of the protestations of Robert Kennedy, both of these
actions were x/ithin the Eugene Daniell perogatlve. All he needed was a sem-
blance of an organization and sufficient New Hampshire voters wiUing to file
as delegate candidates. The 1968 edition of the New Hampshire presidential
classic was underway.
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At lhi.s point a cligrcssion is in order. As has been discussed in this
SGction the 1960 presidential prJuKu-y of John Kennedy revealed some of the
political dynamics of the New Hampshire presidential primary. The 19GA version
of that event revealed additional options. Both experiences were to have an
Important influence on the planning of the 1963 contest.
What is important to note is that the 1960 primary was principally of
interest to Democrats seeking a nominee who could win the Presidency for their
party in 1960. The 196A primary was of particular interest to Republicans
who had to select a candidate to face the incumbent President, Lyndon Johnson.
Regardless of the party for which the election interest was greatest, the
lessons, the experiences of the various primaries are important to those
who observe and for those who might be tempted to be involved in planning and
managing a New Hampshire presidential primary campaign.
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CHAPTER III
POLITICAL ALTERNATIVI^S AND NEW HAMPSHIRE
Early Chronology
Accounts of the national search to find a person to be a candidate
against Lyndon Johnson have been well documented. ^ It Is sufficient to note
that a series of separate and unrelated organizational activities and alternative
candidate searches were underway. The searches which had succeeded in
attracting attention in New Hampshire were: The Draft Kennedy movement
stimulated by Dr. Martin Shepard of New York City; the Wisconsin vote "no"
option; the California Democratic Council organization; and the New York
Coalition for a Democratic Alternative. Little if anything was known of the
activities of Allard Lowensteln, Russel Hemenway, Maurice Rosenblat, Curtis
Gans, and others as they went from office to senatorial office trying to con-
vince first Kennedy, then McGovern, then McCarthy to become a candidate against
the certain renominatlon of President Lyndon B. Johnson.
All that has been reported subsequently of Lowenstein's search from
one possible candidate to the next inside VJashington and elsewhere, was unknown
to those who were evaluating presidential prl:nary options in New Hampshire.
As September and the political season of 1968 began, the possibility of working
with the Draft Kennedy movement in New Hampshire seemed to be the only remaining
option. Others in New Hampshire had come to the same conclusion and had
already begun to attend the meetings that Eugene Daniell held in various parts
of the state.
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Once Lowo..s..in h.ul secuved a tenCaLLve c:on„:.lt:,nont f.o.n McCarthy
that he would consider being a presidential primary candidate, Lowenstein
and an associate, Curtis Gans, wanted to see what such a candidacy might
attract. The two with several others began visiting the various presidential
primary states to talk with those who might work in such a campaign. Gans
was assigned to visit New Hampshire where he had been given the name of David
Hoeh a twenty-nine year old Dartmouth Co] lege administrator who had had
extensive experience in New Hampshire politics.
Although Hoeh did not recall Cans' name when the meeting had been
arranged, when Gans came into the room he immediately recognized Gans as having
been an effective proponent of the Democratic Party at a 1959 National Student
Association meeting Hoeh had attended. After introductions, the next words
from Gans were that there was a possibility that Senator Eugene McCarthy
would run for president against Lyndon B. Johnson, and that there was a
possibility that he would enter the New Hampshire Primary. Without elaboration
Gans then asked what Hoeh thought of McCarthy's prospects as a presidential
candi^iate.
Stunned, Hoeh remembered that in the spring of 1960 a little kno\^n U.S.
Senator, Eugene J. McCarthy, w^as introduced to a student audience at the
University of New Hampshire by the Catholic Student Chaplian, Father Francis
0' Conner. He vas speaking in behalf of the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey, then
a candidate for the presidency against John F. Kennedy. Hoeh's impression
for that brief exposure to McCarthy was indelible.
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Mcc:an.,y
,.ui he., errecUve speake. and an especially efrcctive
.csp.nd.n. to nues. loom.. He sprinUed his answers with facts and disarmed
see hostility With hu.or and subtle barbs. He .as ,uiet spo.en. Incld, with
a style that, tended to bring his audience close to hi.. Fro. that experience
Hoeh felt that McCarthy conld campaign well in New Hampshire even upon such
emotionally charged issues as the war in Vietnam. Hoeh's reaction to Cans
was
-yes" he thought McCarthy could be a good candidate but that a successful
candidacy would depend upon attracting support fro. those experienced with
the machinery of New Hampshire cam.paigns.
Cans began the exploratory contacts with a list of names that Hoeh
provided. Several meetings of potential McCarthy supporters followed leading
to the formation of a New Hampshire committee. In the weeks that followed
the October 22, 1967 meeting with David Hoeh, several campaign efforts began
in New Hampshire. The first was to assemble a state-wide cadre of potential
McCarthy supporters who could become a McCarthy campaign organization. The
second was to demonstrate to McCarthy that he should enter the New Hampshire
presidential primary. The third effort was to counter the pro-K:.nnedy
write-in drive of Eugene Daniell so that McCarthy would be the only anti-war
name with organized support in New Hampshire. A fourth campaign sprang from
the others as an effort to keep the New Hampshire Democratic party from
converting itself into a campaign organization for the renomination of
Lyndon Johnson and an endorsement of his Vietnam policies. By the middle
of November 1967, these four efforts were well under way and led by the cadre
of supporters that Cans had found and Hoeh had brought together into the
McCarthy Now Hampshire Steering Committee.
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TO a ,reac ex.on. the s.cces. of ca.palcn
..a. followed in New Hamp-
shire was dependent: upon U.e lengths to which Lowensteln and Cans had been
able to demonstrate to politically experienced individuals that a contest in
the presidential primary might have an impact on national affairs.
Without question, the lengthy and fruitless work of those who had first
opposed the war policies of the Johnson administration had stirred the con-
sciences of at least some political activists. To those like the emerging
McCarthy leadership in New Hampshire, Wisconsin, California, New York and
other states, who were looking for a way to express oppostion to the war, a
live candidacy by a respected political leader, within the political system
was by far the preferable protect route. Their experience, their political
skills, and their understanding of the political processes could direct the
energy of protest within a political system designed to absorb such discontent,
In contrast to those with political expertise were those in the national peace
movement who had already written off the possibility of creating a policy
change by using the political system. Later, when the success of the politi-
cal efforts began to show, some of these groups and individuals joined the
effort. But even until the very end in Chicago 1968, some substantial and
vocal groups did not join, did not see the efficacy of participating in the
political system, and felt vindicated by the miscarriage which the Chicago
Convention produced.
To support their argument for inside the political system activity,
Allard Lowensteln collaborated with a University of Michigan Professor,
Arnold S. Kaufman, on a policy statement agruing why President Johnson should
be challenged. Cans capsulized the argument in each of his subsequent meet-
ings as he pursued the list of twenty names that Hoeh had given him on Octo-
ber 25th.
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To ccn.nter the ar,^.uncnt:.= of those who felt that the political system
could not produce policy change Allard Lowenstein and University of Michigan
Professor, Arnold S. Kaufman, collaborated on a statement titled, "Why
Democrats Should Work to Stop Johnson." A verbal summary of this statement
became the argument that both Lowenstein and Cans used in their efforts to
organize the opposition among Democratic party activists. The statement
sought to counter prevalent themes of party loyalty with higher questions
of national morality. "...If a president is wrong but popular, political
realities may make opposing him difficult, however right; if a president
is right but unpopular, supporting him may be a duty, however difficult.
But when a president is both wrong and unpopular, to refuse to oppose him is
a moral abdication and political stupidity."
They felt that Johnson was bound to be opposed, as they put it,
"... whatever liberal Democrats may 'decide' to do. In Wisconsin, does
one vote 'Yes' or 'No' when those words appear beside Mr. Johnson's name
on the ballot? In California, can one simply avoid the primary contest
between the CDC "peace" slaue and a coalition of party regulars ...led by
Mayor Yorty? And if one does these things is the anti-war cause strengthened
by the stronger pro-Johnson vote that would presumably result?"
To tliese questions Lowenstein and Kaufmann offered alternatives.
The first was that there could be "somebody" to counter the "you can't
beat somebody with nobody" argument. They wrote, "There will be an
acceptable "somebody" as soon as the depth and extent of Democratic dis-
satisfaction is clear." They de-bunked the idea that achieving a "peace
plank" in the 1968 Democratic Party Platform would be a worthy accomplishment,
as they did those who attributed to Johnson motives of eventual Vietnam
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poMcy change. To each of these reasons for withholding support for a
counter candidacy they offered the long-shot political route, a route,
however, that had the
'
potent ial for at least tapping public frustration
with the status quo. For liberal Democrats they offered the prospect of
a "new coalition en^bracing much of the disenchanted left and of the anxious
muddled middle
- a coalition that would be based on present realities and
needs rather than on fading memories of past political victories." They
concluded their manifesto by writing:
The American people are generally appalled by the prospect of
a Johnson-Nixon-Wallace choice in 1968. One may hope Republicans
will do a]l they can in their party to avert such a choice.
But it is conceivable that those of us who are Democrats will
surrender the party of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and
of John F. Kennedy to those whose policies are shattering
our hopes for a just society and a peaceful world. To accept
the Johnson record as the basis for a national campaign is
such a surrender. It may seem difficult at first to fight
for the party against the power of the presidency, but that is
how the fight must be made if it is to be relevant.
It became a fact that as the political year of 1968 approached, the
possibility of influencing Johnson's war policies within the Democratic
Party was remote. New Hampshire Republicans and liberals wanting to
attack administration war policies were looking at the Republican presi-
dential nominating contest as being the place to have an impact. If the
candidate in the Republican primary who was most critical of the adminis-
tration on the war were to prevail, then a strong political message would
be transmitted to President Johnson. Changing party was then a complicated
process in New Hampshire. The possibility that a significant number of
these anti-war Republicans would switch to the Democratic Party and thereby
be eligible to vote for or against its candidates was negligible.
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AUhoufi!, the rcady-n,ade organizations of peace activists and anti-war
committees were thought to be of value in the ultimate organization of the
political campaign, in the early stages these groups presented problems.
Most of New Hampshire's anti-war groups were located in the less populous
college communities while their impact would be slight and their value to
the larger state organization limited. Early contact efforts, therefore,
were concentrated in the large to.ms and cities where a significant Democratic
primary vote existed. Generally, these were not the communities that had
been politicized by the war. Where anti-war activity had occurred, in Nashua,
for example, it had emerged from the less political and the radical activists
of the community.
McCarthy leaders did not want to build the possible alternative candidacy
on a base of pre-existing anti-war organizations, but rather to create a new
organization developed from the disaf f ections of those with political
experience in the Democratic Party. Once the statewide nctvrork of politically
experienced leaders was established and local groups formed by t'.-.ese leaders,
then it would be possible to form coalitions with the existing peace-action
and anti-war protest groups. This sequence of organizing was important.
If the McCarthy activity had been built on the foundation of existing
anti-war organization before attempting to create a politically experienced
cadre, it is probable that the radical public image of the anti-war activists
would have kept away tliose politically experienced Democrats who could make
the effort succeed.
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A consensus amour, t.hose iiinkin); the contacts was that a drive, to be
successful, had to be mounted within the Democratic Party. It had to be
built Inside the structure of the New Hampshire primary election process and
It had to be directed toward massing votes that were clearly Democratic
Party vote?;. Only in this way v,7ould it be possible to convince President
Lyndon B, Johnson that the opposition was not a collection of miscreant
radicals outside respectable partisan politics.
The peace-action and anti-war groups in New Hampshire were composed of
a conglomeration of some Democratic and some Republican Party activists,
resident and ncn-resident students, radicals, and non partisans. To some,
there was a feeling of a "curse on both of the political houses," whicli made
it difficult to be involved in political action tied to a specific party. In
contrast there was a viev; that the Democratic Party, to which they had owed
allegiance for some years, was being taken in a direction that was not true
to its liistory. Past involvement in the Democratic Party was important in
planning the early McCarthy organization. Once an identity had been estab-
lished for the group of Democratic Party dissenters, then they felt a
coalition could be constructed of others willing to share a common litany of
dissent.
Toward the middle of November, a pattern of escalating political events
began to emerge. A flurry of reports on the pending McCarthy candidacy dom-
inated the ruminations of the columnists and the dispatches of the wire services.
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Various or,v.nJzations In other states wore reporting favorable reaction to a
possible McCarthy candidacy. The pro-Johnson organizing effort, active since
early In the Fall of 1967, set November 19th as the date when the New
Hampshire Democratic State Committee would consider a Johnson renoinination
endorsement. In order to orchestrate that meeting properly and to repress
Darnell's pro-Robert Kennedy activity, Bernard Boutin, che Johnson committee
chairman, scheduled an evening social gathering of New Hampshire's Democrats
for Friday, November 17th. The star attraction would be Senator Robert
Kennedy's younger brother, the senior Senator from Massachusetts, Edward M.
Kennedy.
The Kennedy "Endorsement"
The invitation to Edward Kennedy had been extended several months earlier
through Kennedy's Senate colleague, Tom Mclntyre, on behalf of Governor John
W. King and Bernard Boutin and had been accepted by the Senator as a personal
gesture to those New Hampshire loyalists who had helped with the 1960
Presidential Primary. The event, scheduled for the ballroom of the Sheraton-
Wayfa.er Motel, Bedford, was organized as a $5.00 per person reception. The
price and the attraction of the star, Edward M. Kennedy, insured that most
of the party's leadership and faithful would be attending. A tally of the
receipts for the evening siiowed that more than 2,000 turned out on that snowy
November night.
(
Boutin had scheduled the reception in cooperation v;ith the party
chairman, Manchester attorney William Craig, as the first social event in his
strategy of organizing and then representing to tlie public a unified Democratic
Party Jn support of President Johnson. Tlio public reason for the gathering
was to pay tribute to several leaders of the party for their years of service.
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HrcMU.'io c Ircuuist aiicrs h.id hc)-,UM to c\v\m\r dui inc. t lie lasL vn-fk.s of
()i:U^l).'i ap.(! .Mrlv Wfcks of Novi-inlu" r
, BoiiLin saw Ihc y.ov\:\\ cvonlii}', as an
opporltinlt y In overpov/cr any of those who iiiij-liL bo wavorinj- in thoir support
of Johnr.on. Tlu- vlsnal unity of the New HainiLslii re party's leadership,
delivered throupli Senator Edward Kennedy, he reasoned, should he enouj'.li to do
tliat. Tn fact, in the days prior to the Kennedy visit and In tlie car from
iU)ston to Mancliester
,
Mclntyre and li(nilin urp,ed Keiuiedy to lay to rest any
speculation that his brother mip,ht be a candidate or that the Kennedy family
would lend moral rnijiport to any alternative drive for tlie nomination. lioutin
wanted Kennedy to renew Boutin's promise that if a Kennedy came to New
Hampshire during the time of the presidential primary campaign it would be
for the purpose of endorsing President Johnson, or, actually campaigning for
the. John.son write-in.
Kennedy arrived, spoke and shattered the Boutin dream. Not only did
Kennedy not eiuhirse the President for renomination in unequivocal terms,
he only mentioned hyntWin Johnson's name once and then only among the list of
the Democratic Party's presidentia"" heroes.
The visible >',ap l)etween Rolx-i t Kennedy and tlie President had been
widening in the weeks prior to the November 17th gatiicring. Robert Kennedy
had broken with Jolinson over the war in a speech delivered earlier that fall.
Alth(ni)',li hi;; public stateuu^nts continued to support .lolmson's renomination
and he had privately refused to consider a candidacy for the presidency in
1968, Robert Keiuiedy was seeking a policy cliang,e on Vietnam tlirough his
F.upport of those in dissent.
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To the chagrin of the New Hampshire Democratic Party leadership, duti-
fully assembled behind Kennedy on the platform, he launched into a series of
humorous one-line accounts of conversations between himself and his brother,
Robert, and comments on the contemporary political scene.
After perfunctory introductory remarks, Edward Kennedy recounted recent
conversations he had had with his brother, "When I said I was going to New
Hampshire I asked my brother if he wanted me to file a disclaimer removing him
as a candidate he said, 'Mind your own business.' Wlien I told him about the
vril;e-in campaign he said, 'Robert Kennedy spelled ROBERT KENNEDY
is not a write-in candidate.'" In his traditional review of the great names
in Democratic Party history, the names of Roosevelt, Truman, and John F.
Kennedy drew the loudest response. Johnson was extended courteous but not
extraordinary recognition.
The climax of his speech began with a warning, "I have heard in recent
days that there is a man considering a campaign in New Hampshire for the
presidency. This candidacy poses a serious threat to the Democratic Party.
.This man, from Minnesota, must beconie well known to you all so that you will
understand the seriousness of his positions. This man, Harold E. Stassen, does
not deserve your support." Kennedy's tone, at one playful and yet serious,
hushed the audience. The leaders on the platform hung in anticipation of
words that would tell the gathered Democratic faithful that Eugene McCarthy
was to be feared and could not expect even the slightest encouragement from
the Kennedy clan. Those in the room v/ho had begun their early contacts for
McCarthy were equally suspended by Kennedy's rhetoric. To the noticable relief
of many in the audience and to the visible distress of those on the platform,
Kennedy had not singled out McCarthy for his t;rath. He had instead taken all
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on n rhetorical trio. More questions were raised tluin answered by Edward
Kennedy'.^ performance. No ringing endorsement of the President had occurred. Ills
naTTie was barely mentioned. No great upswelling of emotion had been generated
from the crowd to discourage an effort to build an alternative organization
from within the party. In fact, to those of McCarthy leaders observing the
carefully orchestrated events of that evening, nothing happened that was
anything less than reassuring and even encouraging.
The Johnson Endorsement
The Democratic Committee assembled for its previously scheduled meeting
at 2:00 p.m., Sunday, November 19th at the New Hampshire Highway Motel, Concord.
The meeting was set to closely follow the "unity" reception held the previous
Friday evening. Undaunted by the lack of an endorsement of President Johnson
by Senator Edward Kennedy, the Johnson leaders now sought to convert the
Democratic State Committee into the Johnson write-in campaign organization.
In order to do this Boutin had to secure the endorsement of the State Committee.
The Democratic State Committ'-^e was then composed of the officers of
the ten county committees; additional members based on county population and
for counties casting a majority vote for the gubernatorial nominee in the
most recent state election; present and past party chairmen; major elected
officials, and the immediate past candidates for statewide or national
elected office. Of the approximately seventy persons eligible to vote in a
State Com.mittee meeting, twenty-eight were on hand for the November 17th
meeting.
1.19
TlK- r.solulicn
.iraU.d by tl.o National Co.nnu t t:ee,„an
.osopl> MllU.onl:.
vas in..oauc-.a by Covcvno. Kin, and seconded by Senator McTnty.e. Supporting
the resolutions. King said, 'Mohnson is in the company of greatness and is not
the first president to lose public opinion because of an unpopular war.
Of course lus popularity is dwindling, but he wasn't elected to please all of
the people all of the ti.e." King went on to compare Johnson's war problems
with those of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.
-We elected him because we had faith in l,is ability to lead this country and
to do the rigl^t thing, popular or not." He concluded by vowing strong support
of the President for re-election, "When the chips are down, the people of
this country will realize the fact of life that this man, in four years, has
done more in the way of concrete accomplishments for this country than any
other president in history. Tliis is the man who has had the tenacity and
determination that perservered in the great struggle in Vietnam at the cost
of his own personal poimlarity. And in tliat situation he is in the company
of greatness. For this is not indeed the first time that a president of the
United States faced this very same situation."
"I cheer President Johnson for upholding and maintaining that honor in
the face of the worst personal abuse any President ever had to endure. In
South Vietnam the United States has made a solemn commitment to stop communist
agression, and tliat commitment is a matter of our national honor."
The debate continued for almost an hour. Those opposed to the endorsement
resolution arg.ued the issue on two grouiuhs. The first was their disagreement
with the administration's war policy and the second was the argument in favor
of an open primary and again£;t endorsements.
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n .an argued thnf without an endor.cmeat, individuals could support
whom th.y
.i.hcd and the ,arty structure would remain accessible to all its
members. An endorseraent would shut out those in opposition at a tl.e when each
and every Democrat was needed in order to elect the nominated ticket in tne
fall,
The endorsement resolution was approved by a vote of 23-5. In spite of
the vote a victory of sorts had been won. Five members of the Democratic
State Committee voted in opposition to the party leadership's resolution.
What had been a desire to explore alternatives on the part of the
McCarthy group now became a resolve. The language of the Democratic State
Committee resolution and the arguments of those who supported its adoption
grated their sensitivities. The endorsement meant that for all intents and
purposes the state Democratic Party was now the Johnson organization. Those
not willing to support Johnson's renomination or even those concerned about
the issues while still wanting to remain within the party, had no room to
maneuver. For those who had been considering a McCarthy for Prer-ident
organization this would be the last time for many months that they would share
the Democratic Party as friends.
The Re-Regist ration Problem
One of the McCarthy Committee objectives was to organize a campaign to
encourage the re-registration of Republicans as Democrats during the re-
registration period set by law. In 1963 New Hampshire maintained a
rather tightly regulated party registration system.
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Mcbcshlp in a party by fact ot registration or previous non-parMcipation
in a primary and, therefore, status as an independent, were voting re,aire,nents
m order for a person registered as a Kepublican to participate in the
Democratic presidential primary that person would have to have re-registered
as a Democrat ninety (90) days prior to the primary election date.
The re-registration period opened for the 1968 presidential primary
early in December and was to end December 12, 1957/ This would be the only
time that either Democrats or Republicans could switch their registration in
order to make them eligible to vote in the opposite party's primary. In
their preliminary planning the committee felt that it would be important to
have the McCarthy campaign sufficiently organzied so that they could get some
Republicans to change their party registration. The committee hoped that these
nominal Republicans might feel that their vote would have greater dissenting
impact when cast directly against the administration, in the Democratic
primary, rather than for some Republican candidate.
Unfortunately, re-registration was a difficult process. T:ie voting lists
are maintained by uncompensated Supervisors of the Checklists who are required
to "sit" for the purpose of receiving re-registration requests during periods
defined by the law. These periods vary in duration and number, and are deter-
mined by the population size of the voting precinct. Also to be considered
was the fact that in New Hampshire the voting machinery, with few exceptions,
is controlled by locally elected supervisors who are usually Republicans. The
closed registration system favored the majority party and changes in that
system that would iiuake it VAora open were resisted by the majority party.
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Orj-anl^InK
^ s 1 );u.i f f cant rc-rogisLraL ion drive would have roquired a
...ajor offorL on the i)ai I oi" Ll.c McCarthy Stoorin^^ Comrnitteo, To bo successful
there would have to be an actual candidate ready and willing to challenge
Lyndon John.son in New Hampshire. On the Republican side. Governor George
Komncy was orfcring that attraction to both the real and noininal Republicans
upset with the Johnson administration.
The Committee estimated that they might be able to rc-register 4-5,000
Republicans if they were successful in making known the existence of the
re-registral ion period by publicizing the actual times, dates, and places of
re-registration. On this latter point, it was not unusual fot the supervisors
to select difficult times to comply with the iaw. Saturday evenings and dates
in the middle of long-weekend holidays were often the times selected for re-
registration. Only the most dedicated and persistent of those wishing to
re-register bothered to take the trouble.
The independent is a voter of one of several types. The independent could
be a new voter who had just reached the voting age of 21 years and registered
for the first time, a recent arrival to the state, or a person who had not
previously voted in a primary election. Under the closed primary rules of
1968, an inde]>endent seeking to vote in the primary election, had to select
a party ballot and tliereby became designated as a registrant in that party.
Later he or she could chang.e parties by following the re-registration pro-
cedure, but independent status, like virginity, could not be restored once
It was lost. For reasons, botli personal and political, this rule had dis-
couraged participation by the sl/.able pool of Independents wlio by definition
had i^ot previously voted in a partisan primary.
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Ncvortholess In every pr.I.n.ny rlecLlon, some i ,ulepondont:s did j^ivo up
Lheir status to participate in th. primary of the party of their ehoice. To
r,ot them to do this for a particuiar candidate is one of the important
strategies that both parties and all candidates attempt during a primary
season.
The outcome of the re-registration effort was more successful than the
committed had expected. Although Senator McCarthy did not announce his entry
Into the New Hampshire primary until long after the end of the re-registration
period, his November 30th announcement of candidacy did prompt a significant
increase in the number of re-registrations from Republican to Democrat. The
committee estimated that upwards of 5,000 persons entered the Democratic
Parly and that a majority of these did so to vote for Senator McCarthy.
McCarthy A Presidential Candidate
While the New Hampshire McCarthy Steering Committee was pursuing its
organizational objectives, McCarthy was preparing to announce his presidential
candidacy in Washington. E.W. (NED) Kenworthy, writing in the November 25th
edition of the New Ropubj_i_c, reviewed what Senator McCarthy liad been up to
during the period f rom "November 9 to 13." McCarthy had visited five important
states (New York, Minnesota, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Illinois) testing
sentiment and gathering pledges of financial support for what McCarthy then
described as his "personal confrontation" of Johnson's Vietnam policy. Ken-
wortliy wrote:
by the end of tliosc^ five days the Minnesota Democrat had
reached, if h\i hac; not done so earlier, the jjoint of no
return
.
lie would still be contactipg, hi'^ senatorial colleagues, such as the Kennedy
brothers and VJi sconsin ' s CayJord Nelson who was facing re-election, before
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.alcing ..o f.nal decision. But unle.s these leaders and his close potential
associates objected strenuously McCarthy would announce his candidacy.
So.eti.e prior to November 30th. McCarthy concluded his preliminary search
for support and co:B.itted hi.self to that "personalised alten.ative. " W.en he
entered the Senate Caucus Roo. to .ake his announcement at a press conference,
It was a sense of the personification of protest that surrounded hi.. He was'
a rallying point, a vehicle for dissent on the war, a spokesman with standing
and credibility. He was not, however, viewed by himself or by many others as
being viable as a candidate for the presidency.
The press conference was notably low-key. He began his announcement by
not saying that he was a candidate for the presidency but saying:
"I intend to enter the Democratic primaries in four states, Wis-
consin, Oregon, California, and Nebraska. The decision with re-ference to Massachusetts and also New Hampshire will be made
within the next tv/o or three weeks.
In the remainder of his statement, he set forth the tone of his effort, making
clear that he was not a candidate in conventional terms.
Since I first said that I thought the issue of Vietnam and the is-
sues related to it should be raised in the primaries of the country
I ^ have talked with Democratic leaders from about 25 to 26 states.
I've talked particularly to candidates for re-election to the Senate-
Democratic candidates—some House members and also to students on
campus and to other people throughout the country.
My decision to challenge the President's position and the Adminis-
tration position has been strengthened by evident intention to
escalate and to intensify the war in Vietnam and on the other hand
the absence of any positive indication or suggestion for a compro-
mise or for the negotiated political settlement.
I am concerned that the Administration seems to have set no limit to
the price which it's willing to pay for a military victory. Let roe
summarize the cost of the war up to this point;
The physical destruction of much of a small and weak nation by mili-
tary operation of the most pov/erful nation in the world.
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Our Inimlii'd t 1\(hi;;.iiu1 to ISO, 000 civilian r.i;;u,i 1 ( 1 in Sonl li Vlclna
alone, Io :;ay nolliin)-, ot I iu- di'sl luc I i on of lllc and propcrLy in
Norl.li VJi}Lnaiu.
The upj-oot Inr. and the rrnctiirlnp, of the st-riicLtirc of t he society
of South Vietnam where one-fourth to one-third of the population
are now reporteil to he refuRecs.
For I lie United Stat(\-; as of yesterday over lb, 000 (oiiihat dead and
nearly 95,000 wounded t hroupji November.
A monthly expenditure in jiurrailt of the war aiuoun t i nj', somewhere
between $2 billion ami $i billion.
1 am also concerned about the beariuji; ol tlie war on other areas of
the United States responsibility, both at home and abroad.
The failure to appropriate adecpiate funds for the povt-rty pro)',ram
here, lor housing, for education and to meet other national ni-eds
and the prospect of additional cuts as a condition to llie possible
passap.e of the surtax bill.
The drastic reduction of our foreign aid program in other parts of
the world.
A dangerous rise in inflation and one of the indirect and serious
consequences of our involvement in Vietnam, tlie devaluation of tlie
British pound, whicli in many respects is more important east of Sue?-
today than I lie l^ritish Navy,
In addition, t liero is growing evidence of a deepening, moral crisis
in America—discontent and frustration and a disposition to take
extralegal if not illegal action to manifest protest.
I am hopeful that this challenge which I am making,, which T hope
will be supi^orted by other members of the Senate and other poli-
ticians, may alleviate at least in some degree this sense of
political helplessness and restore to many people a belief in tlie
processes of American politics and of American Government.
The college campuses especial ly-on those campuses—and also among
adult thoughtful Americans, that it may counter the growing sense of
alienation from politics which I think is currently reflected in a
tendency t witiidraw from tlie political action, to talk of nonparti-
clpation, to b(-come cynical and to make threats ol support for third
parties or fourth parties or other irregular political movements.
I do not see In my move any great threat to the unity and stren)',th
of the Democratic party, whatever that unity may be today and what-
ever streng.lh it may be.
The issue of the war in Vietnam is not really a separate issue
but one tlK.t must \u- dealt with in the configuration
of other
problems to which It is related. It is within this broader context
that 1 intend to make tlic case to the people of the United States.
126
lo say that I m a. I'm sure I shall be charr,ed- 1 am not forpeace at any price, but for an honorable, rational and political
solution to this war, a solution which I believe will enhance ourworld position encourage the respect of our allies and our potentialadversaries, which will permit us to give the necessary attentionto other commitments both at home and abroad, military and non-
military and leave us with resources and moral energy to deal
effectively with the pressing domestic problems of the United Statesitself
.
In this— this total effort— I believe we can restore to this nation
a clearer sense of purpose and of dedication to the achievement of
our traditional purpose as a great nation in the 10th century.
The statement and McCarthy's response to the questions that followed
constitute important political documentation of his attitude toward the
venture. As Warren Weaver reported in his New York Times article that day,
"During a bantering, low-key news conference, the Minnesota Senator never
actually declared himself a candidate for president or contended that he
could deprive the President of the nomination. Re viewed his function as
being that of the vehicle, the personification, that would make it possible
to manifest the extent of the national concern—a concern he saw as dividing
the young from their parents, the campuses from their communities, the
present from the future. It was not possible simply to vote "no" on the
issue of the renomination of the President as Wisconsin offered. There had
to be a focal point, a name, but not a great deal more, and certainly not a
candidate projecting the impression that he expected to displace the President.
McCarthy did say, "...I don't mean to draw off at any point, and I think
this challenge v7ould have to go all the way to a challenge for the nomination
for the presidency. It may not be me at that point. It may be someone else,
but so fas as the end result of the effort, I think it has now to go to the
point of trying to change the policy and direction and also tlie mood of
9
America... It was a modest beginning marked by realistic language tied
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to the accept t-d wisdom tb.r.t a sitting president was impossihlo to displace
if that president wished to seek renominat ion . One questioner, in fact,
asked if McCarthy's move wasn't actually political suicide, to which McCarthy
replied, "not suicide but it might be execution.
The crucible of the New Hampshire primary would change the tone of the
McCarthy effort but the essence remained. McCarthy was responding to a call.
There was a spontaneous national uprising that needed a point around which
to organize. The movement needed someone who sensed the urgency of the time;
v/ho could give voice to the senses, who could respond to the vitality of the
concern, and would remain solid when faced with pressures to adjust from within
as well as from without. McCarthy did not describe a traditional political
role for himself. He was there because he was willing to respond to the
call. That was the only condition. To become a candidate in the traditional
sense was not possible in 1967. To have said, "I announce my candidacy for
president and I expect to be nominated and elected to that office" would
have been a false and misleading statement totally out of step with the
needs of the moment. The insincer '..ty of that statement would have driven
away the very support which had created the conditions of the draft. There
were those who faulted McCarthy in his announcement for his lack of passion,
charisma, and firebrand dedication to the cause. They were seeking a leader
to speak with their own sense of urgency, an amplification of their concerns,
rather than a political educator, one capable of expanding the constituency
of dissent with effective arguments and carefully put questions.
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The reaction to the announcement was extensive though widely varied.
The New York Times editorialized:
The decision of Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota to challenge
Johnson in the Democratic Presidential primaries now enables those
who dissent from the administration's policy in Vietnam to find
political expression for their convictions...
.
It is highly unlikely that President Johnson can be denied renomination
if he wants it. Senator McCarthy's more optimistic supporters argue
that if he should be successful in the primaries, such a show of
strength might impel President Johnson to withdraw voluntarily
to prevent a hopeless split with the party. We believe this kind of
reasoning to be based on a complete misreading of Mr. Johnson's
temperament. He is not a man likely to quit under fire.
But it is true that the nation's policy can only be changed by political
methods. How the Vietnam issue is fought out within each party and
between the two parties in the coming year will go far toward deter-
mining the shape of American policy in the next presidential term.
Since Senator McCarthy is a thoughtful, responsible man, he can be
expected to clarify the alternatives in Vietnam and usefully contribute
to the complex political proces^^by which the American people make
up their minds on great issues.
Not quite believing what they were seeing, the mystics of the national
press began to probe immediately for the hidden McCarthy agenda and the
personal moti^^es of his action. The first theme, that of the "stalking
horse" for some othe candidate, usually considered to be Senator Robert F.
Kennedy, was the most persistent early press question. McCarthy did not fully
allay that contention in his press conference when he said that he had
talked with Senator Kennedy about his decision to oppose the President and
Kennedy "had not tried to dissuade him." He indicated that Kennedy was his
second choice as a Johnson challenger. "I would have been glad if he had
moved early. I think if he had, thcre'd have been no need for me to do
anything."
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The New Hampshire and regional newspapers gave McCarthy's announcement
prominent coverage. Major stories appeared in the Boston and New Hampshire
newspapers. The Boston Herald-Traveler ran a large headline, "McCarthy Tests
LBJ in A Primaries," with a column head "Seeks Reaction on War Policy."
::he Christian Science Monitor headline read, "McCarthy Rallies War Critics."
The New Hampshire newspapers ran page one stories with headlines like that in
the ValJey News, "McCarthy is Going to Run" or the Daily Dartmouth 's headline,
"McCarthy Challenges LBJ for Presidency." But inside stories often concentrated
on other themes such as Raymond Lahr ' s UPI article headed in the Valley News,
"Is McCarthy Running Interference for Challenge by Bobby Kennedy?" His lead
paragraph read, "Democratic leaders wondered today whether Senator Eugene J.
McCarthy's presidential candidacy was simply clearing the way for Senator
Robert F. Kennedy to challenge President Johnson in 1968." In Relman Morin's
article in the Herald Traveler
, dated 12/1/67, headlined "McCarthy Offers a
Choice" the lead read, "Senator Eugene J. McCarthy's decision to challenge
President Johnson in four Presidential primaries could polarize the movements
of dissident Democrats already under way in a number of states to block the
renomination of tlie President next year."
The announcement had been received well. It vjas serious news from a
serious man who was challenging the President. The "stalking horse" theme was
carried with the story but as a minor element. Editorial reaction reinforced
the seriousness of the announcement. The tone was one of the "test" which
McCarthy was prepared to make rather than promulgating an aggressive candidacy.
Even the "stalking liorse" theme took on a jaded aspect when surrogates for
the administration, accused McCarthy of being a front runner for Kennedy. The
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N£Al_YcAl]L_Po?t corricd a story !>.adl:ined, "Connally Hits McCarthy as RFK
Front." "Gov. Connally ol" Texas charged today that Sen. McCarthy is a
"stalking horse" for the Presidential aspirations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy..
His (Connally' s) charges came after his W.ite House meeting Wednesday with
JohnsonV'3 "The stalking horse" theme did stimulate interest in the McCarthy
activity. It is possible that without the sub-plot and the reportorial
sniffing for intrigue, the McCarthy story might well have died during the
next month when there was little for the reporters to cover except the
preliminaries of a newly born political venture.
Newsday
_^ Nick Thimmesch in a December 1, 1967 column headlined "McCarthy
Aides the Crux," identified an ultimately more important theme:
The "McCarthy for President" movement has an attractive candidate,
a lively issue, the promise of plenty of money and the immediate problem
of developing an effective campaign apparatus.
The celebrated Minnesota Senator made his big splash yesterday by
announcing that he would enter four primar ies ... Today , his staffers
and supporters are busy arranging schedules and organization in a score
of states in addition to those where he will definitely be on the ballot.
Until that organization is formed, McCarthy must rely largely on
the Conference of Concerned Democrats and similar groups uuich have
been pushing a "Dump Johnson" movement for two m.onths....
The Senator has not signed on any issues specialists and relies on
staffers and friends in universities and in the military for advice on
his principal issue, Vietnam. At this point he does not have a staff of
the dimension usually required for a presidential primary campaign. . . .
At the end of McCarthy's announcement session yesterday, v/here the
Senator showed good wit and poise, a man long associated with liberal
causes remarked: "Gene was great today, but he's so casual about
organization. Vietnam is the big issue and lots of people are for
him. The question is whether he can get well enough organized to make
some impact 1"^
Later in this campaign, as in most others, to show that one was an early
supp(jrter of a candidate became a form of intra-campaign one-upmanship. In
the McCarthy campaign, two themes were Important. The most prominent was
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«mN,i or "for «.CrtUy before Now Hampshire." Tho
,.l«,.ost order of ,„crl.
was to be "for McCarthy before MeCartby."
Thim,„esch and other,, inventoried the support that existed In eaeh of
the states where McCarthy would definitely run. What they found was tapresslve
McCarthy would have to "rely" as Ti^esch put it, on these "groups" until
he built his own orsanizatlon. What he „,issed was that building his own
organization had, to a great extent, already been accomplished. This was
a legitimate draft. Organizations were really seeking a candidate, whereas
usually candidates stimulate organizations to support what they already
have firmly in mind.
Thimmesch wrote:
On the West Coast, McCarthy's initial support is the California
Democratic Council, headed by Gerald N. Hill and Edmond Gerald Brown Jr
son of former Governor "Pat" Brown; California Congressman Donbdwards, and former Oregon Democratic State Chairman Howard Morgan.
In Wisconsin, where McCarthy is popular, Donald 0. Peterson, Democratic
chairman of the 10th Congressional District Committee, is the organizer
The key men in the New York effort are reformers—Attv. Allard K.
Lowenstein, Assemblyman Jerome Kretchmer, City Councilman Ted Weiss and
Ronald Eldridge. McCarthy also has the backing of Michigan's most
publicized dissenter from Johnson's Vietnam policy, Zolton Ferency, who
recently resigned as state chairman.
A "Citizens for McCarthy" group is active in New Hampshire under the
leadership of David Hooh (sic), former assistant to Gov. John W. King
and Sen. Thomas J. Mclntyre.
. .
.
He (McCarthy) would also like to get supplemental support in the form
of favorite son candidacies from three s>Tnpathetic Senate colleagues:
Indiana's Vance Hartke, Ohio's Stephen Young and South Dakota's
George McGovern. Invitations to speak are pouring into McCarthy's
office. His first campaign speech will be delivered to the Conference of
Concerned Democrats, who are already believers, in Chicago tomorrow.
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lUnl, Covon,or J„„n W. Kinc and Son.nto,: J. Hdntyre vore contacted
f.. tl,.U- reaction to the McCarthy a„nounce,.,e„t. King was asRcd whothcr
he agreed with Senator Robert Kennedy when Kennedy said he thought McCarthy's
decision "would be good for the Dirfv Vnr.^ • , t, ^h l r.ne pa ty. King said he disagreed with Kennedy.
"My inclination is to support the President. I have complete confidence that
the .an who has led this country with vigor and determination and unshakable
courage for the past four years will be re-elected for another four year term.
Mclntyre said that, "he. Governor King, and the members of the New
Hampshire State Deniocratic Committee will 'do our best' to make sure Senator
McCarthy 'gets as few votes as possible' if he enters the state presidential
primary. The only McCarthy New Hampshire people know about is the late one"-
referring to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin.
"It poses the threat of early injury to the President," Mclntyre noted,
"it doesn't take too much for the news media to read into the results a
possible threat to the President." But he added, "his own polls and readings
indicated New Hampshire was quite hawkish though he did sense some build-up
for a move to get out of Vietnam." He estimated a turnout of 40,000 of the
state's 87,000 registered Democratic voters and thought that would be a good
showing.
Earlier, Mclntyre had projected that the most McCarthy could expect to
receive in the primary was "3,000 to 5,000 votes!' This statement became
an early target for the McCarthy campaigners who could then say that anything
above Mclntyre 's prediction of 3-5,000 votes would have to be considered
significant.
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jtatus of Lhc Cam2aj^; Early Deceinh^
The. combination of the announcement of McCarthy's national candidacy, the
surge of various state activities for McCarthy and the publicity given the Decem-
ber 1st weekend Conference of Concerned Democrats began to stir the smoldering
dissident Democrats' fire. 19 The Conference of Concerned Democrats had brought
the activities and individuals of the state organizations in contact with the
national press. Reports and columns were written about the conference. As an
example. Paul R, Wieck (one of the more perceptive of those reporting the early
months of the campaign), wrote in the New Republic ;
In many respects, the Chicago weekend offered a study of the stren^^hts
and weaknesses of the McCarthy movement punctuated by a series of "ifs."
"If" the mood of the electorate is really such that a major effort
can be made to deny renomination of President Johnson, a good starthas been made.
This will be answered early — by the v/orking class Catholics in
Massachusetts and, possibly, New Hampshire; by the farmers in Wis-
consin and Nebraska; by the Negroes in the ghettoes of Milx^aukee
and Boston; by the white collar workers in the Boston suburbs.
If the answer is "yes, the mood is there," Senator McCarthy v/ill
assuredly return to Chicago next summer with a sizable block of
delegates in as much as the Democratic Party's structure, outside
Chicago and a few machine-oriented states in the Northeast, is, at
best, a shell. It wouldn't resist a massive, well-funded effort
riding the crest of a voter mood. Thanks, in part, to the way
President Johnson has run, or failed to run, the Democratic Na-
tional Committee.
If the answer, is "yes" one can expect top officials in the party to
come forth as the months roll by.
Its long-range significance could be to recharge the batteries of a
tired party structure and convert it in many areas into a vehicle
responsive to the will of the electorate.
If Senator McCarthy accomplishes nothing more than this, he will have
made a valuable contribution. Much now rests with him.
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gates!
translated Into convention dele-
The beginnings
- by just beginnings - were to be found in Chicagothe first weekend in December. 20 ^n
When uncertain campaign workers read encouraging stories, such as above,
in influential national magazines and they began reading similar analyses in the
columns of their daily newspapers and saw the networks extensively cover their
early national meetings, confidence was created, l^en the New Hampshire trave-
lers returned home from Chicago to find editorial support in their local news-
papers the recharge was iimnediate. Under the headline "An Overnight Phenomenon,"
the Concord Daily Monitor wrote in its lead editorial December 5, 1967:
A person can rise to national prominence in this country in a
surprisingly short time.
The latest example is Senator Eugene McCarthy, endorsed as a
Democratic candidate for the party's nomination for President
by dissenters to the policies of President Johnson
Accentuating the rapidly spreading awareness of his presence as
a national figure is the degree to which it has evoked concern
by the Democratic regulars who support the President's presumed
ambition to succeed himself.
The loud cries of pain, especially from Senator Mclntyre of New
Hampshire, and Governor King's studied efforts to dismiss Sena-
tor McCarthy as a nonentity, belie their expresses confidence in
the President's cause.
Related is the release of Secretary of Defense McNamara at this
particular moment and the subtle drawing back of Senator Robert
Kennedy from his unconditional endorsement of President John-
son's candidacy.
McCarthy has been boosted by those with whom he dissents to the
position of stalking the nomination for Senator Kennedy, whether
he planned it that way or not....
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hor'es" '"f' —'-^Un, Do.nocrats to change
He favors free choice by Democrats of their party leadership
su:h1r::S::!^ "
^"-^ inspirational lanUI in s^p^^J?
His personal political future seems to be of no concern to himwh.ch 3.S one reason he has already attracted a respectab^^ l^oliowing,
On the same day, December 5th, Louis Harris released his latest poll
which showed that "Senator Eugene McCarthy would lose a nationwide primary
battle against President Johnson for the Democratic nomination for President
almost 4 to 1 if it were held today'.'
The survey showed that a national cross section of Democrats preferred
Johnson by 63 percent to McCarthy with 17 percent and 20 percent were unde-
cided
.
The story went on to say:
McCarthy runs weakest in precisely those regions where his backershave been urging him to confront Mr. Johnson. In the East, in-
cluding New Hampshire and Massachusetts, McCarthy trails by 72 to
11 percent. In the Midwest, including Wisconsin, the Senator has
a 67 to 19 percent disadvantage....
Mr Jolmson makes his poorest showing against McCarthy in the South,
where LBJ leads by 54 to 20 percent with 26 percent undecided
It should be pointed out that the results represent the situation
at a time of weakness for any challenger
—before he has had an
opportunity to develop as a serious alternative in the public mind.
How much the Senator could gain on the President would depend partly
on the kind of campaign he waged, the support he could organize and
what happened to the prevailing mood about the Vietnam war, likely
to be the principal issue of any such confrontation.
The potential for which McCarthy might aspire was recorded by
Senator Robert Kennedy of New York in the Harris survey when he
led President Jolmson in preference for the Democratic nomination
by 52 to 32 percent. The gaps between McCarthy's initial support
and Kennedy's demonstrated support are greatest among young people,
Negroes, women and Catholics.
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i...ht: n,ako a contest: of a campaign against PresiLnt John;on!23
From these accounts could be read important implications. The first was
that a 17 percent level of favorable recognition was reported five days after
an announcement of candidacy which was not preceded by the usual pre-announce-
ment build-up. This indicated an important foundation of support. The sizable
undecided percentage was also encouraging, considering a campaign had not
begun. Thirdly, the early comparison between Johnson and Kennedy indicated
that Johnson's 63 percent against McCarthy was anything but rock hard. In
fact the hard commit.nent to Johnson was only at the 37 percent level. The
fourth, and most important implication, was that to strike an early blow
McCarthy would have to enter and do well in one of the states where he was
perceived by the poll to have a difficult contest. Given the size of the swing
vote to Kennedy and percent undecided, such a contest, even if in conservative
New Hampshire, might be impossible for McCarthy. Certainly a campaign could
succeed beyond the 10 percent or "3,000 to 5,000" vote level that Senator
Mclntyre predicted would be necessary in order to be considered significant.
The problem remained one of convincing McCarthy to run in New Ha.-ipshire.
McCarthy's December 14 and 15 New Hampshire Visit
At the Chicago meeting with McCarthy the New Hampshire delegation
pressed an invitation to him to visit New Hampshire and to do so as a lecturer
in a University of New Hampshire sponsored series. He accepted the invitation
and came to New Hampshire December lA. His first contact with the New Hampshire
public was through a lecture before an audience of 1,500 at the V/ayfarer Con-
vention Center, just outside Manchester. His second was a meeting with potential
supporters and the McCarttiy for President Steering Committee. As he entered the
living room in vv-hich the meeting was being held, McCarthy said, "This looks like
a goveriiinent in exile."
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David
.,oeh Introduce. McCan:hy by saying.
-Toni.ht we have had a chance
to hear you .peak, now we would liKe to tell you what we see are your chances
m New Hampshire and what we would like to do for you in this prinury."
The Steering Cotn.ittee had been working hard during the past several
weeks. The news fron, the Chicago meeting, McCarthy's announcement and the New
Hampshire Democratic State Committee's endorsement of the Johnson renomination
had stirred great interest in McCarthy in New Hampshire. One of the first persons
Hoeh asked to speak was Dennis Sullivan, recently elected as Mayor of the city
of Nashua. A maverick Democrat who had taken a leave from his job as a postal
clerk to run for Mayor, Sullivan professed to reflect the view of the New
Hampshire workingman. Sullivan was the senior elected official in the room.
Although he had not been involved in the McCarthy activity, he was attracted
to the m.eeting by his opposition to the Johnson administration and the re-
nomination endorsement of the Democratic State Committee. His comments about
the impact of a possible New Hampshire McCarthy effort were disjointed and
confusing. He was clear, however, in his view that it was desirable to confront
the Democratic Party organization of the State. He concluded by saying that
he did not want to give McCarthy a bum steer. He did not think McCarthy's
anti-war position would be well received in New Hampshire and advised him not
to stake too much on a New Hampshire race. Issues of intra-party "fair play",
and adverse reactions to the Johnson administration and New Hampshire Democratic
Party heavy-handedness
, he felt, were more likely to produce results.
Others, like David Underwood of Concord, Jack Holland of Bedford/Man-
chester, Paul McEachern, Deputy Mayor of Portsmouth, Jean Wallin, Nashua State
Representative, Joseph VVelton, Nashua Democratic Party Cliairman, Ron O'Callaghan,
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Democratic Party activist of Laconia, were basically positive toward the
prospects of a live candidacy and about the organizations they could generate
for such a candidacy in their communities. John Wiseman, a Keene State College
history professor, recounted the independent organizing efforts that were already
well under way in his city. Without prodding from outside, Keene Citizens had
begun a series of activities aimed at focussing public opinion on the impact of
the Vietnam war and toward expressing that concern through the New Hampshire
Presidential Primary. Petitions were being circulated, teach-ins held, and
antn-war activities were regularly scheduled. A broad organization of
community and college persons was already spreading outward from Keene to the
smaller towns of surrounding Cheshire County.
Wiseman wanted McCarthy to enter and said that his organization was
prepared to support the effort. He said that a live candidacy was more
attractive to his committee than the write-in campaign for a reluctant
Robert Kennedy. His account of the Keene effort showed that such activity
would also increase the size of the sympathetic audience even though their
early activities had been met with serious establishment resistance.
The most startling comments of the evening came from John Teague,
member of a prominent New Hampshire Republican family. Teague, an Amherst
College senior, head of the Amherst College McCarthy for President group,
had become a Democrat much to the surprise of his conservative Republican
father. "Students" he said, "are tired of protests. They are tired of
sit-ins and women pushing baby carriages in protest marches. They are tired
of burning their draft cards, and all of the usual kinds of war protests. We
want to push th(; political system just as hard as it can be pushed to see
if we can accomplisli anything." He concluded by urging Senator McCartliy to be
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a serious cnnd ulate for the presidency and to say that he is running for
president.
.'k this happens and young people get the message clearly, then
'
thousands will join the campalgn.-^^ With these words, league had captured the
mood of the evening. Perhaps having McCarthy as the personification of the
war issue, the focal point of protest, would not be enough. McCarthy had to
becon,e a serious candidate for the presidency. If he entered the New Hampshire
primary he would need to understand that that would be a consequence.
Macy Morse, a Nashua mother of eleven sons, two of whom had served
in Vietnam, recounted how disturbed her boys were with what was going on over
ther and how concerned she was about the fate ahead for others of her family if
the war continued. She urged McCarthy to run in New Hampshire, but, more
2 Simportantly, to run hard.
A Manchester man who introduced himself as a Republican said that he
would support McCarthy, if McCarthy ran in New Hampshire, and that he expected
many other Republicans would do the same. In reply the Senator said, "Yes,
at this point there is no indication that the Republican Party will come up with
anyone better than the present administration."
"My purpose in announcing my candidacy in November was threefold. First,
I want to challenge the administration's course in Vietnam and to bring about a
public debate or discourse on the issue. Secondly, I want to bring about a
change in the present administration. And third, I want to be elected President
of the United States."
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McCarthy's voice dropped n bU when he added his third purpose as
though the woids were not as fa.niliar to hin, as "challenge" and "debate."
Perhaps this addition ca,.e as an innnediate response to John league's direct
challenge to McCarthy himself.
With the exception of Mayor Sullivan's early consents, the tone of the
remarks had been serious, positive, and encouraging. Little had been glossed
over. McCarthy had to know from the comments that New Hampshire would be
tought but that he could count on the support of a considerable group of
experienced workers. With this as background, Hoeh felt safe in turning to
the Steering Committee's skeptic, Peter Freedman.
Freedman began by telling McCarthy that he didn't think McCarthy would
do well among the blue collar New Hampshire workers. He recounted conversations
he had had in the past weeks with Manchester Democratic millworkers who
thought McCarthy was Joe McCarthy, and that the best solution to the Vietnam
situation would be to "bomb it off the face of the earthl'^^ McCarthy responded
by saying, "No, I don't imagine I will do well with the labor vote. I don't
think I will do well with them in Minnesota either, but I don't think it will
be much of a problem." But in the final analysis, if he did get the Democratic
nomination, we felt the labor vote would go either to him or George Wallace,
rather than to the Republican candidate. McCarthy also said that he would
not consider running as a third party candidate and was not at all interested
28in that prospect.
Freedman went on with his account of the informal polls he had taken
among liis workers in both the Democratic cities of Manchester and Claremont.
Both samplings showed that his workers held "hawk" positions on the war. He
141
concludod wltli the queslloiu "ScMiator, don't you tl.ink you should have a poll
before deciding whether to enter the New Hampshire Primary?" McCarthy reflected
a moment, then said, "No, I don't think so, I think a poll would be very dis-
couraging." This comment seemed to capsulize the nature of his effort and
unified the gatherings' commitment to liim in one quite prophetic response.
The Senator then asked several questions concerning when a decision on
entering New Hampshire would have to be made. David Roberts, Dartmouth College
professor and member of the Draft Robert Kennedy Committee, said that an organ-
izational meeting would be held on December 28th and that that would be the
final date before their organization would be fully committed. Roberts added
that he felt that organizing two conflicting anti-Johnson efforts could not
work. In his mind it was clear that if McCarthy entered the New Hampshire
30Primary the Draft R.F.K. movement would shift to the McCarthy candidacy.
In response to a question concerning New Hampshire specifically,
McCarthy said, "You know the New Hampshire electorate is known to be somewhat
michievous in nature. I don't really know how we would do here. My time is
very much committed to the Wisconsin campaign and I planned to make a trip
to the Far East stopping over in Saigon and Japan. I will have to let you
..31know later.
Hoeh was about to bring the session to a close when McCarthy said
that he greatly appreciated the meeting and that it had given him a great
deal to consider. He then said, "I had better leave before I do something
32
rash." The meeting ended.
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The N.W lla,npshlre leaders had thought that the meeting had gone
exceptionally well. The right tone had been maintained. A frank discussion
of New Hampshire, its political problems and potential had been accomplished
in a way that showed McCarthy the sincerity of those who would be the activists.
All of the hard questions concerning McCarthy himself as a candidate, and
New Hampshire as a test of his candidacy had been raised. McCarthy's responses
were thoughtful, perceptive, and reassuring, not concerning his decision as
to whether he would enter New Hampshire, but his competence as a candidate.
The big question remained were they closer to a positive decision from
McCarthy about New Hampshire?
The_Campaign Strategy and Schedule Proposed to McCarthy
Inspite of the success of the December 14 and 15 visit to New Hampshire
McCarthy was overheard to say to David Halberstam, then writing for Harper's
magazine, that he was not inclined to enter the New Hampshire primary. Hearing
this David Hoeh and his co-leader, Gerry Studds, were determined to present
the argument once more as to why McCarthy should enter the New Hampshire primary
They had been urged by McCarthy's Administrative Assistant, Jerry Eller, to
contact McCarthy's newly named campaign manager Blair Clark. McCarthy, Clark,
and others would be making final decision regarding which primaries to enter
In the days remaining before the end of the year.
Studds agreed to draft a memorandum and schedule summarizing how
the campaign might be conducted. Hoeh agreed to telephone Blair Clark.
To make contact with Clark was difficult. No campaign headquarters had
been established, nor were there campaign telephones. Clark was travelling
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cxtonsivoJy t:o ,.cet with campaign committees in the states where McCarthy
had said he would campaign, and spending the remainder of his time between
his New York City apartment and the Senator's Washington office. Hoeh left
messages in all conceivable places hoping that Clark would return a call or
that with luck Hoeh might catch him at one spot or the other. Failing in
these attempts, Hoeh then placed all of their hope in the arguments of the
memorandum that Studds was drafting.
Hoeh received the draft of the memo from Studds on approximately
December 20th and reviewed it with Studds on the telephone. It contained all
of their contentions and the schedule and was titled, "Senator McCarthy and
The New Hampshire Primary". Hoeh mailed it to Senator McCarthy December 22
with the following covering letter. A copy of the memo and the letter was
also addressed to Blair Clark in care of the Senator's office. The letter
read
:
Dear Senator McCarthy:
Since your recent visit to New Hampshire Gerry Studds and I have
discussed the possibility of your campaign in New Hampshire
and have attempted to summarize the time requirement and the
mechanism of such a campaign.
Gerry is responsible for the statistical work enclosed and for
drafting the analyzed schedule. We think that this schedule coupled
with strong internal and external media support, direct mail, and
telephone canvass will produce the desired result. The organization
is ready to go and prepared to program each of the campaign elements.
Since the enclosed was prepared, the New Hampshire Attorney General
ruled that permission must be secured from a candidate before funds
may be solicited or expended in a Presidential Primary in his behalf.
This ruling effectively eliminated the write-in campaign planned by
the LBJ committee. They will not be able to expend funds to stimulate
the write-in and v;ill either have to shift to a "stand-up" caij^idate
or concentrate on the delegate section of the Primary ballot.
We liopc. tlK. oncl,uu.cl rc-achos you In time to .-.ssist vou In formin,,your cn,„p„l,.„ stratoKv and tl,au you „1H e„t« the Now Ham, si!P Imary w.th the intontion oE „lnnl„s. Please be in toucIf there are questions on the enclosed. We are willing to meet
"'NerL:ps,=;ir:;"" " '° pot^ntian^^ort
Sincerely,
CoI^itt;e"''''
"^"^P^^"^^ Chairman, McCarthy for President Steering
The memorandum read:
SenatorJIcCa^^yr^^ New Hampshire Primary
The following factors (listed in no particular order of priority) oughtto be given consideration: h ^
-
We already have the nucleus of an experienced, broadly representative
^ncLconmiit^e^^
^fl^ta~I7^.repared T^^kT^^IFEiZileaves of absence in order to give the N.H. campaign professional guidance.
-
We already have done statistical research to a degree without precedentm this state—we have pinpointed the Democratic primary vote with con-
siderable precision, both statewide and by congressional district.
- We have already acquired the votin g lists for the entire state (all
registrants: Democratic, Unaffiliated and Republican).
- We are encouraged about the possibility of a write-in effort for Senator
Aj-CCar thy on the Republican ballot (particularly given the number of
Republicans who were willing to change their registration this month even
though Senator McCartliy was not yet a candidate in New Hampshire).
- We envision a massive mailing effort—of the quality and extent of
the Lodge effort in 196A— to all registered Democrats and Independents.
- We have access to almost unlimited voluntee r help which we foresee
utilizing for a) addressing and stuffing envelopes, b) door-to-door
canvassing, and c) telephone canvassing,
~ Campaigning in Massachusetts and New Hampshire is, in many ways, a
single "package"— there is a great overlap of radio, TV and newspaper
coverage
. Activity in one state is covered in great detail in the
other.
- Sen. McCarthy's candidacy in New Hampshire would lead to the almost
total dissoJution of the RFK "movement" here
,
most whose Executive Comm-
ittee have already indicated a desire to work for McCartliy.
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-
nvcry minute in Now Hampshire in January, February, and March willbring nuiss.vo nationnl ovp...... ....
''n, „ Ha Ire IsLhe principal T^T^rnriTTnin;^^
.j.
''[ntroop, rn Wisconsin Massachusetts. California.Vegon ^ 'wi l\eadof, see. and hear the Senator every day he spends in Hampshire
- Th^j^^ated^
logicallyto New ^^^J^n^sU,r,~K^^r^^^^
want, and need, someone for whom they can work and vote.
~ M^2nZJlLfi£i£ls of the New Hampshire_ Democr^jtj^^_P^ have already
rn n
^
^-f ""''k''''^
McCarthy and haiTid-hiT^urage
.
l^.at^ happensto them if he bypasses New Hampshire?
-
An effective campaign here is relatively inexpensive— $50 , 000 would
sustain a major statewide effort of the magnitude anT^quality we envision.
: IlL^^_g
is nothin g to be lost - and a great deal to be gained - by cominginto New Hampshire: ^
a) Given the general impression that this is a "hawkish" state and
a conservative" state - plus Senator Mclntyre's extraordinary
prediction that McCarthy would get 3,000-5,000 votes, anything
better than that - can be hailed as a stunning performance (and
we can do considerably better than that).
b) The Senator would reaffirm the seriousness of his national candidacy
by his willingness to enter against odds (e.g., JFK in W. Va.).
A victory here—which we think we ought to shoot for—and which seems
to us far more within the realm of possibility than it did a month
ago—
w
ould have major national repercussions
.
- There has been a clear, panic reaction to the threat of McCarthy's
candidacy among the Party hierarchy in this state - and with real
reason. Many prominent Democrats have quietly refused to serve on the
LBJ Committee.
- If we are to move on the Senator's behalf, we must get going yest erday,
e.g.. in the city of Keene, a McCarthy committee, with 90 adult volunteers,
has already located office space for headquarters and is awaiting word
from us to install phones and begin operations. Similar efforts throughout
the state need rapid encouragement.
Finally, New Hampshire Democrats - just as Democrats everywhere else - are
deeply concerned about the present leadership of their party and their
country - and they want an opportunity to express that concern.
(Signed) David Hoeh
Gerry Studds for the N.H. McCarthy for
President St.eering Committee
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The iiu-morniuium of argiuiienf.H was followed by a document entitled, "12 Day
Schedule - Explanation" wliich read:
The percentage figures for each town represent the average percentage
of that town's vote in the last three Democratic primaries (1960,1964,
1966)
—computed both as a percentage of the total, statewide vote and'
as a percentage of the vote in its congressional district. These towns,
then represent over three quarters of the total Democratic primary
turnout (N.B.: It is far less dispersed than is the Republican vote.)
—
and they include every single daily paper (9) and three major weeklies
in the state.
The full schedule was displayed in the following which considered the
time needed (12 days), the places to be visited either by name or by cluster
of names, the importance of each place or cluster by the percentage that
cluster represented of the statewide primary vote, and percentage of the
respective congressional district within which the cluster was located. The
schedule, as developed, would cover areas of the state that contained 76.8
percent of the statewide Democratic primary vote, 79.7 percent of the vote in
the more compact 1st Congressional District, and 72.4 percent of the vote in
the geographically larger 2nd Congressional District. With proper scheduling,
advance work, and good local organization supported by well managed statewide
activities, Hoeli and Studds thought the schedule would provide Senator McCarthy
with enough exposure to draw a meaningful vote. With the exception of the
Berlin cluster, all of the others either contained a dally newspaper or were
served by one near-by. (The Hooksett-All enstown-Pembroke cluster is between
Concord and Manchester and splits circulation between the Concord Daily Mon itor
and the Manchester Union Leader. ) The twenty percent of the statewide vote
not contained in the cities and towns included in their list was scattered
widely in the smaller towns of the state.
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NEW HAm^SHIRE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY
12 DAY SCHEDULE
SENATOR EUGENE J. McCARTIIY
Time
3-1/2. Days
1-1/2 Days
1/2 Day
1/2 Day
1 Day
1 Day
1 Day
citz
Manchester
Gof fstown
Nashua
Portsmouth
New Market
Hookset
Allenstown
Pembroke
Berlin
Gorham
Northumberland
Pelham
Salem
Derry
Hudson
Laconia
Franklin
Concord
% Vote
Statewide
27.3
1.4
28.7
9.9
1.5
1.0
2.5
0.6
0.9
1.2
2.7
6.3
0.6
0.6
7.5
0.8
2.2
0.8
1.6
5.4
2.0
1.2
1.7
% Vote
1st CD.
44.8
2.3
47.1
% Vote
2nd CD,
2.4
1.7
4.1
1.0
1.4
2.1
4.5
1.2
3.6
1.4
2.7
8.9
3.3
3.3
25.7
15.7
1.5
1.5
18.7
3.0
4.4
7.4
1 Day
1 Day
Rochester
Somorsworth
Dover
Hanover
Lebanon
Claremont
Newport
2.0
3.0
2.2
7.2
0.7
0.8
2.0
0.8
4.3
3.3
4.9
3.6
11.8
1.7
2.1
5.0
2.1
10.9
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lime City
1 Day Keene
Jaffrey
Greenville
Milford
Wilton
76.8 79.7 72.4
Reflecting later on the schedule and memorandum, Studds recorded, "That
document is actually one of the few pieces of paper that has emerged from the
campaign of which we are very proud " They told him (McCarthy) that they
felt rather presumptuous giving national arguments, as they sat up there in
the 'woods', but that were McCarthy to wait, if Wisconsin were going to be his
first primary, that the months of January, February and March would be rather
bleak ones in terras of national publicity for him, that the national media
would be in New Hampshire in any event for the primary in March, and this is
where the spotlight would be for these three months.
"It would be crucial for the troops in California and Oregon and Wiscon-
sin and everywhere else to be reading and hearing about him at that time and
not to have him in Vietnam or God knows where else he was going. We told him
that if he meant vjhat he said, he damn v^ell ought to be in New Hampshire any-
way because there are people here who feel very strongly and want someone to
work for," Studds recalled.
^ Vote % Vote % Vote
St atewide 1st CD. 2nd CD.
1-5 3.9
0-^ 1.0
0.6 1.6
0-8 2.1
1.1
3.7
~t:i
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Memo to McCarthy: Basis for Analysis
The strategy outlined in the memorandum to McCarthy contained the two
major questions that will be reviewed in this study, questions of how to
accomplish the desired political impact and how to accomplish a significant
result. The case study that follows describes the most important events of
the campaign that were felt to be the ones that contributed the most to the
result. While many lesser events and activities are omitted it is important
to note that what follows is an abstraction and compression of the totality
of a political campaign. The purpose is to identify aspects that were seen
at the beginning as being important and evaluating the respective contributions
of these to the result. The memorandum to McCarthy is an especially interesting
document because it outlined both the method of the campaigii and the impact
that was intended. Generally, what will be examined are the critical events
of the campaign, predicted and unpredicted; the organization of the campaign,
principally as outlined in the memorandum; the methodology of the campaign
as represented by candidate scheduling, use of media, and voter contacts;
and the environment of the campaign that contributed to or detracted from the
result
.
Not all of these descriptions can be subjected to empirical analysis.
Many will stand as descriptions for the reader to assess as to the relative
impact upon the result. Five indices of campaign activity will be empirically
evaluated. These are campaign visits, local camapign organization, canvassing
activity, auxiliary campaign activities, and newspaper attention. As one
reads the subsequent descriptions of the ciimpaign and events important to the
campaign it will be useful to keep in mind the activities that lead to the
empirical assessment of the relative importance of the five selected indices
of campaign activity.
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To orr.anizo the case study and the concludinp, empirical analysis
both a chronology of events and a discussion oi campaign operations is
necessary. Encompassed in the memorandum to McCarthy are the following basic
campaign elements: organization, schedule, resources, issues, media, manage-
ment, and knowing the opposition. The case study is organized to show how
each of these elements was woven into the campaign and then how selected
indicators of the impact of the campaign are extracted to provide a measure
of effectiveness.
The primary point of reference for both the case study and the analysis
is the December 22, 1967 memorandum to McCarthy and the few subsequent
operational memoranda prepared by the McCarthy leaders after McCarthy's
announcement. In a ten week campaign there was no time to prepare other
more detailed campaign plans. The case study serves to document how the
campaign evolved, what decisions evolved from the early strategy and what
decisions came as the result of unforeseen events. In this latter context,
a sound campaign plan is one that also provides for the unforeseen and is
capable of responding effectively when an advantage emerges from such
events. Part of what made the McCarthy strategy work was that the leaders
understood the political environment of New Hampshire and they sensed that
the strategy they had outlined was also one that would amplify McCarthy's
own assets as a politician. The test was the campaign which tried both
candidate and organization. The result makes a review of what happened
worthy of analysis.
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^K^i^i
^i'-h McCarthy as the presumed nominee. In addition to thevisibility that the meeting gave to the emerging McCarthy leadership it alsogave the state delegations a chance to meet with McCarthy for the first timeThe New Hampshire delegation took advantage of this opportunity to press their
argument that McCarthy should enter the presidential primary and that he should
visit New Hampshire as soon as possible.
20^
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21
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23ib±d.
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•^^At this stage Hoeh and Stvidds were operating on the assumption that the
Attorney General's opinion would apply to the Johnson Committee. The full mean
Ing of the Johnson re - nomination endorsement by the Democratic State Committee
was not clear at the time Hoeh wrote the above but was just beginning to emerge
through the probing of Eugene Daniell on behalf of his Draft R.F.K. Committee.
Their position at that point v/as to keep the Johnson forces on the defensive
while not being particularly concerned about the nature of the actual confronta
tlon. The letter reflects this early naivete on their part.
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If McCarthy entered, Gerry Studds hoped to receive a partial leave of
absence from St. Paul's School to manacc the effort. Senator McCarthy wrote
making such a request of the school's headmaster, but it was denied.
35„ ^Professor Robert Craig had secured most of these lists for public opi
nion surveying purposes. He was willing to make the lists available to any-
one who asked for them. The McCarthy campaign was the only organization to
make such a request.
Gerry Studds, Transcript of a Tape Recorded Interview, (Washington,
D.C.: McCarthy Historical Project, Georgeto\m University, 1969), pp. 11-12.
c U A r E K IV
NEW IIAIIPSIIIRE: A WAITING POLITICAL STAGE
Wait_irvg^
Since McCarthy loft New Ilanipshlre December 15th lloeh and Studds had
had no communication with him; they had also been unable to make contact
with his manager, Blair Clark. The memorandum was mailed; it was their last
effort to convince McCarthy and his Washington advisors of the merits of a
New Hampshire contest. In the meaatime, press accounts of McCarthy's thoughts
gave them little to hope for.
On December 23rd, a Boston Globe headline read, "Senator McCarthy to
avoid New Hampshire Primary," The continuation headline read, "McCarthy Plans
Turn to Bay State Primary." The story's lead read:
Sen. Eugene McCarthy has made a firm decision to avoid
the March 12 New Hampshire primary. The only decision
pending is how and when to announce the fact.
And vjent on:
McCarthy's decision to -.Lay oi;t of New Hampshire was a
concession to the political realities. Some of his
supporters had urged that he enter the primary, saying
that if he was going Lo make an issue against President
Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam v;ar, he could hardly
begin by skipplag the first in the nation primary.
But the more cool-headed among his brain trusters suggested
that running in Nev; }!ampshiro could deal a crushing blow
to the entire McCartiiy campaign.
The Democrats there are showii^g a unique unity over the
primary, and the Democratic vote is so small and con-
centrated v/ithin the few industrial centers that an
attempt to overcome the organizations would be difficult.
Bcslden that, the national spotlight will be on the
Republicans in Now Hampsliire, with Nixon and Romney
fighting wl.at nigjit be a deatli struggle for their party's
nomination. McCartliy would risk being depicted as an
eccentric loner, a sort of Democratic Harold Stassen with
practically no impact on tlie public or press.
I-; 5
The lurthcr dnnper is tlial a hip, flop in New Uanipshi ri-
would spill over into Massachusetts, dei-aoraIi/.ing the
campai^',n workers and conditioning the Bay state voters
to view McCarthy as a loser.
December 23rd was a Saturday, the beginning of the Christmas Holiday,
there was little anyone could do to check whether the story was correct.
December 28th was the date the McCarthy Committee had given McCarthy as a
last day before the plans to organize the Draft-Kennedy effort went forward.
A decision to enter the primary much after tlie first of the year would not
provide time enough to organize an effect campaign for McCarthy. Late in
the afternoon of December 27th Clark finally called Hoeh. The reason for
the call Vr7as to assure I^oeh that, contrary to what he would hear on Walter
Cronkite's CBS-TV "EVENING NEWS," a decision regarding New Hampshire had not
yet been made. Hoeh asked Clark to confirm his call with a telegram. The
telegram arrived the morning of December 28th and read:
It was good to talk to you yesterday and I send you this wire
simply to confirm what I said on the pl;one, thai: the McCarthy
decision on the New Hampshire Primary is still not made,
despite press reports, that it is being actively considered
from the point of view of scheduling and where the best effort
can be made nationally, and that you and your group will be
the first to knovc when the decision has been made within the
next several days. Many thanks to you and your colleagues.
Sincerely, Blair Clark
Hoeh imm.ediately prepared a memo which he sent to the members of the
Steering Committee and a larger list of those titled "friends." Since the
key 28th date was the Thursday before the New Year'p holiday weekend, little
would happen between ?;hen and January 2nd, la his conversation with Clark
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Hoel. di.l discuss the sir,n i C icancc of the Docomlu-r 28th dale In torms of Clark's
planniiH', for tlic New Hauipsliiro decision. llocli indicated tliat ho did not expect
anything irrevocable would happen on the 28th and that most of those who
would form the leadership of the Draft-Kennedy organization had already
agreed to shift to McCarthy if he were to enter the New Hampshire Primary.
Hoeh's memo to the Committee opened:
The question :i s
,
where do we stand? The answer is that we now
serve by standing and waiting. This has been our posture since
Senator McCarthy's visit to New Hampshire December 14 and 15...
Since his New Hampshire visit, he has taken the important
stops to equip his campaign with the necessary national
staff to begin the important scheduling work and strategy
planning that had not been accomplished at the time of his
New Hampshire visit. Numerous meetings have taken place in
V>Jasliington and the results have been reported in various
and sometimes, inaccurate ways. It has been my position to
await the outcome of these meetings knowing that the N.H.
McCarthy for President Steering Committee had made strong
and compelling cases for entering the N.H. primary... .2
Hoeh then recounted the conversation with Clark and the contents of
the telegram. Since up to this point the memo had a rather neutral tone and
since Hoeh wanted to indicate that he expected a positive decision from
McCarthy, he ended by setting a probable meeting time for the end of the first
week in January. He also enclosed petition forms that had to be circulated
in each congressional district in order to place the Senator's name on the
ballot
.
Hoeh's final note was:
Our organization has grovm considerably. is now expensive
to mail and the phone bills are piling up. Any financial help,
at this stage, would be greatly appreciated.
A HAPPY Nl'W YKAR????
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That .v.ninn W.Uer Cronkite did reporl. Lhal: McCarthy definitely would
not enter the New Hampshire presidential primary. Hoch's memo would arrive
the next morning. In addition he had called a number of the Steering Committee
members so that Clark's information could be spread among the local
supporters.
Th e Announcement
December 31st, the telephone rang in David Hoeh's home. Blair Clark i-jas
calling. He wanted to come to New Hampshire the next day, to meet with members
of the McCartliy for President Steering Committee. Hoeh replied that it was
Sunday evening, he had a New Year's Eve party to attend, and assumed that most
of our committee members would be engaged likewise. He said that it would
be impossible to make the calls to set up the meeting for January 1st but
that he could do it for Jiinuary 2nd. Hoeh tried to push Clark for details
on the possible agenda for the meeting, indicating that the Steering Committee
would not be in the mood for another indecisive review. Hoeh said they would
need an answer one way or the other, but Clark said he wanted to meet with
the committee before committing hr.nself or McCarthy to a final decision. This
was satisfactory to Hoeh, so he agreed to gather as many of the committee
members as possible at the Chaplain's home in Bedford, for the evening of
January 2nd, 1968. Hoeh made calls to the committee members during the
afternoon, and evening of New Year's day and was able to contact most of them.
Hoeh's memo of December 28th had arrived and was viewed as optimistic news.
The members \>rere now ready for the challenges of a New Year.
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Sanciy ilooh, Gerry Studds and David Hooh met lUair Clark for the first
time ia his Sheraton Wayfarer room. Tall, lanky, and casual appearing
Clark immediately made his guests feel comfortable by complimenting them on
their persistence. lie said that he had come to New Hampshire to make a final
assessment and that a decision on whether or not McCarthy would enter the
primary would be made within 2A hours. During the discussion Clark was
interrupted by a telephone call from Senator McCarthy. While discussing
situations in other states and parts of the campaign, Clark suddenly motioned
to lloeh that McCarthy v/ould like to talk with him.
McCarthy's question concerned the status of the LBJ write-in effort. He
wanted to be sure that a direct confrontation with Johnson would be possible,
Hoeh explained that in the time since he had last written a clarification of
the Attorney General's position had been received. The Democratic Party
endorsement of the Johnson renomination effort constituted a legal action
which allowed them to run the write-in effort without specific approval from
Johnson. Daniell was challenging the interpretation for the Draft RFK
Comiuittee but if he (McCarthy) entered the primary, a clear contest between
Johnson ajid himself would be. possible. McCarthy seemed pleased with this infor-
mation and ended by saying that he did not want to waste time in efforts that
did not present a clear test of the issues.
During dinner with Clark in the Wayfarer dining room that evening Hoeh
was called to the dining room telephone. Senator McCarthy \ms on the line.
In barely audible tones he said, "Dave, 1 have decided that I will enter the
New llampsliire primary". Hoeh resimnded by saying they had been waiting for that
vork for a Jong time and that thoy were ready to go to work. Not wanting to
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1<>1 Iho convorsat icni ci the decision drop at thai point, lloch said that
ho would Tike to aiHiounco the decision Jn Now Hampshire at the same Lime or
before McCarthy node t:he announcement in Washin;.,ton. Uoeh explained that the
New Hampshire reporters and wLr- service porsonne] had been extremely cooperative
in the past weeks and that he wanted to give them the headstart on the story.
McCartliy said tliat this would be- okay and that Hoel, could liold a press conference
the next day before noon and that McCarthy would hold one in the early afternoon.
Hoel\ reviewed tlie conversations they were liavlng with Blair Clark and asked
McCartliy how he sliould relay the contents of I lie teleplione call to Clark and
to the meeting they were about to have at the Chaplain's. McCarthy said tliat
lloeh should use his judgment and that ho could handle these things as he
wished.
Hoeh returned to the table, looking, according to Gerry Studds, "like
he had just swaljo\;ed a canary", and began by saying to Clark that tlie tele-
phone call was from "your Boss," Senator McCarthy. "Me has just told me
that he is going to enter the New Hampshire primary." Blair Clark's chin,
according to Studds' "sort of fell into liis soup, T (Studds) dr..pped everything
and I (Stu(Uls) thought Sandy was going to faint. We were not prepared for it
3
at that time."
Clark recovered from his surprise, muttered tliat of course he could call
McCarthy back and further delay or chang.e his mind, but that since, they had
a decision and the details of an announccMuent liad been outlined, they should nou
plan the announcement, give the news to th.e committee, and get on with the
campaign. That was Blair Clark's style. No point rehashing the events of
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the. past- two hours: too much h:id to bo done and there was little time
available.
They agreed that they eould not hold a press conference on the basis of
a personal telephone call to Hoeh. There would have to be a document of some
sort from McCarthy that could be released since they were going to make the
announcement in New Hampshire. They concluded that a telegram would suffice
and that they themselves had better draft the telegram, check the contents
with Senator McCarthy by telephone and ask that he send it to them for the
record. Studds and Hoeh drafted a telegram for Clark to review. They then
called McCarthy again to check the text of the telegram and the timing of the
release. Clark would return to New York in the morning before the announcement
press conference.
By 9:30 a.m. Tuesday, January 2nd, Hoeh had called the "Dean" of the
New Hampshire press corps, D. Frank O'Neill of the Manchester Union Leade r to
announce that he would be holding a press conference at the State House Press
Rooir., in Concord, at 11:00 a.m. O'Neil would notify the other reporters and
make the arrangements for the conference. In his call to O'Neill he simply
said that they would be making an announcement concerning the McCarthy effort.
V\\en Hoeh read tlie telegram, it took a moment for the mind-set of the reporters
to change from that of knowing that McCarthy would not enter to actually
understanding what Hoeh liad just read. There were one or two questions about
v/hether McCarthy was holding a similar conference in Washington or how the
message would be confirmed by him. Tlien they sensed that an import^mt national
scoop was in tlieir hands and they rushed to the nearest telephones to call in
a s-.tory lead and the text of the telegram.
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1 have cIocichMl to carry my caiupaijui for the presidency of the
UnlLod States JiUo New Hampshire. I will enter the New Hampshire
primary. My name will be entered in the presidential preference
section and, with your committee's valuable help, we will run afull slate of pledged delegates.
I plan, as you know, to campaign in five other state primaries,
but am now satisfied that I will be able to devote to the New
Hampshire primary the time that is required. It is important
to give the Democrats of New Hampshire the opportunity to express
freely their choice on the grave issues facing our country. I
wil] press my campaign vigorously.
I thank you for wliat your committee has already done and look
forward to working closely with you in the weeks to come.
Addressed to: David C. Hoeh
Signed: Senator Eugene J. McCarthy
Dated: January 2nd, 1968^
Studds and Hoeh wr;ited in the press room for a few moments to vjatcii the
reaction. Within moments a series of return calls came to the press room
requesting wire service taped interviews with Hoeh. Within one-half hour
the f].urry had begun to subside. As they left the press room, Studds and
Hoeh looked at each other and almost simultaneously said, "\^^lat have we
gotten ourselves into now." The full weight of not only the McCarthy
candidacy but of the impact a failure in New Hampshire would ha'/e on tlie issues
of Vietnam policy suddenly became incredibly real. It was a lonely moment and
tliey mentally inventoried tlie resources they had at hand to assume the
responsibility. Given even an optomistic view they had a total of $500 in
their campaign bank account, no headquarters, no telephones, no mailing address,
no manager, no m.aterials, and only a tenuous tie to the new McCarthy manager
whom they had onJy met the day before.
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Recalling, t-lu. event Stu.Ids said. "We enjoyed this one because it was not
particularly v.-cll-attended
.
Tliere were the local reporters of the UPI and
the AP and a few others who had obviously come to hear us say, 'Well, we're
terr.ibly sorry, but Senator McCarthy is not entering New Hampshire.' Their
expressions were rather fun to watch as we read the telegram."
In a campaign strategy designed to have maximum impact the timing and
method of the announcement could not liave been better. The story drew front
page attention across the nation and held the lead position in many radio and
television broadcasts throughouu that day. The New Hampshire Associated Press
version of the story, under the byline of Adolphe V. Bernotas, read:
Concord, N.H. (AP) Senator Eugene McCarthy, D-Minn. an
opponent of President Johnson's Vietnam policy, will enter
New Hampshire's March 12 Democratic presidential primary,
David Hoeh of Hanover, the senator's chief Granite State
backer, told nev;smen today....
Until very recently, McCarthy had indicated he would use
the Massachusetcs primary as his test of New England
sentiment. However, Hoeh said today, there was no clear
reason v/hy McCarthy changed signals.
"He isn't running just to make tests--he*s seeking the
presidency", Hoeti added.
McCarthy had called off plans to tour Europe and Southeast
Asia, Hoeh said, and v;ould be in New Hampshire within the
•next two weeks to campaign "in excess of 12 to 15 days."
Hoeh said his group plans to spend $50,000 "to do a good
job in the campaign."
He added that the organization expects McCarthy to pull
"about a third' of the state's 80,000 Democratic votes...."
Hoeh said the group is already circulating petitions to
got on the ballot. Fifty signatures from each of the
two congressional districts in the state are required.
Some ol the strength shown for Senator Robert F. Kennedy,
D-N.Y., will be drawn away by McCarthy's announcement,
Hoeh maintained.
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He ndded: 'A number of their members said ilioy would
.join McCarLliy '
.
"
A drive lo pick up independent votes will be undertaken
Hoeh said. '
McCartliy's campaign, Hoeh added, would require 'close
campaigning. You can't substitute media for effectiveness
of meeting tlie people.'
Hoeh said the group has not yet decided on potential
delegates
.
He adderl the organization went with pledged rather than
favorable delegates because 'it gives us control over
the structure of the delegation. We can distribute the
delegates where the votes arc'.
In answer to a question on how McCarthy would do in the
state's two biggest cities—Manchester and Nashua—Hoeh
said: 'There is considerable support, especially in Nashua'.
He said that in Manchester 'there is no special love fcr
Johnson
'
.
"Manchester is the kind ^f city where McCarthy would
have appeal." Hoeh said.
While covering essentially the same New Hampshire news, Ward Just,
writing in the Wa shington Post
,
reported a capitol view of the story.
McCarthy's aides insisted that the decision to go into New
Hampshire did not represent a change in plans. Last week in
a radio interview the Minnesota Democrat said the primary
was "not a significant test", and indicated privately that he
would avoid it....
Organization Democrats in New Hampshire led by Bernard Boutin...
have virtually dared McCarthy to oppose the President....
In an interview last month, Boutin predicted that the President
would swamp McCarthy in the March 12 primary, even though McCarthy's
name would be on the ballot and voters would be obliged to write
in the President's. Yesterday, Boutin was unavailable for comment...
"We don't expect a landslide or any thirit?; 1 ike that," said one of
McCartliy's campaign aides yesterday, "but we expect to do well."
Tlie New Hampshire test will be the first direct confrontation
between the President and his critics since the 1964 presidential
election.
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McLarlhy .rides in Washington said that one of the principalfactors in the Senator's decision to vie with the President inNew llaiupshire was an optimistic report from lloeh, and from
McCarthy's national campaign manager, Blair Clark, who can-
vassed the state over the New Year's weekend.
Hoeh reported that the President was not popular in New Hampshire
and that support for the McCarthy candidacy was growing. Hoeh
reported some defections from the regular Democratic organization
but that group was still regarded as solidly pro-Johnson.
One analysis of McCarthy's decision to enter the primary turns
on the criticism of his candidacy as 'non-serious.' Last week
McCarthy confessed himself to be "a little disappointed" with
anti-war Democrats who have refused to support him with 'the
excuse that I am not a serious candidate...."
Political observers here reasoned that if McCarthy did not enter
New Hampshire, with its wide newspaper and television coverage
and opportunity to challenge Lyndon Johnson, the charge of
"Non-seriousness" would grow in currency and plausibility.
A McCarthy aide said yesterday that the fact that a campaign for
Mr. Johnson was being organized was a "major factor" in McCarthy's
decision to add New Hampshire...."
Although Bernard EuuLin was unavailable for comment. Governor John
W. King, did issue a brief statement concerning the McCarthy announcement.
Senator McCarthy is welcome to bring his campaign into the
New Hampshire primary. While I do not agree with his political
viewpoints, a full discussion of the Issues in the great tradition
of American politics can only be beneficial.
I am confident that the vast majority of New Hampshire Democrats
support President Johnson, and his domestic and international
policies justify that support.
On March )2, the New Hampshire Democrats will have the opportunity
to conclusively show their support for one of our country's
greatest-,and most successful Presidents, President Lyndon Baines
Johnson.
With King's statement, timed to ride, if possible, with the McCarthy
announcement story, the battle was joined. The confident Johnson renomination
leadership were sure they could demolish McCarthy in New Hampshire. There
would be no question but that there would be a direct confrontation between the
two In N'^w Ha^iipshire.
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ji^IiLl^£'2111gli±It;_XiLovidcs the Sta^e
Now tlKiL McCarthy had agreed to enter, the McCarthy loaders could
seriously consider organizing the actual campaign. Their preliminary analysis
as reflected in the memorandum of December 22nd was the background plan
but a further evaluation would be necessary to implement the plan.
As with the ethos of New Hampshire primary elections which dictated
party organization neutrality, there was a second ethos concerning presidential
primaries. Nov; Hampshire provides the stage, the audience, and frequently,
the principal directors of a campaign. The production, hov^ever, is paid for
with money from outside the state. To some, principally the communications
Industry, hotel, motel, and restaurant operators, the New Hampshire Presidential
Primary is an economic boon during the slack winter period. To others it is
quadrennial entertainment relieving the cabin fever of the long winter.
In their meetings with Lowenstein, Cans, and later McCarthy and Clark,
the Now Hampshire committee had made clear that the state was the stage and
its voters the audience but that c aly a small air.ount of money could be expected
to be raised from the Nov; Hampshire populace itself for use in the primary
campaign. Nev; Hampshire's small population, approximately 700,000 persons in
1968 and low per capita income, $3,023, in 1969, meant that the resources to
support a presidential primary campaign had to come from outside the state.
In this ethos there lay a part of the McCarthy strategy.
166
Notes
•^The. Boston Globe (Decmeber 23» 1967).
1QA7 ^7/.^^
^'
"''f'
McCarthy Steering Committee, December 28.lyb/, (.tile copy). '
3Studds, C, 0£.Clt.
, p. 13.
^Union Leader (January 4, 1968).
Nashua Telegraph (January 3, 1968).
^The VJashington Post (January 4, 1968).
^The Concord Daily Monitor (January 3, 1968).
C H A ]' T J' R V
Nl'W HAMPSHIRE DEMOCIUTS AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Knowing the Opposition
The New Hampshire Democratic Party leadership had assumed that It would
be united in its drive to deliver the state to Lyndon B. Johnson In his
push for renomlnatlon. The Danlell-Kennedy write-in activity was viewed by
most party leaders as a fringe operation that could be easily Isolated.
A rather elaborate campaign plan had been developed by Bernard Boutin
and informally agreed to by the major office holders, principally Governor
King and Senator Mclntyre, The first public act of the Johnson write-in
campaign was to be the discussion of the campaign at the November 5th
Executive Committee meeting. Word of Cans visit, the possible McCarthy
candidacy, and additional stirrings prompted several changes in the original
plan.
New Hampshire presidential primaries are frequently politically
perilous times for party leaders and office holders. The quadrennial event
is a minefield. For a major office-holder, survival is of ultimate
Importance and to survive being involved in a New Hampshire Presidential
Prlamry without collecting scars is a miracle. Because the spectacle takes
a different form eacl^ time, trying lo figure out which way to move to avoid
political Injury is a chiallenging game. For King, Mclntyre, and Boutin,
party unity in support of the President was assumed. As leaders of the
party by virtue of their offices and titles, they liad every reason to expect
that what they said would carry weight with a sizable constituency. On the
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oLher side, they were in no position to d iff or with the President, since
such a move wouid he costly in terms of present political security and
future rewards. Neutrality under the conditions of late 1967 and early
1968 would not have been an acceptable alternative either. In fact,
neutrality for a Governor about to seek re-election, election to another
office or appointment as a federal judge would be viewed by the President
as tantamount to desertion. In 1967-68, one was either for the President
or against him. There was no middle ground. The Democratic Party's leader-
ship in 1968 was no more successful in protecting itself from the all but
guaranteed surprises of the Presidential Primary than their Republican
counterparts had been in 1964.
The Boutin Strategy
After a string of appointments that had kept Bernard Boutin in
Washington since the election of John F. Kennedy, he had resigned as the
Administrator of the Small Business Administration and returned to New
Hampshire. His new position was with Sanders Associates, a Nashua eletronics
firm with sizable defense contracts. Boutin's assignment with S,anders was of
a public relations nature with responsibility for producing the in-house news
letter and related publically unspecified assignments. Boutin himself had
several other missions. The first was to return to New Hampshire where his
own political career had stopped with his departure to Washington after his
defeat in the 1960 gubernatorial race. A frustrated politician on his own,
Boutin souglit to resume his interrupted career by re-establishing himself
in Nevj Hampshire, and capitalizing on his exemplary record of federal service
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\vhcn he rcLurncHl during Juno. 1%7. to take tho Sanders assJnn.nent, Houtin
had every intention of running for Governor again, assuming tliat three-term
Governor John W. King would either step aside or run for the United States
Senate.
The mission wliich made the Sanders position possible and prompted
Boutin t;o leave the Small Business Administration was his selection by the
President to assume management of the President's renomination efforts in
New Hampshire. As a major Kennedy operative in the carefully executed
Kennedy primary of 19G0 and now a confidant of President Johnson, Boutin
was the ideal person for the assignment. Furthermore, Boutin had recently
assisted in a number of other political ventures for the President including
a project in Texas during the 1966 elections.
Boutin saw the chance to combine the gubernatorial objective with the
Johnson renomination mission. His success as the manager of the Johnson
campaign would bring him back into the limelight of New Hampshire politics,
identify him v/ith the fortunes of his sure-to-be-re-elected President,
foreshadowing his own gubernatorial candidacy. Such a scenario was not hard
to detect, and was immediately determined by the Union Leader Corporation in
a New Hampshire Sunday News editorial dated as early as May 21, 1967.
At approximately the time of Boutin's return to New Hampshire, the press
carried a series of stories about a mysterious man that President Johnson had
sent to New Hampshire to organize his Presidential Primary. The stories had
a peculiar flavor that would be repeated as the Johnson effort went forward.
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It appeared from tiho stories tliat soiueliow Johnson did not trust li;ls
tor tunes to the leadership of the New Hampshire Democratic Party. The
Manch£St^_r Ur^ interpreted this as a slap at its major office-holders.
The press search* for the mysterious man continued for much of the summer but
never successfully labelled a person who fit the description. A similar
search went on inside the party for the mysterious man, more as a reaction
to the news stories than to evidence tliat someone might actually have been
assigned to New Hampshire. Eventually, both the press and the politicians
settled on Boutin as the man, although he steadfastly denied having other
than friendly connections with the White House. Boutin alleged that he left
federal service to return to New Hampshire because of the challenge of his
new job. '^
Whether Boutin was commissioned to manage the Nevj Hampshire Johnson
campaign or not, he arrived in New Hampshire with the plan for Johnson's
effort in the primary. Even before he was appointed as the Re-Elect Pre-
sident Jolmson Chairman for New Hampshire, Boutin outlined the Johnson
campaign to party leaders aiid probable campaign workers.
The Johnson campaign was to be a total party effort. During a conver-
sation with Sandra Hoeh in August 1967, Boutin sketched out the pyramid that
would be the organizational shape of the Johnson Nev; Hampshire campaign. At
the top of the pyramid were the names of the titular leaders of the
Democratic Party—King and Mclntyre. Within the same segment with King and
Mclntyre was the operating head of the organization, Boutin himself.
Beneath that point then stretched downward an organization that would parallel
the organizational structure of the New Hampshire Democratic Party.
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There would bc^ renional leaders similar to the congressional district
chairmen, county leaders, city leaders, town leaders, committee members,
and finally, a campaign connection to each of the 90,000-plus registered
members of the Democratic Party.
Apparently, some time prior to Boutin's return to New Hampshire, a
decision had been made in the \/liite House that Lyndon Johnson would not
become an announced candidate for re-election until late in the prc-convention
season. By this decision, Johnson took the cautious, more traditional
route of incumbent Presidents.^ The fiction of non-candidacy would be
maintained as long as possible for whatever purposes would be served by
appearing to be above the political struggle.
The decision left the renominatlon leadership in New Hampshire with
a single alternative. Since Johnson would not be an announced candidate, it
would not be possible for his name to be listed on the ballot. The
alternative, therefore, would be to ask Democratic voters to write-in
Johnson's name on the ballot. Coiisequently , the Johnson campaign organization
first priority was to stimulate New Hampshire Democrats to turn out in
significant numbers and then to write-in the name of Lyndon Johnson. Of
secoiidary importance in the strategy would be the selection of a slate of
delegates. Boutin planned to solicit as delegate candidates the state's
most prominent political names. These names alone, Boutin felt would
attract the votes needed to fill the delegation with Johnson supporters.
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Houlin's planning was conditioned by several Important experiences.
The party reform effort of the 1950' s had dislodged the conservative wing of
the party from the leadership; however, many of those persons still lurked
in the shadows of the party's councils. To Boutin in 1967, these individuals
still posed the greatest danger to the unity effort which he had in mind
for the Johnson campaign. In his conversation with Sandy Hoeh, that August,
Boutin referred to the names of some of the more obstreperous pre-reformers
as representing that minority who would probably not join the write-in effort.
When Sandy asked how he viewed the Draft Kennedy effort of Eugene Daniell,
Boutin responded by saying that first, Robert Kennedy would come to New
Hampshire and support the renomination of Lyndon B. Johnson, and that second,
Daniell would not be able to generate much support: for his Kennedy write-in
effort. Only those ancient malcontents and a few "wildeyed" radicals would
even consider challenging the renomination campaign of the President in
New Hampshire Boutin concluded.
A second occurrence from Boutin's past which influenced his thinking
was the John F. Kennedy primary of 1960, He clearly painfully recalled
the effort of the party malcontents to abort the election of the full slate
of Kennedy pledged delegates. Those same shadowy figures appeared to so
occupy Boutin in his planning that he did not recognize the growing opposition
to the President's war policies, an opposition composed of some of the
same individuals Vv'ho had helped Boutin reform the Democratic party in the
late 1950's.
A further blinding political event in Boutin's recollection was the
1964 effort to secure a write-in on that year's presidential primary ballot
for vice lu'esident for Robert F. Kennedy. That movement had been generated
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In Nc.w Hn,npsl>irc. hy somo of tlu- same porsons who had opposed the p] edged
slaCe In the 1960 primary. It appeared tlmt this effort was designed to
demonstrate a loyalty to the heir Robert Kennedy that was greater than that
of John Kennedy's 1960 advocates, like Boutin, who were now Johnson loyalists.
An embarrassing situation was developing for Johnson and his supporters
early in 1964. Loyalty to the Kennedy family was being placed in conflict
with loyalty to the Johnson administration. The conflict left many a Kennedy
loya3ist, now well connected in the Johnson administration, on extremely
shaky ground. A significant vote for Robert Kennedy for Vice President could
be embarrassing to President Johnson. Opposition to the Kennedy candidacy
would be interpreted in New Hampshire as ungracious if not actually disloyal.
Boutin, then in Washington, was caught betv/een the desire of the President
to have a free hand in selecting his Vice President and New Hampshire party
leaders' desire to suppress a re-emergence of the malcontents. Given the
choice, Mclntyre, King, Dunfey and otner party leaders met and concluded that
the only way to contsm the divisive threat of the Kennedy Vice President
write-in was to join the effort. In a last minute announcement, most of
the party's leadership, including the Senator and Governor, enthusiastically
endorsed the write-in for Robert Kennedy as Vice President on the 1964
presidential primary preference ballot. Only one of the Democratic Party
leadership. Democratic National Gommitteeman
,
Hugh Bo\>mes, stated his pre-
ference for Hubert H. Humphrey, the eventual nominee.
Boutin was left to explain the reasons for the Kennedy write-in to
an outraged Lyndon Johnson. Fortunately, from his point of view, Johnson
secured slightly more write-in votes for President in 1964 than Robert
Kennedy garnered for tiie Vice President. That result and the machinations
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of the 196/, primary forced Bout:xn t.o ally himself fully with the fortunes
of Lyndon Johnson and to sever his once strong ties with the Kennedy family.
There appeared to be no room in Boutin's thinking for a strategy that
would respond to discontent within the party other than to isolate that
discontent, as had happened in 1960, or to smother opposition in a blanket
of loyalties as happened in 1964. Boutin's plans were based on his own
political experiences and confidence that Robert Kennedy would not allow
his name to be used in a way that would be construed as disruptive to
the New Hampshire Democratic party organization.
Unfortunately for Boutin, his most recent active campaign experiences
had been at the behest of Lyndon Johnson. As a highly placed political
operative in the Johnson administration, Boutin had been used by the admin-
istration to carry out some its political objectives and had become a part
of the White House political operation headed by the Texan, Marvin Watson.
On several occasions he had been sent into the field, especially in the
south and Texas, to assist in organizing election activities fo-; several
Johnson supporters. What Boutin gained from that experience was an indoct-
rination in unit rule, Texas-style politics.
The unit rule, a Texas tradition, worked to systematically remove
from consideration minority views, minority representation and intra-
party minoirty accommodation. Complete and unquestioning loyalty to the
party and its leadership was a hallmark of the unit rule process. The
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The result was t l.aL Marvin Wal.sou, and the Texas-orlg.lnntcd Wliite House
political operation, luid littlt) tolerance for another state's experience
with minority inclusion and compromise. Boutin had, apparently, assimilated
this ethos witliout question. It can be assumed that if Boutin had raised
questions with regard to Texas unit rule politics, his loyalty to Johnson
would have been questioned by the palace guard. In many respects, Boutin's
own experience in New Hampshire had been similar on the surface to Texas
unit rule politics. An obstreporous and destructive element had been
removed from the leadership of the New Hampshire Democratic Party by
Boutin's work in the 1950' s. Boutin, in 1967, could not oppose a renomination
plan tliat carried such heavy overtones of loyalty to the President.
By the time Boutin arrived in New Hampshire he was fully committed to
a unity campaign that was designed to prompt allegiance to the renomination
of the President, The pyramid of interlocking campaign leaders would be
vertically pledged to the support of the President in the same fashion that
Boutin himself was pledged to the political operation of the White House.
Those not supporting the renomination organization would, by implication,
be excluded from the rewards following the re-election. The organization
of the New Hampshire Democratic Party and the loyalists of the major
elected officials would be unified as one structure. There would be no
room in Boutin's campaign concept for anything but total loyalty both to
Johnson and to the policies of the administration.
Nev-; Hampshire Democrats: Traditions and Ethos
Boutin had been away .from New Hampshire politics for more than seven
years when he returned in the Spring of 1967. He had lost hJs sensitivity
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in the political climale of New llampsliire
. U seemed that Boutin tliought
the politics oithe nation had shifted to the model of the Texas White House,
and that allegiance to the Wiite House and the Johnson-dominated party
could overpower New Hampshire political traditions of individuality and
independence. The campaign that Boutin began to implement for President
Johnson was not one that was in keeping with New Hampshire's political
traditions. It is from this beginning that the critical weakness of the
New Hampshire Jolnison renomination effort was revealed.
It might appear obvious that a person with Boutin's New Hampshire
experience would outline a campaign responsive to that experience. In
fact that may well have been what Boutin did recommend. His experiences with
New Hampshire's state primaries and with disorganization of the maverick
Kefauver efforts of 1952 and 1956 led him to admire the tight organization
of the 1960 John F. Kennedy candidacy. Boutin's own involvement in the
revltalization of the New Hampshire Democratic Party was closely tied to
the objective of organizing the nomination of a viable Democratic candidate
for governor. Such success meant that agressive campaigning an:l thorough
organization were necessary to pull the strong candidate through the primary
and on to election.
Too often in the past straw candidates and weak candidates closely
tied to the Republican opposition had manipulated the state primary. The
ethnic blocs of Democratic voters wlio voted in the state primaries were
played against each other. VJeak and often unknown candidates with appropriate
ethnic surnames were filed to dissipate ethnic voting strengtli that was
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noe^led lo nonun.Uo sLroni^ Deumcratic Party candidates. Often, half a
uo;'cn na.iios were listed on the Democratic primary ballot offering au
assortment of French^Cnnad ian and Irish surnames. Not infrequently the
nominee who was produced from such a crowd of candidates disappeared from
political activity after receiving the nomination. The Republican candidate
v7ould go on to win an almost uncontested election.
Boutin himself had been one of the rare Democrats to survive the pro-
cess with his candidacy in 1958. Careful control of the candidate filings,
elimination of straw candidates by demanding adherence to state law re-
garding the authenticity of candidacies, and thorough organization gave
Boutin the 1958 gubernatorial nomination by a narrow margin of 3,863 out
or 35,391 Democratic primary votes cast. He went on to run the best race
a Democrat had run against the Republican nominee in over twenty years.
Boutin lost by a mere 6,835 votes out of 206,745 cast.
To Boutin, therefore, primaries were hazardous affairs. To accomplish
the desired results, a tight organization would be necessary. divisive
minorities and vote sapping straw candidates were to be avoided as had been
accomplished in Boutin's 1958 Democratic reform candidacy.
The Open Pr imary Tradition
There is, however, an important other side to the story. New Hampshire is
a state with a long and engrained primary election tradition. That tradition
has produced a widely accepted ethic regarding the open selection of candidates
that has endured (lespil(; the abuses that ethic was subjected to by some in
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the Republican majority. During the era of the leadership of Governor and
then United States Senator, Stylos Bridges, the nomination of both Republican
candidates and Democratic opponents for major offiecs were regulated through
his office. The Democratic primary was carefully orchestrated to produce
on]y nominal opposition while the Republican primary was structured to pre-
vent divisive internecine warfare.
During the period from the middle 1930' s to Bridges' death in 1961,
a second varible entered the scene. A progressive Republican newspaper, the
Manchester Union Lead er, changed ownership. William Loeb, the son of Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt's secretary, acquired the newspaper from the widow of
Frank Knox, former Secretary of the Navy under President Franklin Roosevelt,
and a former Republican vice-presidential candidate. As a result, the
editorial tone of the newspaper changed from that of progressive Repub-
licanism to one of virilent conservatism. The newspaper became an ardent
supporter of Styles Bridges and followed Bridges in his anti-communist
3foray into both domestic and foreign policy.
Although Bridges exerted considerable influence at the national level
as a result of his leadership positions in Congress, he had not been parti-
cularly concerned about the progressive Republican bent of the party's
leadership in Nev; Hampshire's internal affairs. VTlien Loeb entered the scene
he found the liberalism of the University of New Hampshire as a manifestation
of a social and political "softness" that eminated from the Capitol in
Concord. To sell papers and to sell his philosophy, Loeb began to find and
promote candidates for st.'V^c office who were more to his liking. Loeb's
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basic tacCic, however was to create coiuroversy
.
Loeb's power In New Hainpslrire rests on his ability to use his newspaper
to generate controversy that causes some reaction from the politically
active public. The tactic is simply one that takes situations, issues,
groups or individuals and casts on their behavior in either a favorable or
unfavorable light. Those persons and views that Loeb favors are contrasted
with those which he dislikes. Eventually sufficient controversy revolves
around the situation to either polarize the public's view and to isolate
and, thereby, destroy the effectiveness of the person or the political
usefulness of the issue.
Loeb succeeds in this behavior because New Hampshire does not have
statewide media alternatives to his newspaper. As he builds his case the
other side, the side that might present and legitimize the opposite view,
is not presented. To the populace the adage that "Where there is smoke
there is fire" aids Loeb in his effort to politically polarize issues and
isolate through controversy those he dislikes.
Wlicn Loeb found that he could not penetrate the power structure of the
State Republican Party Vi/it.h liis Conservative philosophy, his bully-boy
tactics, or liis alliance with Senator Bridges, he began to chip away at the
Republican organization with his editorials. To overcome the hazards of
internecine primary contests, the state Republican leadership had organized
to prevent party-destroying primary conflicts . The controllers of this
informal mechanism were a grouj) of party leaders almost exclusively located
In the capitol city of Concord. This group had ruled the Republican Party
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In n mocl,M-aL.> t o im or,ress 1 vc trad i L ion since the days of t he Bull. Moose
Pron. esslves. Jn l acL many of Llu.se in positions of 1 oacI(M-sl, i
,> , formal and
Informal, were descendents of the state's progressive leadersliip. I,oe.b
obicetcd to the leadership's progressive philosophy. After their success
in defeating Loch's candidate, Senator Robert A. Taft, in the 1952 Nev,7
Hampshire Presidential Primary, Locb hvy.im his attack in earnest against
wliat he labeled as tlu> "Concord Gang."
The attack focused heavily on the mechanisms that the Republican Party
leadersliip exercised to maintain control. The key to this control was for
the leadership to elect the strongest potential nominee for the office of
Governor and then to organize the party to support that person with ])re-
primary endorsements and praise. Not falling in step behind the leadership
Implied the opposite as retribution— loss of the governorship and loss of
access to its perquisites.
Since Locb found tlie "Concoird Gang" impenetrable and the moderate
candidates who it generated unresponsive co his brand of Republicanism
he began to attack the "Gang" and their tactics of candidate selection and
pre-prir.iary endorsement. In fact, on several occasions and out of frustration,
Loeb endorsed and editorially supi)orted candidates of the Democratic Party
V\'ho were more in keeping with hi s ant i-comnnmist:
,
anti-tax, and anti-public
support of social services positions.
Loeb's attack took I he form of re-defining the ethics of primary
election contests. Fo him and to the f ramers of th.e theory of primary
elections, a primary was to be an open iirocess unencumbered by the intrusions
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of vested p;n-|y interests. l.oel, objected to pre~prtmary endorsements by
party committees or major party officials such as county chairman, state
committee members, or state party officers. He objected to the expenditure
of party funds to support the primary candidacies of those endorsed prior
to primary elections. He especially objected to efforts by party leaders
to march the rank and file membership of the party to the polls to vote for
the endorsed can(iidate.
Although Loeb's motives may have been questionable, his tactic touched
an old and responsive nerve in the New Hampshire body politic. The reforms
of the progressives that led to the enactment of the primary legislation
were founded on the same principles as those which I.oeb had begun to espouse.
Pclir.ics prior to the adoption of the primary system had been closed and
dominated by powerful railroad, banking, timber and industrial interests.
These interests selected the major candidates for public office, bought the
legislature and manipulated the conditions of electoral politics. The early
Twentieth Century reforms the progressives legislated in coalition with
popu.iist Democrats, had sprung from a perverse, corrupt and exploitative
political environment. Enacting primary election laws and legislating
the structure of the party organizations had established an ethic of an
open party process and individual citizen participation in the selection
of party candidates. By reaffirming his commitment to the basic concept
of an open primary Loeh simply reaffirmed and revitalized an ethic that had
not been restated for more than a generation.
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Loeb's motive was to strip away from the
-Concord Can,>" the rcspcctabilUy
that shrouded their successful efforts to regulate the candidate product of
the primary. Loeb hoped that by forcing the party leadership to stand back
from primaries and by generating legitimate contests between candidates,
eventually a person of his liking would win the Republican Party nomination
and go on to be elected Governor. By 1958 Loeb was successful. His candidate
for the Republican nomination for Governor, Wesley Powell, won the primary
and went on to a narrow victory over Bernard L. Boutin the Democratic Party
nom1 nee
.
At the same time that Loeb was struggling to open the candidate selection
process of the Republican Party, he was also looking askance at the Democratic
Party. In its quest to produce a viable nominee, the reformers of the
Democratic Party sought to control the primary elections much as had the
"Concord Gang" of the Republican Party, Following the minor revolution within
the Democratic Party in 1956, the new and liberal leadersliip began to put
the party in order. To do this required an organizational effort from the
Democratic leadership to pull a strong candidate through the state primary.
In the face of this effort even the slightest aroma of pre-primary organization
for a specific candidate by the party leaders brought down the wrath of
Loeb's editorials on the reformist Democrats.
Since in this case the ends justified the organizational means, in
1958 the reform leadership of the Democratic Party was willing to suffer
tlic bolts from Loeb's pen in order to secure, through party leadership, the
nomination of the strongest candidate, Bernard L. Boutin. Although Boutin
v;as tlie beneficiary of the pre-primary organization and, as such, appreciated
the value of a thorougli effort, tliere was a tendency not to appreciate the
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the sancLity of the- opon primary that Loeb vvay rc-establlshinv;. When )5outin
and others of the reform leadership sought to regulate in a similar way
the campaign for John F. Kennedy, in 1960 New Hampshire Presidential Primary,
Loeb renewed his assault on tliese Democratic party leaders.
What Boutin failed to recognize, when he returned to New Hampshire in
the spring of 1967, was that Loeb had been successful. The old ethic had
been restored. Primaries were intra-party contests. Office-holders of the
party, the party's organization, and the party's treasury were not to be
used to support particular candidates in the primaries. The strong sense
of fair-play fostered by the chipping process of the Manchester Union Leader
now required that the primaries be open. Individuals should be encouraged
to participate not by threats, but through an individual desire to respond
to the call of a candidate. Pressure might be applied to party leaders,
public office-holders, and those needing access to those in power, but such
pressure could not be applied to the mass of a party's membership.
Simply stated, the ethic which the Loeb attacks had revived drew on
the positive attributes that had been ingrained in New Hampshire: participatory
democracy and open political decision-making. The premises of this primary
election ethic required the neutrality of party officials during tlie primary
contests, the neutrality of the formal committee structure of the party, equal
access to the mechanisms of the party for all candidates, no endorsements
and no funds diverted from party accounts for primary election campaigns. The
primary was to be an open intra-party contest fought in a manner that would
give no participant a special advantage. The end being that after the primary
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1-inht: the part:y could unite behind the victor. As a result of tl,ese premises,
votes became diflieult to deliver. The links ti>at had held the Republican
Party together and out of bitter primary fights disintegrated. The old re-
formers in the Democratic Party like Boutin began to feel the sting of the
primary election ethic as they made plans for the renomination campaign of
President Johnson. On his return to New Hampshire, Boutin would find a voting
population that now knew something about primary election ethics. Loeb's
fair play doctrine, together with several vigorous primary contests, had
drawn more voters into primary election activity than ever before. Parti-
cipation, however, was not on the basis of blocs of votes to be delivered
by endorsements from the leadership, but rather, as the result of much
individual decision-making and ad hoc organization. The Boutin model for
the Johnson New Hampshire primary campaign in 1968, was developed out of his
earlier New Hampshire experiences and his activities outside New Hampshire
while serving the Johnson administration in Washington. Attempting a
campaign based on those experiences would run contrary to the independent
mood and the primary election ethic now established in Boutin's home state.
The Johnson Campaign Materializes; Strategy and Counter Strategy
From the earliest stage of the Johnson effort in New Ham.pshire there
were rumblings: first, was there a mysterious man from Washington who had
come to New Hampshire to run the campaign; second, liow much money had the
Johnson leaders imported to New Hampshire to spend on the campaign; and
tliird, when would the "heavies" arrive from Texas and Washington to take over
Boutin's operation? These questions \-jcre generated partly by the press and
partly by tliose already upset witli Boutin's strategy of regimenting the
185
Dcnocr.l ic Party rln-ou,,h cnulorse.nents of Johnson. In reaction, Boutin
stated a policy that the effort on behalf of the President would be "home
grown" and "ho,.e financed" and that its organization, leadership, strategy,
and funding would be the responsibility of New Hampshire people.^ The vote
in the New Hampshire presidential primary would be an expression of New
Hampshire gratitude for the accomplishments of President Johnson, a gift to
the President.
By reacting this way, Boutin had again violated an essential political
ethos. It was obvious that if he and his committee were that concerned about
the impact of outside money, personnel and ideas there had to be something
to fear. The reporters and numerous political observers could not all be
wrong about the heavy-handedness of Lyndon Johnson's domestic politics.
Boutin, again, was on the defensive, a position the McCarthy leadership hoped
to nurture. Tiiey challenged the use of Democratic State Committee funds
for Johnson renomination activities and hinted that they expected that
large amounts of money smelling strongly of Texas crude oil would start
appearing in the state. They intimated that they were expectin;, plane
loads of noisy. Stetson-hatted Texans to start appearing at the local airport
and in the local Johnson headquarters. Both the local and the national
reporters maintained a continuous search for the money and the hats, which
had the effect of keeping both from appearing.
Boutin's only source of manpower, therefore, was that available from
inside Nev; Hampshire or through a loan of office staff by Governor King and
Senator McTntyre. The only source of money for Boutin's effort was to
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he the New Iknnpshl. c Don.ocral: I c Party's minlsculo cuffers, the pockets of
Its sustaining contributors and tliose wl,o could be convinced that they had
better contribute if they wished to maintain favorable relations with the
sure-to-be re-elected President.
On the other hand, the McCarthy campaign could play by the usual New
Hampshire rules. The money would be imported. The national campaign office
was expected to provide most of the campaign materials and media resources
for the effort. Stretching the ethos slightly, they expected to attract
a number of outside v^orkers to assist in the actual operation of the campaign.
Most of this was traditional, seen as good for local business, and the
campaign's contribution to New Hampshire' s econoniy. There was, of course, a
risk in this strategy, especially when it came to importing volunteers and
campaign operatives, but for the McCarthy leadership there was no real choice.
If Johnson was to be the issue in New Hampshire the question was asked,
"Why didn't the President allow his name to be on the New Hampshire primary
bailor?" Boutin answered this in an UPI interview \s?hen he said, "It would
be a question of equal time on every statement he made. It would be just
impossible for him to conduct his office. " Boutin then added that he
expected up to 50,000 Democrats to vote and "if he gets 60 or 70 percent of
that he is doing a fantastic job, realizing that on the one hand you have
McCarthy's name on the ballot, and on the other, you write in for President
Johnson. Just the logistics make it much more difficult for President Johnson,
Johnson would not enter but he would not duck either. His fate was placed in
the hands of his political surrogates in Washington iind New Hampshire.
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Thoro would |H> no lime for politics in the public stmice of his administralion
during the primary contests nhead-at least as far as his personal involvement
was concerned. The polls assured him that his direct participation would
not be necessary.
Bernard Routin, however, held an important card that the McCarthy leaders
discovered early in their preliminary planning. In the name of the Democratic
State Committee, Boutin had blocked, by reservation, the largest hall in the
state, the Manchester Armory, for the Thursday, Friday and Saturday evening
of March 6, 7, and 8. He would be able to hold this space until a specified
period, approximately 10 days prior to the actual reserved date. The question
was, how would this space be used? Would the President be brought out of his
non-participation stance, fly to Mancliester and attempt a dramatic re-creation
of his successful I96h visit? Or was the reservation just good strategy
on Boutin's part to prevent the Republicans from staging their own political
spectacular, thus completely shutting out tlie Democrats in the last moments
of the New Hampshire primary? This would be just the beginning of the
McCarthy forces' tactical joust w..th the Johnson people, but it revealed two
aspects of the contest. The first was that there would be direct con-
frontation between the campaigns supporting the opposing candidates. The
second was a mutual awareness that this was not the ultimate fight. The
ultimate fight was still the one that would pit the nominees of the two
parties against each other in the November election. As both were Democrats,
the Johnson and McCarthy leadc>rs were constantly looking over their shoulders
to see what was happen irig among the Republicans.
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Innitin's rosponsc- to (lie McC/.rCliy c.nuouncomont also revealed the
ber.innin;; of the important numhers game. Would 60 percent be enough for
a Johnson victory or would the result have to be 70 percent in order for
Boutin to claim victory? What would be the percent of the vote that would
mean a McCarthy defeat? Would more than 5 percent but less than 10 percent
mean a "victory?" On both sides optimism was necessary in order to reinforce
efforts at that early stage of the campaign. Boutin was leading from strength.
He had determined that a posture of invincibility was necessary to create the
Imnression of a self-fulfilling prophecy of victory while at the same time
making those who questioned the prophecy seem foolish. On the other hand,
if the McCarthy strategy had been to talk only in terms of miniscule per-
centages his leaders would liave h.ad considerable difficulty recruiting workers
and raising funds. The "real" politicians had to sound the call of reasonable
battle, not suicide.
Boutin's error, initially, was tliat he sought to overpower with rhetoric.
He fell into his own confidence gap. Instead of being more modest in his
predictions he tended to project absolute certitude in his high projections.
Less optimistic language that described the maverick traditions of the New
Hampshire Democrats, the difficulty of write-in elections, tied to tlie usual
criteria of an elector>-ll "win" of 50 percent plus one vote would have put
Boutin and his candidate in a more defensible position. Starting with a
"wJn" projection of 60 to 70 i)ercent meant that Boutin had almost nowhere
to go but down.
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To add more onerny to the conr.csu bc.tv>;cen Llie Johnson and McCarlhy
ca,npai^;n^ was the uso oC Democratic State Committee funds to support the
Johnson campaign. Having secured the party's endorsement and then having
converted the Party organization into the campaign committee for Johnson, the
Now Hampshire primary ethos of party neutrality had been fully raised. At
the McCarthy announcement press conference, D. Frank O'Neil of the Manchester
Unix|n Leader asked Hoeh a question concerning the use of the Democratic
Party's funds to run the Johnson campaign. His newspaper had seen the intra-
party contest between Johnson and McCarthy as an excellent chance to renew
their assault on the practice of pre-primary endorsements. The article
recounting Hoeh's reply read:
The decision of the Democratic State Committee to use party
funds to support the "Citizens-for-Johnson" effort in the
New Hampshire presidential primary vzas under fire from a
second wing of the party yesterday. (The first "wing" being
Eugene Daniell.)
David C. Hoeh of Hanover, state chairman of the McCarthy-
for-President steering committee, told his press conference
at the State House that 'a lot of Democrats are distressed'
by this move on the part of the official party organization.
'Personally, 1 had my name on a $1,000 note for the State
Committee not too many months ago. It's probably spent now.
But I certainly v>7ouldn't like to think this was' being used
for the Johnson primary campaign. Neither would some other
Democrats who are members of the 100 Club.'
Asked if this could have a serious effect on party efforts
in this state after the primary, Hoeh expressed the opinion
^
that it would Miave a bad effect' on fund-raising 'later on.'
By opening tlie issue of the use of party funds, the McCarthy leaders
were further placing the Johnson effort on the defensive. The press would
be watching for reports of heavy media purchase, billboard reservations or
other evidence of large amounts of money being available to Johnson's
campaign. Boutin was already sensitive to this concern and was, publicly
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.nul t:o larj^e oxl ont pi ivaLoly, operating on funds generaLed intornally
in N»-w Hampshire. Hoeh's charge now uiadc the use of Democratic State
Committee funds equally controversial. Boutin would have to run a con-
servative campaign, even if extensive funding were available. He certainly
could not obligate the Democratic Party of New Hampshire to additional
borrowing while a considerable debt still remained to be repaid as a result
of the 1966 campaigns. Hoeh had reported that the McCarthy campaign would
probably spend "ar. least $50,000" in the primary and knew that almost all
of tliat amount would have to come from outside of the state. Because of
the presidential primary tradition, Hoeh knew that criticism concerning
the external-to-Ne.w Hampshire source of that money would be insignificant.
After all, the McCarthy leaders speculated, what power did Senator McCarthy
and his supporters have in the face of the full force of the President and
his administration?
Draft R.F.K. Reactions
McCarthy's announcement took P2ugene Daniell by surprise as well. Like
the rest of the nation, Daniell thought that McCarthy would by-,. ass New
Hampshire when the RFK organization deadline of December 28th came and passec
Again, Daniell, not one to keep in close touch with his associates, did not
realize that many of liis best potential workers were holding back in hopes
that McCarthy would enter New Hampshire. Press reaction was that the future
moves of Daniell 's organization wore uncertain but "most observers believe
Daniell wilJ continue undaunted." Daniell was in the midst of his court
contest with tlie New Hampshire Attorney General concerning tlie legality of
a writ(>-in campaign and had not really considered his options if McCarthy
actu.-tliy entered. Revealing this condition he said "Whatever we do is up
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l:o our ev.eculi.ve conm.UUe. Hut. T know tliat Vs-e wil] continue with a slate of
doJegates. The second committee— tlie RFK write-in committee—will probably
9
run a write-in effort'.'
Danioll reported that he admired McCarthy but that he still believed
that Robert Kennedy was "the best man for the Job of President ^ ° Daniell
appeared to be weakening under the pressure of his legal battle, a dissolving
campaign organization, the limitation that his committee was placing on his
own political style and the organizational success of the McCarthy Steering
Committee. Kis reference to a "slate of RFK delegates" did give the McCarthy
leaders pause. They had not considered seriously the issue of delegates
before the announcement press conference. Daniell 's emphasis on the delegate
selection issue made them begin to consider what their interest might be in
the selection of the delegates and, more importantly, what Daniell 's interest
was. Was it possible that Daniell, a previous delegate to several Democratic
conventions, was at least as interested in being a delegate as he was in
pursuing a R.F.K Draft? This would be a question that would reemerge in the
weeks ahead. At this time, however, it seemed desirable for the McCarthy
leaders to make only oblique, usually complimentary, references to Daniell in
order to avoid a confrontation with him. As long as Daniell was attacking
the Jolinson organization and raising the more radical of the anti-war charges,
the McCarthy organization benefited by appearing to be tlie more reasonable,
especially tlie more moderate, of the two anti-administration movements in
New Hampshire.
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^Shortly after the 1968 election Boutin left his Sanders Associates job
to become the President of his alma mater, St. Michaels College, Winooski,
Vermon t
.
2Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and Dv;ight D.
Eisenhower avoided decarling their respective renomination candidacies in
the pre-nominating convention primaries. Party surrogates in the respective
states maiiaged their affairs keeping the incumbent presidents out of such
politics.
^Cash, K.
,
Op.Cit.
^Churchill, V/inston, Coniston j (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1906).
^An August 1967 conversation between Bernard Boutin and Sandra U. Hoeh
as reported by Sandra U. hoeh.
%nlon Leader (January 4, 1968).
7 Ibid.
^The Boston Globe (Ja7.1uc.ry 4, 1968).
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C II A r T E 11 VI
THE llEPUliLICAJ^S
R^.P"M.^cans and the McCarthy Campaign
In their December 22nd memorandum to McCarthy, Hoeh and Studds had
suggested:
We are encouraged about the possibility of a write-in effort
for Senator McCar thy on the Republican ballot (particularly
given the number of Republicans who were willing to change
their registration this month even though Sen. McCarthy was
not yet a candidate in New Hampshire.)
At their first organization meeting after McCarthy announced entry in
the New Hampshire primary, the Steering Committee decided not to overtly
campaign for either Republican write-in votes or to attract Republican
workers away from those campaigning in New Hampshire for the Republican
nomination. This decision was based on the New Hampshire political ethic
that one should not muddy another party's pond — an ethic v;hlch was
especially revered by those who led the McCarthy campaign. Initially, there
were two major Republican campaigns. Former Vice President Richard M.
Nixon was engaged in what many observers felt was a "do-or-die" effort to
erase the loser's image which he had acquired after his loss to John F.
Kennedy in 1960, and a subsequent defeat in the gubernatorial campaign of
1962 in California. His principal opponent was then Governor of Michigan,
George Romney. Both saw New Hampshire as the first Important test and had
spent great time, money, and effort preparing for the contest. In the wings
were two other prominent political figures, the Governor of New York, Nelson
Rockefeller, and former General then head of the prominent Cambridge based
consulting firm of Arthur D. Little and Associates, James Gavin. Harold
Stassen and a clutch of lesser know individuals ultimately filed
on the
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Republican ballot. — Jncluding one iiian named Herbert Hoover.
Prelude
From the beginning, New Hamprshire looked like an important bat.Lleground
for the Republican Party. Observers assumed that President Johnson would
stroll to renomination. But increasing anti-administration feeling, wliether
focussed on the war policy or other aspects of the administration's record,
meant that the nominee of the Republican Party had a chance to defeat the
incumbent President, Each candidate approached New Hampshire as if engaged
in an artful form of courtship. Neither Romney nor Nixon wished to be
tainted by previous negative New Hampshire experiences nor to reeuforce
negative perceptions of their current candidacies. The courtship took as
its first phase attracting supporters to lead their New Hampshire efforts.
First there was a scurrying among those who wanted leadership positions
in the respective campaigns for their oi-m purposes and to be with a "winner"
early in the presidential season. Then there was the courting of those who
were seen by the candidates as having valuable political skills and/or
followings which would assist the candidates. Elach step revealed something
of the image which the candidates wished to project and the style of their
subsequent campaigns.
Nixon, wanting to avoid tlie trap which had befallen Goldwater in 1964,
carefully avoided re-establishing his ties with many of New Hampshire's
prominent conservatives and supporters from his other campaigns. He selected
as his state chairman a young, recently elected state representative from
Hillsborough named David Sterling. The appointment lent freshness and energy
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to Lhc Nixon efroi l wlvich was a direct attempt to bury Nixon's imap.c as a
re-treaded loser. Tlirouj'.h the appointiiiont of Sterling Nixon's managers had
succeeded in avoiding being labelled through association with controversial
New Harapsliire figures like Wesley Powell or the taciturn former Speaker of
the New Hampshire General Court Stewart Lamprey. The new Nixon was alive,
even vital, as projected through the activity of his young, sports car
driving, attorney, popular state representative chairman. Behind the facade
were tVie same grey politicos but to the public the image was comfortably
contemporary
.
Romney relied heavily on his ties with Governor Rockefeller in his
search for a New Hampshire campaign group. To many Romney appeared as the
fresh face in the crowd and the one who could most effectively take on
President Johnson in November. He had taken positions in opposition to the
administration's war policy and had attracted coiisiderable support from the
establishment dissenters in the Republican Party. Romney was viewed as a
Republican liberal and attracted as New Hampshire supporters many descendants
of the New Hampshire progressives. Romney selected as his chairman VJilliam
R. Johnson, an attorney, member of the State Senate, and recognized leader of
the Republican liberals. Johnson saw in the Romney candidacy a chance to
further his own career through a successful Romney campaign in New Hampshire.
Johnson inherited as his organization those local supporters and friends of
Nelson Rockefeller who had campaigned for the I96^i nomination, also a
sizable group who saw Romney as the only viable alternative to the war polici
of Lyndon Johnson's administration.
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T'^'-^ XPJIK i-oporLed under Clie hcndUnc "Presidential Warm-Up"
on November 5, 1967. that "tlie political lines in Manchester and Hanover,
in Koene and Coos County (sic) are being dra\^T unusually early this year.
The huge "Nixon for President" banner was up on the south end of the New
Hampshire Highway Hotel outside Concord, where the Rockefeller bunting hung
in 196'^, by mid-October.
"David Sterling.
..
quotes a straw poll that gives the former Vice-Presi-
dent 59 per cent. Governor Reagan 16, Governor Rockefeller of New York 12 and
Governor Romney 6.
"Hard by the gilt-domed colonial Capitol downtown there was an operating
Romney headquarters and a dark untenanted second-floor room that purported
to be the action center of a write-in campaign for Gov. Ronald Reagan of
California.
"Romney spent three days in and out of New Hampshire a week ago, his
first real politiclcing there...
"^
This to the press and most observers would be the main event in New
Hampshiie. The press follov;ed each campaign closely as the respective
strategies unravelled.
Each campaign had been carefully planned long in advance. The major
strategies, organizaLlcnal tactics, and logistics were the products of long
periods of detailed preparation that had occurred outside of New Hampshire.
Only when the primary season was about to open did the candidates bring
their campaign
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plans to New llamp.UWro. Behind t.iie scenes were professional manaj^ers with
extensive experience in political campaign management, media, scheduling,
promotion and organization. A manual of operations had been written which
spelled out each detail of the strategy. The professional managers were
there to guide the local leaders, and to regulate all of the movements of the
candidate and the organization. New Hampshire was providing the theatre,
the stage, the audience and some ushers. The production was the first stop
of a complete campaign roadshow for both Nixon and Romney.
Nixon in New Hampshire 1968
Nixon had always done well in Nev; Hampshire and his nomination organ-
ization fell quickly in step behind the New Hampshire and national leadership
he had selected. The New Hanipshire local supi)orters knew exactly where
the votes were that had gone to Nixon in the past and were ready to dust off these
votes for hira again in 1968.
The media effort became the most prominent part of the Nixon campaign.
Billboards stating "Nixon's the Ore" with the candidate peering into an open
attache case sprang up all over New Hampshire. Nixon surrogates campaigned
extensively for him in the small towns and exurban neighborhoods where the
Republican vote was scattered. Nixon's few visits were carefully orchestrated
appearances where the semblance of access and informality were conveyed to
the public, but actual contact with him was totally managed. On February 1st,
a page one advertisement announced Nixon's campaign beginning with an Open
House
.
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On t he next day Wi l l iam Loob pub] isliod one oi: his ramous page one signed
editorials endorsing Richard Nixon's candidacy. The story that appeared
under a posed photo of Nixon and his family showed how the Union Leader would
campaign in New Hampshire.
Nixon, no stranger to the New Hampshire hustings, will fire
his opening guns at a noon press conference today at the
Holiday Inn at Manchester, and will remain in the state for
the remainder of the weekend.
Highlight of his first campaign swing will be Saturday night's
testimonial dinner... in Concord where a capacity crowd is
assured for the convention hall. The hall has a capacity
of close to 1,200.
The former presidential standard bearer of the Republican
Party --- he lost out in a "squeaker" to President John F.
Kennedy in 1960 — will be accompanied to New Hampshire
by his wife, "Pat" and his two daughters, "Tricia" and Julie....
This afternoon from 5 to 7 p.m. the Nixons will be hosts at
a reception for the New Hampshire press and their families
at the N.H. Highway Hotel. This is billed by the Nixon
committee as a "non news-making" event. There will be no
speeches or press conference at this time.
On Saturday the Nixon family will return to Manchester for
a two-hour public reception at St. Anselm's College, Goffstown,
just outside Manchester. This will take place from 1:30 to
3:30 p.m.
They v?ill go back to the N.H. Highway Hotel in Concor-.i late
Saturd-ay afternoon to prepare for the 7 p.m. Nixon-for-
Prosident dinner at the hotel's convention hall.
The former Vice President will stay overnight at the hotel
and is expected to remain there m.ost of Sunday working on
future plans for his campaigning in the Granite State.
There are no public events on Sunday.
Monday morning the party will leave for Manchester where
Nixon is slated to take-off for^Green Bay, Wisconsin and
more campaigning, at 11:50 a.m.
With that kind of press coverage, a background of vigorous earlier
campaigns in New Hampsliire, well covered visits from other members of the
family and surrogates, Nixon needed little else to maintain tlie appearance
a vigorous contest in the state.
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Tn his short ihvcc clay c.-nnpainn sv^ing in New Hampshire, Nixon convoyod
the Linage of an accessible, human, thoughtful, yet hard working candidate.
His schedule had been carefully developed to present each of these facets
and to counter lingering doubts as to his capacity to win a rough campaign
fight. Unien Nixon left New Hampshire that Monday morning, he left behind a
clear image of a mature and effective campaigner. Althougli time for a
possible return visit to New Hampshire was reserved in his schedule, Nixon
did not campaign again — it was not necessary. Radio and television
commercials, surrogate campaigners, newspaper advertising, Loeb's aggressive
support and a carefully organized mailing effort carried the campaign for
him. He was off to more difficult states with the assurance of a percentage
pi ayer
.
Romney in Nevj Hampshire 1968
Governor George Romney of Michigan, opened his New Hampshire campaign
drive first. He hired as his campaign planners the tv;o persons who had
organized the Henry Cabot Lodge write-in during the 1964 New Hampshire Primary,
John D. Deardourff and David B. Goldberg. Following their surprise success
in 1964, Deardourff and Goldberg had formed a consulting firm named Campaign
Consultants Inc. Tom Henshaw wrote for the Sunday Herald Traveler :
The hottest new item on the political shelf in this
presidential year of 1968 is the professional con-
sulting firm wnlch, for a flat fee, will show an
aspiring mayor, governor or even president how Imst to
run his campaign.
CCI specialized in Republican campaigns and had had some successes and
losses but in the process had established a reputation for being effective.
The firm had turned down an offer from Richard Nixon earlier and began working
on the Romney campaign in February 1967.''' They assembled a campaign or-
ganli-.ation for New Hampshire which tied back to Romney 's national campaign.
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In the ornanizal ion v;.-re a nuir.bor of campai gnors who had had close tics
either to Nelson Rockeleller directly, to roles in his administration in
New York State or to liberal Republican candidates such as John l.indsey,
then a Republican and Mayor of tlie City of New York.
To give Romney a special and early boost in his New Hampshire campaign,
Governor Rockefeller and Governor John Chafee or Rhode Island, came to New
Hampshire January 2 to meet with New Hampshire Romney supporters and to give
the effort their full support. In addition to giving Romney support, the
visit was designed to end contentions that Rockefeller would become a can-
didate. In commenting on this, Romney's chairman, William Johnson said, "I
think the people who attended the meeting are convinced that Gov. Rockefeller
is not a candidate and will support Romney."^ Preceding Johnson's comments ii
the article was the paragraph; "Rockefeller's appearance in New Hampshire ha
been interpreted by some political observers as a move by the Romney campaign
organization to drum support for the flagging Romney primary effort."
Even with the extensive re-planning and methodical organizational effort, the
Romney campaign had not attracted the broad interest it needed in order to
confront Nixon effectively.
With Rockefeller fully in support of Romney and Romney identified as
the ultimate hope of tlie moderates of tlie Republican Party, the campaign's
managers felt that the Romney energy and personality would attract the suppor
The next step in the plan called for Romney to blitz New Hampsliire in a six
day campaign visit.
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The Manchcs uor Union Leader paid special a L Lent: ion to Romnoy In these
early weeks. Columnist D. Frank O'Neill wrote:
In this case (referring to the Lodge write-in of 196A)
tliey (N.ll. Republicans voters for Lodge) were "snowed-
under" by a cleverly-managed public relations campaign,
one that was master-minded by a couple of people who are
now trying to sell the same "soap-suds" t^pe of campaign
on behaJ.f of Governor Romney of Michigan.
Romney's anti-administration position on the war in Vietnam gave the
Union Leader a special opportunity to criticize Romney while he was engaged
in his dawn to dark effort to woo Republican voters. In a famous visit to
Vietnam Romney had returned as a supporter of the war effort. Later he
changed his position stating that he felt he had been "brain washed" by the
Pentagon and the Vietnam-based military. Romney was never quite able to shake
the implications of that phrase. Many became skeptical of Romney's ability
to make soimd policy judgments and to keep from being swayed by advisors and
briefings. Senator Eugene McCarthy when asked about Romney's "brainwashed"
statement said that he felt "brainwashed" was an overstatement. "All that
v;as needed in the case of George Romney was a light rinse.
The Manchester Union Leader felt that Romney was vulnerable among the
New Hampshire conservative Republicans on both his policy position on the war
and the implications of the "brainwashed" statement. They also sensed that
the Romney leadership was having difficulty exciting interest in Romney.
Working with both feelings, the editors began to chip away at Romney.
Headline: Romney Deals Verbal Cut to Military Effort in Viet.
Concord: UPl — Michigan Gov. George Romney yesterday dealt a
verbal blow to the military in Vietnam while urging the U.S.
and other major powers increase efforts to achieve talks
202
botwotn-i Lho Saigon governiiieut and the National Llberalion
Front: of North Vietnam.
Ttie Republican presidential hopcfu] told a news conference
"ray general feeling is we have relied tOohe^^vily on search
and destroy rather than clear and hold.'
Romneys' campaign had been labelled a "peace crusade" which had stressed
"peace" and the need for "moral leadership."^ Such words, when placed in
the context of a Manchester Unio n Leader story, conveyed an image of weakness
if not actually traitorous inclinations.
The friendly press had trouble projecting a decisive image for Romney as
well. The Concord Monitor ran a story headlined: And Suddenly, Nelson Rocke-
feller ... ROMNEY BEGINS PRIMARY RID, CHALLENGES NIXON TO DEBATE. The column
titles for the two stories that ran under the headline read, "Defeat Here
Might Bury Romney Bid" and "Candidate Issues Call for Morality." One
article held out the hope that if Romney failed in New Hampshire this would
"signal, the entry of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller." The other led
with Romney 's challenge to Nixon to debate "on the issues", a challenge
that was never accepted
.
''^^ The theme of the Romney effort as reported by
the Concord Monitor would be a "new leadership of a new America to discover
the old morality."
From the beginning, the Romney campaign developed incredible problems.
First, they were unable to stimulate much interest. Secondly, the organization
that did evolve was carelessly managed. Thirdly, the press situation for
Romney was confusing and those items which the campaign thought would help
often backfired. Fourthly, Romney himself was badly scheduled. Instead of
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voters by liir. extensive cainpn J j>,n
,
familiarity seemed to breed contempt.
Because of Komney's campaign impact on tbc McCartby effort, it is important
to recount some of the details of Romney's New Hampshire failure.
The Romney Orf^anlzatlon
Each campaign tried to create an image for itself that was distinct.
One of the devices to show imagination and professionalism was to find new
ways to organize and attract supporters. The Romney managers created the
idea of a series of "home headquarters" that would serve as local organizing
centers and provide identity for the candidate at the neighborhood, small
town level. Opening these "headquarters" x<;ould give something for the candidate
to do in pi.aces where there was little opportunity for conventional campaigning —
especially in the small towns where the Republican vote resided and during
the winter campaign season. An excellent concept, except to be successful
it had to be carefully done.
On his campaign travels Romney rode in a Winnebago vehicle which was
equipped as a headquarters and place to relax between stops. '•'hen scheduled
to come into a town an advance group of "Romney Girls," five Colby Junior
College students, all various shades of blonde, wearing red, white and blue
Romney mini dresses would arrive ahead of Romney and warm the audience
.,11
(usually in a home headquarters) with several Romney campaign songs.
On one of these campaign swings Romney logged more than 2,000 miles of small
town stops, plant gate and main street handshaking and home headquarters
openings
.
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The fault; with the "home headquarters" cau.e when a list of these loca-
tions was announced. On the list were a number of individuals who were not
active in his campaign. In fact, the McCarthy leaders screened the list
carefully and found several active McCarthy supporters who did have a Rornney
"home headquarters" or any intention of opening one,
January 18th Rornney announced that 25 headquarters had been established
In the Concord area, and that these were the "first of 10,000 that will hope
fully be In existence before the Republican National Convention next August.
In New Hampshire Rornney forces are nearlng the end of an effort
to establish 500 home headquarters before the March 12 primary
At last count, they had sevured more than 400, Rornney officials
said. -"-J
On January 20th, William Johnson began correcting, publicly, the list of
"home headquarters" he had issued two days earlier. The public relations
impact of the original announcement dimmed as the inaccuracies of the list
were revealed.
As McCarthy leaders Hoch and Studds had noted in an organizational
meeting, the idea of the "home lieadquar ters" was good and they suggested
that the McCarthy Committee borrow the concept. Those communities which
would not be able to find or support a storefront headquarters should be
organized around "home headquarters." Volunteers would have a place to go,
literature could be distributed from the designated homes, and telephoning
for election day activity could be organized around the headquarters.
They would not, however, be used as Rornney had used them, as the focus of
his own local campaign stops. For a Democratic candidate other activities
took precedence.
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The Roiuney campaign schedule was a masterpiece of how the campalGn
managers thought Romney could storm New Hampshire. He was known to bo. ener-
getic o.nd personally engaging. The managers wished to contrast his access-
ibility, constant energy, enthusiasm, and charisma with the image of aloof
and impersonal Richard Nixon. A typical schedule had Romney outside of a
factory greeting workers at 6:30 a.m., an 8:C0 a.m. breakfast meeting/speech,
mid-morning home headquarters visits, a high school or college speech, a noon
luncheon with a service club, more home headquarters meetings in the after-
noon, street campaigning, a radio interview, a meeting with a local news-
paper editor, perhaps a break from campaigning for dinner or a dinner speak-
ing engagement, and often a speech or meeting with workers in the evening.
The campaign day ended for him after 11:00 p.m. The next morning began
again with the 6:30 a.m. plant gate handshaking. For six days Romney kept
the sam.e pace.
The Roumey managers wasted their own candidate. On his first campaign
day he stood outside of a Nashua factory in 20 degree below zero weather
rea:^hing for the hands of workers who were a bit puzzled to see a grown man
standing outside in the biting cold and darkness of the early New Hamp-
shire dawn. The hands he was reaching for were mostly those of Democrats.
Mixed in the schedule were what the managers felt were the required media
events. New Hampshire skis they thought, thus Romney should be photographed
on skis. He did not ski and appeared in a well circulated photograph
awkwardly trying to stand up on skis. What his managers did not realize was
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that- people, come Lo New Hampshire to sk i
,
hut ,i,ost of Romney's potent Jal
New Hampshire voters didn't. Romncy, well, knovm for his Jogging, appeared
one afternoon in jogging shorts, sneakers and light shirt ready to demo-
strate for the curious as well as the photographers along Concord's
Victorian Main street, the jogging style that had become so well known. For
some reason he had to wait in the cold for the event to be orchestrated,
lost nis temper, did jog, but the whole exercise lost its meaning, if there
had been one. Romney succeeded in reenforcing only one image and that
v;as not one that lent any particular value to his campaign. He was energetic
but perliaps it was true that he could be easily led by his managers and
"brainwashed." He certainly did not cast an image either of identity with
the New Hampshire Republican voter or competence to be the next president
of the United States.
As the schedule proceeded, Romney began to tiro. Wien problems cropped
up Romney was upset. He was generally pleased with the response to his
candidacy he had met on the street, but as Governor King pointed out to
Senator McCarthy, "You will find that New Hampshire people are courteous."
With Nixon's carefully staged visit early in February, whatever momentum
Romney had succeeded in building witVi his attempted blitz faded by contrast.
Nixon appeared like a person these voters, voters who had supported him in
large numbers before, would like as tlieir president. Romney's campaign was
entertainment, almost a circus except tliat he was trying valiantly through it
all, to say something important about the war policy in Vietnam and the impact
of the Johnson administration on tlie national morality.
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Ron]no};^^8_S ccret: Weapon
Tlie fiiuil irony of the Roninoy cnudidacy came in Llio form of that
very expertise tliat had surprised New Hampshire in 196A. Early in
January the Romney leadership revealed tliat they had the capacity to
prepare 40 personalized letters per minute and had mailed more than
80,000 letters during the same week. Their "secret weapon" was a com-
puter-driven printer capable of producing 1,200 lines of typewriting
per minute, William Johnson reported that the "names, addresses, telephone
numbers and occupations of 130,000 Republicans have been put on computer
tape, leaving about 15,000 yet to do."^'^ The names had come from
precinct checklists with city and town directories used to match husbands
and wives, and to get occupations.
The Nixon campaign was using a mechnical letter-writer that pro-
duced 300 letters a day with a total of 27,000 at that point in the campaign.
The battle of the letters was on, and from the early report Romney'
s
computer-based operation was in the lead. The Nixon campaign's reaction
to the Romney leaders gleeful report of their sophisticated na;:ie, letter,
and interest matching system v^as that they "did not consider using a
computer in their mailings." They were using a hand personalizing method
for their letters wliich took longer and did noc involve a computer. With
Mixon running 3 to 1 ahead of Romney at that point in the polls, they
were sticking to tried and true methods.
William Johnson had borrowed student help and purchased computer
time on the computer equipment based at Dartmouth College. His delight
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at Lho ability o( Lids sysU-m to produce letters, iimiutnln lists, and
sort for special interest constituencies was too much for him to contain.
In the midsi: of his candidate's important first campaign visit to New
Hampshire major press attention was diverted from Romney to Johnson, his
letters and the computer's capabilities. The computer was the campaign
giiiuaick of 19G8. William Johnson was the proud father or, more appropriately,
midwife.
Unfortunately, the revelation of the "secret weapon" fell into the
Ulliojl il?iiil£il' view of the Romney campaign as a bit of soapselling hucksterism,
a bit too slick, sophisticated and unsettling for many New Hampshire
voters who saw the "secret weapon" as a device to manipulate voters. It
violated the ethic of making an independent choice and raised suspicion.
In reality there was no need for Johnson to crov; about his voter contacting
operation. If the letters had been quietly produced, mailed and read,
the impact would tiave been considerably greater than was the fear Johnson
thought he could evoke in the Nixon camp. The fine art of commercial direct
mail had long possessed the sophistication that Johnson publicly described.
Johnson deflated the credibility of his letters when he allowed his
"secret weapon" to become public. It must also be recalled that this was
the beginning of a public concern with who was keeping personal records
and why. When Johnson indicated that he had liopcd to include data on how
frequently each Republican goes to the polls the spector of an invasion
of privacy became evident. Johnson's use of the phrase "data bank" coupled
with a Concor d Monitor headline which read
,
"Romney ' s Race Aided by Secret
16
CoKiputer," was enough to raise great concern and suspicion.
Suspicion incroasc'ci a>ui thv UmUts thai wore mailed arrived with
considerably less eredibilily. Romncy f iced controversy at tlie same tliat
ho was trying to establish rapport with New Hampshire voters. The
"secret weapon" turned out to be a dud.
VJilliam Loeb focussed the suspicion with one of his front page
signed editorials which read:
Us Guinea Pigs in New Hampshire
For the last two weeks the campaign managers of Gov. Romney
have told half a dozen national publications — with remarkable
candor — precisely what they are relying on to win the Ne.w
Hampshire primary.
Tlie mainstay of their campaign is not the qualifications or
ability of Gov. Romney to dig himself out of the quicksand
of contradictions where he has been floundering for months.
Their "secret weapon," as Warren Beaver of the New York Times
wrote a week ago, "is not even in New Hampshire."
It is a gi ant computer, an electronic data bank, based In
New York City, that will be work ing overtime to rescue Gov
.
Romney' s flagging political fortunes .
Into that computer the Romney organizers have fed not only
the voters' lists of all New Hampshire Republicans and Inde-
pendents, but also as much personal background as they
could dig up in four months of scouring the state.
Inside this "People Bank" in New York City, the voters can
be segmented, in seconds, into Catholics, Protestants, Jews,
married, divorced, single, rich, poor, old, young, union man
and businessman, black and white, male and female, government
worker, home owner, renter — and we don't know what else.
VJhen all this personal data is coupled with analyses of
opinion surveys and behavioral studies, the potential for
manipulating the electorate of New Hampshire is enormous.
The Romncy managers are aware of tliis potential — and frank
about it.
They have b r agged that with in a ma^tt^erj?j[jj__fev^
can _h;w e J l^tnjjjjnLHr^)ieces of l iteratu re in tlie hands of
any special interest voting bloc in the state
.
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Tlie loltm- that j^ics to the young, Roman Catholic, vui Ion
work(:!r in Manchester can be wholly different than ti\at sent
up to the Protestant, small to\^/n, upstate, middle-aged
businessman.
Eacli of these letters would be prepared by social scientists
in New York, then mass-produced, inserted, stamped by com-
puter, trucked to New Hampshire and mailed.
Yet, each of these computer-produced letters would appear to
all the worl d to be a personalized note written and signed
by _ei^t_h
e
r Mr. Johnson,, or Gov. Romney or Gov. Rockefeller
himsel f
!
A few years back a rather frightening book was written
entitled "THE 480."
Its theme was that a small group of behavioral scientists,
using a computer and massive personal data on each American
voter, could sub-divide the country into 480 "voting segments,"
make "tailored appeals" to each of these segments — and
elect any man they chose to be President of the United
States.
NEW HAMPSHIRE IS TO BE THE TESTING GROUND OF THIS KIND OF X
"PROGRv\MMED POLITICS" AND YOU THE VOTERS OF THIS STATE
ARE TO BE THE GUINEA PIGS.
If Gov. George Romney — a man almost without comprehension
of the magnitude of the crises this country faces abroad —
can be put across to the New Hampshire voter by a complex of
data banks in New York City, the lesson will not be lost on
other men with similar ideas.
Despite the conf idence of theRomney camp in thei r computer ,
we~don' t" think it will work. We hope that you cannot sell
a presidential cand idate the way you sell cigarettes .
The be st defcn^^.e again st this so rt o f effort to manipulate
the^electora te and exploit the racial, religious, income and
"regional "dif ferences among u s — is the basic good sense of
New Hampshi re
.
From the Romney camp comes word that the first to be hit with
the special interest mailings will be the voters over 60.
Maybe^ th_i^ edi torial will help tliem t o know beforehand just
v^ij:_th_e y are g e 1 1 i n
g
.
,
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Signed: William Locb, publisher
2.11
l2}!HliLY-liiJi9_g '^<-' fell er P r o b 1^
In spite of Govcnior Nelson Rockefeller';, early, continuing, and
vigorous support for Romney, their remained a sizable group of skeptics
in New Hampshire. When the February 10th closing date had passed, sixteen
delegate candidates had filed as being "favorable" to the nomination of
Governor Rockefeller. By February 18th the New York Times reported that
Prof. John A. Beckett of Durham had been selected chairman of a delegate
candidate committee which was organized for a write-in campaign on behalf
of the Nevi? York governor.
Announcing the effort one of the members of the committee said: "they
expected that the write-in would pick up a large portion of the Henry
1
8
Cabot Lodge write-in vote cast in 196^." The basis for the organizing
v;as the fact that many continued to view Romney as a "stand-in" or "stalking
horse" for Rockefeller. If Romney failed, then these analysts were sure
that their preferred candidate. Rockefeller, would announce bis candidacy.
If they could generate a sufficient write-in vote for Rockefeller in the
New Hampshire primary they felt that the demise of the Romney campaign
would result and Rockefeller would consider challenging Nixon for the
nomination.
Until the January 28th release of a Gallup Poll, Rockefeller had been as
much as lA points ahead of President Johnson in these sui-veys. The January
28th release had Lyndon Johnson running ahead of eacli of the four most
popular Republicans with the highest approval, A8 percent, in some time.
Rockefeller remained the candidate supported most frequently by voters
against Johnson.
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Romney, in ;:i-)M:r of his agp.resslve New Hampshire campai);n, did not
appear to move either xn tlie straw polls in New Hainpshi.re or in his
standing among other Republicans mentioned as possible candidates nationally.
He was not able to attract Rockefeller's strong liberal and moderate Republican
interest; nor had he been able to show the national strength among all voters
that would attract support for his nomination against President Jobnson.
The Rockefeller v;rite-in organizers perceived this weakness and began actively
to hold out hope for a Rockefeller nomination.
February 28th, Governor Romney declared that he was withdrawing from the
New Ham.pshire presidential primary. Several hours before, he had been given
the results of the latest private poll conducted by his campaign vv/hich showed
that he not only seriously trailed in his campaign against Richard Nixon but
that his position relative to Nixon was approximately the same as it had
been before he began campaigning. His campaign had failed to generate the
momentum that v/ould bring him sufficiently close to Nixon so that even if ho
did lose he could claim a victory, of sorts, in the narrowness of the Nixon
max. gin.
The demise of the Romney campaign released volunteers and local moderate/
liberal Republican energy to work on the McCarthy effort. "Republicans for
McCarthy" committees were organized, letters supporting McCarthy were circulated
to former Romney activists, advertisements urging Republicans concerned
about
the policies of the Johnson administration were placed by these
committees
and fund raising began. Isolated and frustrated Republican liberals
began
to appear at McCarthy campaign stops and express their support
for him.
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WluMi Uoiiincy on.icd lils campaign, some, of the media Llioui;hL the iuteresting
part of the New llampsliiro primary was over for 1968. CBS and ABC cancelled
their hotel and motel spaces, stopped preparing extensive election eve coverage
and left New Hampshire. Other news gatliering organizations and several of
the major newspapers greatly reduced their coverage of the remaining campaigns.
The indications were that Nixon would win easily over the write-in effort
for Rockefeller and that Johnson was at least a three-to-one leader in the
campaign with McCarthy. Given that prospect, a fait accompli coul(] easily
be reported by a few local stringers and the budget rich National Broadcasting
Corporation.
By nibbling at the edges of the Romney campaign, the McCarthy organization
was able to feed rather well. Until Romney showed his final and considerable
weakness as a candidate, tlie McCarthy workers had hoped that he would succeed
with his anti-war position against Richard Nixon. When he failed they were
ready to absorb as much of the anti-war anti-Johnson administration
sentiment as was likely to move from Republican ranks to a Democrat of any
sor L
.
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C U A P T R V I I
THE LliJ CA>1PAIGN, THE McCARTHY CAMl'AIGN : C0NTPJ^ST1NG STYLES
Knowing the Opposition
The John:;on campaign devclopGd according to the plan that Bernard L.
Boutin had outlined to Sandra Hoeh during their August 1967 meeting. Following
the Democratic Stal;e Committee's endorsement of the Johnson renominatlon bid
November 19th, other local and county committees and prominent Democratic
Party leaders and officials began endorsing the renominatlon of the President
as v.'ell. Each of the significant endorsements received the attention of a
press release from the Democratic State Committee headquarters and local or
statewide media distribution. In carefully orchestrated succession the
Johnson campaign leadership began filing for the delegate places. Again, each
of the principal and approved filings was accompanied by a press release that
kept the efforts of the committee before the public on almost a daily basis.
On January 22nd Governor John W. King and Bernard L, Boutin filed their
delegate candidacies while the story that covered the filing indicated that
U.S. Senator Thomas H. Mclntyre was expected to file later. The stream was
properly staggered to insure that the LBJ campaign would gain some press
attention even though tlie major focus was almost entirely on tlie Republican
contest.
Shortly before Senator McCarthy was to make his first campaign visit
to New Hampshire, Rowland Evans, the nationally syndicated columnist,
called the McCarthy state headquarters Inviting Hoeh and Studds to join him
for dinncn-. Evans had been spending the day with Bernard Boutin and other
members of the LBJ committee and now wanted to contrast his experience with
the McCarthy leaders' view of the contest.
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Evans was impressed by whaL liouLlu had told bin, of the Jolmson campaign
plan and the extensive list oi endorsements which Boutin liad n.itihcred. lloeh
responded that he felt if someone were asked for an endorsement that is what
would be given. If someone was asked to work then that is what they would
do. In the case of the Johnson campaign, Hoeh said that he felt endorsements
were contrary to the non-endorsement ethic in New Hampshire and might well
hurt the Jolmson effort rather than help. As for the campaign plan, Hoeh
responded that ho did not see it as being particularly unique. It still rested
on the hard work of volunteers, who did not seem to be volunteering, and
on the backs of those who had endorsed the renoraination effort but had done
little else. To Hoeh and Studds it appeared as if the endorsers were
busier congratulating each other over the endorsements and predicting how
badly McCarthy would be beaten than actually stirring up a Johnson vote. An
air of self-assurance about the "3 to 1" defeat of McCarthy and the ultimate
success of Johnson, not only in New Hampshire but in November as well, kei)t the
energy and volunteer levels low in the Johnson camp. To Hoeh and Studds,
the Johnson campaign seemed narrowly based and over confident. Few persons
were actually at work in the campaign. The reasons for each of these con-
clusions they carefully explained to Evans.
They began by reviewing how rapidly the McCarthy organization had
developv^d before McCarthy announced; liow it had sustained itself before
McCarthy entered the New Hampshire primary; how it had grown since the
January 3rd announcement; hc^w dedicated and effective the volunteers had become;
the extensive press attention the campaign had already received; and reported
that a substantial flow of outside volunteers was beginning.
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Fa'.ius' colunni .ii-ptNiro 1 January ?.r)t li, t lu.' day bcforo McCarthy arrived for
lilH first Nc-w Hampshire ca!npai;;n visit. The headline read "LBJ Turns on
Heat to Roast McCarthy," and went on:
Concord, N.H. — The real surprise in the campaign for the
March 12 Democratic presidential primary is not the dis-
organized nature of Sen. Eugene McCarthy's campaign but
how the much-maligned regular party organization here is
building a well-oiled macliine to support President Johnson.
On tlic eve of McCarthy's first campaign visit here Friday for
his battle against Mr. Johnson, the state of the senator's
campaign is easily depicted: not until this week did his
campaign headquarters in Washington send a single advanceman
to survey New Hampshire and confer with McCarthy's original
supporter and now the manager on the scene, Dartmouth Col-
lege public affairs man David Iloeh (sic).
In contrast, McCarthy, the only name on the ballot, faces
what looks to be the most formidable and highly organized
campaign ever fielded in this state, promoting the v/rite-in
of Mr. Johnson's name against McCarthy. Headed by Nashua
businessman and former Washington bureaucrat Bernard Boutin
(who handled Sen. Estes Kefauver's winning primary campaign
in 1936 and John F. Kennedy's in 1960) the Johnson organization
is developing a campaign concept based on careful organization
wholly new to New Hampshire.
If successful, it will undermine the habitual primary campaign
approach of non-organization Democrats like Kefauver, who
conducted hamlet-to-hamlet, handshaking tours that overwlielmed
the voters.
But Kefauver's stunning upset of Harry Truman in 1952 came
against the backdrop of a weak, almost non-existent Democratic
Party organization. Kefauver filled a power vacuum by going
directly to the voters with little if any resistance from tlie
regular s
.
Nov;, however, the Democrats not only have the governorship
and one U.S. senator but are also organized. They are breaking
down the state's 87,bOO registered Democrats into 2000 neighbor-
hoods, witli one coordinator for each. Every Democratic voter
will be handed a pledge card, with a detachable blank addressed
to the White House telling President Johnson why the voter will
write in liis. name on Mar. 12.
Campaign pl.u-ss yeldc.m live up to advance billing. But if
Boutin,' backed by Gov. John King, does half as well as his
blueprint, McCarthy will be facing a defeat close to annihilation
Evans' column a |)po;u-od January 23t;li, tlie day before McCarthy arrived f
his first New Hampshire campaign visit. The headline read "LBJ Turns on
Heat to Roast McCarthy," and went on:
Concord, N.H. — The real surprise in the campaign for the
March 12 Democratic presidential primary is not the dis-
organized nature of Sen. Eugene McCarthy's campaign but
how the much-maligned regular party organization here is
building a well-oiled machine to support President Johnson.
On the eve of McCarthy's first campaign visit here Friday for
his battle against Mr. Johnson, the state of the senator's
campaign is easily depicted: not until this week did his
campaign headquarters in Washington send a single advanceman
to survey New Hampsliire and confer with McCarthy's original
supporter and now the manager on the scene, Dartmouth Col-
lege public affairs man David Hoeh (sic)
.
In contrast, McCarthy, the only name on the ballot, faces
what looks to be the most formidable and highly organized
campaign ever fielded in this state, promoting the write-in
of Mr. Johnson's name against McCarthy. Headed by Nashua
businessman and former Washington bureaucrat Bernard Boutin
(who handled Sen. Estes Kefauver's winning primary campaign
in 19!36 and John F. Kennedy's in 1960) the Johnson organization
is developing a campaign concept based on careful organization
wholly new to New Hampshire.
If successful, it will undermine the habitual primary campaign
approach of non-organization Democrats like Kefauver, who
conducted hamlet-to-hamlet, handshaking tours that overwhelmed
the voters.
But Kefauver's stunning upset of Harry Truman in 1952 came
against the backdrop of a weak, almost non-existent Democratic
Party organization. Kefauver filled a power vacuum by going
directly to the voters with little if any resistance from the
regulars
.
Now, however, the Democrats not only have the governorship
and one U.S. senator but are also organized. They are breaking
down the state's 87,500 registered Democrats into 2000 neighbor-
hoods, witli one coordinator for each. Every Democratic voter
will be handed a pledge card, with a detachable blank addressed
to the Wliite House telling President Johnson why the voter will
v;rite in his name on Mar. 12.
Campaign plans seldom live up to advance billing. But if
Boutin, backed by Gov. John King, does half as well as his
blueprint, McCarthy will be facing a defeat close to annihilatio
218
He concluded his coUunn:
The one brii'la spot since his entry is that the chance for
a large write-in for non-candidate Sen. Robert F. Kennedy,
has sharply declined. Eugene Danieil... is still running
several candidates for convention delegates pledged to
Kennedy. But Danieil is now planning to vote for McCarthy in
the preferential primary.
That will help McCarthy, but not enough. A McCarthy vote
of nore than 20 percent would be a surprise, and a total
of less would be an undisguised disaster. ^
Reading the coluuva the McCarthy leaders feared that on the day before
McCarthy's first visit the conclusions of a major national columnist would
seriously undercut the fledgling campaign
. They felt the campaign was fragile,
subject to easy destruction either from the outside or through reactions of
those working within New Hampshire. Fortunately, Evans' and Novak's column
does not circulate widely in Nev7 Hampshire.
As Hoch and Studds had tried to poiiit out to Evans that while Viis image
of the national headquarters and a centrally directed campaign might be
correct, his image of what was developing for McCarthy at the state level was
not. What had impressed Evans about the Johnson New Hampshire campaign were
the very attributes of that campaign that held the greatest opportunity for
McCarthy's success. A tightly controlled, centrally managed campaign or-
ganization highlighted the same negative attributes of the Johnson administra-
tion that people at the "grass roots" had begun to fear. Hoeh and Studds
sensed a basic alienation from and distrust of the Johnson dominated national
government. The giant personality of Johnson himself seemed to frighten
people. His style and his real or imagined ability to overpower tlie institutions
of the federal government and to stifle opposition had created a considerable
•
reaction. In the early stages of the campaign, this reaction was neither
wide
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spread nor Jocusscd. Unfortunately for the Johnson can.paign leadership, the
very structure of their campaign helped to gather the reaction into a
political force — a political force that could be exploited against Lyndon
Johnson.
Evans mentioned several details of the Johnson campaign that intrigued
Hoeh and Studds. The first was the organizational concept of Boutin's
effort which was to depend on "2000 neighborhoods, with one coordinator for
eacli." Boutin, Hoeh recalled, was dusting off a page from the 1960
Kennedy campaign which avoided senseless local struggles over titles in
the campaign, e.g. the John Kennedy organizers used the label "Kennedy
Secretary" as the means of identifying the local organizer. Boutin revealed
by this tViat he expected difficulty in getting his campaign job done by
using only the local Democratic Party organizations — something that Evans
did not appreciate when he wrote his column.
Secondly, Boutin had taken the idea generated by the Lodge write-in
campaign of 1964 of a "pledge" ca/d. The impact of Lodge's surprise
victory in the 196A Republican presidential primary had conditioned the
organization of ail of the 1968 primary campaigns — Republican and Dcmocrati
Although the McCarthy leaders were not surprised by Boutin's use of a "pledge
card they were interested in what form this effort would take.
A basic element of any political campaign is to know what the opposition
is doing. In the case of the Johnson campaign, this became a relatively easy
task. First, in their self-confidence the leadership was not reluctant to
discuss the organizational concept of the campaign with the press. Boutin
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h:u\ done this with Kowhnul Evans. Secondly, close ties and friendships
had been buiU up over the years between the McCarthy leaders and those
working on the Johnson campaign. This friendship had long preceded 1968 's
politics and would continue after March 12th. Dissension within the Johnson
camp kept information flowing to the McCarthy camp.
The organizational manual for the Johnson campaign had been developed
by Boutin while still in Washington. Wien he returned to New Hampshire he
adopted a rather inflexible leadership role that allowed for little dis-
agreement with his concept of the campaign.
Late in January, the first rumblings of dissension began to come to
the McCarthy leaders. Boutin's leadership was demanding, heavy-handed, and
in a style tiiat seemed to those v;ho witnessed it to come less from his
New Hampshire origin than from too many years in Washington close to Lyndon
B. Johnson. Boutin expected all of those who had endorsed Johnson to fall
into line behind him and the top leadership of the Johnson effort in New
Hampshire. Criticism was viewed by Boutin as a form of disloyalty. To
him there were 90,000 Democrats out in the state who had to be reached and
told how to support their president by writing-in his name. A New Hampshire
success for Boutin's campaign concept would prope] Boutin to the national
leadership of Johnson's campaign and bestow on Boutin's new campaign concept
the mark of genius. The personal investment for Boutin was enormous.
Winning was the only acceptable result. To others winning was important
but keeping the New Hampshire Democratic Party alive and friendships viable
after the primary was at least as important. Boutin was becoming a drill
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sergeant in his olfort to extort production and unquestioning loyalty.
Shortly after Evans' column appeared, Iloeh and Studds were given a
package of the Jolinson campaign's organizational materials. One of their
volunteers had been given the kit by a disgruntled Johnson supporter.
The kit contained a sixteen page mimeographed document titled, "New Hampshire
Citizens for Johnson Campaign Checklist for the President Johnson 'Write-In'
Campaign, New Hampshire - March 12, 1967 (sic)." With the document were ten
attractively presented pictorial brochures titled, "A Strong Man in a Tough
Job," five green and white vinyl bumper strips which read "I Support President
Johnson," along with a mimeographed slip which said, "Bumper roust be wiped
clean before attaching;" four pre~addressed and stamped enevelopes; a one
page item titled, "Notabi.e Accomplishments of the Vice President, Hubert H.
Humphrey;" and twenty, serially numbered three part wallet sized cards. The
first part of the card read, "N.H. Democrats Are 90,000 Strong, I have
pledged my support to President Johnson, and though he is not an announced
candidate, I am writing his name a.n on my ballot in the March 12th New
Hampshire Presidential Preference Primary," witli space under the pledge for
tVie voter's signature. Part tv^70 of the card was titled "White House Copy"
and read "President Johnson, 1 pledge my support to you and will WF,ITE-IN
your name on my ballot in the March 12th New Hampshire Presidential Preference
Primary, Name (print clearly) Address ^Tel. No. and
two boxes: Democrat or Independent, (As an expression of your support this
card will be forwarded tc President Jclmson at the White House in Washington,
D.C.)."
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Port: t'.u-oG Cillcd "ikMdquar ters Copy" rcpoatoci tin- name, address,
U-leplioP.o number, vo'.er status, note space .for services needed such as
"transportation, baby sitter, and remarks," and, as with the other two parts,
the serial numer was repeated. The pre-addressed and stamped enevelopes
were for the return of these last two coupons to the Johnson headquarters
in Manchester.
The whole package was carefully developed and well presented. The
brochure folded out to a sheet of high grade paper with a sample ballot on
one side with graphic instructions for writing in the President's name and
on the otlier a selection of pictures with President Johnson in his "Tough
Job." Johnson was sViowi quietly in his office, meeting with Senate leaders
Mansfield and Dirksen, with Dean Rusk in a cabinet meeting, a face-to-face
conversation with Premier Kosigin of the Soviet Union and listening to a
General in some military field situation. The photographs portrayed the
burdens of the Presidency and Johnson's thoughtful leadership in that
job. The brief text read:
There is no tougher job in the world than being Pres.' dent
of the United States — and never has it been tougher than
it is now.
You, along with 200 million other Americans, look to him
for decisive action as we face the most serious challenges
ever to confront our nation and the world.
An effective President must avoid weakness . . . avoid backing
down when tlie going gets tough... and he must forego the
impulse to let loose... because as the leader of the most
powerful nation on earth, he can trigger the destruction
of civilization with a single word. he must follow the
responsible course... enduring the wailings of the peaceniks
and those who would surrender.
He must be a map of dedicated strength and President Johnson
is . . .
A STRONG MAN IN A TOUGH JOB
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The job is made lougliei" because the emi raj;eovis course
is never easy. He assummed office under tlie most trying
circumstances... and besides carrying out, to tlie letter,
every one of President Kennedy's pi-ograms, he has gone
beyond as he strives for an ever better America. It is
not easy for a President to crusade for expanded oppor-
tunities for all Americans ... when most Americans are al-
ready living better than any people in history.
President Johnson is a tireless worker.
He has done a remarkable job ... and with our support he
will continue as one of our greatest Presidents. Your
endorsement will bolster President Johnson's determination.
Both he and the country look to New Hampshire as the first
state in the nation to reaffirm its unflinching devotion
to convictions of honor.
Your write-in vote can set the pace for the entire nation
as an overwhelming endorsem.ent of this strong man in a
tough -job. Your vote is both the source, and measure,
of his strength.
The theme had been carefully chosen to attract feelings sympathetic
to a President in a difficult position. The campaign concept from brochure
to Instructions to pledge cards was one of unifying behind the President
to provide security, and national solidarity against potentially destructive
forces outside and inside the nation. To defeat such a strategy would
mean that the McCarthy leaders would have to pick it apart. The instructions
circulated with the campaign materials began to give Hoeh and Studds some
help in countering the Johnson strategy.
The introduction to the instructions read:
On March 12th New Hampshire will vote 50,000 strong for
President byndon B. Johnson.
Tliere are over 87,000 registertul Democrats and over 127,000
"Indepentlonts". The goal is attainable — witli hard work.
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I'-tit
- tlu' iob is JilllcuJt ;;,inct>. 1 lu< I'r.sident ' s nnine
wMl not bi> on the balioL and it will he necessary to
wr i t e-- i t - Lii
.
That then, is the p,oal for our cnmpaif;n - by March 12th N.H,
will have 50,000 write-in votes pledRcd to the President.!.!^
The instructions went on to explain that because of the "equal time pro-
vision which requires the news media to give equal time to other candidates-
it olten appears "advantageous for potential candidates who hold public
office at that Lime to delay announcing their actual candidacy until
later " For this reason the "write-in" for President Johnson was nec-
essary. To accomplish a "write-in" the instructions stated that it would
be necessary to "educate" the voter as to "wliat is required and then get
him to the polls to vote." The name rules for write-ins in New Hampshire
hold that tlie "voters intent must be clear" so the instructions advised
writing in "Lyndon Johnson." Instructions on the delegate selection
portion of the ballot were included and referenced to the enclosed sample
ballot printed on the Johnson brochure.
In a section titled "Tips for Organization" was written: "We are
aware that tlie situation varies somewhat from town to town and ward to ward.
We leave to your sound judi'.iiicnt any variations in the suggestions but that
you consider the fact that the suggestions are not our own but are based upon
long experience connected with the various campaigns." properly warned not
to vary the framework, tlie instructions tlien outlined the campaign structure.
1. The Neighborliood Coordinator: The backbone of the entire
campaign is the Nei gliborhood Coordinator. In most cases these
coordinators will be women although there is no real preference....
Each "N.C." will have responsibility only for liis or her neighbor-
hood, consisting of a street or streets assigned by tht^ Town or
Ward coordinator.
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Tlu- "N.C." was oxpecUxl to contacL all Democrats and Independents
.living
wltliin the assigned area. Each was responsible for from 35-50 voters. The
"single most important activity of the entire campaign will be the Pledge-
Card Drive. This will be handled by the Neighborhood Coordinator... and...
will be his to£ £ri_or i_tx project prior to Primary Day," The instructions
wont on to discuss the otlier roles in the campaign including the (2. the
"Town or Ward Coordinator, 3. the City Coordinator, 4. The County Coordinator,
5. The Check List Committee, 6. The Transportation Committee, 7, The
Finance Committee, 8. The Baby Sitter Committee, and 9. The Publicity
Committee. Item 10 called for "Weekly Progress Reports" to be filed from
the "County, City, & Town" on an attached report form.
The instructions outlined the responsibilities of each position in
the campaign structure and covered eacli step in the expected campaign even
to the point of including separate telephone messages to be read when
contacting a registered Democrat or an Independent voter. The Publicity
Chairman was advised that he "mus t" be responsible for the following:
1. Prepare releases on strictly local activities and
local committee appointments.
2. Invite rei>orters and photographers, well in advance,
to all major events in the area.
3. Recommend procedures to State Headquarters in
working with newspapers and radio in your area.
A. Encourage letters to the Editor by people in your area.
5. Organize people to call in to "open mike" shows, in
support of President Johnson.
6. Organize people to participate in "talk shows" and
interview programs on behalf of President,
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The last page of tl,e InstrucLions was titled "Conauittce Roster" which had
spaces for listing the city, town, and ward, coordinator's name, and the names
of the con.n)ittee mer.bers. This was to be sent to the Manchester Johnson cam-
paign headquarters.
The most intriguing position of the instructions was the page devoted to
"The Pledge-Card Drive." The pledge card drive gave the organization an acti-
vity that would substitute for the fact that there would not be a live candidate
travelling in New Hampshire. Circulating pledge cards and getting signatures
would be the principal campaign activity and the cards themselves would be the
basis for the election day get-out-the-vote effort.
Harry Makris, Executive Director of the Democratic State Committee, began
distributing the kits late in January through county and city organizational
meetings. Each meeting scuglic to fill in the pyramid of coordiaatoi s , stimu-
late interest in the campaign, and disr.ribuue the neighborhood coordinator kits.
It was at the Berlin meeting that a McCarthy volunteer received a kit
from a Democratic party worker. The worker took the kit to avoid being dis-
courteous but planned to throw it away. He said he didn't like the idea of
pledging people to vote in a certain way. He felt such decisions were private
and should be kept that way. He especially didn't like having copies of the
pledge being sent to the Wliite House or even to Manchester. He also felt it
would easy enough to sign the pledge and then vote differently. From this
conversation with their Berlin worker, Hoeh and Studds began to see a way to
turn the slick new Boutin campaign against itself.
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M.iki-ij; Look tlic Johnson caniixn (.'.n into llio f ield as a technician
explaining the campaign concept, recruiting volunteers, and instructing
coordinators. Others, principally Governor Johm W. King and Bernard L.
Boutin took a different tack. Given that Johnson was viewed by most as
being miles ahead of McCarthy, it was difficult to stimulate much interest
in doing the hard work of contacting voters, getting pledge cards signed,
or even attending many of the organizational meetings. To drum up interest
Governor King and, occasionally, Bernard Boutin, began to stump for the
Johnson effort.
As early as January 12th, the McCarthy leaders found it necessary to
respond to King's statements. In a January Ilth press conference King
had asserted that there was strong support for President Johnson in New
Hampshire because it was the "patriotic" thing to do in the midst of a war.
"This sounds corny to some people, but I think New Hampshire voters are
patriotic," King said when asked what he thought McCarthy's chances were
in the New Hampshire primary. In the same press conference Governor King
said he planned a "person-to-per: on" campaign for the President in which he
would stump the state. In a press release responding to King's remarks
Hoeh asked if Governor King finds it unpatriotic to support Senator Mc-
Carthy," noting that members of the McCarthy committee had campaigned
for John F. Kennedy in 1960 and Lyndon Johnson in 196A. "We are now fighting
for Eugene McCarthy. Does the governor find this unpatriotic?"
King's allusion to what constituted "patriotism" and what did not had
an immediate reaction in the McCarthy campaign. If this was to be the
style
of the New Hampshire Johnson campaign and if this style were in any
way
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authori:.ucl or connected to ieclin,;s In the White House then somethina other
than the policy concerning the war in Vietnam was at stake.
Senator McCarthy responded to the same theme when speaking in Athens,
Georgia, January 24th when he said:
"The administration's tendency to equate loyalty to its
policies with loyalty to the country is dangerous and self-
serving. The Johnson administration's efforts to discourage
dissent at home in order to bring false unity has not been
successful. Effort to quell dissent is dangerous because
it obscures the real military and political cause to give
doubtful policies undeserved immunity from democratic debate,
and it tries to use American armed forces as a shield for
our policy makers against their critics."
"It is proof not of weakness but of democratic vitality that
our people reject the contention that debate must end and vze
must all rally to the struggle regardless of its causes, ob-
jectives and consequences. There are differences between one
war and another and betvreen one issue and another. The essence
of intelligent policy-making is to discriminate among those
according to their effects upon our country's interests and
values. I intend to do what I can in this election year to
make these distinctions clear. "^
Instead of attempting to clarify these distinctions, the Johnson administration
itself and through its surrogates at the state level, sought to cloud the dif-
ferences and to compel unquestioning loyalty. Governor King speaking January
30th before a group of Sullivan County Democrats urged that McCarthy be rejected
and that they unite solidly behind President Johnson:
"How vjould President Johnson face the parents of our Vietnam
veterans should we pull out? To dishonor our commitment would
be to dislionor the memory of those who have given their lives
in Vietnam. Wliat people anywhere in the v7orld v^ould believe
in our will to protect them against communist aggression if we
show that we back dovna when the going gets tough? The honor of
America and safety of the Free World are at stake in this elec-
tion. Despite a campaign of vilification and abuse that is
without precedent in our history President Johnson had continued
to lead. In spite of faint hearts and carping critics, Presi-
dent Jolmson is keeping faith to our commitments in Southeast
Asia."''
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Att end Inr, t lie meet ing were a nunilier of McCarthy supporters. In
response Iloeh chr.rged that King, "is clearly frightened." He noted that
King was speaking beiore a meeting of Sullivan County Democrats for the
first time in his six years in office and was doing so "not only to line
up LBJ support but to pose as a foreign policy expert. In the process,
Governor King had willfully and irresponsibly distorted and slandered the
position of Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy and the thousands of loyal citizens
of New Hampshire who agree with him. For six years he (King) has failed
to address a Democratic meeting in Sullivan County which is additional
evidence chat the governor is obediently jumping through hoops held by
g
LBJ." The Claremont Eagle had headlined the story on King's speech,
"Gov. King Rides 'Shotgun' for LBJ at Newport:," while carrying on the same
page the Concord datlined response from the McCarthy campaign headlined,
"McCarthy Aide Declares King 'Is Frightened!"
At the same meeting, Makris distributed the Johnson Write-in Campaign
Kits, gave instructions, and then, with the Governor, was forced to respond
to (jUestioiis . The most embarassing concerned whether state committee
funds were being used to advance Johnson's candidacy. Makris said, "Money
spent on the Johnson drive was raised separately from state committee funds
and donors had clearly earmarked their contributions to be used for LBJ."
The Newport meeting set a pattern which kept the LBJ campaign at
least neutralized if not actually on the defensive in each of these organizing
sessions. The media coverage carried both sides of tlie story, often in the
same article, and the LBJ organizers faced increasingly severe questioning as
time went on. Tlie press saw King's state-wide "stumping" for LBJ as an
effort to "bolst or LBJ ' s wavering image and shoot down some doves in party
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la his f ru::^tr.U Jon Covornor King began to escnlate his rhetoric.
Speaking In Dovcm- beloro anotlior gatlioring of Democrats, King said, "Our
President is under violent personal attack and because he is the champion
of the free world. That means the time has come for every true Democrat
to stand up and be counted — or from now on, to be counted out. On this
field we accept battle. His friends are our friends. His enemies are our
enemies and we meet all comers -- inside and out. The battle begins here
and we will carry it forward to a great victory next fall.^^
When asked in a radio interview, if he agreed with Governor King's con-
clusion, U.S. Senator Tom Mclntyre Co-Chairman with King of the New Hampshire
LBJ Committee said, "Oh, no, I think John went a little far there." Hoeh
picked up the comment, issued a press release in which he said, "Senator
McTntyre repudiated the unprecedented way in which Governor King threatened
New Hampshire Democrats..,. We thank the Senator for disassociating himself
from the Governor's remarks and this aspect of intimidation and distortion
which has characterized the Johiison campaign in New Hampshire. New Hampshire's
12
Democrats now await an apology from John King himself."
As with Mclntyre, other Democrats were beginning to resent the tactics of
the Johnson campaign and the vaguely veiled threats coming from King and
others who were aggressively supporting the write-in effort. Symbolic of the
effort to line up the Democratic Party behind the write-in effort was the
pledge card» the same pledge card that v;as the "top priority project" of
the write-in organizing effort. The effort and what it began to symbolize
pro(hiccd a major campaign opportunity for the McCarthy campaign. Not only
was the reaction severe outside the Jolmson campaign it was growing among
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t.he sup|,(,,-u>rs. Divide and conquer becam(> n surnri^.o buL ofrccLive
McCarLliy slrai.ogy.
As Governor King's speeches became more intense tb.e dissension inside
the Johnson campaign heightened. As Senator McTntyre alluded to in his
mild effort to disassociate himself from the Governor's vigorous attacks,
the survival of the Democratic Party in Nev^ Hampshire was more important
than the success or failure of the write-in drive. The ability of the
party to close ranks after the primary and to elect Democratic candidates
for New Hampshire offices was, to him, the top priority. Vigorous support
of Llie President's political future was one thing; quite another was
accomplishing that by driving from the party the very people who had made it
possible for a Democrat to sit in the Governor's chair for the first time in
forty years and for a Democrat to represent the state in VJashington for
the first time in twenty years.
McCarirhy; Nour ishing a Campaign
.
A Special Style
At some point: early in the campaign, Senator McCarthy was asked how he
expected to run a successful campaign against all that could be mustered
against him by an incumbent administration of his owii party. Was there a
secret which he possessed or did he have some basic strategy which would
])rove irivincible as the campaign year began to unfold? To this McCarthy
responded that no, he did not possess a secret formula for success but that
he did have a basic faith in the goodness of the American voting public and
that he intended to survive by "feeding off the land." The image of a
foraging army or swarm of locusts came to mind immediately, wliich is not
exactly an improper image as things turned out. But what McCarthy had in
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mhu] hi.s oxm capacit.y Lo make political hay of evcnCs and limes that
could not l)o foreseen.
To a considerable extent, McCarthy felt that history was made by
events and that history did not just occur. His political career had been
a demonstration of his ability to reap benefits from events that were not
entirely of his making. His campaigns had been successful as the result of
individuals being stimulated to work for him, to create advantages for him,
and his own ability to grasp a moment and create from it a positive political
event. McCarthy had established himself as a formidable national political
force when he did what no other congressman of his era would do and that
was to confront the Junior Senator from V'Jisconsin, Joseph McCarthy. On June
22, 1952, wlien Joseph McCarthy was at the peak of his national power, the
D.ittle known two-term congressm.an from Minnesota, Eugene McCarthy, agreed
to meet the Senator from Wisconsin in a one half hour, televised debate
on the prominent AMERICAN FORUM OF THE AIR. In so doing, Eugene McCarthy
became the first member of Congress to oppose Senator McCarthy in a public
, ^ 13
aebaUe.
While there is no evidence to suggest that the debate marked the
beginning of Joseph McCarthy's eventual decline, at least one observer felt
it was the first time anyone had shown that the Wisconsin senator could be
successfully debated. "The fallacy of Senator McCarthy's invincibility in
debate was exploded on Ted Granik's AMERICAN FORUM OF THE AIR." Harry
MacArthur, television critic for the Wash.ington Evening Star wrote after-
wards.
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To nn extent nc,t fully understood by those who had come to know Senator
McCartliy in the short time prior to his announced presidential candidacy,
Senator McCarthy would build his campaign from the opportunities that occurred
as the campaign developed. The New Hampshire campaigners began to understand
this during McCarthy'^ early campaigning, but it was other evidence that began
to reenforce the purpose of the campaign. McCarthy liked to see what indi-
viduals would on their own. He had become a candidate to "test" the
administration concerning the war policy. McCarthy would be the focus, the
personification of the "test," but the effort would have to be made by others
in the ways v^hich they perceived the "test" could best be made in their own
jurisdict ioi^is
.
The earliest 1968 McCarthy successes came as "tests" conceived and
managed by those who welcomed the opportunity to focus their opposition to
the war policy througli the political system. There were often spontaneous
efforts to use McCarthy as the reason for the challenge, but the challenge
was theirs to make and manage.
Early Campaign Operations
In a speech before graduates of tlie Amos Tuck School of Business
Administration of Dartmouth College in the Spring of 1968, Hoeh said:
Since the art of politics has not become a structured form,
despite the attempts of num.erous political scientists and the
Kennedys; it is possible to continue the process as a "free-
form" almost as varied as the totality of human response. In
other words, each campaign has its own conception, birth, life,
and death — a data producing incident, unique in the history
of man. That, for the unrestrained mind, is what makes
politics fascinating and alluring.
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...You will rind Ihc special, art of canipa:i};n mauap^enunit
more like an infectious disease than an occupational
attraction. If you once become involved and the spirit
of competition, desire to influence history, or simply a
fascination with the political game gets under your skin
from tha^^time on your life may well be colored by the
disease.
Politics may be "free-form" but also political events, especially
campaigns have a "stream of consciousness" aspect that requires special
understanding. Studds and Hoeh felt that they had identified the limits
of the political consciousness for the McCarthy effort and had described
these in the December 22nd memorandum to McCarthy. Bringing a campaign
into operation would require less encompassing concepts. The campaign was
born with the January 3rd press conference announcing McCarthy's entry into
the New Hampshire primary. Now that campaign had to crawl before it could
walk, and v,/alk before it could run. As witli human development, the earliest
movements were awkward. Tliey could see more than they could grasp. Accom-
plishing the first priorities was the ultimate frustration. From the
loftiness of a press conference that drew international attention, they had
to find a place for a headquarters, find furnisliings, order telephones, and
make a home for the campaign.
The first major decision they faced was in what city a headquarters
should be located. Traditionally, Democratic presidential primary candidates
have centered their campaigns in Manchester tlie city containting the largest
number of Democratic Party registrants. The Republicans usually selected
Concord which was closer to the center of their constituency.
The McCarthy leaders were concerned about tlie outward appearance of
the campaign. liven at this early stage they antic i])ated that a number of
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youn;\ pcr^;on.s vjou.ld involvecl and that their appearance would not always
be lie.liiful to tlie McCarthy :i.maj;e. Long hair, beards, short skirts, and
other recently evolved symbols of the "youth culture" they felt might pro-
vide the Manchester Union Leader and Manchester's less tolerant public
officials with a v;ay to embarrass the campaign \v7ithout facing the real
campaign issues. Concord seemed to be a ^nore tolerant city for the McCarthy
headquarters
.
In contrast to Manchester's more conservative partisaii Democrats,
Concord's role as the State Capitol and local progressive Republican climate
made it appear as a more favorable location for the McCarthy headquarters
than Manchester. Given these social/political realities, tied to the fact that
the V7ire services were located there. Concord was selected. Few decisions
are casual decisions in successful campaigns. Even such a simple decision as
the location of a headquarters involved the full strategy of tlie campaign.
It took Gercy Studds more than a wekk to actually locate a headquarters
site and then what he found appe.--red to be far from ideal. Wliat he found was
the recently vacated electrical supply store on Pleasant Street Extension.
In the heydey of the railroad, Pleasant Street Extension had been a busy
thoroughfare. Now it served only as an automobile route to a new shopping
center located on the site of the old railroad station and rail yards.
The
store was away from Main Street, few pedestrians would bo passing by.
There
would be some parking for campaign workers, but little else to
make it
location attractive. Inside, to quote Gerry Studds, "It was
in absolutely
wretched condit ion. . .There are two to three inches of
electrical commotion
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nil over tin. place. Thore. were wires hanging out ot the wall. It looked
like a medieval, torture chamber, and it was too big. We didn't know what
the hell to do with it. There i,;as a fuH
-length basement and an enormous
room behind (the showroom in the front)."!^ There was no furniture, plenty
of wires and parts of electrical fixtures but few lights. It was dark, dingy
dusty, and dirty.
With McCarthy's January 3rd announcement the New Hampshire campaign
began receiving a number of small checks and offers of help from across the
country. The offers and contributions were reassuring, but the money did
not constitute an amount sufficient to meet even early bills. Within a
little more than a week, two checks arrived each for $2,500 made out to the
N.H. McCarthy for President Campaign. The first was signed by Blair Clark
1
8
and the second by Martin Peretz. Both were drawn on their respective
personal checkii:ig accounts.
Developing Strategy
Wanting desperately to get the campaign into as many hands as possible,
the McCarthy leaders called a meeting of the New Hampshire Committee for
Sunday evening, January 7th. The announcement read:
We now have the chance to pave the way for Senator McCarthy
in his cam.paign for the Presidency. This effort, and our work
in tliC next fe\>7 weeks, may change the course of history. We,
individually, and as a committee, have accepted a considerable
responsibility. We must now organize to pursue our goals
effectively and efficiently.
Our first step is to put our state organization in order so that
we can begin to fully structure the campaign. To do this, the
Steering Committee asks tliat those receiving this notice attend
a meeting... at the home of Dr. and Mrs. Warren Eberhart, 110
School Street, Concord, N.H.
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The purpose of l ho iiioctin}', is to discuss in ilet-iil the steps
that must be token between now and March l?th. An agenda for
the meeting will be prepared so that all the important items
are covered and that a full perspective on the campaign is
made clear to all.
Items needing attention now and/or should be considered by you
before attending the meeting:
1. Circulate the nominating petitions as soon as possible.
Completed petitions should be forwarded to me.
2. Compile lists of tliose interested in forming a local McCarthy
for President Committee or county committee.
3. We need money — further instructions on the specifics of
fundraising will follow but preliminary contact now will
bring better results later.
4. Take a look at a calendar of events for the next ten weeks
noting those days when Senator McCarthy could fill a good
campaign day in your area. This early work will background
the kind of scheduling that will make the best use of the
Senator's limited campaign time.
5. Compile lists of volunteers willing to participate in the
ca?ipaign. Be sure the list is complete with addresses and
telephone numbers. This will make it possible for us to
move the campaign quickly when the telephoning and mailings
must be handled.
6. Look for a good locations for headquarters in the larger
towns and cities. Be prepared to staff and support head-
quarters with volunteers.
A REMINDER — We are engaged in a rough fight, with people who
are skilled in the profession. We must be careful in our
activities not to open ourselves to criticisms that will isolate
us from being able to wage an effective campaign. We must, how-
ever, keep our eyes open and be willing to speak out when the
wrong strings are pulled.
Signed: David C. Hoeh, Temporary Chairman
Tlie notice was circulated to more than those of the original Steering Committee
membership. The time had come to expand the organization as much as possible.
Copies were scut to persons in each of the major primary vote producing cities
and tovms who had expressed an interest in McCarthy. With the announcement
Iloeh and Studds had reason to expect that individual and group anti-war
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ac-l ivif .Lcf> could be- broui'JiL under l.lio loadersliip of the Steering Committee
to support the McCarthy campaign.
The greatest uncertainty of a New Hampshire campaign is the weather.
For outsiders the weather often makes New Hampshire impossible — impossible
to get to and impossible to leave — but for residents the weather is a fact
of life to be enjoyed or overcome. The first organizational meeting of the
New Hampshire McCarthy campaign, Sunday evening, January 7th, found people
overcoming. Despite a snowstorm contingents of three or four arrived from
Nashua, Manchester, Keene, Portsmouth, Durham, Laconia, Hanover, and several
others until almost thirty persons were gathered in the Eberhart living room.
An agenda was circulated.
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N.H. McCarthy for Prosldont ConimJ t:^e l/V/68
AGENDA
Establishment of Store -front HQ in Top 12 Cities
Nashua Manchester
Keene Berlin
Concord (State HQ) Soniersworth
Portsmouth Claremont
Laconia Rochester
Dover Salem
- Assignment of Responsibility
A) Opening of HQ
B) Formation of local committee
C) Responsibilities of local committee
- Establishment of Home HQ in Other Important Towns
1st CD. 2nd CD.
Hud son n T*l U 1 "1 7*1
Pembroke Newport
Gof f stown Milford
New Market Lebanon
Allenstov>7i"i Gorham
Derry Greenvile
Pelham Hanover
Hooks et Northumberland
Hampton Lincoln
Plaistow Jaf frey
Exeter Wilton
Merrimack Littleton
Rollinsford Winchester
Bedford Peterborough
Epping New Ipswich
Seabrook Lancaster
Tilton Swanzey
Fannington Ashland
Londonderry Troy
Meredith Hinsdale
Pittsf ield Andover
Durham Hillsborough
Milton
- Assignment of Responsibility
A) Designation of Home
B) Formation of local committee
C) Responsibilities of local committee (See separate sheet.)
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lloeh cal U-ci t.\w inc'Pt ini; to ordor and began to go through the agenda. The
J:l.i.sL stop was t:o CL-(ati. an organization tluit would asKume the state-wide
responsibilities of the ca;r,paign, the candidate schedule and organization of
the localities. Studds and lloeh had given this problem their attention
earlier and came to the meeting with a series of specific proposals. Contrary
to their argument favoring McCarthy's New Hampshire entry which stated that
an organization was "ready and waiting", when the moment of his announcement
actually came Lhey realized that the organization they then had and the or-
ganization they v;ould need to run a successful campaign were two distinctly
different beings. On January 7th they realized how much had to be done, how
short the time was, and how thin their organizational base really was. UTiat
they did have were good contacts in almost all of the crucial vote producing
cities and the larger to\ms. If properly managed this resource could be
expanded into local organizations capable of carrying on a variety of campaign
tasks
.
Drawing on the scheduling list which he had prepared for the December
22nd memorandum to McCarthy, Studds stated that they should at; empt to
establish headquarters in the twelve cities, then, in descending order of
po})ulatxon and voter turn-out, the larger towns. In some cases Hoeh and
Studds advised forming area headquarters to support activities in several
cities and the surrounding towns. In the case of the smaller towns, but
ones with high voter participation they advised establishing a "home"
headquarters borrowing a page from Romney's campaign manual.
A local organization, would have to be created; then it would have to
find, staff, and fund the local headquarters. Coupled with the organizatior
objective for tliesc headcjuar tor s was also a caiiipaign schedu] ing priority.
2hl
They oxpoctcd t.lKi.. Sonaun- McCarthy would be visiting New Uau.psliirc wit.bin
two or tliree weeks. The campaign's top organizing priority then had to
be the cities where McCarthy could campaign without time lost to travel and
where the broadest media coverage would be possible. Hoeh and Studds used
the folJ owing analysis of the most recent presidential preference primary, 196
to determine the cities and towns that would receive their highest priority
attention. The first priority would be the opening and staffing of a state
campaign headquarters. The committee agreed with the decision to locate
the headquarters in Concord. The next priorities were the cities which, in
all but tlie case of Franklin, had populations in excess of the towns. Then
they selected those towns having a population of 2,000 persons or more and
ranked them according to their respective size and ratio of Democratic voter
participation. The organizational task was to begin moving do\m the list of
cities from Manchester to Franklin and through the list of towTis from Salem
to the smallest incorporated community in New Hampshire, Waterville Valley.
(Tables 7-1 and 7-2 contain the data to rank the organizing priorities.)
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Tabic 7.01: City Demncratic Vote Rank Ordered"'-^
City County
Population
1960
Democratic
Pres. Primary
Vote 1964
Dcmoc rat ic
Vote as
% of
Checklist
Names on
Clieckl ist
1964
KancnGstor (Hillsborough) 88,282 8,900 18.8% 47,298
Nashua (Hillsborough) 39,096 3,486 14.8 23,517
Concord (Merrimack) 28,991 760 4.7 15,148
Portsmouth (Rockingham) 25,833 442 3.7 11,800
Dover (Stafford) 19,131 1,760 16.7 10,506
Berlin (Cooc) 17,821 3,306 30.0 10,985
Keene (Cheshire) 17,562 777 8.5 9,118
Rochester (Strafford) 15,927 681 7.8 8,722
Laconia (Belknap 15,288 769 9.2 8,328
Claremont (Sullivan) 13,563 757 10.0 7,498
Lebanon (Grafton) 9,299 251 5.6 4,457
Soricrswor th (Stafford) 8,529 861 15.2 5,645
Franklin (Merrimack) 6,742 398 9.7 4,077
CITY TOTAL: >'<54.9% 306,064 23,148 13.7% 168,099
STATE TOTAL: *57.6% 606,921 41,436 11.8% 349,667
* Percent of city population registered to vote.
Table 7.02: County/Large Tow Democratic Vote Rank Order
20
7M3
Towns (Pop. 2.(lQOjO_
Belknap Co. ^(GO.A^o)
Belmont
Gilford
Meredith
Til ton
Carrol] Co._ ''-(72.1%)
*Convjay
Wolf eboro
Chesir c Co. *(54.A%)
Hinsdale
*Jaf f rey
*Swanzey
Walpole
Winchester
Coos Co. A (57. 4%)
Col cbrook
Gorham
Lancaster
Northcumber land
Grafton Co . *(55.3%)
Enfield
*Hanover
Haverhill
*Littleton
^Plymouth
Amherst
^Bedford
*Gof fstown
Hillsborough
''Hudson
+Merrimack
''^Milf ord
Pel ham
H-Peterborough
Wilton
HGrccnvi] le
Population
1960
28,912
1,953
2,043
2,434
2,137
15,829
4,298
2,689
43,342
2, 187
3, 154
3,626
2,825
2,411
37,140
2,389
3,039
3,138
2,586
48,857
1,867
7,329
3,127
5,003
3,210
HHlsborough Co. '^57.1%) i?8jiAl
2,051
3,636
7,230
2,310
5,876
2,989
4,863
2,605
2,963
2,025
1,385
Democratic
Pres. Primary
Vote 1964
1,509
86
67
138
109
469
89
74
2,290
116
256
113
77
206
4,883
114
318
163
376
2,125
90
289
63
228
109
16,789
67
229
664
95
761
291
413
400
180
175
338
Democratic
Vote as
% of
Checklist
_8._6%
7.6
4.8
8.5
7.6
3.2
3.8
9.6
10.0
13.4
6.5
4.6
16.6
22.9
10.8
18.5
9.0
26.8
8.3
10.4
3.7
6.6
6.0
16.4
5.2
10.4
16.0
6.9
23.
1
15.9
11.8
24.7
9.3
14.4
A4.4
Number of
Names on
Checklist 1964
17,483
1,119
1,385
1,619
1,420
11 ,416
" 2", 752
1,918
23,621
1,159
1,900
1,737
1,663
1,239
21 ,321
1,046
1,710
1,794
1,400
27,021
1,072
2,762
1,570
3,450
1,787
101,895
1,288
2,199
4,148
1,367
3,285
1,825
3,497
1,614
1,924
1,215
760
* Percent of county population registered to vote.
TABLE 7.02 (Cont.)
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Toj^ns (Po p. 2,000+)
Merrima ck Co. *(59.9)
*Bo£Jcaweri
*HookseLt
Hopkinton
^Pembroke
Pit tsf ield
''tAlleiistown
Rockingham Co. * ( 5 8 . 1 %
)
''Derry
F.pping
*Exeter
''Hampton
Londonderry
Newmarket
Plaistow
Rye
*Salem
Seabrook
Straf ford Co. *(55.2%)
'Durham
Farniington
Rollinsf ord
Sullivan Co. '-(55.2%)
Char] estown
*Newport
* Percent of county populati
Democratic
Population Pres. Primary
1960 Vote 19e
67,785 3,339
2,181 104
3,713 264
2,225 107
3,514 625
2,419 129
1,789 240
99,029 5,422
6,987 390
2,006 211
7,243 284
5,379 288
2,457 180
3,153 424
2,915 307
3,244 76
9,210 1 , 104
2,209 197
59,799 3,097
5,504 124
3,287 193
1,935 237
28,067 1,513
2,576 52
5,458 411
registered to vote.
Democratic
Vote as Number of
of Names on
Checklist Checklist 1964
8.2% 40,665
9.2 ' 1,126
10. J 2,547
6.7 1,594
22.9 2,720
10.1 1,271
20.4 1,174
9. .4 57,613
9.2 4,224
16.6 1,266
6.6 4,267
7.7 3,712
11.6 1,544
23.8 1,779
15.6 1,963
4.1 1,833
15.5 7,082
13.8 1,422
9.3 33^040
7.2 1,710
9.3 2,070
20.3 1,162
9.7 15,592
3.9 1,325
13.5 3,044
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13y simply reading the name of the key city or to^^. they were able to list
as field orfir.ni7.ers those in the room v;ho were willing to begin the work.
Strong leads existed in many conununities ; there were organizations in a few,
the nucleus of organizations in others, but almost nothing in the largest city
Manchester, and in three strongly Democratic cities, Rochester, Somersworth.
and Dover. There was no contact for Berlin. V/liat they had was the name of
a state representative from neighboring Gorham but not a single name from
Berlin itself. Berlin, the northernmost city in New Hampshire, was strongly
Democratic. Isolated by the barrier of the VJlii r.e Mountains from the populous
southern part of the otate, Berlin had grown up as a paper-moking wood-process
ing city. A tradiLion of strong union organization, bread and butter Demo-
cratic Party allegiance, and a population composed mostly of French speaking
Canadians made Berlin unique among Nev; Hampshire's cities.
Realizing that the campaign had to be developed rapidly in order to
work, Hoeh and Studds outlined what was ahead. Ten weeks remained before
primary day March 12th. During that time many tasks would have to be
accompj.ished. The first would be to identify local supporters .:n each of the
priority/important Democratic vote producing coraiDunities. The second would
be to identify or organize events that would be appropriate for Senator
McCarthy Co attend, A "shelf" of possible campaign activities had to be
inventoried for each of the key cities and towns. The local organizations
would be responsible for maintaining this "shelf." They, Hoeh advised,
should be able to suggest on short notice activities that could be arranged
as an effective schedule for the candidate.
2^6
The third lmportnr.t. loca:i rosponslb i 1
.{ ty wns l:o fund the activities
they .ould be assigned. T],. ean,paign had to be a confederation of separate
local efforts. Each of these local efforts would require a local organization
which would be a miniature campaign. There would have to be fund raisers,
schedulers, headquarters staff, publicists, and most of the other accoutennent
of the statewide campaign. Too much had to be accomplished in too short a
time to permit centralized management and control of all of the campaign's
es.c:cntial activities. Furthermore Hoeh and Studds felt that without a large
central campaign staff capable of organizing and advancing each activity of
the campaign, it was necessary to rely heavily on the ingenuity of the local
activists. Both baa developed an appreciation for the effectiveness of the
local groups in the early stages and were impressed by the sensitivity of the
local groups to both the needs of a national candidacy and the political
traditions of their own communities.
The campaign, therefore, had to be created as a confederation of local
operating committees tied by the need for mutual communication and by a
common objective to the state and national structure of the McCarthy candidacy
At this stage it should be noted that the local organizations in many states
and in a number of New Hampshire communities were further developed than were
either llie state or the national McCarthy organization. If a local committee
felt Ihcy could support a headcjuarters they were advised to find one, install
a telc]ihone, put up a sign and go from tliere. They should not expect the
state or the national caiapaign to be of much assistance with eitiier money
or advice.
2A7
As ..n exa.,.i.U> Lho Kceno aron commiff:cc was roady to proceed. All, tHey
wanted to know was wl>ether they should ;;o alu-ad, whether their plans were
constructive, how they should relate to tlie statewide effort and whether
there would be financial assistance for their headquarters. Further advanced
In their efforts than most other communities, the Keene committee set a
pattern that would be followed in almost all of the local efforts of the
campaign. The local committee could expect little or no financial assistance
from either tlie state or the national offices. The local committees were
encouraged to do what they thouglit they could do effectively and wliat they
could sustain with locally raised money and locally recruited volunteers.
Hoeh and Studds advised tliose attending not to commit themselves either
in terms of activity or expenses to more than they thought they could sustain.
Secondly, they warned against careless press statements, speaking for
Senator McCarthy, or representing In'm or the campaign with respect to issue
positions or activities other than their o\m. Any state or national campaign
policy questions or issue positions should be directed to the state headquarter
The meeting ended with several priorities clearly in mind. The first
was to return to tlieir communities and begin organizing for a campaign. The
first major task for some Vs^ould be to j^repare campaign schedules. The
second wa.s to find workers, money, a place to work, and to outline appropriate
.local objectives for the campaign. The meeting ended with, a mild sense of con-
fidence, but with an even stronger feeling of the Importance of the tasks
ahead
.
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At host camiKn;.ns Uavc difi iculu .-arly pc-rJods. Often the start: up
problems are reduced through lengthy preliminary meetings tliat usually pre-
'
code major political ventures. During the usual pre-campaign preparation
scores of tasks have to be accomplished which prepare the participants for
the campaign while at the same time providing a testing period. All but
the McCarthy campaign had had extensive preparation. For Nixon and Romney
planning had been underway for years. Even the Jolinson campaign had been
carefully developed over months before Boutin arrived in New Hampshire.
For the national McCarthy campaign or the New Hampshire effort no
such preparation time was available. Given this circumstance the campaign
had to develop rapidly on a number of fronts without the planning, the testing,
or the caution that precedes similar events. Ten weeks was an incredibly
short period in whicli to organize an effective campaign for Senator McCarthy,
With a little advice and some cautions, the McCarthy leaders released the
local campaigners. Although their experience warned against such loose
management, they felt th.at the bond between the selfless objectives of
McCartliy's effort, concern about the war, and a certain desire to be professional
would somehow keep the locally based campaigns under control. If the local
loadershi]) had trouble, or needed to check an activity or wanted to report
something, they were advised to call Hoeh or Studds. They were advised
especially to call before acting if there was a question. liecause of the
quixi>ti(: nature of the effort, few if any of the New Hampshire committee
members, state or local, viewed the campaign as in any way enhancing their
ovm personal or politica] futures, unlike some persons involved in other campaigns,
2A9
As a rosaU of this basic difference, cooperation and comnmnical Ion were
tho watchwords. No one sou!;ht to establish an independent role for oneself
at the expense of the campaign or the candidacy. The reward, if there was to
be a reward, haunted the shadows of something that could only come from
selflessness, joint effort, and careful consideration of each individual
action. There were no stars, major personages, or special leaders to flatter
or to be dealt with with special deferance. It was a campaign of equals,
equally stressed, equally responsible, and equally entitled to taste the
success. With tluit feeling the tone of the campaign was set.
In spite of the early coheslveness of the campaign, the first several
weeks moved ponderously. The meeting at the Eberhart home on January 7th was
the first and only organizational meeting of the state campaign. There would
be other meetings much later in the campaign but these would be used to present
information about a campaign objective rather than to bring together an
organization. New Hampshire winter weather and distances make statewide
meetings difficult and, in this campaign, such meetings were seen as a waste
of valuable time and energy.
Within the first two struggling weeks of the campaign Hoeh and Studds had
been successful in giving the effort its own cliaracter and vitality. Part of
this success cam.c from McCarthy's own unique political posture and part from
tlie growing frustration of the voting public with things as they were early in
1968. But, undeniably, the growing McCartliy campaign in New Hampshire, and
nationally was lively news, even optimistic news. It was appealing in con-
trast to the jiondorous nev^^s of tVic LBJ administration and the depressing news
from Vjetriani and the American cities.
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Tin. McCarUiy olf orf vvas coniini' t:o 1 i fo In Now Hampshire. It wns boglnning
to iind its pJace in tlu. public's stream of consciousness. Tlie art form of
campaign politics require that a campaign organi.-ation project consistency
with the public image of the candidate, respond to the ability of the voter to
tolerate issue contents, and to adapt to the particular political climate of
a jurisdiction. To be successful, each of these constraints had to be care-
fully observed. Since this campaign began differently, had different objectives,
and sought different methods in a time v/hen conformance was becoming
oppressive, it started by bending if not actually breaking many of the conven-
tions of political activity. Its success could be insured by continuing to
be distinct and continuing to find different ways to organize, and to gain the
allegiance of the New Hampshire voters. The importance of the biography of tlie
Nev7 Hampshire campaign is that the leaders were able to calculate the risks
and then reach out to the voters in a manner that produced the desired results.
Electorial politics is at best a chance. When there is a competitive
situation the odds are even. As a result most campaigns are conservative,
seek to avoid risks, minimize exposure and attempt to control events. To
outward appearances, campaigns are often boring, narrow, lack imagination,
concentrate on accepted or acceptable societal standards and fail to strain
either tlie mental or institutional capacities of the population. Under the
best of circum5- tances campaigns create excitement through images, hoopla,
stylo, rhetoric and method, but rarely through serious debate or constructive
dialogue. To accomplish anything with tlie McCarthy candidacy in New Hampshire,
the McCarthy leaders realized tliat many of the rules of campaigns and the
lessons of tlieir own campaign experiences would have to be quickly and carefully
examined and new rules created in order to m:ike the McCarthy candidacy work.
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C !! A P T E R V I I I
EAKLY STATE CAMl'AIGM OPlvRATIONS
Mailing
_and Volun V. c. e i:
s
In the December 1967 memorandum to Senator McCarthy, Koeh and Studds
wrote;
We envision a massive mailing effor t — of the quality and
and extent of the Lodge effort in 1S64 — to all registered
Democrats and Independents.
Coupled with this promise was an assuanption also stated in the December
mejuorandum:
We have already acquired the voting list s for the entire
state (All registrants: Democratic, Unaffiliated, and
Republican.
)
Acquiring the lists and making such lists into something uyable for mailings
\7cre tX'JO quite distinct tasks as Studds and Hoeh found out shortly after the
State headquarters opened in Concord. Both assumed that the lists would be
readily trannferable to mailing labels. Wiat they found was that the lists
were anything but orderly, most omitted proper addresses, and some important
communities were totally missing.
The plan called for tv70 distinct mailings. One V70uld be sent to the
registered Democrats and the other to the unaffiliated or Independent voters.
Therefore, each checklist had to be reviewed twice to produce labels for each
class of voters. The major problem was that many New HaDipshire coiiauunities
do not record the address of the voter on the checklist. This meant that
reverse telephone directories, roealar telephone directories, or city direc-
tories had to be used to fiiid the correct address for each voter. This was
a problem not anticipated by r.he McCarthy leaders.
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When the firrt volunteers began struggling with tl,e lists a deep shudder
was fell.: in the young c.-impc.igu. Approximately 110.000 names had to be taken
from the voting lists to construct the mailing file of the campaign. This
was expected co be boring but a routine job. As soon as the first checklists
were examined and t)w. first label sheets put in a volunteer's portable type-
writer, a telephone call vjas made to Studds. What they thought would be a
simple task vanished in chaos.
Much of the campaign had been predicated on the Lodge write-in model.
The variation of the model which Hoeh and Studds felt would succeed for
McCarthy wa?: that, in addition to the registered Democrats, they expected
to attract a significant number of i-ndependents into the Denocratic column
to vote for Senator McCarthy. To have this happen a direct personalized
appeal had to be made. The independent voters had to receive a letter from
Senator McCarthy urging them to vote for him. The appeal to the Democrats
was almost the same as that which had been directed to the registered Repub-
licans by the organizers of the Lodge effort in 1964. There was an alterna-
tive to Lyndon B. Johnson and there were substantial reasons for considering
a vote for McCarthy, In fact, at the planning stage, Hoeh and Studds serious-
ly considered Including a return postage paid card with the letter. A similar
card had been included with the Lodge mailing. It had produced the early
indication that there was substantial support for the Ambassador among Nev;
Hampshire Republicans.
The mailing was essential and it had to be personally addressed. If
addresses had been included v;ith the names on the checklists then the job
would be manageable. Without addresses the job became something far beyond
the capacity of the campaign as originally conceived. The manpower needed to
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sort throutJi the lists, the directories, and to prepare labels exceeded the
optireistic view of lloeh and Studds and presented the campaign with its first
serious problem.
Weighing alternatives, the McCarthy leaders considered scrapping the
mailing as a direct appeal and blanket mailing to the critical cities and
tovms instead. Such a blanket mailing could be accomplished by using a com-
mercial direct mail house. The effect would be of a blanket, but indiscrete
and impersonal. The message could not be specific. It would have to be the
same for both Democrats and Independents. It would also arrive at Republican
homes who might be irritated by being so carelessly addressed. Any appearance
of professionalism on behalf of Senator McCarthy would be lost by such a
broadcast approach. Somehow the mailing problem had to be solved and the oxily
way seemed to be to use manpower. At this point the New Hampshire McCarthy
Campaign made its first appeal for help to the national McCarthy headquarters.
Previously an appeal for a manager and an advance person had been made, but
not a request for volunteers.
Obviously there would be a risk. A broadcast call to V/ashington for
volunteer help to carry out New Hampshire based campaign tasks could present
the New Hampshire campaign with some serious problems. The risk V7as not
having control over who would be sent to New Hampshire and now knowing how
they might behave. Secondly, the logistical problem of supporting volunteers
with housing, transportation, and m.eals would confront the fragile New Hamp-
shire effort with demands that it was not then equipped to handle. At this
period in national politics the peace protests were at their height. The
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) had created a seriously negative
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imase for student activists, and New Hampshire's latent xenophobia seemed
both real end virulent to the New Hampshire McCarthy leadership.
The risk had to be taken or the carapaign would be unable to mall to its
targeted voters. Hoeh established several guidelines for out-of-state volun-
teers. The firct was that they should contact him or Studds before coming to
New Hampshire so that at least a telephone introduction would be made.
Secondly, before doing anything else in the campaign, a volunteer should
check In with either Hoeh or Studds at the state headquarters. Both these
coiiditions made it possible to, first, establish in the mind of the volunteer
the direction of the campaign and from whom their work v7ould be coming and,
secondly, it would give Hoeh and Studds the opportunity to acquaint the person
with the political and social sensitivities or, perhaps more appropriately,
paranoia of the McCarthy effort. By late January the first trickle of volun-
teers had begun. The mailing label job was still proceeding at a ponderously
slow pace, but between the dedication of local volunteers and the vitality of
those willing to come to New Hampshire to help, the right mood for the miser-
able job was set.
Delegate Selection Strategy
ALnost the furthest thing from the leaders' minds was the possibility
that delegates would be elected representing McCarthy. The campaign concept
was to dent the political armor of Lyndon Johnson by showing that a significant
segment of his party was willing to vote against him when given the opportunity.
There was no question in the minds of any of those involved in the campaign
that if Lyndon Johnson wanted the nomination he had it. From ali of the evi-
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dence i. Now Ilnmpr.hire, Johnson not only wanted to be renominated, but he
also wanted a vote of approval for his policy in Vietnam. Johnson, it appear-
ed, would only be vulnerable on the presidential preference side of the two
part New Hampshire ballot, and this is where the McCarthy leadership would
focus the campaign.
On January 7. 1969 the NEW YORK TIMES published the following editorial
which reminded the New Hampshire campaigners of the importance of the dele-
gate portion of the ballot:
McCarthy in new hai^shire
Early in 1952 President Truman had privately made up his
mind to retire, but organization Democrats in New Hampshire
persuaded hJju to enter his name in the state's primary.
Otherwise, they argued, a slate of political unknoxms
pledged to Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee would win
by default. "If the boss doesn't win that primary," one
TruHian aide remarked at the time, "those New Hampshire
fellov7S better now shov7 their faces around the VJhite House."
The unexpected happened. Senator Kefauver, with his coon-
skin cap and tireless handshake, routed the better-kno^^m
Truman delegation.
Senator Eugene McCarthy can take some comfort from this
history. President Johnson today has the backing of the
Democratic party organization and of most of the leaders.
But party organizations do not count for much in New
Hampshire, and leaders can often deliver nobody's vote but
their own. Under these circumstances. Senator McCarthy v;as
well advised to change his mind and enter the New Hampshire
primary.
President Johnson, taking care to avoid the fiasco that be-
fell President Truman, has refused to authorize the use of
his name in Nevj Hampshire. As a result, his supporters are
running as delegates "favorable" rather than "pledged" to
him and are seeking r^^-rite-in votes for him on the preferen-
tial side of the ballot since his name will not be listed.
This cautious approach will enable Mr. Johnson to claim all
the credit for a victory and to blur the significance of a
defeat.
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Hw i^opubllcan primary voting in New Hampshire Islictcwi.e encouraging to Gov. George Romney, the G.O.P. under-dog. In 1952 In the Republican primary, General Eise;ho"erabsent .n Paris, defeated Senator Robert A. Taft. who cam!paigncd vigorously. Four years ago a write-in campaign forHenry Cabot Lodge swamped the two Republican front-runners.
Against this background of insurgency and independent think-ing there is no reason to suppose that New Hampshire voters
are particularly conservative or hawkish. Governor Rcmney
can thus afford to discount the polls that show him runningtar behind former Vice President Nixon and to rely upon his
own formidable talent for man-to-man persuasion. New Hainp-
shxre is not going to decide the nomination in either partybut no one should underestimate its capacity to manufacture*
political surprises.-^
Given this reminder, Hoeh and Studds concluded that a slate of delegates
had to be filed in order to show the seriousness of the New Hampshire McCarthy
campaign. Without delegates the campaign would be criticized as being just an
effort to embarrass the President and to assist the Republican Party win the
election in November.
At the same time, the LBJ leadership was filing its slate of delegates.
The Democratic State Conmittae Chairman, William Craig, announced to the New
Hampshire press that he v/as filing as a delegate "favorable" to the nomina-
tion of Lyndon Johnson, January 5, 1968.^ With this followed e series of
carefully orchestrated delegate filings of prominent New Hampshire Democratic
Party leaders.
Not faT,\iliar with the political importance of the delegate filing pro-
cess, Koeh called former Democratic National Committeeman William L. Dunfey
to ask his advice. Hoeh's question concerned how Dunfey perceived the diffe-
rence between the two classes of delegates — those "pledged" and those
"favorable." Hoeh and Studds knew the legal difference, but V7ere not aware
of the political advantages. Dunfey explained that filing a delegation
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••pledged" to the McCarthy nomination would give those making the slate complete
control over the immbor of delegate candidates that would be filed under thai:
label. Each "pledged" delegate had to have written authorization from the
candidate before being permitted to file with the label "pledged." He pointed
out that anyone could file as a "favorable" delegate candidate by simply pay-
ing the $10.00 filing fee. He also noted that the Johnson vn.-ite-in leaders
were so r.uro of their candidate's vote-getting power that they did not plan
to control the number of individuals filing for the delegate and alternate
delegate slots. Dunfey then went on to recount a bit of Kew Hampshire's poli-
tical history telling Hoeh that in 1952 the same situation had existed. The
Kefauver supporters had filed a slate of "pledged" delegates and alternates
in just the number of available slots. The Truman supporters had allowed
their slates of "favorable" candidates to exceed the num.ber of slots by a
ccnslderable number. As a result the Kefauver delegate vote was concentrated
while the Triimar. vote was diluted by being spread over the list of candidates.
A "pledged" Kefauver delegation represented New Hampshire at the 1952 Democra-
tic National Convention.
VJith thi£i advice Hoeh and Studds adopted the "pledged" delegate strategy
and agreed to control the number of candidates. To make this strategy work,
hov/ever, th.ey had to discourage individuals from filing as delegate candidates
"favorable" to the nomination of Senator McCarthy.' Unfortunately, even before
this decision h.ad been made, two McCarthy supporters from Cheshire County
(Keene area) h^ad already filed as "Favorable" to McCarthy. To operate a dele-
gate strategy they had to discourage McCarthy supporters from filing on their
own as "favorable" delegate candidates, and at the same time, construct a full
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8lnt:<.: of caudidatCB for both delegates and altcrnnte delegates pledged to
8upi.iort McCarthy in the Cii.-'.cago Convention.
Eugene Daniell. leader of the Draft Robert Kennedy effort, had already
promised to file delegates favorable to the nomination of Kennedy. Daniell
had been one of the mavericks elected as a Kefauver delegate in the 1952
election. He appreciated the possibility that the magic of the Kennedy name
might send hira to another convention. His persistence in not only filing him-
Relf as a delegate candidate but getting several others of the Kennedy group
to file, gave lloeh and Stvdds aiiother problem.
After Hoeh's conversation with William Dunfey, he and Studds concluded
that they had to develop a full slate of candidates. The delegates and alter-
nates were assigned to New Hampshire in accord with the rules of the Democratic
National Comiittec whicli meant first, delegates were to be elected by congres-
sional diRtrictr, and second, since New Hampshire had been carried by the
Democratic candidate in the previous election (1964) , it was entitled to a
reward — an increase in the total size of the delegation. The number of
slots in each of the state's two congressional districts were twelve delegates
and twelve aJ.tcrnates, a total of forty-eight candidate openings.
Gerry Studds agreed to make it his job to fill the forty-eight spots.
The strategy thay adopted was to attract attention to the McCarthy New Hamp-
shire effort by awarding places on the ballot on the basis of geographical
distribution. The usual strategy, the one used in the John Kennedy delegate
selection fight of 1960, was to select delegate candidates on the basis of
prominence and location. The latter criteria meant that most of the first
congressio!ial district candidates came from Manchester, the largest Democratic
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Party city, and from Nashua and Berlin, the second congressional district's
largest Democratic vote producing centers.
Hoeh and Stadds concluded that the likelihood of electing any delegates
was remote, so instead of geographically concentrating delegate candidates
from a few of the most populous cities of a district, they decided to seek
candidates in a manner that x^ould geographically disperse the campaign. They
also sought to reward with delegate positions, the prominent who had come out
in support of Senator McCarthy.
With forty-eight places to fill, Studds had assumed a considerable task.
His first telephone calls brought strange responses. Instead of immediately
saying yes or no to his request, many responded by saying they would have to
check their plans for the coming suraiiier. They said they would not become
candidates unless they wers iree to attend the convention scheduled for August.
It had not occurred to Studds or Hoeh that more than a delegate or two would
be elected. The campaign had not become sufficiently strong state-wide to
have supporters v/here Studds and Hoeh felt the delegate candidates should
reside. As a result, the job of filling the slate became one of convincing
supporters of their value to the slate to allow Studds to add their names to
his list.
According to New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated Chapter 57, Section
53:5 "The name of a candidate shall not be printed upon any such ballot unless
not more than sixty nor less than thirty days before the primary he files with
the secretary of state a declaration of candidacy. . .V The thirty day filing
period be^an January 13th and would close Saturday, February 10th at 5:00 p.m.
Studds kept the names of the campaign leaders in reserve and contacted geo-
graphically
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dispersed campaign workers. Again ho faced the problc. of having serious voids
in the list. These reflected weaknesses in the state-wide organization. Prin-
cipally, these voids appeared in the southeastern area of the state, Rochester,
Someri.worth aod Dover, and in the north, Berlin and Gorham.
With the state-wide organization paper thin and time slipping by, Studds
roughed out a slate from these who were willing to run. It became obvious too
that building the ideal slate would take more time than vras justified. Conse-
quently, Studds began assigning places in the slate to the leadership, includ-
ing his ovm name, Hoeh's and that of David Hoeh's wife, Sandra, as an alternate.
There still remained a number of slots unfilled.
A second problem then occurred. The "pledged" delegate candidacy re-
quired the written consent of the candidate for president and that consent had
to be filed prior to the expiration date of the filing period on February 10th.
McCarthy was scheduled to visit New Hampshire late in January and probably
would not return to th-^i state again until after the expiration of the filing
date. This meant that either the slate would have to be completed before
McCarthy's late January visit or some means of getting the slate approved would
be needed. Koeh aad Studds gave this problem considerable thought and con-
cluded that it would not be possible to complete the slate before McCarthy's
late January visit. Getting the final slate to McCarthy for signing prior to
the February 10th deadline would be chancy, given the Senator's possible inter-
national travel plans and the vagaries of New Hampshire weather. Hoeh proposed
that a blank statement be prepared v;lth space for forty-eight names. An appro-
priate consent statement and space for Senator McCarthy's signature were added.
rUi.
.oXMtn... iv.,, BJ«ir <:l«rk'„ „„p.:ov,,l. wlHm So.u.l..r McCnrth,
..r.lvcd
m NOV 1,.™,,.!,!,:,.
.,.„„„„,. 2„t„.
„i,.„,>,l th. blank .Inte o.kI Stud<l» continued
the Job of l;li;dJn(_. caiidldateG
.
Durinfi the aaine time as the Johnson conm^lttec wa. aTuun-ncJuc Mk" nau,c» of
the ,>t-omincnt New Hampshire De.uocratic Party leaders who were fllinf. an dele-
Cate candidates "1 avoraI,l.e" to the renominatlon of ITesldent Johr.on, a larfie
number of r.poataneous filings occurred. Ry the end of the fillnr, P-m IcuI, tlu-re
wou1<l he twenty-Lilx Johnson delegate candidatcr, in the first congressional dis-
trict and nineteen in the second congresBioual district for the twelve allo-
cated alots for each district.
Dissolution of the RFK Wrltc-Tn Campaign
]'.y letter dated January 2, 196^1, addreaced to Kugene Dnniell, loader of
tlie Nov Hampshire Kennedy v/r:! te-ln cffc^rt, Robert ]'. KcniKuly asked nan iell to
"cease your efforts In my behalf." DanJe.ll's reaction to what he sa:ld was the
lirst commun.i cation received from Kennedy, was tliat the reciuoiU "liad not
changed anyth i rig . " ' "The Kennedy name and what it stands for Is blgj-.er tlian
either you or me," nanJcll said while stating tliat he was "undaunted" In his
effort to llle dolegntcs "favorable" to the nomination of the New York Senator
and to solicit a write-in vote for tlie .Senator on the March }2l:l\ presidential
primary ballot.
At th.e iiame time- that Robert Kenmtrly wrote Danlell asking him to "cease"
activities on his boliai f in New llampslii r e , he stati-d that he wouid "remain
neutrai in tlit; I)(MnocxatIc Presidential primaries. Kennedy stated that he ('id
not think he \vOuid 'Jurther thi> cause' of peace in Vietnam by throwinj; hi»
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support to Senator Eugene J. McCarthy." In the saine state.ruent Kennedy reaf-
firP.ed his contentJon th.t "Mr. McCarthy's entry into the Presidential race was
a healthy influence, because it helped channel protest within the limits of
the d-emocratic process. He went on to note that a majority of perhaps only 25
percent of the population backed his position on Vietnam. That in the last
analysis, his responsibility was to try to be effective in convincing a majo-
rity of more thar 50 percent."''-^
This equivocation on the part of Kennedy presented serious problems for
the New Hampshire and the national McCarthy campaigns. McCarthy himself had
expected that when he took the first step to focus protest toward the politi-
cal system he would receive the support of his congressional colleagues who
had been outspoken in their opposition to the war in Vietnam. As late as his
entry in the New Hampshire primary, not one member of the Senate had come for-
ward to support his position. Especially distressing to him and to the evolv-
ing McCarthy organization was the fact that Robert Kennedy continued to play a
coy game in the political wings of both those opposing the war and those
supporting the renomination of Lyndon Johnson.
In a column published January 8, 1968, Mary McGrory alluded to the dilemma
of this frustratioii when she wrote:
Since November 30, when he (McCarthy) announced his inten-
tion to challenge the President, McCarthy has been accused
by the Johnson forces of being a stalking horse for Sen.
Robert F. Kennedy. The RFK followers, coniplainl...: of
McCarthy's inertia, have begun to call McCarthy "a stalking-
horse for Lyndon Johnson.^
Daniell's efforts in New Hampshire perpetuated both sides of this reaction.
First the McCarthy announcement had failed to bring with it re-enforcement
through the endorsement of prominent congressional leaders in the anti-war
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effort which reflected uncertainty on their part as to McCarthy's effoctivenes
no the protest focus. Secondly, without direct Kennedy support, the option of
KcTincdy as the ultimate candidate would remain should McCarthy fail.
IsThile the McCarthy leaders tried to i^^nore Daniell's efforts and avoided
direct conflict with him, his activity remained a problem in their effort to
unify opposition to Jchnsou. The same situation occurred nationally and slowed
the movement of money and endorsements to McCarthy during those important early
weeks following his announcement. Until McCarthy's decision to enter the New
Hampshire primary the flow of both money and endorsements had dried to a trickle.
No major endorsements had occurred and the campaign was being run out of the
pockets of McCarthy's old liberal allies and a few wealthy nouveau political
activists who saw McCarthy as the only possibility for political protest. In
the four primaries wiiich McCarthy had said he would enter all were almost
totally dependent on funds raised locally to support the McCarthy effort.
Kennedy's impact diverted attention from McCarthy as a serious candidate
toward his possible role as an RFK stalking horse. During the early weeks of
1968, the influential New York Time s concentrated its attention on the prospect
of a Kennedy candidacy to the point of all but excluding coverage of McCarthy's
budding c^iiiipaign. The secondary impact of the Times coverage was to distort
other media interest in McCarthy and especially the McCaxthy effort in New
Hampshire. The 'rime.s editorial and reportorial emphasis tends to have an impor-
tant ripple effect in the regional media of northern Nev? England. A number of
daily newspapers and many weekly papers carry Times news service items and arc
edited by f the paper. Consequently, V7he:a the Times coverage
shifts in a particular direction, then local daily and v'sekly newspapers tend
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to respond :L„ tho. r.au,e .mnuor. Since staff i:o cover anything but local, events
and an occasional stata event are severely limited in most instances, the
regional preso takes its cues from as reliable a source as it can find. Beyond
that news conditioning was the fact that Robert Kennedy was of special regional
news interest.
While perhaps not significant to the casual observer of New Hampshire
politics, the nall>: Partmouth
,
the student run newspaper of Dartmouth College,
played a particularly interesting role in the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign.
Mentioned earlier was the fact that the Daily Dartmouth was sponsoring a series
of candidate forums during the primary seasons to which all of the candidates
had been Invited. In addition to the forum was the role the paper played
within the campus community. The student community is served by two daily
newspapers — the Daily Dartmouth and the New York Time s. The IDa^ilj/ Dartmouth
plcl-ed up the editorial inclination of the New York Times from the beginning.
As a result, the Daily Darumouth speculated as to the impact of McCarthy's New
Hampshire announcement on the possible candidacy of Robert Kennedy. In their
first interview with David Hoeh immediately following the McCarthy's New Hamp-
shire announcement, the Daily Dartmouth headlined the story, "Can McCarthy Lure
RFK Backers?" The lead read:
David C. Hoeh. . .head of the McCarthy-for-President move-
ment in New Hampshire, predicted yesterday that support for
Robert Kennedy in the state primary will "dry-up" in the
v;ake of Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy's announcement. . A
The article went on to note that two Hanover area RFK supporters. History Pro-
fessor F. Dav;ld Roberto and Rev. Malcolm J. Grobe, had notified Daniell that
they were resigning from the RFK effort. Otherwise the article quoted Daniell
as sayJug that the New Hampshire RFK committee remained intact.
:!G7
Tlu; illusion Lluir Kennedy miy,hi become, a candidate appeared especially
Ftronn to those readers ot the l)ally Dartniouth
.
the New York Timea and the
listeners of the popular proGramming of WDCi:
, the student radio station. On.ly
the few faculty, residents and students who strayed from Hanover to become in-
volved in various 1968 protest or political events were attracted to the
McCarthy activity.
On January 16th, Daniell filed himself and five others as delegate candi-
dates favorable to r^FK. In tlie following weeks additional delegate and alter-
nate candidates filed as Danicll tried to keep the write-in effort alive by
emphasizing the importance of the delegate filings. There was, however, no
substantive organi::ing on the part of the RFK committee.
Early in February, Theodore C. Sorenson, a former top policy aide of
President John F. Kennedy, asked to meet with the members of Daniell's RFK
commit tee. The session was scheduled for February 7th at the Sheraton Wayfarer
Motel, Bedford. At that time, Daniell had been successful in filing fifteen
candidates for tlie delegate slots favorable to the nomination of Robert Kennedy.
Sorenson came accompanied by William L. Dunfey, former Democratic National
Conmiitteoman and a close associate of the Kennedy family.
Dunfey had arraiiged the meeting in hopes of discouraging the Daniell group
from continuing their unauthorized efforts on behalf ol Robert Kennedy. He felt
that bringing someone like Sorenson to New Hampshire would deliver the message
in irrefutable terms. Sorenson met with the group and urged them to "cease and
desist" in their efforts to secure a write-in vote for RFK. Sorenson followed
the mooting with a press conference in vdiicli he described tho message he gave
to Daniell's committee.
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Sorensou described himself as "friend, lawyer, and unofficial advisor" to
Senator Kennedy. m hia press conference he explained, "New Hampshire Demo-
crats will have
.
cho.ce in next month's primary between two real candidates,
U.S. Senator Eugene J, McCarthy and President Johnson." He noted that "to cast
one ballot for a non-candidate is a wasted vote. Therefore, if even one vote
is cast for him (RFK) in the New Hampshire primary the Senator will regard it
as one vote too many." Fc concluded by saying. "Senator Kennedy wanted me to
persuade everyone supporting him in this drive that they are performing a grave
disservice to the senator, his beliefs, and the Democratic Party." With this
Sorenson reaffirmed Kennedy's non-candidacy by repeating Kennedy's statement,
"I will not be a candidate againsc President Johnson this year under any
foreseeable circumstances . "^
Dan.tell's reaction to the instructions from RFK's personal emissary was
to say that he vjould, "press on" with the effort.^
Sorenson' s visit had its intended impact. Front page coverage illustrated
Kennedy's reluctance to be identified with the New Hampshire write-in effort.
Dunfey had carefully assessed the situation. Robert Kennedy's political future
could be seriously harmed by Daniell's poorly organized effort in New Hampshire.
Sorenson vras the chosen messenger with authority to speak for the Senator.
Kennedy was not running in Nev/ Hampshire and no authorization, direct, indirect,
by omission or commission could legitimize the use of his name by Daniell and
his group. Daniell lield his "press on" position but his group began to have
serious doubts.
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Altbounh nanioll never had a large organization, he began to receive calls
from his supporters and even from several of those who had filed as delegate
candidates favorable to RFK. With this pressure and Sorenson's visit, Daniell
ir.sued a statement Friday, February 9th. one day before the close of the dele-
gate filing period.
In deference to his (Kennedy's) request we encourage all his
many loyal friends and sympathizers not to write-in his name
in the coming presidential primary, but as the best means of
giving support to his views and in particular those concern-
ing Vief-nam, \je unanimously endorse and will actively work
for the present campaign in this state of Senator Eugene
McCarthy. ...
Ee concluded:
We offer our services in any capacity and are united in our
complete opposition to Lyndon B. Johnson.
Approved by unanimous vote. Signed: Eugene S. Daniell, Jr.,
Chairman.
9
An event of significant political proportions to the fledgling McCarthy
effort had transpired. A potentially divisive companion effort had been eli-
minated without acrimony. The pressure to end the RFK write-in had come from
Robert Kennedy himself which could be interpreted in tv70 ways. The first,
and least apparent, was that he wished to protect himself from a weak and
potentially damaging surrogate-managed political event. But secondly, and of
greater Importance, was the appearance of support for the New Hampshire McCarthy
effort that could be read from Kennedy's request.
Kennedy was a prominent critic of the Johnson administration's Vietnam
policy whose early statements had encouraged those organizing the McCarthy
effort. Soienson's only reference to the McCartliy campaign during his New
Hampshire visit was that "it speaks for itself."-'-^ Reacting to Daniell 's an-
nouncement, David Hoeh Issued a brief statement dated February 11th, which read:
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We are dclirJir-cd with Mils dcve.l opmcMit . It. unices uil
those in Nev^ IIainp£;hirc who with both Sen. Kennedy and
Sen. McCarthy take strong issue with the manner in which
Lyndon Johnson has broken the pledges he made to the
Democratic I'arty and to the American people in 196/.
.
The campaign had now developed sufficient strength not only to draw atten-
tion but to capitalize on events that were external to the campaign. On the
other hand, the Johnson campaign suffered at least two critical blows during
the period. The first was that Robert Kennedy was clearly assuming a "hands
off" position. He would not come to New Hampshire to campaign for the re-
nomination of Lyndon Johnson as Bernard Boutin had contended he would eight
roonths earlier. Boutin's trump card vanished. He could not expect help from
the most popular political name in New Hampsliire. At the same time Boutin
also lost the potentially divisive activity, to the McCarthy campaign, of
Daniell and liis v/rite-in effort. The dissenting forces in New Hampshire were
now joined behind Senator McCarthy and under the leader sliip not of the maverick
Daniell but of respected Democratic Party workers and established local, county
and state leaders.
The McCarthy Dele gate Slate is Filed
Daniell announced that he was ending the RFK write-in effort February 9th.
The filing period for delegate candidates closed Saturday, Februaiy 10th at
5:00 ]>.ir). St.udda had been feverishly trying to complete the McCarthy slate of
2-^1 delegate and 2^ alternate delegate candidates as the deadline approached.
Two serious problems remained as the last week of the filing period began to
close. The first was that, in spite of his best efforts, the slate did not
contain names from either Manchester or Berlin. Secondly, in order to file for
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deIoj>.;teG each canaJdatc had t.o incBont hiinsolf or herself personally nl the
office of the Secretary of State in the State Capitol. Concord. Individual
schedules and po.ssihle bad weather made this requirement a serious hurdle.
Studd... ai.i Iloeh had been successful in getting two persons who had filed
on their own as favorable McCarthy delegate candidates to withdraw with one
subsequently being included in the pledged McCarthy slate. Otherwise, the
record of McCarthy delegate candidate filings was clear of all names except
those approved by Studds and included in the pledged slate. Unfortunately, as
the week caroe near an end, Studds still lacked a sufficient list of persons
willing to file as candidates. Several stil] were holding back because of
potential schedule conflicts with the Chicago Democratic National Convention
dates, and others had not yet made the trip from their homes to fi]e in person
as required by state law.
In the last seventy- two hours before the filing period closed, Sorenson
had come to New Hampshire. Daniell hedged on whether to end the RFK write-in.
Studds needed delegate candidates and Iloeh wanted to seal the end of the RFK
effort as amicably as possible. Daniell had long expressed his interest in the
delegate selection portion of the primary rather than the "beauty contest."
Iloeh suggested to Studds that perhaps Daniel] could be encouraged to fold the
RFK tent if he and some of those who had already filed as RFK delegate candidates
were offered places on the slate of "pledged" McCartliy delegates. In addition,
Daniell had flliJ as delegate ciindidates persons who resided in Manchestei and
Berlin. If tliese filings could be swltclied to McCartliy, the geographical dis-
tribution objective of the McCarthy slate would be accomplished. When contacted
by Studds, Daniel.! was favorable, lie agreed to withdraw as a favorable delegate
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candidate for RFK and re-fl]<> as a pledged delegate for McCarthy. He sold he
vould al8o call each of those who were filed as lU-K delegate candidates asking
them to withdraw and to offer those residing in areas where the McCarthy slate
was deficient the chance to re-file either as delegate or alternate candidates
pledged to McCarthy.
With Daniell's blessing and full cooperation, Studds now contacted those
Daniell suggested would want to re--file and offered to help them through the
procedures of the Secretary of State. Several were able to make the change
Friday, February 9th but the last five or so slots could not be filed until
Saturday. All was moving smoothly until Studds awoke Saturday morning to find
that it was beginning to snow. By noon New Hampshire was in the midst of a
serious storm. Roads v/ere hazardous and the predictions v;ere for increasing
snow and freezing conditions. As late as noon several of those v/ho had promised
to make the trip to Concord had not arrived. Studds called and found all the
late filers were on the road. By approximately 4:00 p.m., the last of the
delegate slate had filed. Studds completed the listing of the delegate and
alternate names on the signed authorization from McCarthy and filed that too
with the Secretary of State. Forty-eight names, no more and no less, were
filed for the forty-eiglit slots oti the McCarthy slate. No attempt had been
made either to cross file favorable McCarthy candidates for delegate positions
or to remove the over filed names on the part of the Johnson organization.
The coup was coiTjplete. The RFK effort had been successfully folded into the
McCarthy organization and symbolically sealed with the additional gesture of
filing their geographically prominent candidates for McCarthy. On the other
hand, the Johnson organization, unwilling to control delegate candidate filings.
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wa« now stuck with lists ol favorable candidates far in excess of the slots
available. The strategy had worked better than the McCarthy leaders could
have expected.
Early Scheduling and Field Operations
Senator McCarthy's first campaign visit to New Hampshire was scheduled
for Friday, January 26th and Saturday, January 27th. Scheduling and related
logistics are always a challenge in a campaign but especially in a New Hamp-
shire presidential primary. This results from the fact that both the national
campaign and the state organization are usually inexperienced. Campaigns that
had extensive preparation, such as that of John Kennedy in 1960, and which had
the resources to employ experienced workers tended to move a bit more smoothly
in early campaign going, but all must face the test In the field. Furthermore,
there is nothing quite like a presidential primary campaign to tax the capaci-
ties and capabilities of individuals, organizations, and candidates. Even
large state senatorial or gubernatorial campaigns do not match the stakes that
are on the block as a presidential candidate begins in New Hampshire.
Beyond the inexperience and nervousness of a usual campaign, venturing
into New Hampshire attracts, for the serious candidate, great press and elec-
tronic media attention. New Hampshire is the first. Consequently, there is
little else for the reporters and columnists to talk about except New Hampshire,
As the McCarthy leaders learned when McCarthy arrived for the
Deceiuber 1967 lecture visit, the reporters were attracted to New Hampshire and
could not be discouraged from visiting even with an unannounced candidate.
Once a candidate had announced and was scheduled to visit New Hampshire, the
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canipa:Lr,n had to consider the modia as a factor in its plans and niakc every
attempt to iiiaximize the positive news. Also the campaign had to understand
that almost every step, statement and activity would be under the probing
scrutiny of the reporters. Schedules must include transportation, rooms, commu-
nications and plans to meet deadlines. The campaign needed a full scale press
operation to provide copies of campaign schedules, press statements, advanced
copy of speeches, and photographs in order to be sure that the media coverage
would be adequate and, hopefully, positive.
The media seemed to respond to what had become kno\vm as media events.
These were either regular campaign activities which attracted attention or
staged episodes of human interest value that could be easily encapsulated for
television viewing. By 1968 such events had become a fetish of most national
campaigns. The medic\ had come to expect, if not actually demand, that the can-
didate take every opportunity to provide the reporters V7ith these homey, if
occasionally foolish, profiles. These had become what amounts to a gray area
in many presidential campaigns between what is a legitimate means of attracting
public attention and a circus act. The temptation to perform in the center
ring of the traveling show of a presidential campaign is strong. Some candi-
dates resist, others succumb. Some succeed by resisting, others by succumbing.
All have to reveal their humanity in these media rites or risk being labeled
"aloof" or "detached" or "not down-to-earth." The pull to contrive and perform
is tremendous upon all involved: candidates, campaign leaders, workers and even
the media. New Hampshire is the stage. The stars, the production, the audience
and tlie bit jjlayers are conveniently homogenized into a statewide road show that
shifts its focus from the stage to the background in one continually flowing
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ecricB of events. The question which caiupaicn managers have to consider is:
what would be viewed as a legitimate news event? What could be contrived to
capture media attention? Relying on the spontaneous would not necessarily pro-
duce a noteworthy event. Contriving events, as the Romney managers did. would
not always cast the candidate in the proper light. For the McCarthy leadership
there was alvmys the seriousness of the underlying reasons for the McCarthy
candidacy. It may have been, or even be now, appropriate for some candidates
to run for the highest office of the land in the middle of a travelling circus,
but from what McCarthy's managers in New Hampshire had seen of McCarthy this
was not his stylo. Nor did they sense that he would succumb to the siren's
call of that show.
With only the barest of exposure to McCarthy in Chicago and during his
non-candidate visit to New Hampshire, Rtudds and Hoeh had had no experience
with McCarthy as a candidate. They assumed that the contemporary model of the
1960 Kennedy campaign with which both were familiar and which was then the
organizational model to be followed for success, would be used to shape the
McCarthy organization and campaign.
The NeX'^ Hampshire leaders wanted to show McCarthy as a candidate in the
Kennedy tradition of well-organized, fast moving, diverse and street-level
campaign activity. That model meant beginning the campaign day early, v/orking
constantly through the day and ending late in the evening. It meant finding
a series of activities that V70uld make news, be symbolic, shov/ the candidate's
humanity and reveal his intellectual capacities. The spectrum had to be set
in a schedule that would both reflect the qualities of the candidate while
responding to the political ethos of New Hampshire. With little to guide them,
276
Ho<-l, and SLudda relied on their Now llampohiro. experience and political judgments
to buJ.ld the Bchedule lor the first day of the campaiau.
Hooh recalled that John F. Kennedy bccan his 1960 presidential drive with
a prefis conference at the City Hall in Nashua on January 2.5, Just eii;ht years
earlier. For a campaign that felt its antecedent to be the lost spirit of
John F. Kennedy, no better symbolic place to becin the McCarthy drive could
be found. Tlie Nashua committee couJd schedule the appropriate greetinc before
the statue of the late President near the City llnll steps, a press conference
opening the campaign could follow and then, perhaps, a main street hand shaking
tour followed by a neighborhood coffee reception.
The populous spine of New Hampshire runs from Nashua on the border with
Massachusetts to Manchester, approximately 15 miles north of Nashua, to Concord
approximately 20 miles north of Manchester. A convincing first day of cam-
paigning had to cover each of the three principal New Hnrapshire cities. By
doing this the niaxiiuum an-state media impact would be available and with the
Nashua stop, some Boston television and press coverage would also be attracted.
VJhile Hoeh and Studds were confident of the scheduling abilities of those
in Nashua and Concord, Manchester had not yet developed its own McCarthy commit-
tee. Without an organization to build a full schedule and with the need to get
to Concord before the end of the work day, to file McCarthy's candidacy peti-
tions, Studds and Hoch decided to shorten the Manchester visit to the "visible"
luncheon, a brief block or two Elm Street hand shaking tour, and then to catch
a shift change at one of the plants in the Amoskeag Millyard.
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Following the candidacy filing In Concord and a briei: headquar tcrr. recep-
tion. McCarthy would return to Manchester where a major policy speech was
scheduled at St. Anselm's College. Studds and Hoeh were pleased that a college
site was available because there would be fewer audience problems. Also, the
conservative Catholic school would be an excellent backdrop for McCarthy's
policy criticisms. The speech would end the campaign day. A Friday evening
was not tlie best time to schedule a political speech, but again the risk had
to be taken in order to strengthen McCarthy's image.
Both felt a reasonably good schedule had been created for McCarthy for
his first campaign day. There was an open question concerning possible cam-
paigning on the next day, Saturday, January 27th, but this remained uncertain
in Washington. A Saturday schedule would be difficult this early in the cam-
paign. Winter Saturdays are difficult days. Most campaigning happens during
the week when factories are operating, children are in school, and coffee
klatchcs can be arranged. Visits to shopping centers, a winter carnival, ski
area, hockey rink, or outdoor recreation activity are possibilities but sche-
dules are heavily dependent on favorable weather, careful advance work and
considerable dead time in travelling. The major outdoor winter attractions
draw more out-of-staters than New llampshirites and while this would help
McCarthy with the upcoming Massachusetts primary, it was not particularly
valuable for the New Hampshire effort. Furthermore, a candidate was expected
to try out the sport or activity on show. McCarthy skated, Hoeh and Studds
learned, and had been a good hockey player, but to put him on skis would have
made him a part of a circus act rather than a campaign. Saturday, the 27th,
was k(!pt open but without a specific schedule.
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Adynnci n}], the First Campnif^,n Day
The hailnK.rk of the modern campaicn Is advance work. The advance person
i« the scout who is supposed to check all of a campaign day's details, adjust
the Gchedule to meet the personal needs of the candidate, provide opportunities
for the media and synchronize both the ethos of the campaign and the campaign
locality. It is a demanding and often thankless job. A good campaign day is
a work of art which occurs as much by chance as by design, but Is always
subject to a critical review. The critics are the candidate, the media, the
local committee and virtually all others who have a hand in making the events
that occupy the candidate's time and project the campaign's message. The best
laid plans of the schedulers and advance workers do not always guarantee re-
sults. Too often it is the unexpected that will make or break a campaign day,
and it is quite often the unexpected that receives the attention of the media
to the exclusion of the pre-planned message.
The New Hampshire leaders knew the importance of both good schedules and
good advance work. The rough outline that they had developed for McCarthy's
first day in New Hampshire would have to be timed, pre-run, checked and adjusted.
They suffered in this task from having only brief exposure to McCarthy as a
person and even less to him as a candidate. They had no idea how fast or slow
McCarthy would work, what kind of reaction he would receive or what activities
were his favorites. They knew he had worked hard in his Minnesota election
contests and that Minnesota and New Hampshire contained much the same mix of
rural small town and urban industrial centers as did New Hampshire. They could
only assume that McCarthy would do as well in New Hampshire as he had in
Minnesota seizing upon those political opportunities which each state offered.
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Since In-state media, especially television, was insignificant, McCarthy would
have to meet the voters on the street, in their places of work, in their homes
and where they gathered. He would have to handshake his way through a schedule
and find a way to communicate his issues and his qualifications through these
informal contacts. McCarthy's schedules had to be less what he might like to
do in a campaign and more of what New Hampshire required of a campaigner. In
other states he might be able to pick and choose, but in New Hampshire their
was little choice and for a Democrat running during the winter, the choices
were even fewer.
Studds and Hoeh expected that now McCarthy had announced and a major na-
tional campaign v;as in progress, a full blown advance operation would descend
on the fledgling New Hampshire campaign before McCarthy's January 26th visit.
Again they relied on their only previous national campaign model, that of
John F. Kennedy in 1960 and Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey's visits during
the 1964 presidential campaign.
Several days before McCarthy v/as to arrive Studds received a call from
New York that Sandy Fraucher V70uld be arriving to advance the Senator's visit.
A check v:ith Blair Clark assured Studds that Sandy Fraucher was an experienced
advance person and, while young, had developed a considerable reputation advanc-
ing John Lindsey's campaign in New York City.
Sandy Fraucher arrived in Concord late in the afternoon of the Wednesday
before McCarthy's scheduled Friday arrival. He left his shirts for Studds to
have cleaned, called the New Hampshire contacts he was given, and set up
several meetings to go through the schedule the next morning. He made some
of the local connections but the day was gone before he had been able to
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The First Campal)>n D.r^
During the night the snow Gtorni ended. New Ilampshlre road crews are famous
for being able to clear the state's main highways to almost bare pavement within
a few hours after the end of a storm. About six inches of white, fluffy snow
lay on the ground and hung from the branches of the hardwoods and in blankets
on the evergreens. The key was that deep, cloudless blue that only follows the
air cleansing of the day after a storm. The temperature was in the upper
twenties but with the intense sun the air felt warm, almost with a touch of
spring — a day that would begin the maple sugar harvester thinking about pre-
paring to tap his trees.
Hoeh and Studds were elated with the changed weather when they met early
that morning at the Concord Headquarters. The cars for the motorcade were
waiting. With them were two new faces who had come into town the night before
to help v;ith the campaign. Studds and Hoeh vzere now confronted with a wrench-
ing problem. Both of the new young men were neatly dressed, sport coat and tie
according to some perceived dress code, but one had a lengthy beard and the
other long hair. Both were about to jump into a car to follow along during the
day's activity helping to drive, hand out materials or do vjhatever was needed.
Both Hoeh and Studds had been working with the concerned and serious students
who were involved in the anti-war efforts and knew appearances were only a
small part of what the generation of the late nineteen sixties was experiencing.
Appearances did not particularly bother either of them as long as individuals
worked hard and behaved in a way that lent credit to the effort. But this was
McCarthy's first day in New Hampshire. Hoeh and Studds were particularly sen-
sitive to the fact that the oniy television image that might be projected from
282
New Ilar.p^hirc-. would be of bearded, long-halrcd, mini-skirted, anti-establisloment
appearing young people. This could not be allowed. Studds took both aside and
explained the situation. As much as he hated the task it had to be done and to
the credit of the two young men involved they understood. Their response to
Studds' request not to come that day was, they had come to New Hampshire to
help McCarthy not to hurt him. If Studds felt that their appearance would
hurt McCarthy during this campaign day they would not travel. In fact, Studds
asked that they not even come close to the campaign that day. He suggested
that they remain in Concord, help with preparations for McCarthy's visit later
in the day, and when McCarthy arrived, to get out of sight. This was probably
the toughest job Studds had to do during the whole campaign. It was not neces-
sary for either Studds or Hoeh to mention appearance again. Like the New
Hampshire political history lesson which became required reading during the
campaign, volunteers were either "clean cut" and out front or they accepted
back room, invisible assignments.
McCarthy's car arrived in Nashua on time followed closely by the press
bus. A group of perhaps fifty had gathered anticipating his arrival on the
plaza in front of Nashua's City Hall. It was a bit after 9:00 a.m., a little
early for the shoppers. But the activity and especially the sight of newsreel
cameras, light men, reporters, and sound crews began to swell the crowd. CBS
had sent Roger Mudd, the Boston stations had sent reporters well known to
Nashua residents and the wire services had sent in their top reporters.
Studds and Hoeh greeted Senator McCarthy and directed him to the place
v/here the bust of President Kennedy stood on a pedestal just in front of the
City Hall rteps. McCarthy gazed rather solecnily, reading the inscription
engraved in gold on the face of the black granite pedestal to himself:
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IN MKMORIAM
PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
ON JANUARY 25, 1960,
THIS CITY HALL PLAZA
WAS JOHN F. KENNEDY'S
FIRST CAMPAIGN STOP
IN THE NATION FOR
THE PRESIDENCY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Still and nev7sreel photographers clicked and ground away as the message of
that precedent became obvious. Then McCarthy shook hands with those who had
gathered, exchanged friendly greetings and informal words of welcome. Then
he entered City Hall.
The press conference had been scheduled for 9:30 a.m. when McCarthy
entered the City Hall auditorium at 9:15 a.m. the camera crews were still
struggling to assemble their microphones, lights and cameras, and the audience
was almost entirely composed of empty chairs. Almost no one had experienced a
candidate who arrived on time much less one who was early. John Kennedy's
campaign was notoriously late as v;ere most others that the political observers
could recall. There were some awkward moments as the chairs begin to fill,
the stragglers from outside found their places. Hoeh and Studds went to find
the Mayor v^ho was scheduled to greet the Senator.
The New Hampshire press office had released a schedule for the day earlier
and copies were available for the press, and Hoeh and Studds expected that an
advance release of the Senator's remarks would be available for distribution.
The national advance man, Sandy Fraucher, appeared but he had no advance text
nor did he have a copy of the schedule for the day. Hoeh and Studds were also
looking for their own advance man who v/as to meet them as they arrived in
Nashua. He was expected to guide them through the day.
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The Mayor, Dennis Sullivan, finally arrived saying that he had been ill and
had just come from his bed for the occasion. In a few words Sullivan extended
the welcome of the city but did not offer further encouragement. McCarthy re-
sponded briefly and without text. He called the Granite State primary a
special challenge, as he put it, "the primary has the reputation of being the
harshest political judgment in the country." He went on to note that "some of
New Hampshire's Democratic leaders have said the state is so well organized
and disciplined that there wasn't any sense in his coming to the state." "Some
say that all New Hampshire people are hawks" and his anti-war stand wouldn't
win him any votes. He said he wanted the people to deny all those "base
rumors. "il
McCarthy set the theme of his campaign through his response to reporters'
questions. One asked, "l-Jhy aren't you conducting a more forceful campaign?"
"I don't intend to shout at people around the country, I don't think the people
in New Hampshire V7ant to be shouted at. The issues I want to get cut are not
best served by table thumping," he responded. 12
The press asked how his campaign was going so far, to which McCarthy re-
plied, "All right." Some one asked him to be more enthusiastic but he repeated,
"I think all right is an honest statement. We haven't despaired yet. We
haven't folded up our equipment and left the room." He concluded the press
conference by noting that the prediction was that he would be lucky to get ten
or tv;elve percent of the vote on March 12th. He said that he expected the figure
to be far more than what people supporting him say to expect. "We're going to
run to win, that's all.''^^
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McCarthy, now well ahead of the scheduled tinie for the end of tlie press
conference, visited several City Hall offices to handshake and chat with city
employees, then out: to the street, greeting a few more of the early shoppers.
A nearby coffee shop had been scouted by the Nashua committee as being the
place where McCarthy might meet voters on their mid-morning coffee break. The
entourage of reporters, camera men and the local committee jammed in around
the surprised customers perched on their stools waiting to hear the reaction
of these locals to the likes of Senator McCarthy. For some reason the press
had expected McCarthy to receive a hostile reaction from New Hampshire voters.
They spent most of that first day quizzing those who shook hands with the
Senator and those who were present during his various appearances. In the
coffee shop McCarthy quietly introduced himself, excused his interruption,
and moved easily from patron to patron. The owner working behind the counter
had several opinions about the war which he expressed in a friendly way. He
was a supporter of the nation and therefore the war, but he didn't care much
for the Johnson administration or its handling of the war.
In spite of the unscheduled tour of City Hall offices and the visits on
Main Street, McCarthy was still running ahead of schedule and few people re-
mained on the sidewalks whom McCarthy had not already met. It was time to move
on to the next stop, another example of the New Hampshire tradition of campaign-
ing, a coffee party in a local home. The entourage now numbering ten to fifteen
cars and the press bus vjound through Nashua's residential area arriving at the
home. The reporters were anxious to see how McCarthy performed in this domestic
setting and proceeded to almost crovjd out the neighbors who had come to hear
and question Senator McCarthy. Hoeh and Studds did not want the coffee to be
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an extension of the press conf erciice
, nor did they want the presence, of the
reporters to repress the neighbors. They had to make a decision between media
access to McCarthy or voter access. They decided on the side of the voter and
quietly asked the press to adjourn to the kitchen and hold their questions
until McCarthy had had his chance to meet voters and respond to their questions.
During the session Koeh and Studds became a bit concerned with the pace
that u^as set during the day. McCarthy was running as much as one-half hour
ahead of the schedule. Iloeh made a quick telephone call ahead to Manchester
to see if the New Hampshire advance man had arrived and to warn tliat Senator
McCarthy would be arriving in Manchester approximately fifteen minutes earlier
than planned. Hoeh said he would stall as long as he could both in Nashua and
on the road, but too slow a pace would be obvious to the reporters and also
stretch the coffee beyond the reasonable patience of those who had come.
McCarthy recorded and filmed several interviews for the Boston television
stations that were following him that morning. The Boston reporters and crews
then left the campaign just before noon in order to process their film and pre-
pare for late afternoon deadlines. Hoeh then asked that the Senator's car be
brought to the house in preparation for the trip to Manchester. A few moments
later the driver returned saying he could not find the keys. A reserve car
v/as called in and led tlie entourage safely out of Nashua.
In spite of the delay and slow driving, the campaign arrived at the Manches
ter restaurant fifteen minutes early as predicted. One Manchester supporter was
there to greet McCarthy but he whispered to Hoeh that the others he had Invited
to join in the luncheon had not yet arrived. Again people assumed that campaign
always run late and for them to be on time, certainly not early, would be enough
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StuddG crabbed Senator McCarthy' h arm and began about a one block impromptu
handshaking tour of the Elm Street sidev^alk. The press tagged along to check
on the local residents' reactions to McCarthy in this, the most hostile of New
Hampshire territory. Most people were startled, did not recognize McCarthy,
but when introduced were friendly, usually wishing him "good luck."
Using approximately ten of the extra fifteen minutes in the street tour,
McCarthy returned to the restaurant and, followed by the somewhat smaller press
corps, was ushered to his table through the main floor to the rear of the crowded
second level of the restaurant. Hoeh and Studds had expected that he would
move slowly through the restaurant shaking hands and Introducing himself or
being introduced by the Manchester supporters. It became quickly obvious that
McCarthy, unlike uiany other politicians, did not enjoy interrupting people as
they were eating. Hoeh tried to get McCarthy to appreciate that in this res-
taurant and at noon time, people were there to be interrupted and that in a
certain v/ay they expected that McCarthy would pass among the tables and booths
greeting each of them. Apparently, this was not McCarthy's style. The luncheon
went well but faster than scheduled since McCarthy had not tarried on entering
the restaurant nor did he change his ways when leaving. He greeted a few of
the other patrons but mostly persons introduced to him by those who had joined
hira for lunch.
The major disaster of the day was about to occur. In his account of the
day Studds recorded the following:
McCarthy's first campaign visit to the state. . .was a
nightmare. David (Hoeh) and I. . .had hired a local ad-
vance man who turned out to be some kind of a character
who never showed up and that trip was advanced 20 minutes
ahead of the Senator's arrival (at each stop) by David
and myse]f. I never want to live through anything like
that againl^*^
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Tha telephone calling Hoch and Studda began in Nashua now rapidly Increased
when they arrived in Manchester. No advance man had appeared and the next stops
on the schedule called for McCarthy to be in the Amoskeag Millyard to shake
hands with workers changing shifts. A time for this was listed but it had not
been confirmed. Holland and the other Manchester local supporters had thought
these details had been checked by the advance man. In addition to the need to
check the exact shift change time, Hoeh now wanted to add something into the
schedule in order to pick up the pace and fill in the extra time that was
available
.
Studds and Hoeh bounced in and out of the dining room making desperate
telephone calls to confirm the shift change mentioned in the schedule, and
second, to try to add another event, possibly a plant tour or another shift
change. The situation was desperate. McCarthy was about to leave the res-
taurant for his next stop. Originally, Hoeh and Studds wanted to have McCarthy
campaign along Elm Street to the newly rented store front that was to be the
McCarthy Manchester campaign headquarters. But shortly after the lease was
signed and a day or so before McCarthy was to arrive the ceiling of the main
room fell in leaving the place a mess and a hazard. In addition, the young
out-of-state volunteer, who Hoeh and Studds had sent to Manchester to set up
the headquarters and work with the local committee, was having trouble v/ith
the building inspectors' office over the sign that was to be placed over the
store front. Apparently he did not realize that to place a sign on the front
of a building a permit was needed. As a consequence of the combination of
these events, a headquarters opening in Manchester was out of the question.
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McCarthy war. now out on the street with Hoeh and Studds, still not quite
sure what would happen next, lloeh began a hand shaking walking tour with
McCarthy north along the east side of Elm Street while Studds and Manchester
supporters went to telephone booths to call in search of more definite shift
change tiraes. Although it was reasonably warm and sunny there were not many
people on the streets during an early Friday afternoon, so Hoeh began taking
McCarthy into several of the larger stores and circulating among the customers.
To make sure that no incidents occurred, Hoeh sent a campaign workers ahead to
check with the store manager to be sure that he would welcome McCarthy's cam-
paigning. McCarthy also made knovm his preference. No campaigning in beauty
parlors. "Wom.en," he said, "did not like being seen by strangers when under
a dryer or wrapped up in towels." He also cautioned about barber shops as
being places of strong opinion with little likelihood of being able to counter
the barber's view. "It's as hard to argue with a man holding scissors or a
razor as it is to talk while in a dentist's chair," he quipped, and the cam-
paign passed by the beauty parlors and the barber shop on this first Manchester
hand shaking tour.-'-^
The west side of Elm Street was in the shade, with even fewer people on
the street and smaller shops. McCarthy moved quickly making his way back to
the place v;here the cars were waiting to take him to the next campaign stop
in the Millyard.
Studds was almost sure of the shift change time but still had not been
able to confirm it or make another change to his satisfaction. The place, the
Brookshire Knitting Mills, was in the middle of the Millyard along a narrow
street that had been designed for rail and horse-drawn wagon service. The
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care could enter but not the bus. McCarthy arrived, the press ran to catch up
with him from the bus that was parked outside, and all stood in eager expecta-
tion for the flood of workers to stream down the steps, past the Senator's out-
stretched hand. They waited for ten, then fifteen, then twenty minutes, while
lloeh and Studds nervously tried to find out what had gone wrong in their
scheduling. The Brookshire Mills were owned by the Sidores, a prominent Demo-
cratic family, and under this management were assumed to be friendly. Hoeh and
Studds had also assumed that their advance man had been in touch with a member
of the family to arrange the visit. As they soon found out no one had checked
with the Brookshire raanagement, they asked if the shift were about to change
and were told that part of the shift would change soon but that the largest
number of the workers had left approximately five minutes before McCarthy had
arrived. Quickly Hoeh tried to arrange an in-plant tour but found that per-
mission to do this had to be secured well in advance.
At this inopportune time, one of the lost advance men, Sandy Fraucher,
arrived complaining loudly that McCarthy was standing outside of a non-union
factory about to greet non-union workers. The reporters finally had something
to write about and began taking notes. Hoeh grabbed Fraucher by the sleeve
and took him aside explaining in a stage whisper, that John F. Kennedy had
toured this factory in 1960 and that the Sidore family offered their workers
benefits tliat most textile union contracts had not even begun to include.
Through it all McCarthy chatted with reporters, remained calm, and greeted
the few workers who straggled out the door.
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Up until this point the day had gone well to the outsiders. The schedule
and the logistics seemed professionally handled and what few problems had deve-
loped were known only to Studds and Hoeh. Now the campaign was lodged on a rock
in the Millyard with little or nothing to do but wait.
As Studds recalled:
We made the famous mistake there. We got him five minutes
late to a factory gate and he had just missed the bulk of
people which all the national press picked up to show how
bad the organization in New Hampshire was.
The organization in New Hampshire had been naively assum-
ing that a candidate for the Presidency of the United
States would be preceded by some advance men. Some of us
had worked on Kennedy campaigns before and we had some
disillusioning still to go.
But we learned after that point that if there was going to
be advance work we were going to do it.
.
The doorstep of the Brookshire Mills became a symbol of a low point in the
campaign. Every story about McCarthy's first visit to New Hampshire carried at
least c. paragraph about the doorstep and the key theme of the next two days
coverage of the campaign focused on the doorstep either in words or in film.
As an example one reporter wrote:
It also became clear early in the day that McCarthy's New
Hampshire organization has a long way to go to take on a
patina of professionalism.
Item: McCarthy is scheduled to have dinner in a busy
downtown Manchester restaurant, where well-heeled busi-
ness types eat, with a small group of supporters.
The dining rooms, upper and lower, are filled with people.
McCarthy has lunch, shakes hands with one or two people
who come to his table, then walks out without visiting one
single table or shaking another hand.
Explains his aide when asked by a reporter what the man is
doing: We're behind schedule."
292
Item: McCarthy ir. scheduled to visit a textile plant at
3:00 p.m. to shake hands as the workers get off their shift.
He arrives at the plant slightly before 3:00 p.m.
But the shift got out at 2:A5 p.m.
So, he stands in the cold and slush, or in the plant entry
waiting for another shift to get out half an hour later.
The result — about 30 minutes spent waiting to shake the
hands of less than 20 women who were obviously in a big
hurry to go home.-^''
Another caught the same scene but found something in the event that revealed
McCarthy's character.
At Manchester's Brookshire Knitting Mills, a schedule mix-
up found the campaigners arriving 10 minutes after a large
2:A5 p.m. shift let out.
The next flov; of vrorkers was to occur at 3:15 p.m. McCarthy
and his staff spent the time between the millyard, where
heavy slush from the day's traffic mingled with ruts carved
from ice, and the front lobby, where the weather was more
clement.
Then only about 15 women came out.
"I'm sorry, Senator," an aide confided. "Our man fed the
wrong information about this."
"That's all right."
Later travelling between Manchester and Concord. . .McCarthy
noted: "Yes, it has been a good day. V7ell planned. "-^^
McCarthy was not easily ruffled by miscues or schedule mix-ups. Hoeh and
Studds were demolished by the disaster in Manchester, but since McCarthy had
been so forgiving they promised each other that nothing like that would happen
again if they could control it in any way. Other candidates, even several
then working in New Hampshire had become notorious for their intolerance of
mistakes. Their outrages, while not often seen in public, had become part of
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the underfiround information of that campaicn year. To see how McCarthy re-
sponded when faced with a debacle was refreshing but more importantly, stimu-
lated complete dedication to insure future perfection.
Quietly, McCarthy said, "Let's go," to Hoeh and Studds. Sensing that the
press was let down by the stand in the cold, McCarthy climbed aboard the press
bus to ride with the reporters to Concord. Hoeh and Studds riding in the lead
car again slowed the pace as the campaign was still ahead of its scheduled
arrival in Concord, \sTiile fumbling in the front office of the Brookshire
Knitting Mills, Hoeh had called ahead to Concord to warn them of an early arri-
val at the State House. The well organized Concord Committee quickly made
the appropriate calls to the local reporters and photographers so that they
would be on hand for McCarthy's filing and to local supporters who could be
expected to attend the headquarters opening.
Both McCarthy and the reporters who had ridden with him on the bus came
off in a jovial mood as if nothing had happened during the previous stop.
McCarthy entered the State House, went directly to the Secretary of State'
office where Hoeh and Studds produced the appropriately signed petitions and
forms necessary to make the filing official. The reporters asked the number
of signatures and the reply from Hoeh was, "Just the number required. We did
not attempt to produce more than this number." The filing was official, no
questions were asked concerning the names, nor problems encountered in the
exercise.
McCarthy then went to Governor John W. King's office to pay a courtesy
call. The Boston Globe account of the meeting read:
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It was a courtesy call on the governor, the kind visiting
high-level politicians make when on someone else's home
ground. The chat between Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy and Gov.
John W. King was brief.
"Is this your official start?" King small-talked as they
sat on a black leather couch In his office. "Yes," said
McCarthy.
"You will find the people here will treat you courteously.
You will like campaigning here. I did; I wouldn't have
done it three times otherwise. I hope you will say what
a beautiful state we have here," said King.
"Yes, it is, I have already said how it reminds me of
Minnesota," said McCarthy.
Then, Friday afternoon, the two men shook hands, probably
for the last time until March 12. . .19
Follovzing the official filing and the meeting with the Governor, McCarthy
seemed to catch the spirit of the campaign. His ride from Manchester to
Concord in the press bus had been stimulating and his reception in Concord
reassuring. Nov/ he left the State House to walk the three blocks to the state
headquarters. On his way he greeted people on the sidewalk. Here the recep-
tion was more cordial than it had been since Nashua. As he rounded the corner
from the State House to Main Street he was met by Vincent Dunn, Jr., the eight
year old son of the New Hampshire's Banking Commissioner, who was holding a
copy of McCarthy's book The Limits of Power . The boy asked the Senator to
autograph the book. Hoeh then took the opportunity to usher McCarthy into
the offices of the Banking Commission and to introduce him to Vincent Dunn, Sr.
Dunn and his wife v/ere becoming increasingly helpful to the McCarthy effort
and V70uld become heavily involved before the end.
295
As was usual for Lho clay, McCarthy arrived at the headquarters a bit
ahead of schedule which meant that things were not completely ready for the
reception nor had all the people gathered. Before he left about fifty persons
filled the room. Speaking briefly, McCarthy thanked them for their interest
and commented on his first day:
If what I have seen in the three tov,ms I have been in is
indicative of a general response, we'll settle for 55
percent of the vote.
I have never had as encouraging a response, even in my
own state. And in spite of the "mischievous" New Hamp-
shire voter, I might have a chance to win.
I want you to know the burden you bear, and thank you
for working in this conmion cause.
He made a point of greeting and talking with each person in the head-
quarters and promised to return again before the end of the campaign in order
to meet those who had not arrived before he had to leave for his next stop, a
5:45 p.m. reception, part of the annual meeting of the New Hampshire Bar
Association.
Hoeh and Studds delivered their candidate to several members of the New
Hampchirc Bar who escorted McCarthy to the private reception being held at
the Wayfarer Convention Center in Bedford. The press was not included and
would not rejoin McCarthy until his speaking date at 8:00 p.m. at St. Anselm's
College.
McCarthy's Second Manchester Speech
On January 12, 1968, William Loeb, the controversial editor and publisher
of the Manches ter Union header printed one of his famous front page editorials
titled, ADDRESSED TO DEMOCRATS ONLY. It read:
It is cood news to all patriotic Democrats that Senator
Eugene McCarthy has announced that he will authorize a
write-in (sic) candidacy for himself in New Hampshire.
HERE IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EVERY PATRIOTIC. SENSIBLE
DEMOCRAT IN THE STATE OF GEN. STARK TO INDICATE JUST HOW
LITTLE HE THINKS OF AN-YONE \mO GOES APvOUND GIVING SPEECHES
V7IIICH SERVE TO PROLONG THE WAR, AS SEN. MCCARTHY IS DOING
BY ATTACKING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ANT) THIS NATION'S COM-
MITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF FREEDOM IN VIETNAM.
Dissent, of course, is the right of every American. But
carping dissent in V7ar time, with the enemy at our throats
and killing our boys in Vietnam, is NOT a right.
IT IS A DISGRACE !
It is difficult for this newspaper to believe that Sen.
McCarthy doesn't understand that every speech he makes
in favor of our withdrawal from Vietnam, in favor of what
amounts — no matter how carefully disguised — to sur-
render to Communist aggression, costs the lives of many
American boys.
WIH'THER SEN. McC.\PvTHY KllOWS IT OR NOT, THOSE SPEECHES OF
HIS ARE VJRITTEN IN BLOOD — NOT HIS BLOOD, BUT THE ELOOD
OF AI>1ERICAN BOYS WHO ARE KILLED BECAUSE THIS WAR IS PRO-
LONGlffl BY THOSE SPEECHES.
When the rulers in Hanoi hear a speech by McCarthy, or
Bobby Kennedy, or all the other chickens who want to pull
out of Vietnam, who want to run home with their tails
between their legs like so many licked yellovj curs, they
say: "All we have to do is to wait long enough and those
crazy Americans will be fighting among themselves so hard
they won't bo able to beat us."
EDITORIALS VJON'T BEAT SEN. McCARTHY OR THE WIIOLE BARNYARD
OF CRAZY CHICKENS, BUT THE PATRIOTIC, SOUITO DEMOCRATS OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE HAVE A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY IN THIS ELECTION
TO SUPPORT OVERWHELMINGLY ~ THOSE DELEGATES PLEDGED TO
PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND GIVE SEN. McCARTHY AS FEW WRITE-INS
AS IS HUMANH.Y POSSIBLE.
LET NEW IIA>n\SHIRE, THE STATE W!OSE MOTTO IS "LIVE FREE OR
DIE," ONCE AGAIN SHOW THl^ NATION THAT, DEMOCRATS, OR REPUB-
LICANS, WE ARE EAGLES AND NOT PLUCKED CHICKENS.
(Signed) William Loeb, Publisher
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The question which the McCarthy organii^crs faced was what impact such
statements would have on the turn-out for the St, Anselni's speech, and secondly,
what impact would this rhetoric have on the Manchester voter. Would there be a
crowd for the St. Anselm's speech? Would the crowd be friendly or hostile?
Would the air of controversy which the Union Leader had introduced with its
editorial make attending the speech a personally and reputationally inadvisable
thing to do? These were the concerns which the McCarthy leaders had as they
arrived at St. Anselm's to check the arrangements for the speech.
Studds had gambled in favor of holding the speech in the large gymnasium
of the College rather than in some smaller but easier to fill space. He felt
the risk had to be taken, even though a political speech on a Friday night was
not likely to attract a large audience. After making the decision to use the
larger space, Studds sent out the v/ord to the nearby cities of Nashua and Con-
cord and even to the vrell organized Keene committee some distance away. These
committees were urged to contact as many of their allies as possible and en-
courage them to help fill the St. Anselm's hall.
To their relief, some time before the scheduled 8:00 p.m. speech the crowd
assembled. By the time McCarthy arrived most of the seats were filled and some
people were standing to the sides and sitting on the floor. This was not to be
a lecture but rather it was billed as a major foreign policy address. Hoeh and
Studds also wanted it to be a campaign speech if not in fact, then at least the
candidate would be received and treated like he was campaigning. They asked
the knovm McCarthy supporters to disperse in small groups throughout the crowd
and to be responsive. "McCarthy," they said, "will not shout nor become ani-
mated in his presentation. He will make subtle references that should draw a
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response and he will draw important illustrations that will be understated.
When those occur, they said, the audience should respond. It will be up to
McCarthy's supporters to lead that response. And when McCarthy enters, stand
and clap and whistle to provide him with as warm a reception as possible.
In those days, before Secret Service protection of presidential candidates
Hoeh and Studds were also concerned about possible hecklers and disrupters.
They asked their dispersed supporters to be ready for trouble if something
should happen.
McCarthy entered as scheduled, the audience rose, clapped and some cheered
He was introduced by the head of the monastic order which operates St. Anselm's
College, with references to McCarthy's own strong Catholic background. There
had been little need to prepare the audience for McCarthy on this evening. He
quickly brought them close to him and carried them through a speech that was
deeply serious but laced with humor and referenced with illustratioDS dravm
from his o\m understanding of monastic orders, the rites and traditions of
the Roman Catholic Church.
The speech ended vjith a standing ovation that sent supporters and the
curious away with a renewed dedication and interest in his campaign. The only
two notes of dissent V7ere a banner over the podium that read "Go Hawk Go" but
this referred to the St. Anselm's College basketball team, and one older priest
who left the room. Hoeh and Studds had planned the event to happen v-jithout a
question period following the address^ They did not want to open the floor to
potential harassment which would be the news of the evening rather than the
content of the speech.
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There hud been no advanced text of the speech. Hoch and Studds had ex-
pected that copies of the speech would be available from the McCarthy national
office cither to be distributed by thein for release prior to the speech or to
be given to the New Hampshire campaign's press person for distribution. Neither
occurred and the reporters, long used to following a speech line by line in a
text, noting departures from the text, and marking the text for use in their
stories, had to cover the speech as a news event.
Bill Cardoso, the New Hampshire reporter for the Boston Globe complained
that McCarthy hadn't said anything new that night. "I couldn't stop the
presses on this speech and make them break into the type with a new story.
I've already missed my deadline. There were no early press releases available."
Cardoso expressed the frustration of his colleagues in the press who look for
the advanced texts and press released excerpts of speeches to help them make
their deadlines.
The comment frequently heard among the reporters around presidential cam-
paigns is that the candidate didn't say anything, or if they are charitable,
much that vjas new in his speech. The comment reflects the fact that the
reporters hear most of a candidate's speeches, read a great deal about the
candidate, and are in many vays better informed as to the manner and style of
the candidate than is almost any one else in the public. This creates a cyni-
cism that comes from familiarity, a cynicism that tends to be reflected in
what they feel is important to report or how they perform their job when there
is little fresh to report.
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On the other side of this coin is the candidate and nn unwritten rule
that repetition creates positions, issues and ultimately an image which provides
the candidate with recognition and identity. Candidates are constantly search-
ing for themes, ways of using the language to create a response, to convey their
thoughts, to reveal their personal qualities. Once those vignettes of an issue,
a position on the issue and the style of the candidate have been found to at-
tract audience response they are repeated. Unlike the reporters, each audience
is new and each audience wants to be given the opportunity to take full measure
of the candidate. Consequently, audiences come not only to expect to hear what
they have read that a candidate has said, but also hope that he \-7±ll use the
same phrasing, the same illustrative passages to make the points of his message.
There appears to be some element of reinforcement, credibility, in such repeti-
tion which gives each medium its particular impact. If the listener has heard
and seen the candidate make a particularly valid point on a television inter-
view or speech excerpt, that viewer, when part of the candidate's audience,
wants to hear that statement again and, preferably, with the same phrasing,
intonation, and emphasis that stimulated interest from the other medium. To
the continual displeasure of the reporter, v/ho must find other things to \-nrite
about v.'hen candidates repeat and repeat their speeches, the requirement to
repeat remains. VThat is refreshing about covering the New Hampshire primary
is that the candidates are groping to find those themes, phrases and the pace
of delivery v/hich v/ill distinguish them from the others. McCarthy was in the
process of establishing his style while the reporters were trying to fit him
into some familiar mold of what a candidate should be, say and do.
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Following the spcc.cl. McCarthy returned to his downtown Manchester Hotel
room where Hoeh, Studds, and the recently arrived Blair Clark reviewed the
day with the Senator. McCarthy was genuinely pleased with his reception.
Hoeh and Studds were happy that the day had only one serious problem, and the
speech had not only drawn a respectable audience but the Senator had been
exceptionally well received. They were also delighted with the relationship
that was beginning to develop between them and the candidate. Their schedule
had been a test for themselves but more importantly a test for McCarthy. If
their earlier perception of McCarthy as being able to campaign effectively in
New Hampshire were confirmed by his day of activity, then they felt assured
that if their own organijcational efforts succeeded, McCarthy had a chance in
the primary.
Hoeh and Studds learned that McCarthy could work hard, sustain enthusiasm
through a long campaign day, that he was effective in press conferences, hand
shaking on the street, in stores, at a factory door; that his presence was
commanding, that he suffered mistakes without visible irritation, that he
could make something out of the unplanned and unexpected; that he was flexible,
and that he could stimulate an audience. In short, they felt they had been
right. McCarthy would be an exceptional candidate in New Hampshire. He did
not create or attract hostility and when he encountered opposition, he turned
it comfortably to his advantage.
In response to Blair Clark's questions concerning their view of the day,
Hoeh and Studds reviewed their reaction to each event, apologized for the
error at the factory, but felt the day had gone better than either had expected.
McCarthy felt the name way and at that point showed how he had prepared for
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New Hmupshire. He rolled up hlr. pant leg to show the bottom of a pair of long
underwear which had kept him warm while moving through Hoeh and Studds' mine
field of a schedule.
Hoeh outlined a possible schedule for the next day, warned that it was
not well advanced, and that he was not sure that the local contacts were
sufficiently experienced with campaigning to check out the details. In other
words, he felt it v;ould be risky to attempt to create a day of activity from
what he had available.
McCarthy made clear that some time in the campaign he would like to skate
and even piny some hockey. With that he suggested that the day be cleared and
that he would return to Washington to prepare for a Sunday trip to St. Louis,
Mo. He felt it would be better to end the day on the positive note of his
speech and the reception he had received in the three cities visited rather
than risk a potentially awkward schedule.
Evaluating the First Day and Field Operations: The Impact
Uoeh and Studds began their review by checking to see hov; the press had
reacted to McCarthy's first New Hampshire visit. The word from Washington was
that as far as the national television was concerned the big story had been
the mistake at the factory gate. This, according to those who were observing,
had been the major image that the nation had seen as a result of McCarthy's
first New Hampshire campaign visit. The timing of the mistake had made it
even worse because it happened just prior to the evening and weekend deadlines
for the networks, a number of the major newspapers and news services. This
was the stcry that they could use; everything else that happened that day
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happened too late for their deadlines. And not having an advance of McCarthy'
speech meant that it was also omitted from the lead stories.
A sample of newspaper headlines read:
"McCarthy Roams in Granite State" sub-head: "Low-keyed
Approach as Senator Kicks Off Anti-LBJ Drive." (Rutland
Herald
, 1/27/68) - -
||McCarthy Leaves N.H.
; Romney Still Plugging" sub-head:
McCarthy Bases Hope on Voter Independence" (Boston
Herald
. 1/27/68)
"N.H. 'Courteous'
,
McCarthy Told" sub-head: "3-1 Defeat
Seen for McCarthy" (Boston Globe. 1/28/68)
"N.H. Race V/arms Up, McCarthy Meets the Governor" (Boston
Globe, 1/28/68)
"McCarthy Moves Through N.H. with the Slow Step of a
Priest" (Washington Post, 1/28/68)
"McCarthy Runs Genteel Campaign" (V7ashington Post, 1/28/68)
"McCarthy Launches 'Challenge' to LBJ" (Manchester Union
Leader 1/27/68)
"McCarthy Keeps at N.H. Voters" (Christian Science Monitor,
1/27/68)
"Dove Candidate Warns of Growing Militarism" (Rutland
Herald, 1/27/68)
"McCarthy Stumps in New Hampshire" (New York Times
,
1/27/68)
Beloxj the headlines an interesting story began to emerge. The reporters
were trying to figure out who this man was and how he would fare in New Hamp-
shire. At first they were looking for signs of hostility toward the "dove"
candidate from those he met on the streets. In Nashua, practically everyone
McCarthy met as he walked was interviewed for their reaction. One reporter
wrote:
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McCarthy is a tall, well-built man with silver hair. Hedresses in conservative banker-lawyer greys, complete withbuttoned vest
.
There is no question he is a handsome man, and he did make
a hit with many of the people, especially the women, as he
strode the slush-laden sidewalks.
"Ooooooh," was the reaction from Mrs. Ida Levesque, a late
sixty ish widow from Manchester who immigrated years ago to
this country from St. Clement, Que.
"Sure^, I'll vote for him," she said, after he had passed
by. "It was a pleasure to shake his hand."
She added that she was a Democrat, didn't know much about
what he stood for, but that he had a "nice personality,"
and she liked the "way he looks."
In Manchester, one woman who shook his land later said she
had no idea who he was — "I've never met him before" —
that she, too, vvrould vote for him. 22
Even under some rather intense grilling in front of network sound cameras,
Roger Mudd was unable to get a negative response from those who had just met
McCarthy. Not many knew him or had heard of him but what they experienced as
McCarthy met them on the street was positive. The reporters could not find
hostility toward this man Xv/ho had come to challenge an incumbent Democratic
administration and a war.
A point that did give lloeh and Studds some concern was that several report-
ers attempted to lump the Romney campaign together with McCarthy and to contrast
their campaign styles. Romney had just ended a six day tour of the state a week
earlier and was scheduled to return for a two day swing Saturday and Sunday of
January 27-28. Romney was attempting to take New Hampshire by storm. A high
pressure, professional campaign had been organized for him which had him working
long days, travelling extensively, and always acting the booster. His street
manner was forceful, quick, and aggressive. He thrust himself into virtually
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every situation to the delight of the following reporters and photogrophers and
commanded broad interest and extensive coverage. He was viewed as the candi-
date most likely to succeed with the issue of an alternative to the Johnson
administration's policies in Vietnam. He attracted attention wherever he went
in the state and was seen as the man to watch during the 1968 New Hampshire
campaign season. Consequently, everything that McCarthy did or failed to do
in New Hampshire was contrasted with Governor Romney and what the press felt
were Romney 's strengths as a campaigner.
Under the heading "McCarthy in New Hampshire," the Rutland Herald editorial-
ized :
Judging from reports coming from the frozen Connecticut
River, Sen. Eugene McCarthy is running a real risk of
being mistaken for a Republican, or perhaps just a
Minnesota Farm-Labor candidate. This unkind assessment
of a loyal Democrat's young presidential primary campaign
is based on the facts he is follov/ing the Romney trail
around New Hampshire (v;ithout the folksy Romney touch)
and is "opposing" a rival who isn't even entered in the
race but whose supporters include the cream of the state's
Democratic organization.
McCarthy isn't running against Romney, but it is evident
from newspaper and television reports that if the two men
were selling vacuum cleaners, Romney would probably sell
out before McCarthy made his first sale.
Wliile Romney has glad-handed factory workers and farmers
and regaled affluent middle-class New Hampshire with his
manly charm over tea cups, McCarthy has opened his cam-
paign with nothing more than polite, professional phrases
aiid a somewhat wan smile. Since both men have hopes of
winning some of the state's registered Independent voters,
they are in fact rivals.
It seems doubtful McCarthy can rally enough support from
the Hanover intellectuals and other groups opposing the
Johnson war policy to make even a dent in the state's
Democratic cheering section led by the Johnson trio of
Gov. John W. King, Sen. Thomas J. Mclntyre, and former
General Services Administrator, Bernard Boutin.
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The editorial went on to concede that McCarthy had made an interesting point in
his St. Anselin's speech, "when he i,;arned his audience of a growing militarism
in American foreign policy.
. ..He even cited former Republican President
Eisenhower's recent warning that the military establishment was growing too
powerful. ..." But concluded:
It wasn't McCarthy's fault that he stepped into New Hamp-
shire in the shadow of the Pueblo incident. But one
wonders if that shadow makes much difference. His cam-
paign seems to be a little shadowy anyTi,?i^y, and his "oppo-
nent" is only a write-in shadow. 2j
The story that led to the editorial had picked up the contrast in styles be-
tween McCarthy and Romney but had mis-read the reaction.
It became clear early in the day that the senator is go-
ing to run a down-style campaign, free of the usual
flowery oratory and Araerican-way-of-lif e speeches.
The McCarthy approach is low-keyed, intellectual, reasoned
— in a word, amateurish when compared to (the) style of
campaigning the public is accustomed to.
He's not forceful when handshaking on the street, if he is
compared to Michigan Governor George Romney, who excels in
the thrust~pump-and- smile technique. '^'^
The contrasting styles presented a problem for the McCarthy leaders in their
early campaign management but they had been pleased with what they had seen in
McCarthy as a campaigner and were skeptical of the reporters' reaction to Romney.
To them McCarthy showed quiet confidence, strength, and resolve. Something that
would make It possible around which to build an effective campaign organization.
Ward Just, writing in the Washington Post , had caught a bit of what the
campaign would be.
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There will be fivo more trips like this one before thepresidential primary March 12, trips with journalists
laughing and asking repetitive questions to which they
will receive repetitive answers at the state press con-ferences, awkward dialogues in living rooms, and meet-
ings with moneymon who will insist on computers to
"profile" the vote by ethnic group and religion. In
New Hampshire McCarthy will say yes, no, temporize a
little, back, fill, and finally decide: No. He will
surely say no to the professionals. "You can't package
religion and politics" he says.
Of course, he is wrong. You can. Kennedy did. McCarthy
has the wrong kind of cool for 1968.25
But his conclusion showed that Ward Just was trying to fit McCarthy into a
convenient mold as well. After the one day, Hoeh and Studds knew that McCarth]
would not tolerate packaging. His theme, which slowly began to emerge during
that day, was the word, "reconciliation."
The New Hampshire McCarthy campaigners now had an experiential basis from
v.'hich to make changes in their view of the campaign. McCarthy was not a
Kennedy, dependent upon a staff of \^^:iters, researchers, press officers,
advance persons and managers. He was independent and remarkably self-reliant.
The national campaign had not only failed to provide personnel to support his
visit, but it seemed to Hoeh and Studds that they now knew McCarthy's campaign
style as well as anyone else, at least as he had shown it in New Hampshire.
On this basis they would adjust.
Since there would, probably, not be advanced texts of McCarthy's speeches
each j;peech would have to be recorded and transcribed for the press. Since th
advance operation had failed both in Nev; Hampshire and from the national cam-
paign, Hoeh assigned that job to his new volunteer corps. All subsequent ad-
vance work would be based and directed from New Hampshire.
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The first day schedule had depended on the work of the two best organized
local committees iti the state at that tii,)e. the Nashua and Concord McCarthy
people. The mistake had been In Manchester where the committee was new, inex-
perienced and thin on members. All subsequent scheduling would be handled
through Sandra Hoeh from her home in Hanover. She would coordinate the inte-
rests of the national campaign, McCarthy's senatorial office, local committees
and the state campaign in building the remaining campaign days for the Senator
Blair Clark had still not been able to assign someone to fill the full
time manager position for the New Hampshire campaign. Hoeh and Studds were
desperate for this assistance as items requiring attention began to pile up.
Organization, other scheduling, media preparation, canvassing and support
activities were all beginning to reach the point in the campaign where atten-
tion v;as required.
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chapter ix
McCarthy feeds from ti^k land
To date with no evidence that the national campaign had staff that they
vould ::end to New Hampshire to carry out the scheduling clioro, Sandy Hoeh
was asked hy i:ha New ]!a:iipshire leaders to prepare McCarthy's schedules. She
knew Ncv/ Hampshire's politics and v^as familiar with the requirements of
a good schedule. Her only liability was that she lived in Hanover, had a
young family and would not be able to work from the Concord Headquarters.
With a UAIS telephone line installed in her dining room, a calendar posted
on the V7all, t.ho priority places explained to her and both Senator McCarthy's
office and lUair Clark's home telephone numbers ported with the calendar, she
was in business. Other aspects of the scheduling task were less easily resolved,
Sandy nov^ stood between the national campaign, the Senator's Washington office
and the state and local campaign in New Hampshire. Tliese four organizations
eacii v;ou.1d play an importanl: role in the scheduling activity.
Hoeh and Studds liad assumed that the national campaign and the Senator's
congressional office staff would be working as one or at least closely together.
As Sandy tried to fix dates on the New Hampshire campaign calendar slic found that
often more tl\an physical distance between Capitol Hill and the national head-
quarters in downtown Washington separated the activities. Initially, she would
talk with r.lair Clark who, when she was first assigned to the task, said tViat
he should be the principal scheduling contact. Eventually she found that
McCarthy would work through both Clark and his personal secretary in his
CapJtol Hill office, .Jean Stack. It depended on who was available at the time
that McCarthy was ready to discuss his schedule and most frequently that person
w;is Ills t^ecretary, Jean Slack.
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Following the campaign Sandy Hoeh recorded her scheduling problems in
an interview.
There, were a couple of problems. The first was that we very
rarely had enough warning, absolute dates....
Originally Blair Clark had promised, he said we'll give you these
dates and you'll work with them. But it was more a matter
of the Senator coming up and then they'd decide when he'd
come again, how long. So this made it difficult.
The other thing was not having a national advance person, which
really turned out in some cases, to be disastrous.
Instead of the promised series of definite campaign dates for McCarthy in
New Hampshire, Sandy found herself in the middle of a series of negotiations.
McCarthy was negotiating with Clark and the campaign with a trip to France and
possibly South Vietnam in mind. Sandy was negotiating with Clark for definite
dates from -which to build a schedule. The local committees were negotiating
with Sandy about v/hen McCarthy would visit their areas and what he would do when
he arrived.
A ] ead time of at least a week and preferably more was desirable. Clark
would give Sandy a series of dates. She would notify the local committees.
They would suggest activities pre-existing or of their own creation that might
occupy the Senator's tim.e. Sandy would begin sorting these according to the
expected time of arrival, length of the visit and options for his arrival.
When she had a preliminary draft of the schedule ready she would attempt to check
it with staff in the national headquarters or with Clark himself. At this point
the flow became confusing. What she had thought were firm and workable dates
often were a];proxlmate dates. Until definite times for travel to New Hampshire
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had been set by the SennUor himself, a schedule vas a proposal. This was
frustrating for Sandy who v;as familiar with siinJlar probloins in other campaigns,
but alnost totally disruptive to those at the local level who did not understand
the complications.
VJhat each of the actors in the scheduling process had to learn was basic
communication. What had been the Senator's office staff procedure for the
Senator's schedule could not be followed in a campaign, especially a campaign
of the short duration of tlie one in New Hampshire. Their experience with the
Senator's Minnesotn campaigning or other national speaking activity could not
be duplicated in a state as difficult to schedule as is New Hampshire. Blair
Clark had not been able to get the definite time commitments he had hoped be-
cause of the competition for the Senator's time. Instead of saying that this
was a fact of life and that those scheduling the Senator in New Hampshire would
have to work within a floating series of time slots, he continued to assert
that he would produce definite dates for the tvx?clve days. Sandy in communicating
with local committees relayed what she thought was definite information and
the local people began their work with specific days and times in mind. After
some serious gnashing of teeth and a lost temper or two as dates and times
changed, Sandy and the local organizations began to learn that a good schedule
was a flexible schedule, one that could be changed, expanded or contracted
without losing the appearance of being professionally planned in advance.
A part of the scheduling lesson came during the first campaign day when
Hoeh and Studds found that they were advancing the Senator's activity as little
as fifteen minutes ahead of him. They learned that it was possible to make
adjustments in the schedule with such short notice if their local contacts were
firm and understood why the schedule had to be adjusted. To accomplish such
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chan5;oG on a rcy^ulur basis required initiating local workers ahead of time,
sov.K.thi,^R Ihat in Ll.o early stages of the campaign was difficult to do. Further,
neither lloeh nor Studds realized that such quick adjustments would be necessary
once they had organized proper scheduling and advance functions in the campaign.
Where they had experienced people working at the local level, people who have
been involved in other campaigns, the importance of being able to respond
quickly to changes in schedules was understood. The difficulty was with the
new workers who broke their hearts creating a local schedule only to get a call
from Sandy Hoeh that the date of the visit had been changed or certain activities
were not appropriate.
Early in the campaign lloeh had circulated a memorandum outlining what might
be included in a campaign schedule. Under the title "A Day of Campaigning," he
advised:
Note: The following are items that should be considered by
you when planning for a visit to your area by Senator
Eugene J. McCarthy. This list is not inclusive.
Please add those particular events that are of special
importance in your community.
* Visit local newspaper offices.
* Schedule short local radio and TV Interviews if possible.
* Coffee parties, open house parties, evening socials, etc..
* Communion, breakfasts, other similar gatherings.
* Tours of factories, handshaking at factory gates during shift changes.
* Visits to places where Democrats gather - clubs, etc.
* Supermarkets, shopping centers, etc.
* Opportunities for speeches before local audiences regardless of
political composition - preferably Democrats and Independents.
* Headquarters openings, receptions, etc.
* Special community events.
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With the closing aduionition: "Don't forget to invite the Independents
.
VTliilo the above list of items to include in a schedule was relevant in any
season, campaigning In New Hampshire in the winter required even more demanding
scheduling. New Hampshire's usual campaign season is during the summer and fall
leading to the September primary and November general elections. During these
months there are numerous outdoor spectacles such as fairs, old home days, festi-
vals and sports events which lend themselves to campaigning. In the winter an
event must compete with chancy weather conditions and the cold. People leave
their home for the necessities of shopping and work but since the advent of tele-
vision, social or recreational gatherings have much less appeal. To substitute
for the fact that people were not often out during the winter nor could they be
easily lured to special political events, the campaign had to go where the
people were when they did go out, or go to their homes, or use ways of reaching
people in their homes. Other than scheduled activities which would be amplified
by the media, the scheduler had to send the candidate to the places where people
worked, shopped and went to school.
One activity that was especially important for McCarthy in the winter was
going to schools. In the days before eighteen year olds were franchised, speak-
ing in schools seemed of little political value. New Hampshire's colleges and
universities have large non-resident populations but guaranteed an audience for a
speech. To most candidates speaking to groups of elementary and secondary school
children had little more than educational value. During the winter of a presiden-
tial primary New Hampshire public schools extend invitations to candidates to ad-
dress assemblies and to meet with classes. In the larger cities the candidates
often accept these opportunities to speak because few other opportunities
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to address groups exist. If press coverage is allowed the candidate has the
cluincf to show his mettle in a different setting. Without press coverage such
speeches were considered as a good civic gesture to be done if nothing else could
be found to fill a scliedule.
Hoeh. and Studds perceived an additional benefit to be derived from scheduling
McCarthy before school groups. As educators, they knew that the young people
often were better informed about contemporary issues than were their preoccupied
parents. Tliey also felt that since most other means of reaching parents as
voters were limited, during the winter, a message from a youngster returning
home after having heard Senator McCarthy speak or having asked him a question
'would probably be the subject of the evening's dinner table conversation. There
was also a certain sophistication on the part of many students in secondary
schools especially if their school had been visited by more than one of that
year's crop of candidates. Without exception a school invitation to speak
required that the candidate respond to questions. Often classes prepared their
questions ahead of the guest's visit and would use the same questions for each
visitor. A favorably impressed youn;-ster returning home became an ambassador
for the candidate of the highest credibility.
To buttress their decision to accept invitations to speak in the schools
and include these in McCarthy's schedule, Hoeh recalled that former Democratic
National Chairman John Bailey of Connecticut contended that the most accurate
poll that can be conducted close to an election was that of high school students.
During his years of political activity Bailey had found tliat high school students
reflect accurately what would be the vote of their parents on election day
when
asked a poll question. New Hampshire liigh schools often conduct polls
before
elections and the results receive considerable local newspaper attention.
Hoeh
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and Studds wanted McCarthy to do well in these polls.
McCarrJjx:s_Ea£l^^ A Case Study of a CampalRn Schedule
After a considerable struggle, Sandy Hoeh was able to get a definite com-
mitment from both Blair Clark and Senator McCarthy's office that the Senator
would campaign In New Hampshire February 6, 7, and 8. Plans for a Europe-
Vietnam trip had been cancelled in favor of having McCarthy spend more time cam-
paigning directly rather than through uncertain press coverage of a foreign
journey. A three day schedule would test the capacity of the New Hampshire
organization and give the Senator a chance to demonstrate to the reporters whe-
ther his candidacy could get a response in New Hampshire.
Since his first visit had been in the south central part of the state,
Hoeh and Studds felt he should begin in the west and move back across to the
center where he could generate statewide media coverage, swing to the northeast
city of Laconia, and leave from there. In their minds Hoeh and Studds hoped that
they could have McCarthy fly directly to New Hampshire and be welcomed there by a
local group rather than landing in Boston to struggle into some meeting point
in New Hampshire. There was air service to Keene, Manchester, Lebanon, and
Laconia. Keene offered adequate connections and the local committee would be
capable of meeting McCarthy on arrival.
At least once during each visit Hoeh and Studds wanted McCarthy scheduled
to address a large group. This would be his only opportunity to discuss the is-
sued of his candidacy in hiw own way and in a widely accepted format. There
would V of course, be numerous other chances for brief talks and press sessions,
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but it was the major address that would attract media attention beyond that of
strictly a local or state-wide nature. The larger cities and the college campuses
were the best sites for major speeches. Since Manchester had been used twice,
other cities had to be selected.
From Concord there were telephone calls clamoring for the
Senator to appear there, as Concord had only one full day of
campaigning alloted to it. A strong organization had been
started but it needed the Senator's appearance to keep up the
momentum. Too many people needed another chance to evaluate
him. Competition was strong from the liberal Republican
candidate, George Romney, who seemed to be operating a smooth
and successful campaign out of home headquarters. The most
impressive thing about Romney was that he was willing to
stand up and answer the voter's questions in a sincere and
direct way.
. .
.
The Concord committee was handicapped by the
lack of time to have a series of home gatherings, but they
could schedule one big meeting, where everyone vjould attend
at the same time. The traditional place for such a political
gathering was the Concord Community Center.
Understandably, both David and Sandra Hoeh had visions of
a McCarthy speech at the Concord community center turning into
an utter fiasco. They visualized the press attending a
speech by the Senator to which no audience appeared. It was
a horrible spectre.
Concord, said David Hoeh, was known in Democratic circles
as a political graveyard. T^o one ever came out in an evening
to hear a candidate speak, particularly i^ February, if it's
cold and the roads are icy and dangerous.
Hoeh had lived in Concord for four years prior to moving to Hanover and had
watched as Concord struggled to keep its Democratic Committee alive. Concord
and surrounding Merrimack county had long been strong Republican territory.
Only Ward One, the French Canadian area of Penacook, had been successful in
electing Democrats to either city or state offices.
Furthermore, Concord could not count on students to fill up
the bulk of empty seats. Gerry Studds had promised St. Paul's
School that the Seantor ' would speak there. The school prided itself
in having every serious candidate come to tlieir campus. In
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addition the headmaster said he would orcn the meetlnr, to members ofthe press and outside Ruests. (Since some at St. Paul's were
crJtlcal of Studds activity and felt he was neglecting his duties
he had to schedule the Senator for the School as token compensation.)
The local high school had also been promised the Senator, but
\JOuld allow neither the press nor the public. For this reason
the Concord committee argued to break the arrangements with the
local high school aiid ask the public school students to come to
tlie community center speech.
Others argued against this by declaring that more would
be lost than gained in refusing the local high school a chance to
have their own political speech There would be friction caused
in town if the private school boys were allowed to hear the Senator
in their own school and public school children were not.
This left the Concord Committee the problem of rounding up
an audience made up almost entirely of adult voters in a Republican
city for a Democratic candidate whose reputation was hardly known.
Wliilt noted for its Republicanism, the Concord committee argued that Concord
residents tended to be political activists who could be attracted to a political
event. The Vietnam War issue, they contended, was crossing party lines and
McCarthy was beginning to appear as the most effective spokesman against the
administration's policies.
Sandra Hoeh nervously, and V7ith some misgivings relented and scheduled
the Senator for February 6th, Concord Community Center, 7:30 P.M.
Where local committees were well organized and willing to accept risks
in their schedule, negotiations, such as those described above, were frequent.
The Concord Committee had organizational depth and political experience which
meant that they would not suggest activities which they themselves were uncertain
about or were not willing to work exceptionally hard to make a success. In
other comiiMinitJes, frequently the local McCarthy organization had much less
experience, deptli or understanding of their own local situation. Many of these
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conunituees wore newly formed from well intentioned residents who had little or
no previous political
,
much less campaign, experience. Sandy Hoeh knew where the
McCarthy organization had local depth and where it did not and she attempted to
protect the schedule as best she could from weak efforts. Unfortunately, a
totally effective scheduling effort depended upon extensive advance work, check-
ing and double checking. One advance person and Sandy's telephones were not suf-
ficient to make up for the inexperience of some local organizations or the diffi-
cult communications between New Hampshire and Washington. McCarthy's three day
schedule illustrates tbi;-; poinc well.
Arrival :
McCarthy was scheduled to fly through New York City connecting with a
"flight to Keene's municipal airport, arriving early in the evening. He would
then be driven to Claremont where his campaign would begin at 6:40 A.M. with
McCarthy greeting workers at the gate of Joy Manufacturing Co., Clareraont's
largest employer. Since this would be McCarthy's first airport arrival in New
Hampshire, Hoeh called the Keeue McCarthy committee to see if they could arrange
a presL conference for McCarthy at the airport. If they had the time and in-
clination, Hoeh suggested that they miglit arrange an airport welcome for McCarthy.
Like the porposed speech in Concord, airport welcomes or campaign "whistle stops"
at airports have not been particularly successful in New Hampshire. People
will step out of their stores or home to v/elcome a prominent figure in the down-
town of a city but few will take the time to gether at an airport to see a can-
didate.
John F. Kennedy scheduled an airport in Manchester just after he captured
the Democratic Party nomination in 1960 but the crov^d was disappointing. Since
then, few have tried the approach although, occasionally, there will be a small
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welccnin. cow.. Hoeh was not opti.i.tic about attracting a crowd In Ko^
but felt that the Keene Connnittee, perhaps the best organized in the state,
should have the chance to do so.ethin, directly for McCarthy since he was it
scheduled to be in Keene until a later campaign tour.
As part of the scheduling job, Sandra Hoeh booked reservations in a motel
outside of Claremont for the Senator and those travelling with him. His
schedule was typical of what was possible in a small New Hampshire city during
a morning. The local committee, composed of few who had previous political
experience, had worked closely with Sandy and their community contacts to
complete as effective a campaign morning as possible. Because of other demands
on his time and with assurances from the Claremont workers this portion of the
schedule was not advanced.
Schedu.l e: Tuesday, February 6, 1968
Time Place Function
6:A0 a.m. Claremont Greet workers outside Joy Mfg. Co.
8:00 a.m. Claremont Breakfast at Pleasant Restaurant
9:00 a.m. Claremont Tour Claremont Paper Co.
9:30 a . in
.
Claremont Claremont Daily Eagle (newspaper)
10:00 a.m. Claremont WTSV radio interview
10:30 a . m Claremont Coffee at home of Mr. & Mrs. John
Moloney, 95 Winter Street
11:00 a.m.. Claremont Tour Main Street
12:00 a.m. Claremont Address Claremont Rotary, Moody Hotel
1:00 p.m. Claremont Drive to Newport
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A note nL tho bottom of the schedule said. "Press Bus Starts in Clareniont."
A bus had been hired by the campaign to provide reporters with transportation
when McCarthy was campaigning.
McCarthy Arrives February 5th
Having made an exceptional effort to avoid incidents such as the Manchester
shift change mistake all liad every reason to expect that the schedule for this
visit would move as planned. McCarthy arrived in Keene to one of the largest
airport gatherings in recent memory. The Keene McCarthy committee had v^rked
for days preparing signs, placards, and slogans, recruiting people to come
to the airport and even had a small band. The airplane touched down in a
light snow shower, taxied to the gate, disembarked a crowd of national reporters,
and then a startled McCarthy to a cheering throng. The press conference in
the small terminal building went well with the Senator responding to questions,
coramenting on his surprise at the reception and making several radio tapes
that were played througliout the next day in the area. He was then directed
to the car which would take McCarthy to Claremont to his motel.
Arriving at the motel was the first tip off that things might not go
as V7ell in Claremont as had been expected. Sandy Hoeh described the events:
We knew that the national press was coming. No one told
me that the national press like to have their own rooms.
So we put them into rooms together and .they were very
nice abgut it, but some of the Senator's people were quite
upset.
There was even some confusion concerning the Senator's reservations which had
been pre-reglstered . The owner of the motel, of French-Canadian descent, spoke
limited English. When the herd of press, the Senator and McCarthy's aide
Jerry EHcr appeared out of the snow and dark in his lobby to be registered and
assigned their rooms, the man lost his ability to cope. Eventually the proprietor
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calmed down and registered the crowd, probably more business than his motel
had ever experienced in so few minutes.
Disaster struck early the next morning. Sandy Hoeh recalled:
The next morning he went to a factory gate, which someone
supposedly had advanced, but he got there a few minutes late
and missed almost everyone. With him were the national press.
Then he went to a hotel to eat breakfast and no one told us
that the hotel did not usually serve breakfast. The hotel
management said they did serve but did not make clear that
it was not part of their regular operation.
They then went to a restaurant to meet people who were sup-
posed to be there for breakfast but the place was empty.
I remember getting a telephone call in the middle of the
morning from one McCarthy staff person, who said the morning
had been a disaster. I had had only three hours of sleep
and the call absolutely shattered me. I called David (Hoeh)
and said get someone else, it's not going to work. He said,
oh yes it will. And things did begin to improve.,..
....I kept saying, the Kennedy's wouldn't go any place with-
out national advance, it was the only campaign I could com-
pare with from what I'd heard. Up here people who knew the
kind of thing you advance, what you look for, there had to
be split second timing (which had not been learned by the
local schedulers or those who had checked the schedule).
T. don't know who was responsible for the advancing, but I
was after the first morning. I remember shaking. I was too
tired to even take a nap and I rushed over to Newport.^
Certainly the press could not avoid writing a whole series of new stories
concerning the problems of McCarthy's campaign in New Hampshire. Sandy re-
ported that Jerry Eiler was furious with embarrassment over the incident and
the subsequent problems that occurred in the schedule that morning. As it was
reported back while others, including McCarthy were making the best of the
situations, Eller kept the discomfort high, especially for the hard working,
novice New Hampshire volunteers.
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Toward the niiddlo of the morning things began l:o click closer to what
was expected. McCarthy's habit of running ahead of the schedule caused problcns,
but the interviews went well as did the coffee at the Moloney home. The one
hour allotted for a main street tour v^as too much time. There were few people
on the streets or in the shops and Claremont is not a large city, but the
major event turned out to be the address at the Claremont Rotary Club. Again
the advance work that should have uncovered a preference and, perliaps, have
avoided an incident had not been done. The oversight produced an incident with
unusual impact. Tom Wicker wrote the first story about the campaign in New
Hampshire that received national attention. Under his column heading, "In
the Nation: Luncheon at the Rotary Club," Wicker wrote:
Claremont, N.H. - This is an apt state for Senator Eugene
McCarthy's kind of campaigning. Not far from here, along
one of the narrow roads that thread New Hampshire's hills,
an old, white clapboard house has been restored and
painted and a vntty weekend resident has placed a sign out
front that reads: "The Old Values."
That is the kind of rebuke that Gene McCarthy might make
to those who talk glibly about getting back to an earlier
simpler way of life that New England somehow is supposed
to exemplify. In this postcard state with its frozen
lakes and huts of fishermen standing blackly on the ice,
1: is too easy to believe that there really are old values
to which we all go back. It is something about the farms,
the hills, the white churches in their serenity.
The Birch-White Hills
In fact, most of the old villages with their church steeples
nad their beautifully proportioned white houses and their
empty red brick mills are angling for tourists and skiers
these days, and the garish supermarkets and sprawling motels
with their blo;'k parking lots lie on the land like a pox;
the birch-white hills, tinged with the faint rays of sun-
light on winter leaves, rise above polluted streams, in-
trusive highways and the creeping urban litter of the
twentieth century.
Still men have to believe something and no doubt that was
why there seemed to be a special quality at the
luncheon of the Rotary Club of Claremont In the Hotel
^
Moody hero (:lu> other day. Boncath i:hc four j-lass chandeliers
and the st.'.lned p,lass panels of the windows, the Rotnrians
bad galliercd to liear Senator McCartliy, who is running for
President in the New Hampshire Democratic primary.
The first thing that happened was that President Rodney
Brock ordered the television cameras out of the room. He
explained that his club was nonpolitical
, that Senator
McCarthy had come to discuss public affairs, not politics,
and that he was not going to have the club meeting exploited
either for television or politics.
A solidly built man, with a quick, nervous smile and sparse,
sandy hair, President Brock encountered enough argument
to make his chin tremble with tension. But he stood by his
simple defiance of the television networks, which is something
no President of the United States ever has been known to do,
and in the end the cameras were packed up and taken out.
After that, the club sang, "L'il Liza Jane" and "Smile,
and the World Smiles With You" conducted its regular business,
and settled back to hear McCarthy. Apparently untroubled by
the absence of television, before which most politicians bow
and scrape like valets, the Senator spoke in his relaxed manner
and with his corrosive wit ("We don't declare war any more, we
declare national defense") and gave the Rotarians — if not
much of a show, by Ronald Reagan standards — a clear picture
of himself.
It was a picture of a man who had set out to discuss what he
called "two or three questions of vital importance" and who
was deeply earnest about the need for the nation to "turn
aside from the war in order to attend to the most pressing
problems at home" — which he defined as the rebellion of
Negroes against any longer being "a kind of colonial people in
our country."
He was unemotional, undramatic and nothing about his speech or
his manner was hoked up for cheap applause or eiithusiasm. He
even treated his audience as though it would understand his
point and allusions, and respond sensibly to his ideas. He
said what he had to say, witli some eloquence but no particular
flourish, and then \\e sat do\m.
Self, Not an Image
It is possible that Rod.icy Brock was legally off base in turning
out the cameras, and it is possible that Gene McCarthy is wrong
in his stand on the war. Some might question Brock's judgment and
others challenge McCartliy's motives, but during luncheon at the
Rotary Club nobody could accuse either of showing an image rather
than a self.
Th.-iL is i)rob;!bly not p,ood polUJcs; all the. pros will tell
you that. But in an age when tlic image is the idol, the
old values are inspected by avid tourists, and the flagrant
falsities and pretension of American life deride verity, two
men stubbornly being themselves must be worth something!^
Every newspaper that carried the New York Times news service and many that
did not, published Wicker's column. Somehow through the haze of scheduling
probl ems, conflicts and even a substantial incident at tlie expense of television
a setting, accidental in fact, had been created that illustrated the strengths
of two individuals.
Once away from Claremont the scheduling problem began to disappear. Jerry
Eller regained his composure. Senator McCarthy chortled over the difficulties
of the often pretentious television crews and enjoyed a visit with the urbane
editor of Nev/port's weekly newspaper, Edward DeCourcy. By early afternoon
Sandra Hoel^i's telephone carried a distinctly different message from that she
had lieard in the morning. The remainder of the day's scliedule read:
1:30 p.m.
2: 15 p.m.
3: 10 p.m.
3:35 p.m.
Newport
Newport
Newport
Newport
WCNL Radio interview
Tour Door Woolen Co.
Meet Newport High School faculty
Argu s Champion (meet Editor DeCourcey-
tour plant)
A: 00 p.m.
A : 4 5 p.m.
5:45 p.m.
7:30 p.m.
Newport
Newport
Concord
Concord
Tour main street
Drive to Concord
Arrive Nil Highway Hotel
Address at Concord Community Center
The Newport to Concord portion of the schedule had been carefully timed.
The
schedule clicked. The reporters saw that the New Hampshire McCarthy
organization
could create an effective schedule and by the time the entourage
arrived in
Concord, there was a feeling that it had been a good day.
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By the end oT ihaL evenlnp, dn Concord, a major divide iu tlio campai-n
would l)c. crossctl. The risks that liad been taken In preparing >k-Carthy's
campaign schedule produced the first positive results. Tom Wicker's column
was the first indication of the change. The sense of change would be further
strengthen(Kl by the response McCartliy received that evening. As will be
discussed later.
McCarthy's T'ebruary 6th Evening In Concord
Of the days that McCarthy campaigned in New Hampshire, Febraury 6th
was decisive. From the visit the campaign organization learned liow McCarthy
campaigned best, liow the organi^iation could better support his efforts, wliat
schedules would bring out his personal and political qualities, and how
effective McCarthy could be in making issues from the environment of the
campaign.
McCarthy was beginning to have an impact. The brief stop at the Keene
airport, February 5th, produced the first front page photographs of McCarthy
campaigning before an enthusiastic placard waving crowd. Newspaper and radio
coverage in each of the cities and towns he visited was extensive. The
travelling reporters of the national press and wire services began to feel the
spirit as the candidate progressed comfortably through the schedule. The
premier event, which made McCarthy a political force to be contended with, was
his scheduled speech in Concord on the evening of February 6th.
The speech was scheduled because the Concord McCarthy committee promised
extraordinary efforts to mak.e it a success. To insure that the event was
well
attended the Concord Commit tee did everything except physically drag
people to
the Community Center itself.
In trylnr, to get ovit an nmlicncc for McCarthy's speech
the Concord committee made Ward Seven and the other
central Concord wards their prime target. Every registered
Democratic or independent voter was called on the telephone
inviting them to attend. Advertisements were placed in
the newspapers and on the radio. The entire membership list
of the League of Women Voters was called personally, as
was the entire faculty list at St. Paul's School.
If the people were Republicans an appeal was made to their
civic pride. "Imagine how Concord, New Hampshire will look
in a big picture by Life magazine showing rows and rows of
empty seats at a speech by a member of the United States
Senate," they said.
Posters advertising the speech were put up wherever tliey
were accepted; however, on Main Street most of the
merchants refused to take them. McCarthy was too contro-
versial a figure; he might be bad for business. One
stroke of good fortune came at a new little Victorian-styled
ice cream parlor called MacKenzie's, located on the corner
of School and Main Streets. It was in the center of town...
The manager came from the Midwest. Ke was a Democrat and
knew McCarthy. He was willing to put up four posters in
his windows advertising the speech. The posters also
invited peoi)le to comCgin and join the Senator for breakfast
the following morning.
The site and arrangements for the address were carefully advanced. The
speaker's platform would face out toward the main door. Bleachers could be
pulled out for an audience along the far right. The press should be accommo-
dated by long tables, stretching along the length of the far left. All TV
cameras should be kept on the left side. In the middle, chairs should be
set up. Only lAO were to be used in case the evening was a flop. The chairs
were set up so that they provided a wide aisle. The chairs would bo set back
from the speaker's platform. Young people were asked to sit up front on the
floor between the speaker and the first row of chairs. The senator was at his
best before a young audience, .md liked to have them around. And it would look
10
good in press pliotos.
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The cvcninc unfoided as envisioned. The reporters occupied the long
tables, J-.ho television crews set up to the left of the platform, and then a
group of girls from Concord High School took positions near the door ready
to pass out campaign literature to the audience as they entered. Then came
the audience.
There were enough people so that all the chairs and
bleachers were filled. Those who arrived late stood
in the rear of the auditorium. David and Sandra Hoeh
had driven do^m from Hanover and they smiled in relief
at the turnout. Some 150 people was all that had been
hoped for; Instead, more than AOO were showing up.H
The Senator arrived to be joined by the McCarthy Concord Co-Chairman.
A nervous sense of expectation seized the Concord
McCarthy Committee. Would the audience stand for
McCarthy? Would they boo or would they clap? The
Concord chairman escorted the Senator, who looked
tall and distinguished, down a wide aisle between
scores of standing, cheering and applauding voters.
Even the press hoted the power of suggestion. Here
was a tribute to a potential president. 12
Someone recalled that McCarthy had described his campaigning to a Time
magazine reporter as, "fighting from a low crouch. You wait for events to
develop." His speech that evening demonstrated how effective a fighter he was.
The story of the LRJ cainpaign strategy and principally the use of their pledge
cards had broken several days earlier. McCarthy had seen these clippings dur-
ing his earlier campaigning had picked up coimnents on the street that gave him
the feeling that tlie pledge card idea might backfire. Frank B. Merrick, New
Hc'unpshire State News Service writer and Time magazine stringer, had written
in his column distributed widely in New Hampshire on February 3rd:
A more public move that smacks of potential arm-twist-
ing was initiated this week when Citizens for Johnson
kicked off n three or four-week campaign to get Demo-
crats publicly coimnitted to Johnson.
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The CDiiiir, i L);ci.' bcj^m d i str ibuL iug "pledge cards" to
l)cinocr\'it-.s and I ndependents, asking them to pi edge
tlieir r.upport to Johnson and state their intention
of writing in Iris name on the primary ballot.
The cards are in three parts: one to be signed and
retain(Hi by the voter "as a record of his endorsement
of the President," one to be sent to the White House in
a "shower of support" and the third to be kept on file
by the state Johnsonitcs.
The cards arc numbered (the one sent to us bore the
number 29998) on all three sections, so it should not
be liard for the Johnson Democrats keep track of who
was and wlio was not on their side.
The pledge card issue was smoldering near the surface in the campaign but
no one liad quite yet been able to frame it as an issue. McCarthy entered the
hall to a standing crowd and quickly began his speech with a brief summary of
his reaction to New Hampshire campaigning.
I have been campaigning two days in New Hampshire, today
and one day about a week and one-half ago, and unless you're
more mischievous than I have been led to believe, I've
had a very good response....
If the response has been genuine in these two days and, if
anything, it may have led me to be a little overconfident
about my campaign for the nomination of the Democratic Party.
He tlien went on into a discussion of political parties and specifically the
the Democratic Party. He first chided the state for its peculiar treatment
of Independent voters which may have been prompted by an editorial he read
before coming to the Community Center. The editorial appeared in the Concord
Monitor and was a speculation on how Richard Nixon expected to win the
Republican primary by attracting the Independent voter. The section of interest
to McCarthy read:
Democrats can't vote in the Republican primaries. Independents
can stay home in the primaries, as they have done in the past
to maintain their, independence of political parties, or they
can clioo5;e to identify with one or the other.
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Tndependonts may participate in the New Hampshire primaries
but probably not in large numbers. There is little reason
to believe tliat those who do will vote for Nixon.
Two motives may cause Independents to join in the primaries.
One is anti-war sentiment, which is more likely to cause
them to vote Democratic, for Senator McCarthy.
The other is desire for a change, and that would cause them
to vote Republican, but probably. for the most electable
Republican, Nelson Rockefeller.
McCarthy picked up the theme of the dilemma of the Independent when he
said
:
I know some of you are Republicans, I assume that, and some
of you are Independents, and that in New Hampshire, you lead
a rather strange life. As Independents, once you commit
yourselves, you're committed either to the party vv?hich you
identify with or to the other, which is a terrible prospect,
it seems to me.
If you decide to be Democrats, you ought to have some other
choice than to becom.e Republicans if you want to change. I
hope we could work something out on that matter, as a matter^^,
of a new civil rights bill, I think, which we could take up.
With this brief analysis McCarthy touched a point of inequity in the New
Hampsliire primary system. Few had been concerned about the Independent's
problem before. Prior to the 1972 presidential primary the registration law
would be changed to allow a voter to recover Independent status.
But of special concern to McCarthy was what had become of the institution
of the Ameri.'^an political party.
A political party is really the essential element of
American politics, and it is important for us... in presidential
election years... to give some thought to what a party is. We're
inclined to — and I think quite properly,... ridicule them and
to joke about them most of the time, but there are occasions
when we ought to give some thought to what their real purpose is
and how they ought to function and what role they play in
determining policy for the United States.
I would suggest, first, that we ought to be clear about what a
political party is not. It is certainly not a club, not a kind
of last-man club or something set up to ensure jobs for those
who liold tliem by patronage or by other devices.
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It's not really a labor union or an extension of the
labor movement.... It should not be looked upon as an
instrument ot" propaganda because it has a role beyond
that. it has a role to propagandize some and to
educate some, but it has a practical political purpose
beyond propaganda, and if that was all that I was con-
cerned about or that you were concerned about, the
Democrats here, why, we could be off with a third party
movement of some kind... and there are some people who
seem to want to do that, in this country, with the
issue of the war in Vietnam... who would, as I've said,
rather light bonfires on the hill, instead of coming
do\<m into the valley where the real political action...
and the real political fight must be carried out.
A political party is not even an organization, and we
Democrats know that to be true, but it shouldn't be
an organization. This is the point. It ought to be
organic. It's not something to be taken over and con-
trolled and directed
,
but it's something which must be
alive andj^yhich must grow and which must have its own
vitality.
lie then looked around the room a moment before illvistrating his point saying
that he hoped he did not offend any Republicans but "back in Minnesota, we
say that the Republican Party is like the lowest form of plant and animal
life. We give them credit for being alive, but like moss on a rock. It
doesn't have much vitality at its highest point, but on the other hand, it
never dies out, and ," he concluded "we credit it with having some organic
existence and some organic purpose.
"A party," he noted, " is really set up to develop the issues, consider
the problems of the country and to pick candidates, and then to go on from
that to gain control over the government of the country, and that's not a
very modest objective in these United States The important thing to keep
in mind is that once you gain control, it's not supposed to rule for the good
of the majority but by the determination of that majority, but to rule for
the good of all."^'-^ Hore he revealed the essence of his philosophy
toward
the role of the political party and his view of the purpose of his
campaign.
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In our party, M,o D.MnocraUc Party, Ll.rough the years, we'vebeen able to put top.ethor what seemed to be comp3ete
contradictions We were the party that supposedly representedthe country and, also, the city. We claimed that we couJd
represent labor and, also, agriculture.
We said that we could represent both the North and the South-
we could represent the Baptists and, also, the Catholics
who were supposed to be beyond any kind of mixing, but all
of these, somehow, put together in the party, each one a
kind of separate minority, each one having a position which
was antagonistic in some ways, if they pursued only their
self-interest... taken all together, this kind of majority,
made up of all these different groups and different forces
and different interests, could make determinations which would
be good for the country as a whole.
I tliink, really the basis upon which great things have been
achieved in this, the 20th century, by the Democratic Party—
V7e were the party which gloried in dissent and in disagreement
.
McCarthy then recalled the bitter civil rights battle within the Democratic
party during the 1948 National Convention, as a time when the issue was one
of "great moral significance" but one that threatened to "tear the party
to pieces." The party "did take a chance," McCarthy noted, "and... the Nation
7 1and the party, both, were well-served, in consequence of that decision."'
Taking the analogy further McCarthy asked,' "But where do we find our
party today? What is the position of the Democratic Party leadership in
Washington and, I might say. New Hampshire, on the matter of dissent? Well,
generally, they say, 'let us have no dissent.' The cry is for unity. I think,
on the record, in our party, the request for unity usually comes about the
last day of the National Convention and sometimes, not until two or three
weeks after." "But to be out, as Democrats," McCarthy chided, "saying in
January and Fcbraury, that we ought to have unity on an issue of vital moral
significance, even before we've gone through any primaries, and even before
weVe anticipated a convention... is, I'd say, contrary to every tradition of
the Democratic party, and really, contrary to the tradition of politics in
the United States."
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MrCnrtlu' Hun rhallenj.od his audionce, "1 tl,ink it all important, horr in
Nov./ Hau.i.sliirr, Lhat you make the lirst stand, Democrats, Independents, and
Republicans, insofar as you can help, to stand against that suggestion and to
prevent the establishment of what might develop into a wholly undesirable
tradition in American politics." He then began feeding from the New Hampshire
political landscape to frame an issue that illustrated what was happening
to t:he democracy of the political party.
I was somewhat surprised to find out what devices the Democratic
Parry organization here is proposing to use in order to ensure
a write-in for the candidate of the party's choice — a matter
of assigning numbers in triplicate so that they know who has the
number and who gave it to you and, supposedly, where you go with
the number.
If this were to be carried out, it would seem to me, it would
really tend to destroy the whole reputation that this state
has in the Democratic Party for free and open primary elections.
This proposal, with the numbered pledges , comes closest, I think,
to denying people the right of a secret ballot in a primary,
of any suggestion that l' ve seen or heard of in the c^i^ntry,
and I b.ope that you will all stand boldly against it.
The audience exploded with applause. Surprisingly the cheerleaders were the
reporters seated at the press table. Hoeh and Studds, standing at the back of
the room grinned like the proverbial Cheshire cats knowing that not only did
they have a candidate of substance, but they now had an important issue which
could frame in the context of the New Hampshire politics. With it they could
create tlic sort of political effort that would put the Johnson campaign on
the defensive by embarrassing the leaders un the central strategy of their
campaign and make controversial tlie symbol of that strategy, the pledge card.
McCarth.y went on to note that in Wisconsin a similar effort had been
made and it had been rejected. Although a pledge card was not used, an
effort w.:is made to have all of the party officials declare themselves before
the prc3i(iential primary. The State Central Committee of Wisconsin he reported,
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"votpci down llie proposition. You evidently don't havo n chance, to do that
here... but I do hope that you will keep it :in mind, as you go along tl»e way
2 Atowards the primary."
Since McCarthy had hit a responsive chord in his audience, he did not
let the subject die until he had added one of his favorite illustrative themes
It's more or less as though the whole Democratic Party in
this country were being asked to submit to rather - a kind
of single identification, as though we were all to bear a
particular brand and there was to be no independence of
spirit, no independence of judgment, and no independence
of action.
Out in the Midwest, and I might say, also Texas, it helps
some in understanding the administration in critizing it,
to have som.e knowledge of how cattle are handled.
It creeps into the language of the administration, these
figures of speech and the metaphors of the administration,
things like 'cut and run.'
VJell, 'cut and run,' if you're dealing with cattle, is a
pretty good thing to do, if you're being stampeded. It's
the only way you can get out, and if you're being stampeded
over tlie cliff or into the shipping yards, why, the best
thing to do is to 'cut and run.'
We make a distinction out home, also, with reference to
particular kinds of brands which, I think, ought to be
explained to you.
They h.ave what you call a 'hair brand' and, also a 'hide
brand." Now, if it's a hair brand, it doesn't really get
into the hide. It grows out in one season. T hope most
of you have no more than that, as Democrats, and that
it will grow out before the next primary comes along,
and you can vote as independent Democrats. You haven't been
burned into the hide and, therefore, committed to a
particular purpose or to a particular program, as it has
been suggested by some of your party leaders here in New
Hampshire.25
McCarthy then made the transition to the essence of his campaign and
tlie serious concerns of those who had come to consider him. "Taken
all together
of course, the Issues are too important for any of us to yield
to this kind of -
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it 's not i-c.aUy compulyion, in the strict sense of the word, but it's a
kin.l of pre.c.s„re, a kind of move to limit the freedom of choice and the
freedom of action, on the part of the electorate in this state and, beyond
it. I think all of you know, what I think are the important issues, basically
the question of the war in Vietnam. "26
McCarthy approached the issue of the war by not discussing the facts of
the war Itself but by discussing the consequences of the war. His first concern
was that the issues be adequately presented and discussed "in such context
that they (the people) can make a judgment on it," not simply a debate by
the United States Senate or plank in the platform of the Democratic National
Convention, but to take the issue directly to the people and to let them respond
in the primaries. He saw little validity to the notions that "if you raise
questions about a military policy, you're unpatriotic," and "that patriotism
stops at the water's edge." A concept "which we cannot accept because the
obligation to be patriotic and a loyal critic of national policy applies
to domestic programs; it applies to international programs; it applies to the
Pentafc,on and to tlie Central Intelligence Agency and to the State Department,
just as it does to the Treasury Department or the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, or the Department of Agriculture or Labor. "27
His second concern related to the consequence of the war as it distracted
the nation from its "pressing domestic problems','" but the issues which he was
to discuss in detail that evening was, what he considered of "almost equal
importance...of even more importance and that is the growing militarization of
American foreign policy, the growing influence of our military establishment
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The audionce visibly relaxed as McCarthy conLinuc-d not v-ith a strident Utany
of the horrors and atrocities of the way but with a carefully developed thesis
of how war had grown as the consequences of post-World War II foreign policy
and International strategy. McCarthy had anticipated the niood of his audience
well. There would be little tolerance for militant dissent or verbal pictures
of the ugliness of war. Probably no one in the audience liked war, but few
would say that they would not support a war if it was necessary and just. What
had brought them to hear McCarthy that evening was questions not yet fully formed
or capable of articulation. Questions that revealed skepticism, uncertainty,
insecurity and even a fear that for the first time in many of their lives they
were not committed to what their national government had pledged them. McCarthy
understood the nature and even the scope of this concern. He understood that
thirs was a new concern, something unfamiliar and personally disturbing. It
tended to disrupt not only a person's view toward the government but also
relations with friends, neighbors and even more distressingly, one's own family.
To have talked about the field operations of the war, its civilian and
milit: ry leadership, its consequence at home with specifics of draft resistance
or street protest, McCarthy would have made his audience uncomfortable, even
hostile. What he did instead was establish a dialogue between himself and his
audience. His discussion was slightly abstract, tied to times, events and
personalities, not immediate, but through logical connections to illustrations
that could be supplied in the listener's mind. He was reassuring with respect
to his faith that the nation's political institutions could be made to work;
he challenged his listeners to act through these institutions, and he outlined
the rewards. He concluded his quiet dialogue breaking the spell only with his
closing words:
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TliJ.s, ,-)s 1 see It, is the total complex and context of Issues
wUi\ which we have to deal in the year 1968, and I hesitate
to say that this is a most critical year, or the most
critical year for American politics. There may have been times
in the past in the early history of this country, or at
the time of the Civil War when the decisions which were
made were more significant when the threat of some kind of
deterioration and collapse of the Republic were more pressing
than they are now.
But I do think that this is a most important campaign because
Am.erica is on the verge of becoming a great world leader.
The question that we have to decide, at least in part, is
whether we will give direction to that leadership by continuing
a kind of militaristic policy, which now seems to be in the
ascendency, or whether we will attempt to blunt that thrust.
To suggest — and — not to suggest — but to m.ake a reality —
by injecting into American politics and into American government
the acceptance that this nation is not to make its record in the
history of the world as a military power, but by demonstration
all of those things which we claim for ourselves. The right to
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and a basic belief
in a non-military approach, and a basic belief in freedom
and self determination, that these are the real strength of America
and theit these are the gifts that we have to offer the rest of the
world . 29
McCarthy's arguTiient, his language and his tone worked with his audience much
like the measured beat of a pendulum. With each swing it punctuated a point
and with each point the swing of the argument or the illustration became
ever-so-slightly more forceful'. With each speech after the Concord address,
McCarthy found his audience willing to accept more of the national policy
critique, until toward the end of the campaign, they had accepted much of
his indictment, wanted more and stated in ever stronger language.
An open question session followed Senator McCarthy's address where the
enthusiasm grew. The questions showed that McCarthy had tapped the deeper
concerns of his audience and would now deal with the specifics of issues
which
were on their minds. His answers were thoughtful yet precise
and were often
followed by prolonged applause as if an expression of relief,
even gratitude
that there was, at last, someone believable and deserving
of their attention.
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The (d'il^iir^ li^"'ML9.n 1'^^^' carried a letter to the editor that day whJ.cli
when read al"terv;ards captured the spirit of the evening.
Sir: 1 .submit the following recipe for your readers: Take one
middle-agc'l, lukewarm Republican — get him thinking about the
war in Vietnam until he is worried sick; cause him to be
vitally concerned for the survival of mankind; deny him an
acceptable presidential candidate in his o\m party — leave
him groping in a twilight zone of confusion without safe or
sound leadership — expose him to the Democratic presidential
hopeful. Senator Eugene McCartliy — let simmer until March Ilth.
Elanine D, Finch ---- llenniker30
To end this extraordinary campaign day, Senator McCarthy would then play
hockey for twenty minutec.
Hockey is tlie sport of many New Hampshire people. It is the big school
boy winter sport and is especially popular among the strongly Democratic French
Canadian populations of most of New Hampshire's cities. In fact, Berlin,
New Hampshire, calls itself "Hockey Town USA."
The New Hampshire leaders had now had enough experience with McCarthy's
schedules to know that something like skating could not be confirmed ahead of
time but if the option where open then McCartliy might do it if he was in the
mood
.
That night a Concord "Old Timers" game was scheduled in the local skating
arena. Two of the Senator's Concord supporters regularly played with the team.
When asked whether McCarthy could join the game if he wished, they consulted
the other team members who said yes and also said they could provide suitable
equipment.
Obviously plea.cd by hi» reception during the long day of campaigning and
by the reaction to his speech, Senator McCarthy would now demonstrate a further
facet of his character, one that would not lose in comparison to George Romney.
lie would not only skate but he would don protective gear and play hockey, ^^at
none seemed to know was that the "Old Timers" team was made up of "old timers"
mostly under thirty who had played hockey in high school and college, with a few
having played semi-professionally as well. When McCarthy came on the ice he was
treated like another member of the opposition. He beat the opponent in face offs,
was checked, skated hard, handled the puck well, and fell to the ice in the tumble
of the play. After about twenty minutes of the game McCarthy left the ice, but
not before the few reporters and photographers who had followed him to the arena
had recorded the event.
The Impact of February 6th
For the; reporters and for McCarthy observers outside New Hampshire, February
6th marked the first day of substantial campaigning. In the space of fourteen
hours McCarthy bad successfully eliminated any further comparisons with the cam-
paign style of ex-Governor George Romney. McCarthy had shovm his own effective-
ness as a diverse campaigner. He was capable of eliciting favorable responses
on the street, at factory gates, inside the plants, from conservative service
clubs and before a sizable civic audience. He showed the ability to handle dif-
ficult and polarizing issues, in a manner that carried both insight and challenge
without being provocative or disruptive.
For his New Hampshire campaigners, McCarthy had shown his ability to pro-
vide them vjith both the issues and the style of a potentially successful cam-
paign. McCarthy had sensed what the political ethos of New Hampshire required.
Personal sincerity, a calm, restrained, yet confident presence, a quick wit,
and ready smile, wlieu personified by McCarthy's tall, rather gray, presidential
3U
nvninc'i- ;;ec-inod ualurally to brlnp, ]^oop\c to hlin. Instead of the tc.ns:i(s on
that often accompanies a political campaign, McCarthy had the ability to
relax and then to engage those he met. In addition McCarthy now showed
that he was willing to work very hard in New Hampshire, even play hockey at
the end of a long day — not just to produce news but because he wanted to and
knew he could skate well. He gave his campaign an important issue when he
framed in his speech the potential hazard to the vote which was implied by
the Jolmson campaign's "pledge card." Both the twenty minutes of hockey and
the brief comments on tlie "pledge card" gave the New Hampshire campaign and,
especially the reporters items that were uniquely representative of the New
Hampslrire campaign, and ones that could be used as symbols of McCarthy's
energy and political intelligence. Those who would have liked to write
McCarthy off as an "intellectual," or "aloof," or "professorial" now had
to contend with an image of McCarthy shown slipping slightly on the ice of
a Claremont doorstep then playing a rough game of hockey. From these images
reporters wrote their stories and supporters began to perk up not only in New
Hampshire but across the nation.
A national Associated Press story datelined, "Concord, N.H.," led:
At a time when presidential aspirants like to show the
voters their skill at sports, Sen. Eugene McCarthy has
set a now athletic standard — taking part in a rough
game of ice hockey.
In a yellow sweatshirt, black trousers, a red helmet and
borrowed skates the Minnesota Democrat — challenging
President Johnson's Vietnam war policies in primaries —
skated out onto the ice rink here Tuesday night to join in
a game of hockey. . .
.
Before swinging into the hockey game — a favorite sport
with New Hampshire voters — McCarthy took a shot at the
regular Democratic party in New Hampshire, which has not
welcomed his challenge of President Johnson
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The Sonntor r.ook oxccpLiou... to a card circulated
in New Hampsliire under the label of the Democratic
state coirjiiittee.
. .
. -"^l
In every story carried of the day's activities, playing hockey was an
important part, and was especially prominent in the New Hampshire coverage
of the story. The Foster's Daily Democrat of Dover, New Hampshire headlined
their story, "McCarthy Plays Hockey in N.H. Campaign Trip. "32 Newsweek and
Time magazines carried the rare photograph of McCarthy scrambling after the
puck. His first campaign coverage in these weeklies. Newsweek captioned
its picture, "Senator McCarthy: Hawkish on Ice," and led its story with the
phrase, "The Iceman Runneth. "33 Time magazine' s story led, "On Thin Ice,"
with a picture caption which read, "Time for the Face Off."3'^
McCarthy playing liockey, or at least a candidate capable of playing hockey,
was a valuable symbol for the New Hampshire campaign. The photograph with an
appropriate caption would appear in almost every piece of campaign material
designed for circulation in New Hampshire.
McCarthy's attack on the Johnson campaign's pledge card provided the New
Hampshire leaders with their best piece of ammunition. His remarks during the
Concord speech and in subsequent press conferences started a political brush
fire that could not be controlled by the New Hampshire Johnson committee.
Desperately in need of some campaign literature that reflected a New Hampshire
aspect to McCarthy's campaign, a flyer was printed that attacked the Johnson
campaign's "pledge card." The flyer read: "What ever happened to the secret
ballot?" Then displayed a photograph of one of the serial numbered, in
triplicate, pledge cards, with "You don't have to sign anything to vote for
Senator F.ugone McCarthy. On March 12, let Lyndon Johnson know it.
McCarthy
for President."
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The Press aiul the PloJ
p.
e Ca rd
Tlie LBJ Conimiutee's i)ledge card was an issue ready made for the press.
All Senator McCarthy had to do was niention it, provide a context for the reporter
to evaluate it, and then almost not mention the subject again except when asked.
Thursday, February 8th the Boston ]lerald_wrote an early editorial titled,
"Clieck-Off List for LBJ." which in its lead read:
Voting in a party primary ought to be as sacrosanct as
voting in an election, with no interference, pressure or
cajoling to confound the voters.
That principal doesn't seem to prevail in New Hampshire,
however, where the Democratic organization is baldly
soliciting party members for pledges that they will write
in votes for Lyndon Baines Johnson in the March 12.... Sen.
Eugene McCartliy ... likens the roundup of pledges to cattle
herding
» although he says the gimmick may be merely a local
inspiration to demonstrate loyalty to Lyndon Johnson....
There is nothing illegal about the pledges, though they
certainly seem presumptuous and meddling. One would think
the regular Democrats would be confident of putting down
Sen. McCarthy's challenge to the president without soliciting
reassurance beforehand. \'7hy should a Democrat enrolled in
New HampGhirc be asked directly to pledge his vote to any
candidate? If a Democrat fails to sign and return his pledge
or refuses to do so on principle, will he be considered disloyal
to Lyndon Johnson or to the regular Democratic organization?
I'ew Hampshire Democrats would be wise to discard their scheme
of pledges to the President and to spend their energies per-
suading fellow Democrats that the President's pledge to the
nation are worth unsubscribed write-in votes. 35
The Concord Monitor columnist, Jack Hubbard, began stirring tlie
pledge card issue in New Hampshire with an approach which was pursued fre-
quently by other reporters. He began calling both Johnson and McCarthy
supporters for their reaction to the use of the pledge card scheme. In his
column dated February 8th he wrote, "The Johnson Democrat's pledge card cam-
paign could backfire." Tlien he quoted State Representative and McCarthy support
of Nashua, Jean Wallin, v^/llo said, "I think you are signing' your right away
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t;o m.ikc
.1 decision in the voting bootli. It in the people wlio refuse to sign
tlio cards. I am not saying anything will happen to those people... it is
just tlio idea."
Rep. VJallln went on, "It Is a great campaign on paper. They say they
have 82 workers in Nashua (where there are 8,000 Democrats), but a lot of
these people won't work." Hubbard concluded his column with references to
the structure of the scheme as reported by the Johnson Committee, then wrote,
"But this idea couJd be lost in the verbal battle over whether LBJ is twisting
arms in New Hampshire's primary.'
In an article on the New Hampshire Independent voter and various can-
didates' strategies to "woo" that vote, a New Hampshire State News Service
reporter quoted Bernard Boutin, Johnson Campaign Director, who said, "Attempts
have been made in past primaries to attract independent voters" but he did
not knov; how successful they had been. "We'll have a better indication this
time than ever before because of the 'pledge' cards being distributed to
Deraoc-.ats and independents."-^'^
In a report Boutin prepared for a meeting of the LBJ campaign leaders he
said that the pledge card campaign was producing "excellent results" after
the first week of operation. In tlie news story on his report Boutin said
that large quantities of the numbered cards were being mailed to President
Johnson in what Bo.itin called "a concrete sign of the support the President
has here in New Hampshire." 38
3/(5
Kich:,ru W. Daly wriLinr, in t-he Ik^stpn ILcra]_cl Tr^^^ Vchvuavy 9th under
Lho hr.ulline, "l,Ikl Forces Running Out of Gimmicks," said:
"The teapot tempest in New Hampshire over the crude maneuver
oy backers of President Johnson to solicit loyalty pledges
from voters illustrates once again the difficulties inherentm campaigning without a candidate Most significant,
they are numbered. It is as if some aspiring Big Brother
impatient for 198A plans to pinpoint just who is faithful
and who is not, lest some future postmastership fall into the
wrong hands.
. .
.
In tlie Cjijistian Science Monitor
,
Edgar M. Mills, wrote that "Sen.
Eugene J. McCarthy is attempting to transform a Johnson pledge card, write-in
drive in New Hampshire into a political backlash for his own presidential
candidacy W.J. McCarthy writing a column datelined Laconia, N.H., for
the Ho Ston Herald of the same day, picked up the same theme. John H. Fenton
New England reporter for the New York Times wrote an article February 9th
which began to uncover the attitude of the Johnson campaign toward their
pledge card effort now that it was becoming controversial. Fenton
reported:
The first reaction to information kits that are being
distributed among Democratic ward and town chairmen
is that the White House is engaged in an arm-tv;isting
campaign. Senator McCarthy... commented with a chuckle:
"if there is a difference of one vote between the
number of pledges and the number of registered voters,
then all are traitors and all must die."
...But the cries of anguish were being heard among
some rank-and-file Democrats over a three-section pledge
card that each voter is asked to sign....
'Are we supposed to go to confession in public?' asked
one Democrat who has already filed as a delegate favorable
to the nomination of Mr. Jolinson....
But Richard Weston, of Gov. John W. King's staff at the
State House, said the purpose of the numbering was to
make sure that local chairmen and other coordinators
distributed tlie cards....
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Ak Koon as the Individual votov';; naiiiG has been
returned to headquarters, ho. will be sent an
acknowledgement that his pledge is being forwarded
'with thanks and deep appreciation' to the Uliite
House. The acknowledgement is signed by Governor
King and by Senator Thomas J. Mclntyre
A party leader in Hanover, who said he had heard
about the pledge cards but had not yet received
one* said
:
'I think I am going to write Hubert Humphrey in for
President, what the hell. 41
When E. W. "Ned" Kenworthy, a New York Times reporter, was travelling with
McCarthy in New Hampshire during a factory tour, he found that the LBJ pledge
card was already stirring a negative reaction. Kenworthy wrote: "There was
evidence (that the pledge card goes against the grain of New Hampshire politics)
vjhen Mr. McCarthy visited the plant of the Cott Bottling Company in Manchester.
As he approached one worker with hand outstretched, a cry went up from several
employees, who pointed at the worker and said, "Look out, that's Johnson's
Communist."
"Robert Bergeron, one of those who raised the cry, explained later that
the man approached was Robert Durocher, a ward leader who had been distributing
pledge cards.
"Mr. Bergeron told reporters: 'I only got a seventh grade education. But
I think the pledge is phony. I got a kid brother in Vietnam. I want to find
out what it's all about."
"Resentment over the pledao cards, some observers said, had bccni com-
pounded by a recent liLaLement by Governor King that it would be "unpatriotic"
for Democrats not to vote for President Johnson. ""^-^
The Sunday edition of the Boston Herald Traveler carried a major story
on the New Hampshire presidential primary which contained a reproduction of
the serially numbered pledge card.'^^ Hampshire newspapers began to print
letters-to-the-editor critical of the "pledge card" to an extent where it seemed
that there was little else of interest in the campaign. The local leaders of
the McCarthy campaign kept the pot boiling with a steady stream of well publi-
ciiied attacks of the "pledge cards" including one \diere the Laconia McCarthy
chairman expressed the "hope that those Democrats who feel compelled to sign
the pledge cards for political or personal reasons will still exercise the
right of free choice once they are in the voting booth. "'^''"*
In her nationally syndicated column, Mary McGrory v^;as also captured by
the pledge card issue when under the headiiig, "McCarthy Thrives on LBJ
'Pledges,'" she wrote, "Sen. Eugene McCarthy said enigmatically a month ago
that he expected to "live off the land" in New Hampshire, nobody paid much
attention.
"But lately, thanks to an issue provided by his opposition, he has been
doing just that, and thriving." She then recounted that when signed, it would
bring the signer not only "an engraved thank you" from Governor King and
Senator Tom Mclntrye, but also a "photograph of President and Mrs. Johnson
standing on the steps of Air Force I."
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Mary McLhory took Lhe story back to tlie WhLto House where the Prosiacnt's
Press Secretary, George Christian was asked whether Governor Klnfi had spoken as
"an agent of President Joh.nson," when the Governor had called McCarthy "an
advocate of api>easeiiient" in a counter-attack on McCarthy's successful pledge-
card characterization. McGrory reported that Christian, "professed ignorance
of the governor's remarks... but elsewhere in the administration, it was con-
ceded that tlie pledge cards were 'a minor tactical error.'" She concluded her
report with a summary that caught the meaning of both the pledge card issue
and McCarthy's campaign to that point.
The violent reaction of the President's managers tells
McCarthy that he has struck a raw nerve in opening up
the question of presidential coercion. As a critic
of the war McCarthy had been tagged "a one-issue candidate."
Now he is letting events speak for themselves in Vietnam,
and effectively calling on the voters of New Hampshire
not to let themselves be pushed around. '^5
In spite of wliat appeared to observers as a picture of rats fleeing
the sinking ship of the pledge card campaign, Boutin persisted. Speaking in
Keene, Boutin nov; "termed the use of the numbered pledge cards as a 'petition
to Pr:;sident Johrisori to run again,'" contending "the use of the cards was
consistent with the First Amendment which allows petition to the government . "46
On the same day Senator Tom Mclntyre spoke at a kick-off session of "Pledge
to Johnson Week," at a Nashua motel. Boutin, also attending, said, "Do not
be fooled by tlie phony issue being raised by the other candidate when he pro-
claims we are invading the secrecy of the ballot with our pledge card campaign.
The pledge card campaign was no more of an invasion of privacy than when our
opponent asks his supporters to wear his campaign buttons or attach bumper strips
to their cars."^-^
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Now almoct t.oLally on the defensive concerning the pledge card a.ui what
tlioy had come to ropref.eut for many, the Johnr,on campaign faced a series of
hlghJy critioa.1. editor jals which renewed the assault. The Portsmouth Herald
said, "There is growing evidence that New Ilampchire's Democratic "party bosses"
may have -overp] ayed their hand in their eagerness to promote write-in jjupport
for President Johnson " The editorial went on to suggest that Senator
Mclntyre, whom tt)e paper had supported, would do well to disassociate himself
from Governor Kin[; in his attacks on Senator McCarthy. The result, they con-
tended, was H-iving McCar.:uy "underdog status" which will "surely win him
syaipathy . "'^^'^
^'^^^ VAJ-l'-y News L;!iared the Herald 's sentiments but added, "Wlien the Demo-
cratic P,-;rty can no longer tolerate dissent within its ranks in a primary, it
no longer deijerves to wxn elections .... "'^^
To make things even worse for the Johnson organizers, the McCarthy workers,
then engaged in a docr-to-door canvass of registered Democrats and Independents,
had four.d that some peopj.e who had signed the pledge card were under the impres-
sion that this v;as a nfiw way of voting. In glee, they kept this bit of informa-
tion quietly to thero.selvG.s but it was eventually reported in the press. Date-
lined "Lebanon, K.ll." with a column lieading, "The Lady Voted — On Pledge Card,"
the story read;
A nev>; twist in the pledge card campaign for President
Johnson ccime to light here yesterday, posing a new prob-
lem for regu-lar Democrats supporting the President.
A door~to~door campaign workers for Sen. Eugene McCarthy
said she liad asked a lady if she might talk about her
vote in tomorrow's Presidential Primary.
I've alreatiy voted," said the lady. "I signed the pledge
card and sent it back."^^
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So InfaluaLcul witi. the pledge card issue, Llic press did neglect so.ne of
Its serious reportorial business. This lack was detected early on when a
woman wrote criticizing the Concord MonJ^tor for not covering "the major subject
of his (February 6th) speech — the growth and power of the military-industrial
complex Your failure to do so in reporting the Senator's talk smacks of
editorializing a news item. Also, I am rapidly tiring of the tendency on your
part and that of the other media of presenting McCarthy as simply anti-Johnson
and anti-Vietnam without giving him credit for creativity or constructiveness
.
Signed: Diana Anderson ."
Ey the end of February the pledge card issue faded as the Johnson leaders
shifted Ho an aggressive attack on McCarthy's Vietnam policies and the implications
of those poJicies. Ry then even Bernard Boutin appeared to hope that the
pledge cards were forgotten and for almost a two v^eek period they were gone as
the stream-of-consciousness of a political campaign moved on. But on March
7th, Marc Drogin, a reporter for the Concord Monitor made a series of telephone
calls that produced one of the funny stories of the campaign. It began when
Governor King was asked how many of the cards had been sent to Washington and
he said that more than "25,000 pledge cards had been sent to the White House."
As they come in, the New Hampshire Democrats for
Johnson keep sending 'em on down.
And the V/liite House keeps mailing 'em back.
If that sounds confusing, it's an improvement
over Monday when the Governor's office said they
weren't being mailed out, the Director of
Democrats for Johnson said they had been for the
past week, and the White House said it didn't know
anything about it.
Now it seems it does.
Asst. Press Secretary Robert Fleming told the
Monitj)^r yesterday afternoon that 'there were a few of
7lu)se cards around' and that instructions are tliat
they 'go back to Mr. Boutin.'
At the la Lost, count, that's 25,000 little pledge
cards golnp, hither and thither.
The Democrats for Johnson know about the hither
but the word is yet to get around about the
thither
.
Democratic Campaign Headquarters in Manchester....
said Gov. King was right about the cards going out.
In fact, said a young lady, 'they're addressed to
Mr. W. Marvin Watson... special assistant to the
President .
'
Could she explain why the l^Jhite House was returning
them?
'They're mailing back all the cards?' She couldn't.
Neither could John Barker, a Johnson campaign aide
in Manchester. He explained that, 'Hmm.mm, that's
a surprise .
'
Not just surprised but angry are New Hampshireites
who have discovered that somebody else has been
signing their names to the pledge cards.
Earlier this week Eugene S. Daniell Jr. complained
aloud that half tlie pledge cards in Franklin were
forgeries and that counterfeits were cropping up all
over the countryside.
At least tv>7o were found in Concord yesterday.
The assumption on the part of those not for Johnson.,,
was that local cjimpaigners found it easier to sit
home and sign other people's names to pledge cards
than to go out and solicit genuine signatures.
William Craig, head of the State Democratic Committee,
had replied that such might be the case in part, but
he was checking it out and not overlooking the
possibility that the pledge card peculiarities could
have been a ploy by the McCarthy supporters.
He didn't consider it a laughing matter.
A number of other persons do.
The business of pledge cards, good and bad, being
mailed to here and gone, is "most humorous" to McCarthy
Headquarters.
'It seems a little bit strange,' David Hoeh, McCarthy's
Campaign Manager told the Monitor as he broke into
anoth<:;r guffaw. . . .
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'We're anuised by tlio great dlfficuUies they're hnvinr,...
we thinlc the confusion reflects the inability ol the
Jolmson campaign to register with any substance in the
electorate.
'
Meanwhile, back at the White House — why is President
Johnson's staff mailing back the pledge cards as quick
as they come in? The White House says because its in-
structions are to return them to Boutin.
The Monitor asked Boutin this morning why the White
House has such instructions.
"They don't have," Boutin said.
Boutin sounded angry: "Ask George Christian about
that!
'
Christian was tied up.
But his assistant Fleming, who wasn't, sounded just
a shade annoyed by nov^7:
'The only people we could find who seemed to know any-
thing about it, said they go back to Boutin.'
Fleming then referred the Monito r reporter to the Democratic National Committee
which said that they did not know anything about the pledge cards and, anyway,
they don't get involved in primary elections?'^ The great pledge case mystery
ended with the voters entering New Hampshire voting booths Marth 12th. There
was never a satisfactory answer as to what actually happened to the White
House part of the signed cards.
Sclieduling Lessons Learned
As tlie campaign developed, the scheduling became more sophisticated. There
would not be another time like the morning of February 6th in Claremont. While
McCarthy's habit of completing activities ahead of the time allowed in a
schedule caused a few problems, the drivers or travelling staff began to develop
ways of coping. It became possible to call ahead and add something quickly
or change the route slightly to Include a brief visit to a small
town, a
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campaign hcndquar tor s or shopp ing area. As lloch had sungested durlnj; the
earliest campaign vneeting, the local committees developed a "shelf" of potential
campaign activities from which they could draw a schedule on very short notice.
The Salem headquarters x,;ould put together a three hour schedule, including a
headquarters full of people, with less than two hours notice on the last day
of the campaign. In addition to the tools of the telephone, a fledgling
advance activity, iocal contacts, and the twelve day strategy, Sandy Hoeh had
lists of manufacturing establishments that could be contacted for in-plant
tours or meeting shift changes; lists of service clubs that might need a break-
fast or noontime speaker; newspapers, radio and television stations for inter-
views; schedules of special events that the campaign could join or greet a
crowd; airports where the candidate could arrive or leave without having to
come through Boston, and a special notebook in which she could rough out a
schedule. The most serious problem other than not having firm dates for
McCarthy's visits v/as to create schedules with good activities within a
geograplii cally reasonable area.
..'bile the distances are not great by comparison with other states, the
only travel option is the automobile for intra-state campaigning. Occasionally
a candidate will f3y from southern to northern New Hampshire, but this is
an exception. The scheduler had the choice of either building a schedule from
one or two strong events, filled in with less useful activities in one area, or
having the candidate chase prime events in often widely separated locales. The
remaining two days of McCarthy February 6, 7, 8, schedule reflected the problem
of filling time, responding to opportunities, broadening the impact of the
campaign, and finding a place to depart without having to repeat previously
covered ground.
354
Time
7:00 a.m.
7:20 a.m.
8:05 a.m.
8:30 a.m.
9:00 a.m.
Plcice
Concord
Concord
Concord
Concord
Concord
Function
Greet workers outside factories
Great Rumford Press workers outside
Rumford Press
Breakfast, McKenzie's Restaurant,
Main Street
Address assembly and question and
answer at Concord High School
Tour of Concord Moni tor building and
informal press conference
9: 30 a . ivi
.
Concord Coffee V7ith resident of JFK apartments
(Housing for elderly)
10: ]5 a.m. Concord Address at St. Paul's School and
question and answer period.
11: 15 a.Tii. Concord Greeted by Mayor Gove at City Hall and
introduction to city employees
1: 00 p.m. Manchester Address at Central High School
1: 35 p.m. Manchester Tour Cott Beverage Co.
3: 15 p . m Manchester Coffee at home of Mr. & Mrs. Robert Eschoo
1015 Chestnut St.
A: 00 p.m. Manchester Tour shopping center
A: 30 p , m Manchester Drive to Concord
6: 30 p . in Concord Dinner in Concord
8: 30 Concord Drive to Laconia
10: 00 p.m. Laconia Laconia Tavern
The McCarthy leaders felt that each campaign visit should have at least
part of its schedule in Manchester. As the largest city and the hub of
Hillsborough County with its lieavy Democratic voter registration, McCarthy had
to do well in uhe county if he was to succeed statewide. Unfortunately, the
local campaign organi/.ation was weak. From the beginning many of those attracted
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i-o McCartl.y Mvrd outside the city or had had little previous campaign oxporlonco,
Their contacts werv^ limited, and their understanding, of the political dynamics
of the city was less than adequate to crack the community's tough political
shell. While Hoeh and Studds were determined to have McCarthy campaign in
Manchester once each visit, to do so always strained the best efforts of the
state campaign and a shy local committee. In contrast as sho\,m by the detail
of the February 7th Concord schedule, a well connected, hardworking, politically
sophisticated local McCarthy committee made campaigning in Concord a pleasure
not only for McCarthy but for those scheduling his campaign. In fact, the
local person who scheduled McCarthy for the Concord Committee, would check
eacli time and detail of the schedule personally then re-run as much as possible
with the advance person. To avoid another plant gate miscue the local scheduler
was out in front of the Rumford Press plant early one morning to check tlie flow
of v;/orkers and the shift change times. He pre-ran each travel link, checked the
table location for McCarthy at the restaurant, and made sure that every other
event in that morning schedule would work without having McCarthy late or
awkwardly standing if he completed an activity too soon.
The Laconia committee possessed much of the same ability as the Concord
people. Somewhat younger and broader based in the community, the Laconia
Committee's youth and enthusiasm made their city an attractive campaign stop
and one wliicli would be used on a number of occasions when an activity was needed
tor some of those who came later to campaign for McCarthy. Hoeh and Studds
used Laconia almost as a "test market" for celebrity visits because they were
confidvMii. of the Laconia committee's ability to arrange events and then evaluate
how a celebrity miglit be? used elsewhere in the campaign. The Laconia schedule
for the third day, February 8th, illustrated their skill.
Scl^cHlule: Thursday February 8, 1968 ^ ^
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Time Place Function
6:30 a.m. Laconia
7:30 a.m. Laconia
9:00 a.m.
9:30 a.m.
9:A5 a.m.
Laconia
Laconia
Laconia
Greet workers outside Scott-Williams
Manufacturing Co,
Address Laconia Chamber of Commerce
Breakfast (An obligatory performance
for all presidential primary candidates)
WLNH radio interview
McCarthy for President Headquarters
WEMJ radio interview
10:30 a.m. Laconia Coffee at home of Mr. & Mrs. Ron
O'Callahan, 42 Gilford Street
11: 30 a.m. Laconia Leave Laconia for Lebanon
12: 30 p.m. Lebanon Address Rotary, Landers Restaurant
1: A5 p.m. Lebanon Main Street tour
2: 15 p.m. Lebanon Interview: Valley News
3: 10 p.m. Lebanon Leave Lebanon airport for Boston.
Because it was possible for McCarthy to leave New Hampshire from the
Lebanon Airport and connect with a flight to Washington, the Lebanon schedule
was added which took advantage of a newsworthy speech before the Rotary Club
and McCarthy's fir^t campaigning in New Hampshire's "North Country." To do
this meant that McCarthy had to be driven more than sixty miles across New
Hampshire, over a winding, low speed road — not that comfortable an experience
durin<; the beginning of New Hampshire's frost heavy season.
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To overcome souiti of the conmunications problems between New Hampshire and
the national campaign, Grace Bassett, a friend of the McCarthy family, came to
New Hampshire to help Sandy Hoeh with the next schedule and also to organize
activities for Mrs. McCarthy. An effective political organizer in her own
right, Abigail McCarthy agreed to help in her husband's campaign by coming to
New Hampshire. Her role in previous campaigns had been largely as a behind the
scenes organizer and only occasionally as an active campaigner. Now that their
family vas older, she and daughter Mary, a Radcliffe sophomore were scheduled
for a visit February lA and 15 with the Senator who was coming for three days,
February 13, 14, 15, the scheduling task doubled. The same care in preparation
was needed for Mrs. McCarthy as was required for Senator McCarthy, including
advancii'g, transportation and provisions for several reporters. Although much
of Mrs. McCarthy's schedule would be arranged by local committees, Grace Bassett
provided the important interpretation of what v/as scheduled to both Mrs. McCarthy
and the Senator's office. With Grace Bassett in New Hampshire, date and sche-
dule couf irn)ation through Washington greatly improved.
Building Momentum
Each campaign succeeds or fails on the basis of its ability to attract
voters' interest and, ultimately, their votes. A campaign is effective if it
has been able to create a sense of progress, excitement, movement, momentum.
Campaigns have been said to "peak" too early or "peak" too late or fail to
"peak" at all. The chemistry of a campaign contains many variables which, when
in harmony, seem to produce the attraction. The variables multiply as the
campaign proceeds and their interaction, importance, and identity vary greatly
from moment to moment. To. assign and assess each, then to test and evaluate
would require the ability to control evaluation beyond that which is permissible
in cuch a socially dynamic event. The totality of the campaign becomes
greater
tiian tlu' sum of its parts.
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To sort tlie McCarthy campaign into its constituent elements and to
attribute to ore or the other a reason for its vitality vould be misleading.
Of great importance, of course, were the candidate, the issues, the times,
the management, the workers, the strategy, the funding, the media attention,
the place, the timing, the opponents' mistakes and many other individual,
group actions and inactions that created the momentum. There were, however,
a few identifiable activities and responses that represented a difference.
The difference was that after a number of weeks of uncertainty, hard work, and
frustration the campaign seemed to come to life. The work was no less, nor
the uncertainty, but there was a spirit, a sense of accomplishment, a feeling
that attention was shifting toward the McCarthy candidacy. Evidence of this
shift came through the media, from the field activities, from the canvassing,
from issue targeting, from the interest of celebrities, from the reaction to
McCartliy public relations, to the treasury, and in the commitment of the
candidate. In that time, the campaign left the management of a few and became
the i-roperty of the many. It had become greater in its pulsing energy than
individual direction could contain or candidate charisma could sustain. The
McCarthy campaign had become what the students in New Ham.pshire sensed was
a happening.
The Reporters
In spite of the best laid plans of campaign managers and political
strategists, excitement in a campaign is bestowed, alm.ost as a gift. People
meeting in living rooms and discussing candidates, issues, and campaigns
cannot of themselves have much impact. It is only when the rumblings have
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a conloxt .nul pr ick t he ears of an ii.qu i s J t: ivo reporter or two that a l^eart
Ix^at can be heard. More often than not the beat fades before lonp,. There
were four names printed on the New Hainpshire ballot in 1968 and only one was
that of Senator McCarthy. Also on the ballot was a place for the write-in vote.
That space could have drawn the attention of other possible candidates not just
Lyndon Johnson. Robert Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, John Lindsey, or a local
favorite son such as Governor King or Senator Mclntyre, might have been the
recipient of a surprise vote. Robert Kennedy received a substantial surprise
write-in vote for Vice President in the 1964 New Hampshire presidential primary
as did Henry Cabot Lodge. If protest was the single objective of the 1968
presidential primary then a vote cast for almost anyone, whether listed on the
ballot or not might well have conveyed the message, especially if the non-
Johnson vote equalled or exceeded the number who wrote in the President's name.
For a multiplicity of reasons such alternatives did not produce more than a
scattering of votes. The contest became one between the President and the
Senator from Minnesota, but for many weeks it was seen by the populace,
through the eyes and ears of the reporters, as being no contest at all.
What Hoeh and Studds found was a certain herd instinct on the part of
the reporters. This was especially noticeable when they began meeting members
of the national press on the early McCarthy visits to New Hampshire. The
national reporters arrived as a herd> moved as a herd, responded as a herd, and
not infrequently reported as a herd. The New Hampshire and national leadership
of tlie McCarthy campaign found that the herd Instinct also tended to prevail
among the editors of the major national newspapers. Few wished to be much in
front of tiic herd. Whether this observation can be raised to the level of a
theory purjvjrting to describe the dynamics of the naltonal political media would
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dlfi:ic:u]t
,
but I he observations of the New Hampshire leaders, as they watched
media attention change, may have significance in explaining how campaigns are
covered.
The analogy to the herd relates effectively to the fact that within a
large herd there are sub-groups, families, individuals and mavericks. The
news gathering and reporting echelons tend to form and follow in much the same
manner. The local New Hampshire reporters, so few in number that they could
hardly be labelled a herd, found the the local hot spots of anti-war, anti-
Jolinson, pro-McCarthy sentiments, stirred among the few who were contemplating
an alternative for the New Hampshire voters, and fanned the heat into a fire of
public curiosity. For most of the period between the first mentioning of
Cans October visit and McCarthy's announcement January 4th, it was the state
reporters for United Press International and the Associated Press who kept
the possi-bility of McCarthy before the New Hampshire public. To a certain
extent they were also repsonsible for what little national coverage the McCarthy
organization received.
If it is possible to describe a small state like New Hampshire in terms
of media markets then the coverage of the early New Hampshire McCarthy activity
was carried most heavily in Manchester and Concord where newspapers existed
with their own capital city reporters; secondarily in the cities of Portsmouth,
Laconia, Keene, Claremont, Lebanon, with newspapers that carried one or both of
the wire services and the State News Service reports; and thirdly, in Nashua
and Dover which carried only wire service items. A fourth level of press
coverage was by the weekly newspapers. A number subscribed to the State News
Service summary, others would write their own summary of significant state
politicaJ events especially if a local angle could be developed for the
coverage,
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A frw concent ral cvl thcJr reporting, torally on local events. In l.hose cases
almost the only way for the McCarthy campaign to rccclvo notice was to have
either a ]ocal person do something worthy of publication or create a local
event that the weekly miglit cover.
Beyond the newspaper attention there was also the role of the electronic
media. For all intents and purposes the only electronic media capable of
covering New Hampshire news events were the radio stations of the larger
communities. The one television channel, IMUR-TV located in Manchester, was
not financially strong enough to support continuous news coverage using video
or film inputs. Their one reporter would have to drive considerable distances
to cover events outside Manchester, return to the station, develop his own
soundless film, write a story Lo accompany the film, and then read the story
during the evening nevvrscast with the film running as a background. Needless
to say an event had to be of major proportions to justify that reporter's
exertion. Most television news, therefore, was of the "rip and read" variety
taken from the teletype machines of the wire service carried by the television
station.
Radio reporting was far more important. Local radio stations had often
established as their competitive hallmark their respective ability to either
get to the heart of a story or to add vitality to their newscasts. Using
tape recordings, toJeplione interviews, and follow-up reports, many stations
had become proficient in expanding significantly the stories they received
from the wire services. It was this activity, as much as any other, that
gave eaily life to the New Hampsliire McCarthy campaign.
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I
• r.ulio sl.ition:; that luul news depart iiu-nts carried Lhc lln 1 1 c.l
Press Internal icnia 1 wire service. As soDn as a wire siM-vIce story arrived
in tl>(< news of rice of a radio st:at:ion the most ajigresslve of the news staffs would
call Ll\e quoted New Hampshire source for either a repeat of the story for
tairin); or expanded commentary. Often during llie campaign David lloeh would
receive a 6:00 - 6: 30 a.m. call from tlie lll'l reporter wlio would writ e a story
for tlie wire. IJefore 7:00 a.m. llo(di In-gan receiving telephone calls from
radio news reiJorters for ac tiialit ies . Tlie thirst for state news items using
actuality recordings to validate the account had become a fine art. Each of
the stations in the major marl<cts would cover the news in this way.
Keporting New Hampshire events was much less a process of gleaning from
a number of significant events all competing for scarce newspaper space or
air time, than it was an effort to generate news tliat was wortliy of the space
available. Thc< McCarthy story was attractive and captured the early attention
of tlie reporters and media news staffs. The people involved were cjuotable,
accessible and straight-forward in their responses. For many the "home-grown"
nature of the McCarthy effort was an attractive contrast to the contrived image
of the Now Hampshire dolmson activity and the usual dismal accounts of New
Hampshire's governmental events.
The interest generated by the reporters was expanded by early editorial
attention. The Concord, Tortsmouth, Keenc and Lebanon newspapers, concerned
about the dlrecLion of the administration's war policy, gave editorial
attention
to McCartl>y campaig.n events. The Manche s t er Unjc^ and the Dover newspaper,
.supporters of the war policy, also gave editorial attention.
That attention.
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however, vas not. uni.forn,ly against McCarthy or Iho Now Hn,„pshirc supporters.
While a minor herd instinct does prevail among the editors of the anti-Loeb
press on certain state issues, when issues separate from the anti-Loeb stance
then the editors tend to be quite independent in their analyses. If a herd
is to be labelled then the editors of the Portsmouth, Concord, Keene and
Lebanon newspapers were its members. The Laconia newspaper did not editorialize,
and the Dover, Nashua and Claremont newspapers were not predictable in their
editorial reactions to the McCarthy activity.
The fact that a broad spectrum of news gathering and disseminating people
in New Hampshire found the McCarthy activity to be vjorthy of early attention
was important to the success of the campaign. On its o\vrn and strictly within
the confines of New Hampshire media, the campaign received better than usual
coverage and editorial attention.
Because New Hampshire is almost entirely under the media shadow of
Boston, what has to be described as a regional media activity was also important
to the McCarthy campaign. The Bos ion television stations, recognizing that
their market extends deeply into New Hampshire, frequently cover major events
there. During several of McCarthy's campaign visits Boston television film
crews followed him and carried reports of his campaigning in their news broadcasts.
Perhaps as important, however, was that fact that when McCarthy campaigned in
Massachusetts or when he landed at Boston's Logan International Airport for
Nev7 Hampshire campaigning, he was well covered by the Boston television stations.
For them it was less expensive to catch McCarthy in an airport arrival and inter-
view th.an it was to follow him to the remote corners of New Hampshire.
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Boston 'r, throe major newspapers, the Boston Globe, The Record-American,
and the ILcrald T.:ave3_or, as well as the Christian Science Monitor maintained
constant touch with the campaign. The Monitor 's New England political reporter,
Edgar Mills, ran a circuit of uhe New Hampshire campaigns that meant almost a
\7eekly article summarizing the activities for his paper. The Globe
,
struggling
to become the dominant publication in the Boston market and committed to
improved coverage of New Hampshire events, was the most aggressive. The Globe
management had re-oriented the rather bland format of the paper toward a
stronger editorial and reportorlal image. They had been successful in absorbing
much of the circulation of the Boston Post
,
which closed late in the 1950's,
and buiJt on tliat economic base. The management had sensed the political
direction which Massachusetts was taking and became an independent Democratic
publication editorially. Their reasons for giving attention to New Hampshire
activities came from both economic and editorial motivation. Southern and
especially southeastern New Hampshire was grov7lng as rapidly as any region in
the nation. Many of those living in that part of New Hampshire had migrated
to the state from Massachusetts but still retained employment, shopping habits,
and social orientations toward Massachusetts.
Editorially, the Globe was offended by the practices and opinions of the
Manchester Union Leader and its publisher William Loeb. During labor management
difficulties In Boston the Manchester Union Leader would increase its press
runs and even prepare special editions of the newspaper for circulation in Boston.
Trying to exploit the problems of other newspapers in their own market was
not popular with the Globe management. This was but one of a number of instances
where Loeb offended New England's newspaper owners with his practices and
eccentricities. While not taking the Manchester Union Leader on directly, the
•
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£lpJ^il iiK.n.is;enicnt bojvm l:o mothod ic;i.l.l y Iniild its circulation in those parts
ol tlie state wliorc tlic^re wcjro. daily newspaper vacuums and among the residents
of the southeastern part of the state where it would be economically important
to develop an £idvertising market. The Globe employed a full-time reporter for
New Hampshire news. New Hampshire-circulated daily papers carried expanded
New Hampshire political news especially, and the Sunday edition contained a
special section for regional i^iews with a lieavy emphasis on New Hampshire items
of broader interest.
The Herald-Traveler , Boston's independent Republican newspaper, was in a
struggle for survival. The paper had failed to attract much of the old Post
ireadership and with the changing political and economic orientation of Massa-
chusetts, the Herald was losing readers, advertising and was about to lose
the television station that had bolstered its economic position for many years.
The Heral d had a sizable circulation among New Hampshire Republicans especially
for its Sunday edition. Since the Globe was now challenging the Herald at home
and in Nev7 Hampshire, the Herald sought to improve its New Hampshire coverage
as w.ll. Herald reporters regularly travelled with the senator on his visits
and then stayed to report campaign activities.
The Record-American, a publication of the Hearst chain, had been in con-
tinuing economic difficulty for a number of years. A tabloid with a high cir-
culation, cho paper was read by those most interested in race results, the number
and sports. Its political coverage was confined almost entirely to Massachusetts
with only occasional items of regional interest. New Hampshire politics
found
its wa> into the paper's summary columns, under the by-lines of the
nationally
syndicated writers or from wire service stories distributed beyond
New Hampshire.
Of the four Boston newspapers the Globe was the most
important to the McCarthy
candidacy.
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The Globe's political desk was staffed by a group of "young Turk" repor-
ters, led by Robert Healy, who reflected the changing guard in Masshacusetts
political leaders and its orientation toward liberal, effective, efficient and
corruption free government. In laany respects, John Kennedy's election to the
Presidency in 1960 had stimulated this broad spectrum of political and institu-
tional reform. Before his election Boston's and Massachusetts' political prob-
lems were an embarrassment only to those few in the state who cared. When Massa-
chusetts became the home state of a President, a provincial embarrassment became
intolerable to many civic, business and institutional leaders. Remarkably, an
Important part of that change was the re-constitution of a newspaper into a for-
midable civic institution. The leadership which the Globe exerted upon the re-
form of Massachusetts politics during the 1960s, was reflected in a concern about
the policies of the Johnson administration in 1967 and 1968. To them something
of the heritage that John Kennedy had left had been lost. The energy for construc-
tive good that had been released by his presidency and v/hich had revived the
publication itself, was now being wasted in Vietnam. The Globe's editors were
early advocates of changing Vietnam policy and when their efforts failed, rhey
sensed the importance of what might be accomplished if President Johnson's poli-
tical nerve were tapped. The New Hampshire presidential primary offered that
opportuxTity in their view and its pages were turned to that end. Unlike others
of the nationa.l press that were slow to recognize the New Hampshire McCarthy ef-
fort, the Globe threw caution to the winds and vigorously reported the campaign.
Their performance was much closer to that of New Hampshire's own daily press
than it v:a3 to the major national papers.
Wiiat lloeh and Studds had predicted in their December memorandum to McCarthy
came true beyond their expectations. Because there was a strong McCarthy organi-
7.aliou in Massachusetts, McCarthy's name had been listed on the April
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Mass)rhusoLt;s presid.nvlal primary bal l.oL, and because of confusion :In iho
Massachusetts Democrat ic party as to how tlie President would be represented
in the primary, Boston's newspapers were filled with McCarthy news. This
was a reversal of what the New Hampshire McCarthy leaders had expected. They
had assummed that New Hampshire McCarthy activity would be reported in
Massachusetts helping to build support for him in the later primary. By the
time the New Hampsliire primary was held the decision in Massachusetts had already
been made. Johnson's name would not appear on the ballot nor would their be
a stand-in or effort to secure write-in votes. The contest then became one of
selecting national convention delegates by congressional districts — a contest
that was conceded i.o McCarthy by the Johnson controlled Democratic State
Committee. This series of events released the Boston political writers from
having to cover Massachusetts. They came to New Hampshire.
Unlike the local or the regional reporters, the McCarthy leaders observed,
the natJonal press performed much like a herd. They arrived in a group, moved
as a group, separated only occasionally to gather news, returned to digest
their gatherings as a group, and tended to confirm their perceptions as a group.
There was social, jr,tellectual , and status re-enforcement by being a part of the
herd. Tli.ls led to preconceptions of New Hampshire politics and heavy reliance on
contacts developed and shared from previous quadrennial New Hampshire visits.
In their early contacts with the travelling national press Hoeh and Studds found
the situation both disillusioning and frustrating. In awe of the names they
had read for years in the prominent national press Hoeh and Studds had to
struggle first, to overcome reticence and then to attempt to get the herd to
shift its attention toward the McCartliy c.impaign in New Hampshire. Both
recognized tiial unless they were able to convince national reporters tliat
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somethiui; was luipi'^-n iu,; in New Hampshire Lhe campaign would liave no impact
ouCsld,^ iho srato. Without that recognition the money necessary to sustain the
candidacy would not Mow. For the combined reasons of money and impact the
New Hampshire leaders spent a great deal of their time accommodating reporters
in hopes that before March 12th the story of what was happening in New
Hampshire would reach the larger national audience.
Willie they had had moderate success in getting attention prior to McCarthy's
entry in the New Hampshire primary, af ter the initial burst of his January Ath
release attention dropped to almost zero.
Often Hoeh would make special trips from Hanover to Concord or Manchester
to meet v/ith a national reporter, columnist or for a network interview. The
results were almost uniformly disappointing as either the questions or the
subsequent story offered only skepticism. The New Hampshire spokesman had
difficulty breaking through the pre-conceptions the national press cadre brought
with them when they came to New Hampshire. Skepticism came from their view of
the yaCarthy cam.paign from their normal Washington base. There it appeared that
the campaign had caused l^.ardly a ripple. By comparison with other presidential
efforts, McCarthy was poorly organized, financed, staffed, headquartered, led
and without allies. It was inconceivable that such an organization couid manage
a meaningful national candidacy much less dent the political hide of an incumbent
president. Since there was so little to interest them from the Washington base
it was hard to believe that field operations would be any better. The reporters
arrived in New Hampshire to be greeted by what was, in their view, a rookie
leadership surrounded by unknown local volunteers and a number of pleasant
but naive college kids. When they went to check the local sources they had
developed during earlier New Hampshire visits they found that these prominent
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pol if.icnl lenclc-rs were (^Jihcr commltUH] l:o the ronomi nat i on of Prcsid-nt
JohP..son or rel ired from tho action. There was hardly a fnudllar face in the
McCartlr/ crowd. Certainly there was no one witli the elected stature of Governor
John King or Senator Tom Mclntyre or the political recognition of William Dunfey
or William Craig. Bernard Boutin, the Johnson manager, had a respected record
as a high Kennedy and Johnson administrator as well as a previous record as a
New Hampshire political leader. Hoeh and Studds were unknown outside of New
Hampshire and untried in the view of the national press.
For all of January and through the early weeks of February the national
press remained a herd united in its skepticism and assured that a campaign
developed as the McCarthy candidacy had developed could not assault the
incumbent president. McCarthy's first several visits were assessed in contrast
to Romney. Scheduling and advancing problems, small crowds and McCarthy's
quiet approach were seen as confirmations of the early assessment. To the
continuing irritation of campaign workers who were attempting to improve the
early advancing difficulties, the reporters kept referring to errors. On one
occasion a comj)licated route for a series of evening coffee parties in Manchester
was advanced by carefully pre-running and timing the route several days earlier.
On the evening of the parties the lead driver missed a turn lie did not recognize
in the dark and .led his small motorcade down a deadend street. David Shomacher
of CBS-TV was in one of the cars that had to back up and turn around in order
to re-discover the correct route. This mis-cue became the theme of his often
repeated radio and television reports of the campaign's status. Being taken
down a deadend street was too much for him to resist in his analogy of the
progress or non-progress he felt the campaign was making in New Hampshire.
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All other aspects of the schodulo had gone well and McCarthy's reception had
been Letter tl.an anyone had expected but tlio story from New Hampshire from that
reporter was about the "ainateurisin" of the advance work. To tlieir continuing
frustration the Hampshire leaders could not break the image which the national
press had created of them.
Witli McCarthy's second visit February 6, 7, and 8, the stories began to
change. Tom Wicker did write his refreshing column concerning the Claremont
Rotary Club's exclusion of the electronic media but the New York Times
news columns continued to carry only bits of reports and little that would
indicate anything important was happening in New Hampshire. E. M. "Ned"
Kenv7orthy enjoyed McCarthy's wit, use of language and openness. He, like others
of the herd began to sense that McCarthy was beginning to get through to the
New Hampshire voter and that for some reason, yet to be understood, the campaign
was beginning to work. On several occasions he wrote what he was beginning to
fee-lj but the copy failed to get into the newspaper. The McCarthy leaders were
understandably upset that the Times was not carrying stories that had been
written that were favorable to the Senator. Kenworthy would show them the copy
he had telephoned to New York expecting that the coming edition would contain
his report. VJhen it didn't both the New Hampshire and the Washington headquarters
were worried. It appeared as if a news block at the Times was somehow in
operation that prevented news of the New Hampshire campaign from appearing in
New York. News in the Times in New York meant both money and volunteers for
the campaign. Without coverage the campaign slowly began to starve.
BlaJr Clark found, through social contacts with the Times editors, that
McCarthy was viewed by them not as a presidential candidate but as an "issue
candidate." Since in their view, McCarthy was not running for the presidency
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but
.un,Unn only t:o raise .he Vie.na.n Wa. Issue, he wouM not bo accorded the
coverage In the Tijncs which they normally allocated to a presidential candidate.
In outrage that such a conclusion was possible, Clark through .any of the san,e
prominent social and political contacts in New York, got the editors to recognize
the absurdity of their conclusion. Kenworthy's reports were printed and the
editorial page of the T_ln^ began to recognize the McCarthy candidacy.
What this experience denionstrated to the McCarthy leaders was the peculiar
behavior of the national press establishment. They found that the reporters
tended to accept the established versions of the campaign and to view skeptically
accounts of the burdgeoning McCarthy effort. Their early reports from New Hampshir.
tended to be cautious, reflect the problem.s. and convey the image of a "David and
Goliath" contest with David deprived of a weapon and missing his marbles. When
the theme changed and David was seen as being at least competent, the editors
were reluctant to support their reporters' accounts
. McCarthy and his amateur
campaign were scoring forcefully in New Hampshire long before the editors of
the major nationally regarded newspapers took much notice. The stories that
were printed were buried and without editorial recognition. McCarthy's progress
which was being confirmed not just by the reporters but by canvassing evidence
and growing voter reaction was not receiving editorial recognition. While the
reporters had changed their views, the editors, members of a higher herd, were
unwilling to say that McCarthy was doing well in New Hampshire until there was
a recognized, establislied source. If the Times had written editorially that
McCarthy was campaigning effectively then the Washington Post, the S^t. Louis
Post Dispatch, the Atlanta Const itut ion
,
the Los An gele s Times and one or two
other prominent publications would follow. The problem was getting the first
to break from the herd.
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FortunaL-oly Lhere Is an important- independent source of analysis. To
some extent this role is filled by the syndicated columinsts. They, like the
editors and the reporters, usually like to forecast with assurity. Robert
Evans wrote an early negative column which conditioned many reporters about
what they experienced in New Hampshire for a considerable time. Tom Wicker began
to open the circle a bit with his refreshing Claremont tale. Most of the other
columnists tended to remain a part of the herd until it began to shift from
skepticism to belief that something was happening in New Hampshire. The
important exception was Mary McGrory whose widely read and respected column gave
both reporters and editors the source they needed to change their cautious
stance. Unfortunately her columns came relatively late and had the effect of
confirming the work of an earlier and exceptionally important writer, Paul
Wieck.
Wieck represented an important but perhaps less clearly understood part
of the national press, the independent journals of news and opinion. Wieck,
basically a free-lance writer, was then working for the New Republic and
covering for them the presidential campaigns. He had first met the New
Hampshire McCarthy leaders at the Chicago meeting of the Conference of
Concerned Democrats and had kept in touch with them since that December meeting.
He had caught the flavor of the McCarthy activity in its early days. Without
the inhibitions of the national press and writing for a publication that
prided itself on being out in front of events, he could take seriously the
optimism that came from those involved in the McCarthy campaign. While Wieck
travelled with the national press, he had found threads of credibility in
McCarthy's campaign that had not been reported by the others. His stories
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reflected this anticipation putting his evaluations far ahead of his colleagues.
While Wieck's speculation nude the news reporters uncomfortable, they were not
willing to include his advanced opinions in their own writings until they had
more confirmation.
To a degree the independent journal of opinion does serve to lead the
larger press establishment. Publications like the New Republic have wide
readership among the reporters and editors. Stories often receive preliminary
coverage in such publications and through the leads that are revealed, the
reporters pursue subjects for their own papers. As an important investigative
journalistic outlet, stories are tested that in several weeks often become the
objective of wide-spread interest. The independent journals are much like
scouts ahead of the herd ranging acorss the terrain in search of new routes
and meaningful objectives. They might also be considered as a picket line
which tends to draw the early fire. In truth, the early fire may inflect
wounds that would be damaging to the credibility of larger publications. An
independent journal is expected to be at the edge and is respected according
to its ability to both direct reporters toward new subjects and to shape opi-
nion of events.
Paul Wieck performed both roles exceptionally well in 1968. He sensed
the flow of events and because he had anticipated well, his evaluations gained
high respect as the political year unfolded.
Wieck followed McCarthy to New Hampshire during the Senator's February 13,
14 and 15 visit. He carefully evaluated McCarthy's performance, the response,
the status of his organization and the competence of the opposition. Wlien he
left New Hampshire he carried an opinion of the campaign that was not widely
shared by his press colleagues. Some may have agreed with his assessment but
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were unwlllun^ to put in print what they felt and certainly their editors wouid.
not tolerate fantasies. Wleck's article titled, "McCarthy: Alive and Well in
New Hampshire," appeared in the edition of the New Republic dated March 2, 1968.
Daiielliied Nashua, N.H, Wieck wrote:
Here, in the snow-covered hills Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy'
is finding his identity as a presidential candidate as
he moves unhurriedly in and out of the endless and often
depressing shoe factories, jokes with his supporters at
coffee hours, speaks in town halls and on college campuses.
He is winning friends. In return he commits more of
himself each day. His wit is more incisive, his speeches
stronger .55
Since this was the New Republic 's first major story on the New Hampshire
campaign, Wieck went on to review how the Johnson managers had committed the
"classic goof" with their pledge card scheme and how the tactic had "backfired
so badly it left the state's Democratic organization demoralized." But it was
McCarthy's own effectiveness as a campaigner that brought Wieck to his
conclusions
.
Simultaneously, (with the pledge card mistake) McCarthy's
own performance began to improve. On his first trip to
the state in December, he had delivered a dull, academic
lecture. Wlien he returned January 26, his supporters were
at a low ])oint. Then, he stirred a crowd of some 700
at St. Anselm' s just outside Manchester to repeated bursts
of appJause, and by mid-February, he had succeeded in
drawing a sharp contrast between his o\m style and that of
the pro-Johnson hierarchy. Instead of rhetorical excesses,
he insisted he would "not shout at the voters of New
Hampshire" ( and that he hadn't found any who wanted him) .56
He reported that he had seen McCarthy move effectively among people at
their jobs, in sraalJ groups, before large audiences and on the street. He
noted that McCartliy refused to "demagogue" the issues in spite of the fact that
there were clear opportunities to do so. He used the example of Bernard Boutin
to illustrate McCarthy's ability to move through the thicket of inter-acting
voter concerns and still maintain the basic concerns of his campaign.
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Boutin left- the federal service to vriuru to Now Hampshire
and a position with Sanders Associates, a major employer
in Nasliua and a rapidly r>rowinR firm largely dependent ondefense contracts — $125 million of its current $1A0
million gross, according to Pentagon figures. But many
of New Hampshire's white- and blue-collar vwrkers earn
their paychecks from firms with defense contracts and a
heated attack upon "the complex," pleasing though it might
be to McCarthy's academic following, could cost hundreds,
even thousands of votes.
So, when the question came up at a coffee hour, he dealt
with specific solutions after sizing up the Pentagon as
"about the third or fourth largest nation" in the world.
His solutions to bring the CIA under control, as he and
some of his Senate colleagues have tried to do; to put
some strings on the Pentagon's sale of arms abroad, as
they've also tried to do; and to take all nonmilitary
procurement (he estimated this would amount to $30 billion
of nearly $80 billion in Department of Defense expenditures)
out of DOD, a m.ovc that could also save billions in that
civilian procurement officers would be allowed to wipe out
some of the endless duplication in military procurement . -57
He found during his tour that New Hampshire was still "Nixon country" and
that Nixon's cautious approach to the state had the "nation's first presidential
primary pretty well nailed dovm." But in contrast, Wieck felt the "Democratic
race is wide open," a conclusion that was not widely shared by his fellow
national reporters at the time he wrote it.
To suggest, at this point, that McCarthy could win would
be on the daring side of the ledger. But it no longer
seems impossible. McCarthy wears well. His insistence
oi\ rational discussion is in line with New Hampshire
tradition, which was summed up by Bill Cardoso of the
Boston Globe's bureau here: "The quiet, reasoned man
is always the first selectman." At the same time, he
is showing no relutance to jump on a genuine issue, such
as the pledge card.
This is in contrast to LBJ, who has suffered not only in
New Hampshire but nationally from too much exposure. On
the plane en route to New Hampshire, a young businessman
who sat across the aisle from me said he is a McCarthy
supporter this season. He explained that his "exposure to
McCarthy is "limited" but that his "exposure to Johnson
^
Isn't." He predicts McCarthy will do well in his Concord suburb.-
376
Wiock also found basis for his optimism in the New Hampshire McCarlhy
organization itself. While other reporters had tended cither to dismiss the
organization as amateur and inexperienced or to have neglected to consider
the organi^^ation as important to the effort Wieck wrote:
A rapport had developed between McCarthy's supporters —
as a group, they are bright, young (in their twenties
and thirties), attractive and basically uncomplicated
people who are thrilled just to have an alternative to
LBJ — and the candidate. There is an active statewide
committee of 300 backed up by at least 250 college
students from inside and outside the state. Dave Hoeh,
the McCarthy chairman, believes it is as strong as any
committee he has seen in his 10 years of New Hampshire
politics. They have set up headquarters in 10 towns in
addition to many neighborhood headquarters in private homes.59
He contrasted Vvhat he found in the McCarthy headquarters with the diffi-
culties the Johnson organij'.at ion was having both. in its operations and in its effort
to maintain control over a party that had long been proud of its independent
behavior. Against Boutin's portrayal of a unified Democratic Party supporting
the incumbent president, Wieck recounted the names of a number of local party
leaders who were not only supporting McCarthy but were actively involved in
the campaign. In communities where "newcomers" to politics madc' up the
committees, Wieck reported that "they are showing indefatigable spirit," with
the workers "amazed by the friendly response."
To a picture t!iat seemed to good to be true, Wieck added: "One interesting
facet is the amount of Republican support McCarthy is attracting. In several
towns, registered Republicans are actively urging a write-in on the GOP ticket."
To a woman, a registered Republican who said she might have to choose between
Nixon and Johnson in the November election, Wieck reported that McCarthy said
"That's like clioosing between vulgarity and obscenity, isn't it."60 As Wieck
pointed out that might be the November choice, but in February and in New
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Hanirshir.-., McCarthy was becomlni; an attractive altcrnativo net just for dis-
,';nnU-]od Deniocrats but also for disfranchised Republicans.
In fairness Wieck also recounted some of the problems that had kept his
press colleagues from embracing the McCarthy campaign as he did in his article.
He noted the "immobilizing" affect of Robert Kennedy's "agonizing" on many
potential McCarthy supporters. He felt it was an important sign that most of
Kennedy's people liad become active in McCarthy's campaign. His second concern
was the fact that the McCarthy campaign had had as its goal to win "only a
'psychological' victory rather than New Hampshire's 26 delegates." He wrote,
"None of his supporters could bring themselves to talk about a clear-cut
victory," but he concluded, "this should be corrected by McCarthy's own decision
to go for broke. It could be the very thing needed to maintain momentum at a
critical point in the campaign, and if it works, the timing would be brilliant."
In his final assessment before making his prediction, Wieck wrote:
There are two additional factors working against McCarthy.
One is time. As Dave Hoeh...
,
put it: 'We're trying to do
in eight to ten weeks what we should have had six months to
do.'
The second is his major issue. McCarthy has been wise
enough not to frighten the shoe factory workers by
shouting 'brutality' and 'immorality' at them. But he
is asking them, in his own words, to make "a harsh
historical judgment," to say to the country's leaders
via tlie ballot box that Vietnam is costing — in lives,
money and moral energy — far more than can be gained, that
the decision to make a stand there is not even a good
military judgment... that we aren't fulfilling our
goal of 'building a nation' but doing just the opposite
and that we should summon the moral courage to negotiate
for a coalition government that would include the National
Liberation Front (NI^F) and, if the South Vietnamese govern-
ment resists tliis, proceed to deescalate until they're
agreeable.
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That is .-1 I (It to .'isk of a shoe worker, long
ahuseci hy the jingoif^tic language of the cold war,
conditioned to respond to all tb.e cliches about the
'threat of international communism.' Nevertheless,
a linotype operator in one of the plants McCarthy
visited told a reporter that he plans to vote for him
and added that, at the American Legion club, where he
does his social drinking, they were beginning to 'talk
McCarthy. '62
After their weeks of trying to get the message through to the many
reporters they had talked with, the McCarthy leaders finally read the complete
story as they felt it should be told. Wieck had independently found what they
had felt during the six weeks since McCarthy's New Hampshire announcement. The
campaign was reaching voters; McCarthy was skillfully developing his positions
and his rapport with New Hampshire; the problems were being overcome, and
a noticeable change from a candidacy of protest to a candidacy for the office
was in the offing. No other reporters or columnists had been so bold as to
report v;hat Wieck had reported. It would have been enough to have left his
conclusions as they were, considering the questions that still hung over the
campaign, but Wieck was willing to walk to the end of his own journalistic plank.
It would be inaccurate to say the votes for Senator McCarthy
were there in mid-Februax.-y . He might be lucky to get 30
or 35 percent of the vote. But the write-in votes weren't
there for LBJ either. On the whole, the press appears ready
to award McCarthy a major psychological victory if he gets
AO percent of the vote, which is very possible. ^-^
Both percentages were virtually unspoken by the reporters or by McCarthy workers.
The reporters were reluctant to predict what McCarthy might have or to project
what he would need for the result to be considered "significant." The McCarthy
leadership refused to play the numbers game with the reporters. Anything
above the 3 to 5 percent figure quoted by Senator Mclntyre would be enough to
show the folly of Johnson's policies. If the reporters had concluded that
McCarthy needed to got 35 percent of the vote they were neither saying
nor writing
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it. r„r publj.c;.tion. For W.icck to suggest t:l>at /,() percent: was the figure and
to go on to say that such a vote result was "possible" exlemled everyone's
thinking far beyond the reality about which they felt reasonably sure.
The significance of Wieck's prediction was that he wrote a number and by
implication attached his assessment of the reality of the McCarthy candidacy to
that percentage. In this way he challenged his colleagues to either agree or
disagree with his prediction. The numbers game was out in the open. Wieck
had made his evaluation, picked a number and was ready to stand by it. Since
the number was much higher than the McCarthy leaders expected, the confidence
which VJieck placed in the prediction became contagious. The herd shifted
direction and began to write in much the same manner as had Paul Wieck.
The article gave the campaign leaders renewed confidence. They had begun
to doubt their own evaluations and to feel isolated from a reality which the
press reported in spite of their best efforts to the contrary. With the shift
in the direction of the herd came new re-enforcement. The optimism that the
Ne^v I-.epublic story conveyed radiated to those who had been skeptical during
the earlier weeks. Money loosened up and offers of important volunteer
assistance came. An excitement that had been a part of the campaign from the
beginning now seemed to roll across New Hampshire and outside.
As the herd shifted it also dispersed. Reporters visited local head-
quarters, followed canvassers, accompanied celebrities, visited with volunteers,
attended meetings and assessed voter opinions across the state. Beyond a
political campaign the reporters found numerous human interest stories. They
worte about the. candidate's family, the campaign leadership, the volunteers,
the local activists, the campaign's l(^gistics and many otlicr subjects wliich
then found their way into sections of the newspapers not usually concerned with
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politics.
The impact: of this attention was considerable. With it came re-enforcement
which strengthened the campaign itself. A cycle of recognition, adding to credi-
bility, adding to excitement, attracting more attention, expanded the reach of
the campaign, which further increased its recogniMon, which made the campaign
formidable with national and international significance. The excitement
mounted so rapidly after the publication of Wieck's article, that one network
which had withdravm from covering New Hampshire after Governor Romney withdrew,
rushed back, with aJ.l it could muster, several days before the election.
Theodore Wlilte who had all but neglected the McCarthy campaign, also hurried
back in an effort to catch up with the ten weeks of activity he had missed.
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^'For the first six weeks of the New Hampshire campaign, Hoeh and Studds
were surprised to find greater interest on the part of the international repor-ters in their activities than the national media. London Times reporters
Lewis Chester and Bruce Page were frequent visitors. Claus Toksvig of Danish
national television, interviewed Hoeh on sound film on several occasions for
re-play in Denmark. A team of Japanese reporters visited the Concord head-
quarters to report the election returns by wire directly to Tokyo. Occasional-
ly, the international reporters would travel with the press entourage but
usually they travelled by themselves finding their ovm way to the political
contacts and stories.
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The Kids
During liis first vJsif to New Hampshire Al Lowenstein promised that the
1968 caini)aip,n vould attract tlie wide interest of young people and that they
could he expected to help with the McCarthy candidacy. While hoth Hoeh and
Studds shared this feeling, which came from their own work \<!ith. college and
prep sc1k)o1 students, they were not sure that Kew Hampshire possessed tlie
student resources to effectively staff a full presidential primary campaign.
The colleges, in most instances, were too far away from the city campaign
headquarters to permit the off-hour hetween classes participation that college
students enjoy.
Tn their strategy, Fioch and Studd'^ hpd encouraged the widely Iield
view that the Johnson renoninat ion effort might well be dominated by people
and resources fvo.n outside of New i;amj->shire . Realizing that th2 Johnson
image of a large, powerful, even omnipotent Texan capable of submerging friends
and enemies alike, was not well received in New Hampshire, Berna.-d Boutin liad
promised to run the Johnson primary cnmpaign totally with New Hampshire
people and New Hampshire money. Neither Texan nor non-New Hampshire Johnson
worker ventured openly, or from all accounts, privately, into New Hampshire
during the campaign. Bernard Boutin was in charge and did not feel he needed
the help. Given the reaction to his pledge card scheme and its representation
of trie long hand of Johnson, outside involvement in the Johnson effort would
only have exacerbated Boutin's prohlem.s. His campaign pian and strategy were
set and both depended on local New Hampshire Democrats who Boutin had
assum.med
would jump at the chance to demonstrate their support for their President.
3B3
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His concept- of tho caiii|i,i ijui v^iy (.nt .niy cleptuulcnl; on the veracity of these
intar-pers.:-uai cont.;.fcts. Thi> "pledge card" was the medium of the ro-enforcing
exchange. V/hen the tactic failed it was already too late for Boutin to change
his approach. The only notables whom he felt comfortable reaching for were
the major governmental or political officeholders of New Hampshire — Governor
King, Senator Mclntyre, and Party Chairman Craig — not imports from the
Johnson administration. Boutin was on the defensive vjith respect to what
personnel and monetary resources iic could muster for the President. On the
other side, the McCiirthy leaders knew that both personnel and resources had to
be imported or there would not be a meaningful campaign. Importing people
to work on a campaign would require care, especially when the public image
of protesting youth was far from favorable in New Hampshire.
With caution Hoeh and Studds began to suggest that volunteers would
be welcome in New Hampshire. They clearly feared that a sudden flood of
outsiders vjas possible and that it could destroy their efforts. Managing
the flow of outsiders became an important early task. To their relief an
early flood of hairy, mini-skirted, disestablishment, anti-war, ictivist
youth did not materialize. Perhaps if it had been a different season than
winter or if New Hampshire projected a greater tolerance of alternative
life styles, the flow might have been greater. What Hoeh and Studds came
to understand was that those most anti-establishment in their views,
behavior, and actions had been turued off toward politics much earlier. Those
who began arriving were typical of those of other generations who had been
attracted to politics as a moans of adjusting inequities in their societal
surrounding or as a vehicle of upward mobility and personal identity.
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Couiilod with these paitrcrns was, assuredly, a deeper than usual concern
directed toward the Johnson administration's handling of tlie Vietnam war and
the impact that policy was having on their lives and the values they held
toward society. Prompted by personal frustration and certain despair, the
few volunteers who arrived early in January came simply to help. There was
little to attract them to what must have appeared to be a cold and bleak
situation except that there was a campaign.
The first few volunteers to arrive in New Hampshire were either students
who could take time away from their studies, graduate or undergraduate, or
pre-career aduits who were between school, or work of an interim activity like
the Peace Corps. What was not represented was the volunteer who, while older,
was able to leave a job or profession to spend time in New Hampshire-
These who came later were at least ten years older than the students who
came first, and were willing to spend both their time and money to be involved
in the effort.
The flow of volunteers, at least in the beginning was less than
spontaneous. The few who were sent to New Hampshire were directed to Concord
through contacts with Lowenstein, Cans or those involved early in the national
campaign. John Teague who had been involved in the December meeting with
Senator McCarthy recruited student volunteers at Smith, Holyoke, his
own
college Ameherst, and the University of Massachusetts. He arranged
a regular
shuttle of cars to New Hampshire on weekends which later became
a chartered bus
Robert Craig wrote in his study of the primary voter's
behavior that
a schedule for the Dover, New Hampshire headquarters
dated January 10, 1968,
read: -11:00 a.m. opened headquarters, 5 guys
from Harvard arrived, 1 girl
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from lior.Lon, 6 typowrlLers goinp,, finlshGcl Wards 1,2,3, closed at 9 p.m."^
As his recollection shows there were a few student volunteers who v,7orked at
the campaign's earliest area headquarters, but with the exceptions of Dover,
Keene, Nashua and Manchester, cities near the large Massachusetts student
population, the volunteers trickled to Concord and were kept tViere.
Beside the early arrivals sent from national campaign headquarters.
Concord area students returning home for between-semester vacations got caught
in the contagion of the campaign. As an example one worker had a Connecticut
College friend from Concord, who when she arrived home called the headquarters
about the cam.paign. It was suggested that she attend McCarthy's January
26th speech and help with activities of McCarthy's first day in New Hampshire.
With her sister, a Concord High School senior, and several others from Connecticu
College and Concord High School, plans for a skiing vacation evaporated as
they all spent the next six days in the Concord headquarters typing address
labels and sorting lists. Her parents, who had expected her to ski and didn't
care much for McCarthy's politics at that time, were happy to provide meals and
beds for their daughter's college friends, and to watch their daughters quickly
mature as workers in a campaign. Her reaction was, "People were always asking
me why I didn't do something more important in the peace movement rather than
going around marching in protest, but I neven knew what else to do. I never
knew anyone in politics until Senator McCarthy came along."
The week before and week after McCarthy's January 26th New Hampshire
visit were periods when college semesters ended and students arrived in
New
Hampshire to work. To the doliglit of the McCarthy committee the
headquarters
bustled with activity. The work on the mailing labels progressed.
At last
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there were onoui;!^ people iirouml to take on the variety of taskij that had
to be accomplished either to prepare for McCarthy's visit or to sustain daily
work after the visit.
Recruiting liad been successful in attracting enough students to
New Hampshire during the last week of January and the first week of February to
build the campaign to a high energy level. It was the first period of the
campaign a time during which the McCarthy leaders were reassured of the success
of their plnnning, amazed that vacationing college students would, first come
to New Hampshire, and then stick out a week of boring work in the dismal
surroundings of the old electric supply store.
In her account Barbara Underwood noted:
If Greek architecture can be divided into three periods depending
on the decoration on the tops of its columns, so the McCarthy
campaign can be divided into three periods depending upon the
decoration on the walls of its Concord Headquarters.
In the early period, the decoration of the walls was stark
and simple, broken only by a few newspaper clippings and
the sketches of children made while their mothers (local
volunteers) typed or answered the telephone.
In the middle period, the walls were devoted to what might
be calJed college humor. There were sayings tacked up like:
"Strange Politics Makes Bedfellows" or in Yiddish the Avis
car rental slogan, "We Try Harder" or in German, French, and
Spanish, "No Smoking or Spitting."
In the last period, the walls were covered with elaborate
election charts, containing percentages and previous precinct
results for the entire state. They covered all available
space wich the ^xeeption of that covered by one huge picture
of Paul Newman.
While students were involved in all three periods of the campaign
not until the late January semester break that the tone of that involvement
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became somethiiAj; different. Before, and in many previous campaigns, younp,
people have helped but most had been occasional local volimteers workini; in
local headquarters, doing routine tasks without either great responsibility
ar. Influence in the direction of the campaign. The phenomenon that howenstein
predicted and that the New Hampshire campaign began to experience was that of
selfless, almost total commitment, to a political adventure where the symbol
was the war issue as remotely personified by McCarthy, the candidate.
In the beginning the students were as they had been in previous campaigns,
the workers. The between-semester break saw a headquarters busy with what
appeared as twenty-five or thirty nameless blurs typing, sorting, organizing
headquarters space without complaint or protest. Their task masters were the
Concord area local volunteers who kept track of the work flow, and the earlier
volunteers who had begun to assume leadership roles in the campaign. Toward
the end of the second week of the inter-session when some of those who
had
come earlier returned again, a murmer seemed to stir the typing.
After a
.week and, in some cases, even more of typing address labels
from almost
unreadable voting lists, it had occurred to them that this was a
peculiar way
to end the war. They had come not expecting to do much
more than type labels,
stuff, and seal envelopes but now after a week or more
of the endless drudgery
they wanted to know what it was for, how their work
fit into the concept of
the campaign, and the importance of their contribution.
When the unrest was
reported to Hoeh and Studds, they stopped the work,
gathered everyone in the
front rooTn of the headquarters, introduced
themselves and explained. They
discussed the strategy of the campaign and the
importance of being able to mail
directly to each registered Democratic and
Independent voter in the state.
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They iiur. in perspoct !.ve the iiiLserable typing task and expressed their regret
that there was no oilier way to do the job and that they, bright and valued
as volunteers, could make no greater contribution to McCarthy's New Hampshire
candidacy than to prepare labels. Following several questions about the
carapaign, McCarthy's positions and New Hampshire politics, the crew returned
to their typewriters, if not with renewed commitment, at least resigned to
continue.
The brief meeting accomplished.! subtle change in the attitude of the
volunteers. Before they had worked without a sense of context and tended to
proceed almost blindly as their individual energy and ability to concentrate
allowed. After the meeting they sensed that preparing the labels was their
job and as such they should become responsible for its organization and
efficiency. With the help of several of the long-term volunteers they began to
organize the job into separable tasks which could be understood and controlled
while at the same time being susceptable to changing personnel as volunteers
came and went. Gradually as the students organized, the local volunteers
began to lose touch with the work. Their own irregular schedules and other
demands on their time made it increasingly difficult for them to keep on top
of the schedule and flow of work in the headquarters. In this gradual shift was
a sense that the campaign itself had come alive.
Like any organization that is growing, the McCarthy campaign had its
pains. Symptomatic of this struggle was the lack of identification with the
campaign that the volunteers felt before their meeting with Hoeh and
Studds,
but another symptom was the difficulty the leaders had in finding
things for
volunteers to do. While this might sound like a contradiction
given the
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enormi ty of t he t ask ahe.ul
,
I Jko nny activity of the scale of a campalp.n, each
echelon can employ only those foi- whom there is support. Keeping the flow of
work and the flow of volunteers balanced was difficult throughout the campaign but
especially so in the early stages. Barbara Underwood reported, "One weekend
at the end of January, the Concord Chairman stopped into the headquarters and
was appalled by the number of college girls who were there for one or two
days and had no particular work assigned to them. He called his wife, asked
her to get a babysitter, then go to the headquarters and start immediately
A
organizing the students into something productive." What she did was send
several girls out on Concord's Main Street to hand out flyers announcing
McCarthy's up-coming speech, others went to a shopping center to do the same,
while still others were assigned to telephones and made calls inviting area
residents to hear McCarthy. For this she received criticism from two sides.
"One particularly attractive girl from Smith College felt she was wasting
her intelligence in coming all the way from Northampton and not being assigned
a more useful role in the cam.paign, while another complaint came from a
member of the local committee who commented on what she had seen on Main Street.
She thought it 'looked dreadful.'"^ Between the two criticisms vis the fact
that the arrival of the voluneers was not expected and the system was not
prepared to orient and absorb the sudden arrivals. There were not enough
tables, typewriters, chairs or lights and without these the priority work
could not be done. And beyond that there was almost no one in the headquarters
at the time the volunteers arrived who could provide either the tools or
the assignments that would turn the potential energy into a campaign product.
The local leadei's initiative in sending kids to hand out leaflets was a
pood ploy for the moment but hardly the best way to apply volunteer energy
to the machinery of the campaign. No wonder, as was reported to Barbara
Underwood,
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tlie girls oil Main Strcot "wore v^alking around looking tired, bored, and were
i-.nioklng."^^ Tl\ey had ncjthor been oriented to the campaign nor welcomed to it.
They had simply been given a task to busy tliemselves without knowing how to
behave while accomplishing that task.
Without much method, the McCarthy leaders squeaked through the two
week inter-session ilood of volunteers letting assignments and events evolve.
WTiile serious v;ork was accomplished, it was more an adventure, possibly a
lark, for the young men and women who came to New Hampshire those two weeks.
To succeed both the leaders of the campaign and the long term volunteers
realized that special attention had to be given to accommodating, orienting,
assigning and even, occasionally, de-briefing volunteers in order to gain the
full potential from the short-term visits.
One of the reasons Hoeh insisted that volunteers who expected to stay
in New Hampshire for more than a day or two clieck in with him, was his desire
to provide a basic orientation to the political ethos of New Hampshire and to
establish direct communication with che individual. I^Jhen that person then
left for an assignment, either at an area headquarters or to a specific task
in the state headquarters, the person knew who to contact if questions arose.
When assigned to a local office the person had the responsibility of working
closely with the local committee and responding to their suggestions. While this
dual responsibility to the state campaign and to the local campaign created some
tension it was necessary. Both statewide campaign needs and candidate preference
dictated that the priority response had to be to the state and national campaigns
but without being insensitive to local needs.
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The riork of vol uate.crs
. who came to Now Haini)shire during late
January r.nd ear.ly Februciry received almost no media attention. Studds and lloeh
'.^70uld sit in their office looking out on the main room of the Concord head-
quarters, and comment to each otlier that the room full of volunteers from
Amherst, Holyoke, Smith, Connecticut College, Yale, Harvard, MIT and other
universities was the important story of the campaign at that moment. In
spite of their best efforts to get the media to report the story attention was
minute. The first story to appear was written by a UPI Concord reporter who
met seven of the college volunteers. His interviews picked up some of the
reasons for the visits to New Hampshire.
'A lot of young people began campaigning for McCarthy because
of the war, Christine Howells from Connecticut College for
V/omen said. 'At first he was just a syrribol, but since I've
been working for him I now think of him as a president.'
These students try to tell you that McCarthy is more than just
an opponent of the war, 'If people would read the speeches
McCarthy has given they would realize McCarthy isn't a one
issue man,' Peter Sturgis of Harvard said ," : 'He points out
the symptoms, using Vietnam as his focus.'
.... Susan Solenberger from Smith feels 'the important thing for
this nation is to have an alternative. McCarthy is a declared
candidate.' sl^e added. 'It would be a sicker country if McCarthy
wasn ' t around '
.
The reporters had met these students while traveling with McCarthy during
his visit to Laconia February 8th. Neither he nor had others visited the
headquarters to see the activity there. These early contacts, first with
the local reporters and gradually with the national reporters sparked their
curiosity. As one reporter described: "... in New Hampshire it's sometimes
a pretty lonf^ly business campaigning for McCarthy. The caravan of two staff
cars and a reporter's car headed out of Concord for Laconia into the dark
,,8
New Hampshire night, looking like a convoy heading into enemy territory.
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WiLliout locals to interview on those rides the reporters came to knovj the
students, their reasons for coniinr, to New Hampshire, their expectations and
their backgrounds. It was something to do and something to report until the
caravan arrived at a rendezvous point where the local guides took charge.
It was during these early journeys that the reporters met a few students
who gave them the flavor of the campaign that was evolving. It would be sometime
later before the reporters discovered the headquarters activity and learned
that New Hampshire \;as becoming a mecca for a new volunteer force in American
politics,
Perliaps the reason this discovery took so long in spite of the efforts
of the McCarthy leaders was a coincidence in timing which found Roger Mudd
and his CRS film crew in an almost deserted Concord office late in January.
Mudd had come to New Hampshire to prepare a special report on the primary
election and had come to Concord to interview Governor King and visit the
McCarthy headquarters. He and his crew arrived at the McCarthy headquarters
at noon when botli local and student volunteers had left for lunch. Only
one volunteer was in the otherwise deserted building. Sensing that CBS was
about to carry a film story of an empty headquarters decorated only with a few
maps and children's drawings the volunteer frantically telephoned a local
home where some volunteers had gone for lunch. The attempt to get the head-
quarters activity up failed as Mudd interviewed the Concord chairman, who
happened by, while the film crew photographed his three year old son drawing
9
another picture to be added to those already decorating the walls. It was
hardly the image oE a vigorous campaign organizing to challenge the nomination
of an incumliciit president.
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Just ns siuldenly as the flock of students arrived at the beginning of
tlieir semester recess, they left. By Monday, February 12th only the few
long-termers remained and even the ranks of these had dwindled. That evening
when lloeh joined Studds in Concord, the headquarters was almost empty.
V/here there had been almost two weeks of constant activity that began early and
ended late in the evening, only a typewriter or two clicked and unfinished
stacks of checklists remained to be scanned for mailing label addresses. Once
again the trightenlng sense of loneliness and despair that the New Hampshire
leaders faced following the McCarthy's New Hampshire candidacy announcement
returned. The campaign that had been moving with groat speed until then lay
dead in the water. Fortunately it was a Monday. The press had left New
Hampshire with McCarthy, local reporters were catching up on other news and
few noticed that the headquarters of the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign was
deserted. Even the simplest tasks of answering a telephone, finding some notes
or determining the next priority seemed overpowering. For more than an hour
they stumbled around their small office, roamed the empty work room and tried
to figure out hovj they would resolve their predicament. McCarthy's candidacy,
they concluded, was a national campaign. To that moment, with the exception
of a trickle of money, little national support had arrived. They called
for help. First to Blair Clark, then to the people they had come to know
before McCarthy entered, such as Curtis Cans and Allard Lowenstein. Then
they called those they had constantly pestered for materials and assistance
at the national headquarters. The sense of confidence which had gro\m during
the previous weeks was gone. Their own desperation became urgent pleas for
new volunteers, long-term staff people and an assurance of adequate financial
support. With tlioir plea was a reminder that unless McCarthy succeeded in
Now Hanipsliire his Ci^mpaign and the test which his candidacy represented would
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be lost. Tlie McCarthy leaders were not willing to hide their predicament.
They desperateJy needed lielp. Tlie election was, they reminded those they called,
exactly one month from that February 12th date.
Logistics and Volunteers
While it was uncomfortable for Hoeh and Studds to have the February 12th
break, it was important for the future development of the campaign. It gave
them and the continuing volunteers a chance to assess what could and could
not be accomplished with volunteer help, to VThat stage the campaign had developed,
and to manage the next wave of activity. In addition to preparing the
mailing labels several other tasks had evolved. Students were traveling with
the Senator, helping to advance his visits, working with local committees,
aiding the press activity, receiving visitors, preparing campaign materials,
doing research aiid generally performing a multiplicity of tasks that were
not always at the direction of either the state or the local leaders. Their
initiative was especially engaging and something that Hoeh and Studds found
could be used.
With only brief instructions and an outline of what had to be done, the
students would develop an assignment fully, come back to the leaders to check
their plans and then go ahead with the project. This performance led Hoeh and
Studds to conclude that future management of the campaign's day-to-day operations
could be turned over to the volunteers as long as they understood that when
questions arose they were to check with either Studds or Hoeh before changing
an activity. What evolved was a series of departments within the campaign
organ I'^ed around particular tasks. The departments were almost autonomous
having their own organization, their ovm means of communication and their own
links to otlier departments which might share an objective. Hints of this
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eventu;)] orKanlznl ion Ivul aniuvirod eaillei- but now tl.c campaign loaders tool,
fu.l) advantage of the. opportunity.
Volunte^^rs needed places to sleep, eat and ways to travel. When the
flow was one or two volunteer arrivals every few days, local friends of the
campaign made room in their homes for volunteers. Even in the days of the
semester-recess migration local homes absorbed most of the arrivals.
Stretching the VN/alls of homes went only so far especially in cities like
Manchester were the McCarthy locals were few and far between. In desperation,
those who were responsible for housing volunteers began contacting churches
where a pastor was sympathetic to McCarthy's anti-war position. In Manchester,
Nashua, Concord and several other cities where major volunteer campaigning was
needed, church basements and activity rooms became weekend dormitories for
literally hundreds of kids — a term which came to describe anyone, young or
older, student or not, 'who came to New Ham.pshire to work for Senator McCarthy.
The first effort to have the kids arrive ready to work and survive in
New Hampshire was a vork-of-mouth instruction. Each should bring a sleeping
bag and if they had a portable typewriter to bring that as well. Transportation
was much less of a problem since most arrived in groups with their own cars
nut, occasionally, as with the Amherst shuttle, a bus was hired. In all cases
such charters were paid for by those making the trip.
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With i:l)e oxoeptlon of those who came and stayed for more th^n a
weekend no expenrfcis were paJd. Occasionally a starving student would turn
up who could not find money for a meal and the headquarters petty cash would
be tapped for a transfusion. In some cases those sponsoring cars and even a
bus or tv;o would raise money locally to sustain the volunteers during their
journey. The long term volunteers received a modest per diem which covered
the cost of meals, car operation if one were used and housing in the case of
those who had to rent accommodations. With the exception of a few of the
national staff who eventually came to work in New Hampshire and two secretaries,
no other campaign workers V7ere paid.
Beyond keeping a "straight-laced" even puritanical image for the
campaign, tb.e McCarthy leaders were concerned that New Hampshire might become
a haven for those wishing to escape school and parental authority. They
feared that someone might report to the press that their son or daughter had
been lured away to the campaign much as a legendary circus run-away. Unlike
the circus, which enjoys its reputation as an over powering attraction, the
campaign could not afford such a charge. To avoid the possibility, they
insisted that each person \-jho arrived to work in New Hampshire register through
the state headquarters or at the local headquarters. A printed card containing
space for the person's name, school, home address, person to contact in case
of emergency, home and school telephone, campaign assignment, and where they
were staying while in New Hampshire, had to be filled out by each volunteer
on arrival. These cards were kept in a master file in the state headquarters
to be used in case of emergency but as importantly, to demonstrate to any who
asked that the campaign knew its volunteers, ^^^-len a volunteer returned to the
state for other visits the card was pulled, the visit recorded, and then placed
In a special tile of those then working In the campaign .^^
Althoi:{;h no one made the charge which was feared, the file was used
to find volunteers in emergencies and also to keep track of persons who, be-
cause tliey returned frequently, could handle more difficult jobs. The whole
process of registering and then assigning volunteers to jobs became thorough
and sophisticated. Since volunteers came for short periods, usually weekends,
they did not want to wait long to be put to work nor did the campaign want
them to wait. After the confusion of the semester recess time the housing
department in the campaign became the conduit through which requests for
volunteers came not only to staff the state headquarters but also to staff
the local offices. Where in the beginning almost all volunteers would arrive in
Concord and then be assigned elsewhere, the volunteer operation began to
anticipate how many people would be needed for the local headquarters and then
contact the kids directing them to a local work place. This approach worked
especially we] 1 when groups of volunteers returned after a first visit. They
had become familiar with the campaign, their job, and could be sent directly
to a local headquarters without having to be oriented or having to learn an
assignment. In a short time these returnees had become professionals. They
knew what had to be done, how to do it and how to behave while visiting New
Hampshire.
The registration process bec£me a curiosity to reporters because in
addition to assignments by skills there was also a sorting by appearance.
The campaign had inside jobs and outside jobs. Those who wished to work outside,
that is either with tlie candidate, or representing the campaign, had to be
conservative in dress and appearance. In that time long hair male or female,
facial hair, short skirts or funky clothing were viewed as symbols of protest.
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Those arriving with trimmed hair, clean faces, conservative clothing and neat
appearances were assigned the outside jobs. Those who were more casual in
their appearance were assigned to the less visable jobs even, on occasion,
totally out of sight. With the exception of Studds' order to two bearded
men that they not associate with the campaign on McCarthy's first campaign
visit, peer pressure prevailed. To be "Neat and Clean for Gene" was the slogan
and a fact of the campaign. Enforcement of the slogan rested with the
volunteer leaders. Their code was stiff. It was, in their view, a privilege
to help and if appearance or behavior did not meet the image they had set
then the alternative was simple. Stay out of sight, leave New Hampsliire or
change appearance.
Once the criteria had been accepted by the earliest arrivals, the rite
of passage into the campaign was often more stringent than would have been
applied if the local leaders had enforced the code. At first there were a
number of hair cuts, beard shavings and hair combings around the headquarters,
but as the first v/eeks passed most volunteers arrived well groomed and often a
bit ever dressed for comfort in the New Hampshire winter. Sport coats,
even ties and dress shirts replaced sweaters, turtlenecks and army jackets.
The Second V^Jave
As Barbara Underwood noted in her account, there were three periods in
the evolution of the student volunteers' participation in the campaign. The
first was marked by the surprise arrival of students during the semester
recess and departure v/hen they returned to their schools during the first
week of February. The second period began during the second week of February
when, in response to lioch and Studds plea for help, a new stream of volunteers
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began. Like many others there were Ben and Rosann Stavis. They plauned to
spend more time than a weekend in New Hampshire. In the Stavis' s account of
their experiences he wrote, "...at the beginning of February, Rosann and I had
a block of free time. I had just passed my oral examinations and could leave
campus and studies for awhile. Rosann was working on her dissertation in home
economics education at New York University and could also leave New York. So
on February 14th, St. Valentine's Day, we took a bus to Boston and, next morn-
ing, another one to Concord, New Hampshire — almost four weeks before the New
Hampshire primary. We walked into the headquarters about 10:30 a.m., suit-
cases in hand."-^-^
Special Projects
Stavis and others, functioned as a small task force to research how can-
vassing might be accomplished. The McCarthy leaders admitted that they knew
little about the mechanics of door--to-door canvassing. They needed a full
exploration of the subject before trying it in New Hampshire. Some canvass-
ing efforts had been tried in an effort to reach voters with the anti-Vietnam
war ir<;ssage but most of these door-to-door contacts had been concentrated in
academic communities such as Cambridge, Massachusetts; Berkley, California;
Ann Arbor, Michigan; or Madison, Wisconsin. Canvassing had not been used in
any previous New Hampshire campaign that could be recalled. The work of the
task force led to forming a canvassing strategy and an important campaign ac-
tivity.
A Boston recruit, a thirty-year-old lawyer, John Grace, who had been
attracted to McCarthy through the activities of the Massachusetts McCarthy
Committee made a unique contribution to the campaign. After
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McCnrlhy sk;]t(-d in Concord, February 6th, lloeh and Studds wanted to capture
tl!G evunt in a way tiiat would tic McCarthy to New Hampshire's hockey mania.
Grace thouglit an ice scraper might be designed to look like a hockey stick and
have printed on it McCarthy's name and a slogan. Grace found that it would
bo expensive to create a new scraper shape and would take too long, but an
alternative could be to print a picture of a skater and slogan on the handle
of an available scraper. Grace placed an immediate order for about 5,000
of the scrapers each carrying the slogan "McCarthy Cuts the Ice — McCarthy
for President." Most were distributed in Manchester and where local organization
was weakest.
Another recruit for the New Hampshire campaign was a recently returned
wounded veteran of the Vietnam war, Carl Rogers. His convalescence almost
complete, Rogers arrived wanting to help. To use him as a regular volunteer
seemed to not quite fit his political potential. When he arrived Hoeh and
Studds discussed with him what he might do which would illustrate that the
war was not opposed just by the "peace-niks" "weak-kneed" or "lily-livered,"
as they had been variously characterized, but the war was also opposed by the
veterans who had fought it.
Rogers speculated a bit then concluded that he could speak on campuses
to help recruit volunteers; speak before local groups and service clubs,
and lie could bring together a new organization of Vietnam Veterans Against the
War, sometliing that had already begun. On the latter point he felt an
obligation to his fellow service men both those in and out of the military.
Hoeh and Studds felt that of the three the most helpful would be the latter,
organizing anti-war opposition among Vietnam Veterans. For Rogers to do this
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mc-nU- e:;t.ab].Ir,lvjnp, some distanco. between the McCarthy campaign and cliat of
the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Wliile coordination was Important,
for the Veterans to act independently of the campaign would give them greater
impact and credibility.
Rogers agreed that speaking before church groups, service clubs and in
the schools would be useful but he wanted to do more. He felt that he could
recruit a number of Vietnam veterans who would welcome the chance to come to
Mew Hampshire to help end the war, and that many of these young men would want
to do more than speak occasionally. His idea was to develop a special piece
of literature which stated the veterans' reasons for opposing the war, and
then distribute this themselves. While the New Hampshire leaders were con-
cerned about having separate groups use the campaign for special interest
advocacy, to them if any group had earned the right to state a separate
position it was the war's veterans. Regardless of what they did in stating
their position it would be difficult to discredit them or to tie the
McCarthy campaign to them in a way that would be damaging. In fact, Hoeh
and Studds felt chat even if the public reaction to the veterans' activity
was negative, the fact that a significant number of the war's veterans were
willing to take the time to work against the war would be unsettling to the
New Hampshire voter at the worst.
While not strictly "kids" in the usual definition of the word as defined
by the McCarthy campaign, the Vietnam veterans were contemporaries of the
college students but contemporaries whose experiences in Vietnam set them
apart. There was klnsliip between the vets and the other kids but a kinship
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that. V7as distinct when the vets began their efforts at anti-war political
education. The public perceived that the vets had paid dues, the others had
not, nnd, therefore, deserved a certain respect. For this reason, the Vietnam
veto were able to do things which would have been poorly received, given the
climate of the time, by their college student peers.
In addition to speaking and campus organizing, the veterans decided to
hand out their brochure on the streets and attempt to get passersby to discuss
the war. On weekends, during heavy shopping times, and during pleasant v^ea-
ther, the vets occupied street corners carrying a sign which identified them
as a Vietnam veteran. There they politely distributed the flyers, talked
with people and urged them to support Senator McCarthy's candidacy. Dressed
in their old uniforms they had a startling effect on those wlio had no direct
contact with the war. During the last three weeks of the campaign the ranks
of the veterans swelled from a few leaders like Carl Rogers, to forty or fifty
men. Since Manchester was the problem city for McCarthy and the one with the
largest Democratic vote, Rogers concentrated his fellow veterans there. On
practically every corner of the city's main thoroughfare, Elm Street, there
stood a veteran with his sign, flyers and a cluster of curious persons question-
ing and listening. Of the group that came to New Hampshire, many were not vete-
rans. John Fitzgerald, a captain recovering from wounds received in action, was
at the end of convalescent leave. He and a number of others found ways to come
to New Hampshire to support the veterans' activity while still either in some
stage of discharge or active duty. For those with time yet to serve, coming
to New Hampshire in uniform to protest the war carried serious penalties if
reported. Rogers' veterans seemed to melt in and out of the state when needed.
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From those, who iirrived in the second wave of volunteers came the princi-
pal leaders and organizers of the major activities of the last weeks of the
campaign. Each department in the headquarters ;^as staffed and often led by
volunteers who had either come earlier and stayed, or had arrived early in
February prepared to remain. Direct mail preparation, press relations, sche-
duling, canvassing, candidate support, volunteer recruiting and support, head-
quarters management, media preparation, materials distribution, special group
contacts, speakers scheduling and many other activities were staffed with in-
dividuals who had little or no previous political experience.
From the v/eekend volunteers came the workers who carried out the projects
that v/ere organized and planned during the week. Often students would return
weekend after weekend to vjork. Since the source of help became reliable,
those leading the various departments tended to keep track of their own volun-
teers and plan projects for them. An informal hierarchy evolved which placed
people according to how long they had been with the New Hampshire campaign,
how long they could spend during a given visit and how frequently they could
promise to return. At the bottom of the scale were those nevj arrivals who had
not been involved in the New Ilaaipshire campaign before and might not be able
to return.
In addition to the organizational change of the second period was a
change in the relationship of the early leaders to those who came later. Ben
Stavis recounted his impressions from the perspective of a volunteer arriving,
being assigned to a task and observing from that task the campaign he found.
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The Nrv ll;i.iiip.sh ire staff included very few Now lK-impsl\i.r I tcs
.
We did hire a mature local woman to be fvill-tiine receptionist;
slie could say "McCarthy" with the proper New England
nasal twang. Furthermore, she helped us find our way
around tov^n and the state. The local radical, a seventy-eight-
year-old woman who went to world fellowship conferences
all around the world, came to stuff envelopes. The Concord
co-chairman was Marcie Macey, a young housewife. (The other
co-chairman, a doctor, was vacationing in the Bahamas
during the last weeks of the campaign.)
...Another staff member from Concord v/as a boy of twelve
who built tables, desks, sleeping bag lockers, and telephone
tables with booths. The state chairman, David Hoeh,
thirty years old and an administrator at Dartmouth College,
came by from time to time with his wife Sandi (sic). They
were concerned with the media, with the Senator's schedule,
and with their own relationship with the state Democratic
Party. These broad responsibilities meant that neither
could supervise the hourly crises in the headquarters.
And since they were from Dartmouth, the staff they
recruited worked in Hanover. The state headquarters, then,
as it developed campaigns both in ^^ncord and in the entire
state, was dominated by outsiders.
Stavis had arrived in Concord just at the point when the transition from local
operation of the state campaign to operation by the imported volunteers had
occurred. In the early weeks the Concord McCarthy supporters had filled many
of the state campaign jobs as their personal schedules would allow. No one
from New Hampshire had been able to devote full time to the campaign as a
volunteer. As the tasks of the statewide effort grew, the local committee
members tended to recede to those local tasks that they, and only they, could
accomplish. These usually concerned scheduling Senator McCarthy, members of
his
family, special speakers and visitors with rounds of local events,
meetings and
publicity. They also were concerned with expanding the local
organization to
Included the ward and precinct level, working with special groups
and making
election day preparations. What Stavis did not see nor
understand was that what
had once been a small statewide organization on behalf
of McCarthy's candidacy
Kad now become a federated campaign.
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The Press Discovers the Kids
At; (loteniiincd as the Now Hampshire leaders had been to get the story of
the student volunteers told, it was not until the activity had been going
for several weeks that the reporters finally became interested. In fact
both IJoch and Studds were concerned that if the influx was not discussed by
the press that it might be attacked by the Johnson Committee in a way that
could be embarassing. They felt that there was a point at which an incident
coming from the student activity, might be picked up by either the Johnson
Committee or the Manchester Union Leader
. Either could have re-cast the
positive Impression which Hoeh and Studds felt the students projected into
something akin to an invasion of New Hampshire's sacred political rite,
an invasion by the same crowd that vjas then protesting in the streets and
occupying university administration buildings. Once the student's positive
role liad been established by the press, then it would be difficult to change.
Hoeh especially feared the Manchester Union Leader 's ability to destroy efforts
they opposed by raising the activity to one of public controversy. If having
students come to New Hampshire to work for McCarthy had been described by the
Union Leader as controversial before either the other state media or the
national media had had a chance to review the activity for themselves then, Hoeh
contended, the old adage "where there is smoke there must be fire" could have
prevailed. Instead of being warmly received in the communities as the notoriety
of the student activity grew, there might well have been hostility. The campaign
would not only have lost its manpower, but also the attributes of energy, charm
and sincerity which the students infused. To deny the campaign the manpower
alone would have been a deatli blow to the campaign that had been planned.
WhiJe boll) were firmly committed to the involvement of students and other
volunteers in the campaign, there were times when some questioned whether the
press and the volunteers should get acquainted.
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During tlu^ latter weekends of the canipnign when the flood wat? nearing
its crest the volvmtecr coordinators Vs'ould try to soften the rigors of a
Saturday of campaigning by holding a party late in the evening in the cities
where the volunteers were concentrated. These social events offered the
volunteers a chance to relax, warm-up and share their experiences before
trundling off to the basement of some church or the rec room of house to
sleep. Keeping the puritan spirit, booze was not allowed nor much else in the
way of party fixings, just loud music, milling or exhausted and slumped bodies
trying to sort out v;hat their trip to New Hampshire meant and how their
experiences could possibly help elect McCarthy and/or stop a war.
McCarthy \^7as scheduled to campaign in Manchester Saturday evening, February
2Ath. VJith the exception of the few students who worked as travelling aides
of the Senator, until that evening few of the students had seen Senator McCarthy
in New Hampshire. As usual a party for the volunteers was scheduled and, on this
evening, it was to be in the Manchester Room of the Sherator-Carpenter Hotel
in downtowT-i Manchester. The scheduled starting time about 10:30 p.m. was late
enough so that the candidate and the reporters would be tucked away after a
long campaign day.
McCarthy had travelled to Manchester from Berlin and arrived to tour
Manchester's busy ethnic social clubs. His car was followed by a bus load of
national reporters v;ho enjoyed watching the urbane McCarthy pass among the
startled patrons of Manchester's most prominant social spots. Before the
tour
began Curtis Cans had ordered the organizers of the student volunteer
party to
be sure that the party did not begin until after McCarthy's
tour was over and he
and the press had returned to their respective accommodations.
In fact he had -
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ur<lrrc d t hat t 'no partly should not: begin unt il ai:tcr 12:00 mJ.dnight whon ho. was
quite sure all of the reporters would be out ol sight. Cans was deeply concerned
that jf the reporters stumbled upon tlie party tiiey would see an unruly mob of
young people, ] istening to rock music and appearing much as did their peers
then protesting outside the political system. He felt that if this image were
projected the carefully managed effort would be destroyed in a welter of contro-
versy over the appearance and behavior of contemporary youth.
Hoeh liad been meeting with Cans V7hen Cans issued his order. As Hoeh drove
the short distance from the Sheraton-Wayfarer Motel, whore the meeting was held,
to the Sheraton-Carpenter he mulled over Can's order in his mind. IsTlien he
arrived at the Sheraton-Carpenter he had concluded that contrary to Cans his owii
view \v\as th.at the young people were the ones who had the greatest stake in the
campaign and their commitment should not be hidden. He immediately found the
person who Cans had talked to and said that he should continue with the prepara-
tions. The party, Hoeh said, would be held at the earlier hour. He then said
that he intended to not only invite McCarthy to meet the volunteers but also to
Invice the reporters, l^ien the entourage returned to the Sheraton-Carpenter from
the socJal club tour little betrayed the crowd that had assembled inside the
Manchester Room. A nervous Curtis Cans had m^ade sure that the large crowd of
volunteers was not straggling outside the hotel or even in the lobby leading to
the Manchester Room. McCarthy led the throng of reporters and film crews.
Into a darkened room almost packed with young volunteers strode McCarthy to
Instant applause from the crowd. One of the rare electric events of politics
occurred as McCarthy came in view of tlie several hundred who had come this far to
v^ork so hard for him. The television lights followed McCarthy through the crowd
to a low platform and microphone. Cans had made sure that those closest to the
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dour and nearest the pJ.Mtfonn were anions tlie "neatest and cleanest for Gene."
McCarthy spoke briefly, welcoinhio his workers with the now famous phrase, "you
all look like a government in exile," which brought a roar from the crowd. He
ansv7crcd several questions about his candidacy, the war and such, to which he
replied with his usual skill. The crowd, the press aiid Senator McCarthy were
delighted. The candidate, especially sparkled. It had been a long day for all
but each moment was savored as the rapport between McCarthy, his campaign and the
often cynical press blossomed. It had been a risky venture to bring the three
together under such inauspicious circumstances. As a result the three were joined
into a force of considerable power. McCarthy left for his hotel, the television
lights faded, cameras, note pads, lights and microphones were packed, and the
reporters, crews and volunteers made friends in the dimness of the Manchester
Room. If there was a love-in during the campaign, the evening of February 2Ath
came the closest to it.
The authors of tlie book The American Melodrama wrote of earJ.ier discussions
concerning students in 1968 politics which captured the concern many felt before
students, politics, media, campaign and candidate were joined as they were in New
Ilampsiiire
.
VJhile McCarthy supplied the all-important respectibility to the
enterprise, the students came through with the energy. Back in
November 1967, Robert Kennedy had discussed with Professor Galbraith
the kind of campaign McCarthy ought to wage in New Hampshire. Kennedy
was very emphatic on one specific point, urging Galbraith to tell
McCarthy, "Make sure this is a grown-up enterprise. He'll have
more Dartmouth undergrads than he could or should use. So let him
look out for that." That a campaign could be "grown-up" and yet
make lavish use o^^student volunteers was not part of the conventional
political wisdom.
With care on both tlie part of the students and on the part of those managing the
campaign, a "grown-up enterprise" materialized.
Like many of the more successful events of the New Hampshire campaign the
volunte.irs' party and the McCarthy visit were spontaneous. To have staged such
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a mooting would liavc bocn Impossible. If Cans' instinct" had been followed
Instead of lioeh's, the moment would have been lost; the students might have
viewed themselves as an embarassment to the campaign, and been less willing to
continue. McCarthy, himself, could have vetoed the visit, but he had come to
trust the New Hampshire leaders judgment. He also like the sincerity, intelligence
and energy of the young people he had met. Saturday evening, February 2Ath sealed
the pact between candidate, issues, campaign and an inquisitive, amazed press.
From then on a honeymoon prevailed that could not be dimmed as the press attributed
prodigious accomplishments to the nation's youth suddenly aroused to effective
political action.
Before February 2Ath, the reporters had begun to find the edges of the
growing volunteer body in the campaign. The student press from the schools
vjhoso students came to New Hampshire were the first to run stories about adventures
on the New Hampshire campaign trail. The Amherst Student in a February 12th
story headlined "Tlie McCarthy Campaign: Students, Speeches, Snoopy," recounted
the reporter's travels with the campaign and observation of the "Senator ... up
at 6:15 a.m. in 10 degree weather .:o greet Scott and Williams employees as they
arrived at work. Four Smithies, bedecked in cellophane-blue McCarthy hats and
holding 'Happiness is McCarthy' posters featuring pictures of Snoopy, told the
workers 'Senator McCarthy would like to meet you..." The writer's enticing con-
clusion for those who might consider heading for New Hampshire to campaign read:
The day in Laconia and Lebanon may not have been well oiled
nor the turn outs overwhelming, but the enthusiasm of
tlie volunteers which McCarthy is banking on heavily, was in
great evidence. Tlie four Smith girls had been campaigning
with the Senator all week, and they were still vibrant,
running alongside the Senator as he toured the dov,7ntowns of the
two villages, holding signs, handing out J.^terature, and
providing the needed spark of enthusiasm.
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The rcporuin}' by the student press was not always without serious criticism.
Tlic Yale Dail y News headlined a story about New Hampshire, "Bright Hopes and Dim
Realities," v;hich led "Despite a newly-polished campaign style, Senator Eugene
McCarthy gave little evidence in his swing through New Hampshire last week that
he can launcli a major attack there against President Johnson's Vietnam policy."
The article v/ent on to note places where the blame for the campaign's failure
might be laid. First noting that the "...daily press which tends to ignore a
candidate if he doesn't come up with a new and striking statement each day...,"
and "...McCarthy's organization which has only two full time paid workers in
III 5the state." Peter Donham, editor of the Harvard Crimson came to cover the
student activity in New Hampshire for his paper. He tried to retain his
journalistic neutrality, but eventually he became so attached to the campaign and
Senator McCarthy that he gave up not only his editorial position but college as
well and ran away to the press staff of the McCarthy political circus.
The New York Times printed its first notice of the student involvement
in New Hampshire February 18th \<rith a section heading which read, "College
Students Help," foilov;ed by:
The McCarthy campaign has been bolstered, particularly on
weekends, by college students from inside and outside the
state who have addressed and stuffed envelopes and done
other necessary chores as their contribution to the Senator's
campaign against the Administration's conduct of the Vietnam war.
As tlie result of Hoch and Studds' urging a few items concerning the student in-
volvement did appear in the New Hampshire press but these stirred only local
interest. Jack Hubbard of the Concord Daily Monitor , wrote in his February
7th coluimi:
McCarthy had become^ an inspiration for the
disonchanted Democrat, and the slogan (At Last,
Democrats have a Political Alternative) has
become a battle cry for his New Hampshire or-
ganization, most of whom arc political novices.
The McCarthy campaign perhaps has the least chance
of succeeding in New Hampshire but it is by far
the closest to the soil of political protest, and
it represents a significant grass roots movement.
The backbone of the New Hampshire McCarthy
headquarters is the college student, and many
of them believe McCarthy is the last bastion
of opposition in the existing political structure
to President Johnson.
On weekends, these students trek from all over
New England, pitching in with the drudge work of
the campaign, typing, pasting, mailing, and
answering the telephone.
Last weekend, more than 90 students came from
Amherst, Smith, Connecticur College for Women,
Mt. Holyoke, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Harvard, New York University, and Yale to work on
the McCarthy campaign.
Some of them were in Concord, while others
were dispatched to storefront headquarters in
Nashua, Manchester, Keene, Laconia, Lebanon, and
Dover to do office work.
Still otlier students went hunting for voter
checklists in Granite State towns.
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J lie govornor was rcndy Lo concede that the student power
Invasion has assisted McCarthy.
'They're a good, clean-cut buncli,'he said. 'l hope
they come up here and live and become good Democrats.'
The emphasis was on the word 'good.'
'They have stirred up curiosity and interest, and they
have very^^robably cut down on the President's margin.'
he added.
Even in the heat and bitterness of the last few days of the campaign. Governor
King, who did not spare his language when it came to McCarthy, knew that the
kids had v;on their way into the hearts of even many who would be voting for
President Johnson on March 12th. The fact that the kids had been attacked and
the public had come to their defense assured the New Hampshire McCarthy leaders
that they could expand the use of outside volunteers beyond headquarter '
s
assignments. To tliem tlie role of the volunteers had been legitimized. They
had survived an attack and were prospering through the special attention
the volunteers received in the press.
Unquestionably columnist Mary McGrory became the godmother or midwife,
depending upon one's view, who thrust the volunteers into national prominence.
After her first colum.n appeared a flood of reporters, film crews and subsequent
articles and television features reported on the volunteers to the point where
It almost became the dominant story of the campaign. Larger than life images
of an immense "children's crusade" were marched out of New Hampshire by film
and typewriter to a confused and cynical national populace. In a time when the
generations seemed irreconcilibly apart, the accounts of volunteer activity
from New Hampshire were refreshing if not completely reassuring.
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The st;vident.s are in contrast to the rank and file
party pro Liiat inipvjiates the "CltizGiis for Johnson"
headquarters in Manchester, and full time campaigners
working for Nixon and Romney.
During the week, the McCarthy activity lulls somewhat
because classes are in session.
Not until almost a month later would stories of the same depth be written for
national press. It was not until the Manchester volunteers party February 24th,
and the escalating fortunes of McCarthy in New Hampshire, that the national
press sensed there were more stories in the 1968 New Hampshire campaign than
those tied strictly to the activities of the candidate.
While Hoeh and Studds were sure that the Hubbard account was not premature,
the Johnson campaign saw an opportunity to take a crack at the volunteers
coming from outside tlie state. In a press conference Governor King commented
that the McCarthy campaign could not be considered as a serious threat because
it had failed to receive broad local support. In fact, he noted, the campaign
relies almost totally on college students from outside New Hampshire to support
its efforts. Concerned that this change might stir the investigative juices
of the Manchester Union Leader the New Hampshire leaders anxiously waited to
see wliat response might develop. Like other tactics of the LBJ committee
King's comments seemed to backfire. A number of local people were critical
of King's remarks explaining their o\vTi involvement in the campaign and defending
the assistance the students were providing with their local activities. Toward
the end of the campaign Governor King was quoted as having said, "It's those
damned kids," wlicn asked why McCarthy was creeping up on his candidate. In an
interview published four doys before the election David B. Wilson of the
Boston Globe wrote:
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Mary McGrory, who h.ul bL>on a Johnson supporter In her columns and even
his ally on the war, had come to appreciate the critique of Johnson's policies
by Robert Kennedy, but was captured by her friend Eugene McCarthy. A skeptic,
a realist and believer in the invincibility of an incumbent president. Miss
McCrory came to New Hampshire to cover McCarthy as a friend attempting to
ease- the pain of his Don Quixote quest. She then visited the state headquarter
and could scarcely tear herself away to write her column — a column that
became among the most important of the political year. The headline read: "A
Success for McCarthy: Closing the Generation Gap." Datline: Concord, N.H.
Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy is fighting hard here to close
the wide gap between himself and President Johnson in the
New Hampshire primary next Tuesday. Where he has already
been visibly and dramatically successful is in closing the
gap between the generations and making good on his promise
to civilize dissent.
It was no surprise that students from 100 colleges as far
west as Michigan and as far south as Virginia should rush
up here week-ends to give their all for an anti-war candidate.
VJhat is phenomenal is the reception they have been accorded
by reputedly hawkish natives who are traditionally unfriendly
to strangers.
Grave apprehension attended the first unleashing of youth
three v;eeks ago. It was widely feared that the senator's
'hippie' friends would deliver the coup de grace to hi-s
marginal chances.
But thanks to brilliant generalship on the part of the youth
director, Sam Bro\>m, a dropout from Harvard Divinity School,
and unexpected docility on the part of the students, the
enterprise has developed a spirit and life that has un-nerved
the pro-Johnson camp, beginning with Gov. John W. King.
Their parents and professors might not recognize the cheerful,
humble, willing volunteers who ring doorbells, sweep floors
and lick envelopes for 16 hours at a stretch.
From the moment their buses disgorge them and their sleeping
bags at the door of the state headquarters at Concord, they
are subject to a selection process that would outrage them
under any otlier circumstances.
The "straights'" and the "non-straights" are separated. The
"straights" (clean-shaven, neatly-suited and modestly-
skirted) are allowed to go out on the wards with file
cards and instruction sheets. The beards are put in the
back room to fold and stuff literature, as Beatles music boil
deafeningly out of the record player.
"Oh yes, I see the logic of it — be neat and clean for Gene,
said a 19-year old Indiana dropout with a straggly growth
of chin whiskers and wearing a button that said in Hebrew,
"We try harder."
"I realize I would be a shock to a New Hampshire Yankee.
I'd be an image-breaker for the senator. Four of the
others in the backroom arc candidates for PHDs in thermo-
nuclear physics at Cornell, so I don't mind at all," he
concl uded
.
One "hairy" made the supreme sacrifice for his can-
didate. Told at the door of the Unitarian Church in Concord
that his beard would keep him from engaging the voters
in doorstep dialogue, he asked for a razor and on the
spot shaved a four-year-older.
Those who pass muster in gentility, civility and kemptness
are given the classic instructions as put down in the
Democratic National Committee handbook — "be nice, pet the
dog, help with the groceries."
'Their sheet tells them "not to get too wound up on the war '
and suggest the argument — although they are sternly
forbidden to argue -- that on the war the "question is not
so much to change horses as to change streams."
The greatest coup of the youth movement perhaps was tc
recruit AO Yale "Frenchies" — graduate students in French
who could speak in their paternal tongue to New Hampshire's
enorm.ous French-Canadian community. One particularly fluent
lass straggled in from the wards six hours late. She had
been feted at every home she visited and was inundated in
wine, coffee, and gallic volubility.
In all, they have knocked on 60,000 doors. They report
back a "malaise with Johnson," a feeling of despair that
anything can be done, and much grumbling about high taxes.
Some of McCarthy's migrants wish he would speak more
forcefully about the war, but they accept him as he is.
They feel that liis quiet, rational presentation gives the
lie to the notion that he is a wild radical with an uncouth
following.
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i;; do! jj'JiLod wit h Llicm, overwhelmed by their
or}',ani:.:aL ion, devotion and self-discipline.
"My campaign may not bo organized at the top," he sand
after a conference with an advance man who is editor
of the Yale Law Review, "but it is certainly tightly
organized at the bottom."
The Concord headquarters, which is managed by Ann Hart,
the dissenting daughter of Sen. Philip A. Hart of
Micliigan, a Johnson supporter, is now engaged in trying
to hold back an expected invasion of 2500 for the last
week--eiid of the campaign. They can only handle a thousand.
Several scores of Concord and Manchester families have
offered to put up the visitors, and churches have let
tliose with sleeping bags use the floor, St. Anselm's
College in Manchester has contributed the beds of students
who weekend away.
Sam Brown makes no great claims for the effect of his
young army. "I don't know whether we're just having
a good time or we could make a difference. All I know
is that we're the one thing McCarthy's got that nobody
else in this campaign has or could get."
A 17-year- old high school drop out laboriously inscribing
a stencil about a McCarthy meeting, said: "Sure, I'll
tell you why I'm here. It's the only decent thing to do."^
Mary McGrory's remarkable column stamped a permanent label of meaning-
fulness and legitimacy on the role of the yomig volunteers in the campaign.
While written late in the campaign and long after New Hampshire residents had
become infatuated wit;h the student effort, she did mold the activity in
language that had a tremendous impact across a distressed nation. Shortly
after the column appeai'ed a steady stream of reporters and network film crews
arrived at the Concord headquarters wanting to see the backroom and the
basement wlierc it was alleged the "hairys, the freaks, and the non-straights"
of the campaign were laboring. To their surprise such a "chamber of horrors"
did not exist. Even at their worst, those working in the basement on the
mailings, were neat, clean, orderly, but with scraggles of beards and only
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sllghUv less than .•ulcuiuato skirts to face New Hampsliivo.
' s cold. What they
found in I lie 8 Ploiisant Street Extension store-front was a beehive of activity,
carefully departmentalized, orderly and exceptionally neat for a campaign
office. Even the ash trays, the few that existed, were emptied frequently.
Whether the order came from a compulsiveness engendered by the selection
process that greeted those arriving or because of the real fear of fire in the
old wooden building, would be liard to determine; except that almost all of
the local headquarters were kept in the same constant orderliness. Each seemed
to radiate energy, efficiency and seriousness which had its only counterpoint
in the humor of the occasional wall signs and the relaxed ease with which much
of the campaign's drudge work was accomplished.
The Third Period
It took more than a series of telephone pleas from Hoeh and Studds to
begin the flovj of staff and volunteers to New Hampshire. A lag, of sorts,
between the time that those who had come to New Hampshire and had returned to
school, and when they could convince others to go to New Hampshire developed.
Aggressive recruiting coupled with student press accounts of Nev7 Hampshire
experiences, expanding national press attention to McCarthy and the deteriorating
situation in Vietnam turned the trickle of volunteers into a stream that as
Mary McGrory noted in her column, reached flood proportions.
In their campaign planning, H.oeh and Studds had expected modest volunteer
help and had obligated themselves to tasks that volunteers could do. Their
strategy targeted the cities and towns where the campaign would have to be
especially effective in order to produce the votes needed. The priorities
were set according to population and a reasonable expectation of
volunteer
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oncrr,y. The mailing labeJ preparation was the first priority task. The
second, canvassing, something neith.er Hoeh nor Studds had had experience x,ith,
developed as the major volunteer activity as the numbers again swelled toward
the end of tlie campaign.
The logistics came to determine how many volunteers could be usefully
deployed. Gradually volunteers, who had come out of a certain Spartan resignation
about the effort were replaced by an increasing number who felt that the
McCarthy campaign had become an important "happening" and that if they
were to be a part of their times, to be contemporary or more among their peers,
they had to experience New Hampshire in 1968.
What had been first, an effort to get people to com.e, now became an
effort to sort and assign before they arrived, to an effort to hold back those
who could neither be housed nor given meaningful work in the campaign. In
the recruiting careful instructions had been given to those on the campuses
that they should not head for New Hampshire until they had called telling how
many would be coming, hov^ they would be travelling and when they expected to
arrive. They also had to have a destination assignment from the volunteer
department. As Mary McGrory reported by the last weekend of the campaign,
the volunteer department could house only 1000 volunteers, and the canvassing
department could only deploy that number in areas that had not been canvassed
earlier. Reports that upwards of 2,500 volunteers were planning to be in
New Hampshire that last weekend sent the campaign leaders in a panic. They
had to stem the flow but still end up with enougli volunteers to accomplish the
canvassing plans for the weekend. Through a series of telephone calls to the
sources for volunteers, the leaders were ab]e to d 1 5;courai;e those coming
the greatest distance and regulate the flow of those coming sliorter distances.
A campaign that might well have been overwhelmed by having too many people
to manage was able to protect itself.
When asked to tally the costs of the McCarthy campaign, Hoeh replied
that he though it was probably one of the most expensive campaigns ever
run in New Hampshire. Not because they had spent more money than had been
spent before, but because of the number of volunteer hours that had been
expended for McCartViy. In one calculation it was estimated that there were
over 5,000 individual visits to New Hampshire and that each visit had a work
day value of at least twelve hours. The per hour rate of $2.00 could easily
be assigned to each hour producing a conservative estimate of $120,000 worth
of volunteer energy spent in the campaign. Beyond the actual worth of the
work was the incalculable value of the image that was projected by the student
seriously at work for McCarthy. Their movement became almost as important as
the candidacy itself.
Footnote
What was often lost in the myth that grew larger than the reality of
the volunteer involvement in New Hampshire was that an important symbiosis
developed that made the happening. First, as Hoeh likes to recall, the "kids"
were not all that. Almost as many older people joined as did college under-
graduates. Many of those who managed the local headquarters were outside
volunteers, but volunteers like Arthur Herzog in his middle forties, or Fred
Willman, in his thirties, or Jon Grace in his thirties. With almost
every
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busload of volnnteers thovc would bo a mixture of faculty, faculty wives,
or older activists from the college to\^^us who came to New Hampshire to help.
But of far greater importance was the involvement of scores of local people
in each of tlie cities and to\^ns where the campaign developed. It was these
people who created the welcoming port-of-entry for the volunteers. It was
these people wlio guided the work, set the limits, oriented the newcomers, and
gave the activity a sense of competence and professionalism. Without this
subtle melding of locals and "kids", the effort would have failed. The
volunteers would have foundered in a sea of misconceived good intentions.
When there were questions, the locals were there to correct, reassure, advise,
and encourage. The same was the case at the state level where the state
campaign leaders were on hand to set policy, work through schedules and to help
keep the campaign in close touch with the political ethos of their state. The
campaign avoided both controversy and tragedy because the symbiosis prevailed
from the beginning to end. The same feeling that produced an effective working
rapport inside the campaign between volunteers and locals migrated outside
contagiously affecting the press, the politically alert and ultimately the
voting population. While there were occasional differences of opinion betv/een
the outside managers and the inside leaders, there was little if any hostility
encountered by those working in the localities. It was, unquestionably, a
unique and amazing social phenomenon.
Reflecting on the student effort after the campaigns of 1968, Richard
Goodwin, who had come to work in the campaign, said, "They were like the Viet
Cong. They couldn't be fought in the traditional way." Richard Strout added,
"In New Hampshire, there were 'nominal leaders' and 'coordinators' supposedly
in charge of one thing or another, but most of these 'led' because they simply
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happened to be tlune first. The tleiiiarc;it Ion between chiefs and Indians
was obscure. Everyone pitclied in to do anything." Strout went on to note,
"The Children's Crusade emerged just as the candidacy of George Roraney died,
and reporters from across the country began to focus on it as a new curiosity.
And, indeed, it was one of the most dramatic phenomena in the history of
American politics. But the reporters paid so much attention to the young
people that they missed the broader story of the McCartliy effort," he contended.
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C H A r T E R XI
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
H o.ad c| ua r te£s J)j_gani^atj^
Through January and to the middle of February Hoeh and Studds had attempted
to manage the campaign with their volunteers and through the odd moi^ents they
could spring from their jobs. They expected the Washington headquarters to
supply the essential ingredients of the campaign CBpecially all literature,
handouts, D.edia production, graphic designs and to arrange media purchases.
As with other campaigns with which both had had experience, these items were
prepared or ordered well in advance of the time when they were needed. The
timetable Hoeh and Studds had developed for the campaign specified dates when
items would be required. Radio time had been reserved, as had billboard space,
and some limited television time. Dates to begin canvassing were set as were
the dates when the first direct mail would be sent. While there was always a
Plight margin in the schedule for delays many of the times were critical. When
a radio reservation came due it meant that either the copy for an advertisement
was ready or the time would be lost along with the time and money used to pur-
cl:iase the space. As the sequence of deadlines neared, Hoeh and Studds realized
that little had been done in Washington to prepare the necessary materials.
Often when materials did arrive they could not be used because they were not
appropriate for one reason or another. Usually the problem was one of tone and
content that was i.-)0t consistent xv'ith hov/ McCarthy was campaigning in New Hamp-
shire or what Hoeh and Studds knew of the New Hampshire political ethos. These
early problema were frustrating but time remained to have materials reprinted
through Washington or substituted with inaterinls developed in New Hampshire.
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Working with the New Hampshire based advertising agency of Weston Asso-
ciates, Hoeh and Studds had begun outlining the media campaign that would be
required if McCarthy was to succeed. Their first effort was to have Weston
option as many billboards as were available in the key communities. Next he
reserved as much of the better radio time and television time available on New
Hampshire stations. With each time or space reservation there was a produc-
tion lead time and usually a time when cash must be produced in order to hold
a space reservation. On the word of Blair Clark, Weston was willing to use
his agency's credit to hold the media time. Production presented other prob-
lems. Billboard space was the first to be available. The national office had
not developed a logo, color scheme, or other aspects of a unified campaign
image. No official photograph was available. Clark was busy with preparations
in other states and Hoeh and Studds were facing the day toward the middle of
January when the first billboard space vrould be available without anything to
put on the boards.
Selecting campaign slogans can be among the most frustrating tasks faced
in a campaign. Seemingly endless hours are spent by mature adults sitting
around in meetings or in offices listing possible slogans that will capture
the essence of a candidacy in a phrase. The New Hampshire leaders expected
that this task would be performed nationally either in V7ashington or New York,
and that slogan, billboard layout and related graphics would come well set and
packaged for use not only in New Hampshire but across the nation. As the dead-
line for the billboard space neared, Hoeh and Studds realized that a slogan
had to be selected, colors and graphics determined and billboard paper printed
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or the space would carry the exiatinr. message while being paid for by the
McCarthy campaign. Without the usual protracted consideration, Hoeh and
StuddG decided that the phrase "...there is an alternative
.. .McCarthy tor
President" would run without a photograph. Using the same slogan and graphics,
stationary for the New Hampshire campaign was also printed. For Hoeh and
Studds the slogan seemed to capture what they sensed was on the mind of the
New Hcunpshire Democrat. To have been more direct and more specific would have
been more than the New Hampshire voter was prepared to digest at this early
stage in acceptance of dissent.
Wliat the experience represented to Studds and Hoeh was the beginning of
a migration of the national campaign to New Hampshire. Through January, New
Hampshire—from the standpoint of Studds and Hoeh—was competing for attention
et the national level. As the month progressed, and especially in the period
of reaction to the first McCarthy campaign visit. New Hampshire began to occupy
the top priority position. Slowly, in New York, Boston, Washington and across
the nation, those close to the candidacy or sensitive to the issues being
tested, sav; that if McCarthy failed in New Hampshire their efforts would like-
wise fail. Clark, the various political coalitions, the national office and
others began to realize that the total protest effort of 1968 rested on New
Hampshire, and that neither the resources nor the personnel existed to support
a national campaign until the political bridge of New Hampshire had been
crossed. The first concession to this conclusion was the arrival of a young
former Harvard Divinity School student named Sam Brown.
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Snm Brown had boon vorklnc as a volunteer coordinator through the New York
based Coalition for a Democratic Alternative (CDA)
. His ties vith Allard
Lowenstein went back to National Student Association activities and with Al
into the search for an alternative. While Lowenstein had bec-n almost completely
detached from the campaign since early December in Chicago. Sam had actively
sought to put flesh on his promise that the nation's student population would
respond to the opportunity of the McCarthy campaign. Sam Brown was the first
of the national staff to come to New Hampshire. He provided the first sus-
tained link V7lth the New York and Washington bases of the national campaign.
Now that Sam Brown had arrived and Hoeh and Studds had poured out their
frustrations with Washington and the national campaign, some changes began.
Brov7n had not only Clark's ear but also the confidence of the CDA leaders in
New York. He affirmed the New Hampshire leaders' concerns and urged that
Clark assign quickly some one to manage New Hampshire who could connect back
effectively to both New York and Washington. Clark responded by releasing
Curtis Cans from his non-primary states desk. By February 20th, Cans was in
New Hampshire to assume the long vacant position as the full-time campaign
manager. On his arrival a migration of campaign personnel from Washington
and New York began.
Cans realized that the campaign could not meet its objectives unless it
was staffed with long term volunteers and the response time between New Hamp-
shire and Washington was significantly reduced. To accomplish both of these
requirements meant that almost all activities pertinent to the New Hampshire
campaign would have to be based in New Hampshire and that where full-time
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staff were not available in New Hampshire, they would have to be broupht in
from outBide. The migration he iimnedintely stimulated practically stripped
both the Washington and Now York offices of the key desk assignments along with
a group of willing volunteers capable of assuming management of most of the
local headquarters.
With the exception of two campaign activities, scheduling and fund raising,
all else was managed from the Concord headquarters. From Cans' arrival to the
end of the campaign, almost the total national McCarthy effort emanated from
New Hampshire. Clark remained in Washington with the skeleton of the national
staff and, of course. Senator McCarthy maintained his senatorial office's
contact with the campaign. Scheduling of Senator McCarthy in New Hampshire
was managed by Sandra Hoeh from her Hanover home and campaign financing
operated wherever money could be raised. The principal sources continued to
be Hew York although long time friends of McCarthy also became major contri-
butors.
In spite of the staff shift. Cans began to experience the same frustrating
delays and inaccuracies which had plagued Hoeh and Studds in their efforts to
work through the Washington headquarters. Instead of relying on Washington to
produce radio and television materials Cans and his staff began producing them
through the Weston Agency in New Hampshire. Ad layout and materials prepara-
tion remained somewhat dispersed with preparation occurring in New York as well
as in New Hampshire but the communication was direct and responded to the
critical media deadlines.
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GnuH assumed daily headquarters' management responsibilltieo
. Most of the
operating departments of the campaign were organized and staffed at least to a
limited extent before Cans arrived which meant that most worked smoothly with
minimum supervision. Cans completed the area headquarters staffing and made
sure that each was supplied with materials and properly tied to people in the
headquarters who could respond to requests for help. Hoeh and Studds retained
scheduling policy, overview of materials preparation, management of staff vs.
local relations, general supervision and press contacts concerning the New
Hampshire aspects of the campaign. In addition to Cans' daily management
assignments he moved quickly into an important vacuum that had developed when
Washington failed to produce suitable radio advertising materials. Cans spent
long hours working with Merv Weston and his staff preparing radio advertising
copy, lining up celebrity endorsements and assigning the completed material to
media markets and time slots.
Perhaps better than anything else, campaign materials preparation illus-
trated the complications caused by the confusion which resulted from conflict
between New York and Washington. The New York City based Coalition for a
Democratic Alternative had become a substantial political action organization
several months before McCarthy announced his candidacy. With McCarthy's can-
didacy the locus of political action shifted from New York to Washington.
When the CDA was not invited to become McCarthy's national campaign organiza-
tion or to have much of a role in that organization outside of New York,
conflict, developed.
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The conflict might have faded quickly if the national McCarthy campaign
had hecn able either to preempt CDA's financial base or to create its owi...
With the exception of the private resources of people like Blair Clark and
Martin Peretz, the early McCarthy candidacy drew little substantial financial
help. CDA kept its own large treasury and were willing to release it to the
McCarthy campaign only upon their own terms. During the early weeks of the
New Hampshire campaign CDA was the best, and often the only, source of posters,
reprints of important articles and campaign flyers. While this material did
not have McCarthy's stamp of approval, it did help the New Hampshire leaders
show that a serious campaign was in the making. Eventually. CDA's leaders
and Blair Clark resolved their differences. Some of the CDA staff moved to
Washington, some to New Hampshire, and the rest continued fund raising and
other support from New York. For much of the campaign, however, CDA and
Washington remained independent with the result that both produced campaign
material for New Hampshire that reflected their respective images of what the
campaign should be, rather than what the New Hampshire leaders felt was
appropriate.
Early in the campaign a series of one sheet, black and white, 8h x 11
inch flyers v/as printed, each with a distinct message, usually a quote from a
prominent national or international leader, followed on the reverse vrith other
quotations and McCarthy's responses, l^/hile the format was effective, the tone
was often not. Avoiding the rule that all materials must be checked before
distribution, several flyers escaped from Washington to New Hampshire without
clearance. Of tVie two most controversial, one carried a photograph of General
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Douglas MacArthur. braided hat, dark glasses and corn cob pipe with the quota-
tion, "Anybody who coimnit. the land power of the United States on the Continen
of Asia ought to have his head examined." The other carried a photograph of
Pope Paul VI seated on the papal throne with his hand raised in blessing with
the quotation, "We cry in God's name STOP..." On the reverse were quotations
from Pope Paul, Richard Cardinal Gushing of Boston and Bishop Fulton J. Sheen,
under the title "Religious Leaders Speak Out on Vietnam."
Although a strong piece of campaign material, the McGarthy leaders felt
that the MacArthur campaign piece could be used selectively in New Hampshire.
The Pope Paul VI piece seemed to them to be questionable under the best of
circumstances. Shortly after the materials arrived in New Hampshire, Hoeh
received a call from Senator McGarthy then campaigning in the midwest. He
had heard about the two pieces and wanted Hoeh's description of them and
reaction. When Hoeh finished reading and describing the Pope Paul flyer
McCarthy said, "Don't use it." Hoeh said he did not think it was what McGarth
wanted in his campaign and that it would not be veil received in heavily
Catholic New Hampshire. That night the several boxes were sealed with tape
and early the next morning taken to the Concord City landfill and buried under
that day's city refuse. A campaign worker watched to make sure the boxes were
not broken open but buried intact and completely. The MacArthur flyer was
used after McCarthy accepted Hoeh's advice on how it might be effective.
The ultimate irony of the difficulty between Washington perceptions and
New Hampshire materials needs came when a long awaited brochure arrived. The
carefully developed text had been attractively laid out in a graphically ap-
pealing format. There McCarthy was shown meeting voters, in formal poses.
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with his family, In uniform as a baseball player, with President John F. Kennedy
and, in a 5h by 14 inch fold at the bottom of the brochure, meeting New Hamp-
shire voters before the Kennedy memorial bust in front of the Nashua City Hall
on his first day of campaigning. The New Hampshire leaders had specified how
the brochure would be used as a mailer in addition to general street or door-
to-door distribution. With the brochure was to be a two page letter and a
return mall card,l all stuffed into a number 10 envelope. When the brochure
arrived Hoeh took two pieces of paper and a 3 by 5 card, folded it together
and stuffed an envelope for weighing. He found the package was one and one
half ounces in weight. Wliat was expected to be a one ounce first class mail-
ing now would double in cost or have to be changed. To Hoeh and Studds this
was the final straw in their frustration with Washington. Together they ex-
ploded over the telephone to whoever answered. It was much too late to print
a new brochure or to change other aspects of the mailing. What they found was
that the weight of the mailing could be reduced below the one ounce limit by
tearing off the photo flap with the New Hampshire picture. The next several
days were occupied by volunteers tearing off the one part of the brohcure that
was New Hampshire.
As the critical deadlines neared, the frustration turned to desperation
as the communications between Washington and New Hampshire failed to improve.
Neither Hoeh iior Studds seemed to be able to penetrate the barrier of distance
or to communicate the urgency they felt concerning McCarthy's fate in New
Hampshire. Wlicn Curtis Cans arrived he confirmed what Hoeh and Studds had
been saying for more char a month. What had been a national McCarthy campaign
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with resource, and personnel scattered across the ot_),e_r 49 priu,ary and non-
primary states quickly shifted to support only one primary
. New Hampshire.
The Washington headquarters had attempted to staff and organize both primary
and non-primary states, develop a national press and research operation, or-
gani..e scheduling and advance desks, stimulate fund raising, Bmnage primary
state campaign media and numerous other national campaign related activities
that completely occupied the limited full-time and volunteer staff then avail-
able. What Cans did that the New Hampshire leaders had not been able to do
was to assert that without a success in New Hampshire there would not be a
meaningful McCarthy campaign after March 12th. This meant that New Hampshire
had to be the top priority concern of everyone in the Washington headquarters
and, for that matter, ever^^where else in the campaign.
Within the week of Cans' arrival the shift was complete. Almost all cam-
paign materials, radio advertisements, television material, newspaper ads,
and the like were prepared in New Hampshire. Printing was done elsewhere,
sometimes, but as the time shortened before the election, so did the lead time.
Doing things in New Hampshire gave the campaign managers the highest level of
control. The result was that the conflict was reduced to a minimum, campaign
materials, advertisements and media production tightly controlled. It became
possible to adjust the content of items that were already in production to take
advantage of new opportunities. A maximum level of flexibility v;as possible
within the production and distribution constraints of each medium. Cooperative
printers, radio and television production personnel and distributors, who them-
selves caught the excitement of the campaign, made sure that the McCarthy cam-
paigners received the best possible service.
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Canvassinc
The canvassing priorities were the same as the canpaign's other priorities
as outlined by the December 21st and January 7th memoranda. The heaviest can-
vassing efforts would be conducted in the cities with the largest Democratic
registration and so on, ^.orking dovm the list by population. They hoped to
canvass as many cities and towr.s as time and volunteer energy would permit.
The style of the canvass would dictate how much could be accomplished. If it
were to be a simple literature drop, then only a few hours would be needed to
cover most communities. If it were to involve finding specific households and
contacting pre-identified voters, then the task would be much more complicated.
Those involved in the canvass planning concluded that something more than just
handing out campaign material had to be accomplished. Principally they agreed
that some type of voter contact would be important to provide the campaign with
feedback. All agreed that the major canvassing push would have to be during
the last three or four weekends of the campaign which allowed approximately
one or two weekends to experiment and then to complete the canvassing strategy
that would be adopted.
At approximately the same time as these deliberations were in progress,
the Keene McCarthy committee began its ovm canvassing effort. David Hoeh had
discouraged them from their original intention which had been to take the is-
sues of the v;ar to the doorstep rather than simple support for Senator McCarthy
Tljeir idea for the issue oriented canvass had come as an extension of the "Viet
nam Teach-in" concept. They had thought that if the war were the principal
reason for McCarthy's candidacy, not his nomination, then the issue was the
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real concern, not promoting McCarthy's candidacy. Hoch advised that most
people would not be prepared to discuss world politics on their doorstep and
Height be offended by the stridency of the contact. He suggested that if a
contact at the door was made that it should be directed to the support of
McCarthy. The Keene committee adopted this advice, prepared their own can-
vassing literature and reported considerable success in their efforts.
Several days before a final meeting to adopt a canvassing strategy, Hoeh
received a call from Dr. Al Shepard, a New York based marketing specialist.
Shepard wanted to volunteer some time to the campaign. He profiled his ex-
perience as a product researcher and marketing adviser for a number of large
corporations and prominent products. He suggested that the campaign might
need assistance in identifying issues and strategies that would outline McCarthy's
market appeal to New Hampshire voters.
Cautiously, the campaign leaders pursued with Shepard what he might offer
the campaign. Shepard indicated that the canvassing concept was much like a
marketing study conducted before a new product was introduced or to evaluate
the public's response to a product that had been offered. The challenge, he
suggested, was to develop ties between the public's mood and Senator McCarthy
as an acceptable alternative to President Johnson. The purpose might not be to
displace the President as the Dem.ocratic party's presidential candidate but
rather to demonstrate through votes the public's skepticism. Shepard approached
his marketing analysis from the motivational perspective of the buyer or the
voter.
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Sheparcl agreed to work with tl^ose preparing the canvassing materials, draft
Instructions for the test canvass, and also conduct a training session in the
techniques. Hoeh advised that the test should be made in a city that had
political and ethnic characteristics much like Manchester where the percentages
of registered Democratic voters was high. He noted that Somersworth
, located
in the .southeastern corner of New Hampshire came close to resembling Manchester,
l^ile a small city, approximately 9,000 population, it had a long tradition of
strong Democratic Party loyalty, contained a sizable percentage of French-
Canadians in its population and was isolated. The city was tucked in between
Rochester and Dover without much contact with either city or vdlth the social,
political or economic activities of that area or, for that matter, much of
the remainder of the state. If the canvassing was successful in Somersworth
it could be used in other cities with similar characteristics such as Nashua,
Manchester, Berlin, Claremont, Lebanon and Laconia, and perhaps other less
Democratic and less ethnic cities as well. Hoeh was reasonably sure that word
of the test would not leak far from Somersworth since its links outward were
limited, but the city would be a valid test case because the campaign had not
received much attention there. If the canvassers did sense a favorable re-
sponse to their approach, or at least not hostility, then Hoeh felt a canvass-
ing activity statewide would be worth the risk.
During the remaining few days of the v;eek, preparations for the test V7ere
made. The maps, voter lists and instructions were prepared with packets of
campaign materials that had been selected to state McCarthy's position on
those issues which Shepard thought might be most on the voters' minds. When
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the voluntoev. bog.n
.u-vlvin, for tho. vcokend. the „o.t cxporlcnced and best ap-
pealing oC the volunteers were selected to reeeive Shepard's training. lUey «er
told vhat their assignment would be and found that almost all of those who had
been picked were delighted to do something more than prepare .ailing labels or
sort campaign materials. The canvass would give them a chance to .eet New Hamp-
shire voters themselves and to express some of their o^'r, feelings about the Is-
sues In the campaign.
The fifteen or so selected met with Shepard for the training session early
Saturday morning. Shepard, a forceful Individual, emphatically described the
does and don'ts of the agreed upon procedure. The canvasser was to ring a door
bell, offer a pleasant greeting and introduction, hand the packet of McCarthy
material to the person at the door and then respond to any questions that might
come. If there were no questions then the canvasser was instructed to end the
contact with a phrase such as, "I hope you will consider voting for Senator
McCarthy, March 12th," and then go on to the next door. Between contacts the
canvasser was instructed to note on the address card what the response had been
at the door. Had it been positive, negative or undefinable? The volunteers
were advised not to become involved in debates or to be trapped in lengthy ex-
changes. If they met hostility at the door they should end the contact as
quickly and pleasantly as possible and move on.
Each canvasser was to receive a package of address cards for approximately
25-30 households. The amount of work time for the pack was expected to be
about five hours. Each volunteer was asked to carefully assess each aspect of
the contact and to precisely record any reactions that they might encounter at
the door. The fifteen got in their cars and headed out of Concord for Soraers-
v/orth. It was a cold, grey, snowy day when most people found themselves not
wanting to venture outside. It was February 10th.
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Those who had prepared for the canvass busied themselves in the headquar-
ters but verc preoccupied
.uch like the officers of an air squadron that has
just sent its plan..s on a mission. If the canvassers ran into serious problems
they were to call for instructions. One of the leaders of the expedition who
had had some earlier canvassing experience with civil rights work in Alabama,
did call to report they they had arrived and were not meeting hostility. What
concerned him was that in the early contacts they had had difficulty determin-
ing who the person at the door was supporting. He attributed this non-response
to the inexperience of the canvassers and the weather.
In the dark of the late winter afternoon the canvassing volunteers strag-
gled back to Concord. The looks on their faces were unsettling. They were
cold, tired
»
disappointed and frustrated. They reported that it had been al-
most impossible to detect differences in the reactions from one contact to
another. There had been no hostility, but at the same time there was almost
no recognition of McCarthy or willingness to discuss him or the issues he
represented. People had accepted the campaign material courteously but the
doorstep exchanges had been brief as the person who answered hurried to get
back inside, out of the cold and away from the door. The canvassers described
their own Increasing misery as one brief contact led to another, each seeming
colder and less personal than the last, with each increasing the depressing
combination of being cold and feeling the isolation of being alone in a strange
place.
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The Je-brieflng o£ the canvassers revealed both positive and negative
results. m.Ue the contacts had been cold and remote there had been no antagonism.
Hoeh explained that New Hampshire people are apt to be shy and reluctant to re-
veal their own feelings. Shepard responded to this observation by suggesting
that perhaps the next test should be a bit more challenging. He felt some
questions could be asked or analogies between McCarthy and issues raised that
would call for a response from the person at the door. Discussing this idea
with the canvassers they felt they needed something more than the campaign ma-
terial and a phrase of introduction to bring a response from the person at the
door. They had hoped that they would be able to discuss some of their own
feelings concerning the war and related Johnson administration policies. When
this did not happen their disappointment increased and with it their own
uncertainty. They felt that some local preparation for the canvass might also
help to encourage people to express their opinions to the canvassers and to
understand why the canvass was being conducted in their community.
Shepard, calling upon his motivational research experience, advised that
both leading questions and pre-canvass preparation should be tried to determine
whether a useful rapport could be established between the canvasser and the
persons being canvassed. He recalled that that week's edition of the Saturday
Evening Post carried a cover story written by retired General James Gavin
titled, "We Can Get Out of Vietnam." Shepard thought that the Gavin article
might be a means of linking McCarthy and the canvasser to a respected national
figure, not a candidate, who was critical of the administration's war policy.
Twenty copies of the magazine were purchased and Shepard prepared modified in-
structions. The canvassers were scheduled to return Lo Soraersworth for addi-
tional testing Sunday afternoon February 11th.
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ShepardVs Sunday morning training session varied on two accounts from
the one that had been held the day before. First he advised the canvassers
to be more active in their contact at the door. As the lead for the contact
he demonstrated how the Gavin article should be used. His instructions read;
I'm from the McCarthy for President headquarters. This
week in the ^aturdax Eveninr^ Post, General Gavin has
expressed his ieeling that \^ Can Get Ouj^ of Vi^iiam.
I'd be very interested in your own feelings about the
war from what you have seen on television and read in
the papers.
INSTRUCTION
:
listen to the person 's response
Senator McCarthy feels that although we started out to
hel£^ in Vietnam, since 1963, the war has become more
and more an American war. It is our boys who are
fighting (mostly). Why?
During this introduction, Shepard advised that the canvasser have his or her
copy of the magazine folded to the lead page of the article and that the lead
page be. clearly in view of the person being canvassed. Following the offer to
explain "Why?" the canvasser should mention as reasons a summary of Gavin's
argument such as
:
Corruption in the government: Even in their own rigged
election, the present
government received only
about 30% of the vote cast.
The people do not support
the government— that is
why it has become an
American war.
Effect on United States: Over 2 billion dollars a
month is being spent in
Vietnam - over 70 million
dollars a day. This (70
million) is more than the
total fiscal budget for
1967-1968 in New Hampshire:
The 2 billion a month would
keep the New Hampshire
government going for almost
30 years.
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Result? The request for a
10% tax increase (by the
Johnson administration)
.
After suggesting aspects of the impact of the administration's policy the can-
vasser was advised to suggest some ways to get out of the war. Again rather
than referencing the positions of McCarthy the candidate. Shepard advised that
the Gavin article be the source for ways to withdraw from Vietnam.
How do we get out - how do we stop the waste of tax money
and more important, the loss of life?
General Gavin's article re-
commends much the same thing
as Senator McCarthy.
1. Properly support our boys
in Vietnam by bringing the
scattered planes, ships
and forces from North
Vietnam and the hillsides
to the cities in South
Vietnam,
2. Cease fire on our own ini-
tiative. Maintain a holding
action in the cities. We
would fight back if attacked,
and the forces and equipment
to do it would be there.
(See Step #1)
3. Specific offer to mediate
the situation. Some specific
city, some particular media-
tor (U Thant, the Pope, etc.)
To conclude the contact Shepard advised linking the issues with the importance
of the person's vote and Senator McCarthy's candidacy.^
What yovir vote meana
:
• 51% Lyndon B. Johnson: Lyndon B. Johnson write-in is writ-
ing yes, I want my taxes increased;
yes, I want more boys sent into
Vietnam.
51% Eugene J. McCarthy: Congress may think twice about tax
increase; people in other states
encouraged to speak out; open Demo-
cratic Convention.
Restore the spirit which existed
before 1963 — exemplified by
Kennedy
.
The canvasser was then told how to record the responses after the contact
had been concluded. Instead of a three point scale of favorable-to-McCarthy
,
favorable-to-Johnson or Indefinite, a five point evaluation was advised. The
five points v/ould give the canvasser a way to classify all contacts. The
headquarters could then analyze areas where additional campaigning might move
voters toward voting for Senator McCarthy. The new scale read:
1. Favorable to McCarthy
2. Indifferent but leaning toward McCarthy
3. Totally indifferent.
4. Indifferent but leaning toward Johnson
5. Favorable to Johnson.
WViile all involved felt that a pre-announcement of the canvass in a com-
munity would be desirable, in the case of the second test scheduled that same
day for Somersworth, it was impossible.
As the canvassers left for Somersworth the canvass organizers began to
have second thoughts on what the test might produce. They were concerned that
the attempt to engage the voters might produce the hostility that they feared
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might be m the background of the New Hampshire electorate. New Hampshire
voters, after all, were reputed to be "hawkish- toward the Vietnam policy and
to have a strong sense of national loyalty that might not pennit the question-
ing that the new canvassing approach emphasized.
The long Sunday afternoon passed as had the previous afternoon while the
canvassers worked and the canvass organizers waited in the Concord headquar-
ters. Late that afternoon the canvassers returned. Their experiences had
been the exact opposite of the day before. Instead of the non-response,
they had been able to start conversations that revealed not the feared hos-
tility, but a deep concern about the issues that the canvassers raised.
Often the canvasser was invited inside to talk and pursue the interview.
Wii]e few canvassers could report that the contacts led to number 1 cr
"favorable-to-McCarthy" responses, it was clear that the war was on people's
minds and that they were willing to discuss it with a stranger. There had
been little or no hostility either to the contact or to the appearance of a
young, quite obviously college aged person on the doorstep. Even in working
class, isolated Somersworth, the President and his administration's policies
had produced concern rather than unquestioning loyalty. The canvassers were
stimulated by the effort and had returned warm, anxious to canvass again,
and genuinely surprised by the hospitality that they had experienced.
The careful de-briefing of each canvasser discovered little that was
not positive about the experience. Shepard's advise had made it possible
for the canvasser to get beyond the introduction of the day before. They
found that when the did go beyond the Introduction, the contact wanted to
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talk ana appeared al.ost relieved that so.eono was willing to discuss their
concerns. Occasionally a person would note that they had not been able to
talk with .:belr owr. children and that it was nice to once again speak in
friendly tones
-with someone of their o.^ children's age. The fact that the
canvasser was a stranger seemed to be a positive asset. Many said that they
had not talked about these things with their friends, neighbors or relatives
They did not want to broach controversial subjects with people who were clos
to them in their working or personal lives. ^vT^at appeared to Shepard as he
analyzed the de-briefing, was a tread of repression. People had masked or
buried their personal concerns about the state of their nation and the un-
settling impact of this concern on their personal lives. The canvassers
gave them a chance to reveal these concerns without threatening higher
valued social communications. The canvasser, obviously from out-of-town,
would have almost no V7ay of betraying the momentary trust that the contact
placed in the conversation. The canvass contact produced what amounted to
a moment of mutual relaxation. The canvasser derived a feeling of at last
accomplishing something meaningful in terms of personal opposition to the
v;ar, while the contact seemed to enjoy opening a hidden part of his/her own
psyche that had been protected from doubt. The test had clearly produced an
important new campaign tool. There would be one or two other tests in other
communities before a full-scale effort was organized but at least the dimen-
sions of the technique were now known and could be developed.
Joel Feigenbaum, a Cornell graduate student in nuclear physics, jumped
on the data that the canvass had produced. He was thirsty for a chance to
analyze the canvassers' reports. He drafted charts to record the daily can-
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va«slng results and to estimate the support such an effort would require.
Others could estimate the number of contacts that each canvasser could make
during a weekend in New Hampshire, and from that project the number of can-
vassers that would be needed to cover the priority cities. The job of pre-
paring voter address cards, maps and canvassing instruction packets for the
tests then had to expand to cover a much larger effort.
Within a day or two of the tests, canvassing became the major volunteer
activity of the campaign. Preparation for a full-scale effort would require
the full attention of each of the principal leaders in the test. Shepard
refined the canvassing instructions to specific details. Each canvasser
would be given a copy of the instructions and be required to sit through
an orientation session. Those first volunteers who had canvassed in Somers-
worth became field operations supervisors. They would conduct the training
and then lead a canvassing crew to a priority community. The leaders were
responsible for distributing the canvassing packets and then collecting the
completed cards at the end of each day. These cards were then to be returned
to the state headquarters for analysis.
In many respects the logistics of the canvass became almost as important
as the canvass itself. There had to be close coordination between the seve-
ral supporting departments within the headquarters and then similar coordina-
tion between the state headquarters and the area headquarters. Canvassing
Instructions, materials for distribution, maps and supervisors had to arrive
at the right place at the right time in order to be sure that the brief time
the volunteers could spend in New Hampshire on a weekend was put to productive
use. To guarantee that the orientation for the canvassers was the same in
Berlin as it was in Manchester, and to .ake sure that the canvassers under-
stood the importance of their role, the supervisors were carefully oriented
to their jobs by both oral and written instructions. While the role of the
local committees in the canvass was one of logistical support, the supervisors
were instructed to check their plans with the local connnittee and to observe
their advice. From the beginning the cooperation between the local committee
and the canvassing activity was excellent.
By the third weekend, February 24th, the reporters had discovered the
canvassing story. Film crews would follow canvassers and reporters began
telling the story of a mystical relationship that had begun to develop between
the canvassers and the New Hampshire voters. The stories themselves often
served as the means of pre-advancing a canvassing visit. The area headquar-
ters would release canvassing dates to the media with the result that the
canvassers were often expected when they rang a doorbell. Residents were
ready with their own questions and welcomes. The result was that the can-
vass showed a major shift favoring McCarthy.
Felgenbaum carefully analyzed the date he drew from the cards turned
in by the canvassers. Shepard concentrated his skills on evaluating the de-
briefing reports from both the canvassers and the field canvassing super-
visors. Both evaluations kept the campaign in close touch with its impact
and progress. Feigenbaum prepared weekly reports of the canvassing results
by area. He began to detect a shift from the "3" group to the "2" and from
the "2" to the "1". In some areas the shift was more dramatic than others,
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but in all area. th. raove to.a.d McCarthy was shown and that .ove increased
in intensity as the weekends passed. McCarthy's percentage of the vote crept
fro. 20 to 25 percent when the I's and 2's were taken together in the first
veek, to 25 to 30 percent in the second week, and 30 to 35 percent in the
third week. Feigenbaum began to project election percentages which had
McCarthy approaching the 50 percent figure, a percent that all had thought
was impossible in the earliest days. Wl.at was of greatest concern was the
fact that the movement toward McCarthy was less vigorous in Manchester and
in Nashua. Both cities accounted for much of the state's Democratic primary
vote. Wiile the Keene, Concord. Portsmouth and Laconia areas were reporting
canvassing support for McCarthy exceeding 50 percent, the number of voters
in those areas was far less than the expected turnout in Manchester and Nashua
Shepard accepted Manchester as his challenge. In addition he would keep
close tabs on the de-briefings to find what approaches to the voters were most
convincing. As he evaluated these de-briefing reports he would formulate
changes in the issues to be emphasized and the approach of the canvassers.
In this way Shepard was able to monitor the flow of the issues and to adjust
the details of the coming weekend's canvass to respond to a new event or
issue that had been either produced during the week or was found to be impor-
tant to the voter.
The instructions that were developed for both the canvass and for the
past-canvass reports document the thoroughness of the planning and the execu-
tion of the canvass. Under the title "Information for Volunteers" the follow-
ing mimeographed instructions were given to each canvasser.
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INFORMATION FOR VOLUNTEERS
^
>Jict£_abjnit^
- Approximate figures on voter reris-
Ind ndeL'l ^ ' ' ^^^'^ Democrats, vith Dem^ Ls
?oti^fo'.ttf H
'''^^ (^^^>' approximate number)\ ing pat erns, however, give Republicans 54% and Democrats 34%.The Governor, John King, is a Democrat, and the Senate seats are
split between Norris Cotton (Rep) and Thomas Maclntyre (Dem)
. Kingand Maclntyre arc very active on behalf of President Johnson.
Independent voter registration means that the voter has nevervoted xn a primary before. Crossing over is not permitted, and a
voter can vote in a different primary only if he changes his regis-tration 90 days beforehand.
The primary is a two-part affair. There Is the selection of a
slate of delegates to the national party convention. These may or
may not be pledged to a particular candidate. Then, there is the
preferential primary, in which the voter indicates the candidate he
would vote for in the election itself. In this part of the primary
it is possible to write in the name of a candidate of the other
party. These votes do count in the final result.
The Canvass - Part of the purpose behind the canvass is to de-
termine the nature of support for the Senator. There will also be
the effect that we have upon the voters as the Senator's personal
representatives. Our appearance and behavior will have as much ef-
fect as will the fact that he is interested enough about the public
to send representatives to answer their questions and solicit their
opinions. We also hope to convince them that the Senator is the
candidate who vcill best voice their concerns.
Your approach will therefore be indirect. You are to feel out
the voter's opinions before pressing any of the issues (e.g., the
pledge card, Vietnam, taxes and Inflation, Johnson's credibility).
You want to put yourself inside his frame of reference and discover
how he comes to the conclusions he comes to. Be a good listener.
The pitch v;ill vary with your o\m style, but bear in mind cer-
tain things.
1) Always mention the name of the person (s) on your card. We
want to know if he has moved, died, etc.
2) Always identify yourself as a representative of Senator
McCarthy.
3) If the Senator has been in town recently, mention the fact,
ask the voter if he has seen him. If he is coming shortly, mention
when and where he will be appearing, and that he would very much
like to meet the person you are talking to.
4) Never ask if he is going to vote for McCarthy. Your most
direct bid will be "I hope you will consider voting for McCarthy."
The following are two different approaches, which you may find
useful to consider:
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is offoriio TT. r-* I
volunteer for Senator McCarthy, who
(Break
^'"'^"^ .-i^oun} an alternative to Lyndon Johnson.for conversation of a general nature, about weather, scenerynexghborhood, etc. Mention if Senator has been or will be in to\^Conversation should drift soon to Senator and issues. You can pr^lduce least controversial piece of literature and discuss it, or askIf he^ knows anyone who has been sent to Vietnam.)
^^^11°
,
I am representing Senator McCarthy, who isrunning for the Democratic nomination for President. I wonder ifthere are any questions I could answer for you, any issues you wouldlike to discuss, if I could interest you in some literature...."
Remember that you are there at their service, to answer theirquestions, and discuss the issues that interest them, not to pressyour opinions on them or pressure them into voting one way or the
other. You may be asked what brings you to New Hampshire. Let them
see how urgent you feel it is that everyone consider the issues
carefully, and how important the New Hampshire primary is for the
\jhole nation. Being from out of state can be turned to an advantage.
Perhaps you do not have a primary in your state so you cannot express
your opinion on this question except in this way. A lot of people
commented favorably on the interest shown by young people in coming
out to canvass.
When discussing issues be sure to state the Senator's position
rather than your own adaptation of his views. If you are not familiar
with these positions already, consult the pamphlet' that has been pre-
pared well before you venture onto the streets. Certain issues will
probably recur as follows:
The Pledge Card - You should know that the Democratic State Com-
mittee has openly endorsed President Johnson, before the voters of
the state had a chance to express their opinion. They have sent out
a pledge card to all registered Democrats. These are individually
numbered and it is a fair assumption that there is a master list with
numbers checked off as they are returned. Voters may express resent-
ment at coercion and thr threat of reprisals, and also feel that
the secrecy of the ballot is being violated.
Taxation - You all know that McCarthy is against a tax increase
at this time, and that much of the taxpayers money is being used for
graft and corruption in Saigon. But did you know that the war is
costing every person in the U.S. $150 a year, that more is spent in
Vietnam every day than goes into the N.H. General Fund every year,
that N.H. taxpayers pay $2 to Vietnam for every $1 that goes into
the General Fund. Your voter may not know it. Tell him.
The War - Don't get too wound up in this. You have only a short
time in which to deal with a question you have spent a great deal of
time and thouglit on.
- It's not so much a question of changing horses, but of
changing streams.
- McCarthy does not support unilateral withdrawal, but
rather a negotiated peace. "Never negotiate out of fear, but never
fear to negotiate."
Qt.AT,r,^ Ar.
'^a^T?! asaq^ ij^jA uvo saas
^oj Oi^ll pue aMO pa^anm spaco aq, a^ea^dag
'scravo ITY HAVS
-oad asou, nonoj aseaid 'passpAUPO uaaq seq Paan ;inor^a5^
saofjjo T^uo-[:3a)j
-^xv :o4 passaappy
yu-pssBAUG0--4soj rsuo-c4ona4sui
•qaojja a^oA aq:j rjno-^aS aq^
UBid o5 pasn 3q pxno^ s:nnsa:i sshauho aqa ^oq pa^BOxpuT :inq <s3insaa aqn Sut
-naoda.t JO aouu^joduix aq:i panoqs /Ljuo qou suoT^ona^suj Sutssbaubd 3sod aqi
3daoop :}ou oq
-ciot^iuod tpoot isa:tuau aq:j o:j myq aajaa puc qsxi^i stupaoaaa 'Kauom aAxS o:j ao >iaoA aaa-4unxoA op 0:1 saqsxA aa^oA t? ji 1
*
•aa-40A aqi q^xA gnSan xo XaSut? :ja3 40U oq -
•aa^oA aq3 jo aouasaad aq^ uj uojricraaojux pjooaj
aaABN -patjo aqrj uo ^obj aq:j a^ou «paxp ao paAooi seq aaqoA aq^ jj
«3Jcn:iuaa5jx SABax pue VN P^bo aqrj tJtaBm «araoq auo ou sj aaaq^ ji
Xq^aeoDi-i 04 oxq^aoABjufl (g
uosuqof 04 axqr?joAi?5 Axqxssod tjnq uxeqaaouQ (17
uoxuxdo ON (£;
KqqaB30>i 05 axqcaoApj Xxqissod qnq uxp^aaoufi (Z
XipjBooH oq axqHJOABj (x
rsAioxToj SK iCqaaT^OOR
.C^TTTqsaoAPj 50 aaaSap 3uxaais-p3a:i «asnoq aq:j
SAuax noX aaqjB pat?o qoea uo a:iou b a-j^Hm XTP'^ nox -
•iivi'i 3HI. io AH^Anaa xonHisao o,i ivd3iii si ii 'xoa iivh
ani NX II IQd ION Oa •ax'^issod jx saoop uxboi puB uaaaos uaawqaq
^n^i 'aaaqq srqq aABax *amoq auo ou sj aaaqq jx uaAg 'asnoq
qosa aoj ajnqBaaqxx Jo ^locd b uaAjS aq XTT^ "OA -
•quaooaiaa^a * 5uapuadapui=i 'uoxqBXXTgj'? A:j:tccl q^jw po^;iBtii aaB asaqq
qBqq aojqou XTP>^ no^ -aapao jo qno qaS qou xiT'^ ^^oq:! os aABax noX
aaojaq spasa aqq .xaqran.M 'aaAoa oq ajB noK BaaB aqq jo dBui b puB
sassaappB qqpn spaBO jo iioBd b aAjaaaa xiT^ "ojt - aanpaooaj
iOOe$ S4SOD ruBUqaxA up uo^qdraaxa qjBJtp b qBqq Mouit
noX pxa "spxo jBaA 6T P«t? 8T sqj SuxqjBjp qaA qou sx iBqq 'aAjs
-uajjfo qajL aqq XT^"" XouaSjaoia x^uoT-l^u jo aqBqs b aaBx^iop qou pxp
q(?T{.i *aB.n SjBaTjc'.ai\r sv sxqq spjit?f{aa axu.kIo qopu/v pub[ b uj 'sxcrapx
UBOXJoiay Sujqoinoad qnoqjf.n 'AXyQ^IP^'fu a^p XT'J-''^ ^^^'^ ounoX jo spuBS
-noqj qoxqrt up '.xr/rt jo subd^ jo qoodsoad aqq quasaa^l -
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to ? . ' -"nr ^^^^"^^^ ^^^^ addresses)the. Concord Oliflce. one addressed to "Jessica" and oneaddressed to Verlin." Jessica and Verlin are or.anLing
Klen%rTfrJ"' activities respectiJeJv.eep the third copy of ONES and TWOS for your oZ office^
Separate out all the "moved". "Deceased"
, etc. and remove.Send these cards to the Concord Office, addressed to VerlinSome of these will be challenged on election day.
Separate out all cards for convalescent homes, nursinghomes from the rest. Most of these people have not been
contacted because an appointment is required. It xd.ll beup to the local headquarters to arrange appointments
with these people.
If you have many cards v;hich have "old" or "elderly" x^rit-ten on them, these should be separated out also. It wouldbe helpful, if possible, to have local people go to canvass
these people. They are not effectively canvassed by youngpeople.
If you have any questions, please contact John Barbaieri,
your canvassing liaison at the Concord Office.
Dated: February 28, 1968^^
These instructions showed that another phase of the campaign was about
to begin. As with the earlier phases, the leadership x^as anticipating and
planning activities that would come next in the sequence. Cans assigned his
assistant, Jessica Tuchman, and another former Washington headquarters staffer,
Verlin Nelson, to begin preparing for the immediate preliminaries of the
election. The canvass offered an unforeseen chance to build a get-out-the-
vote effort around those x,7ho had been identified as inclined toward voting
for Senator McCarthy, Since the trend was moving strong in McCarthy's favor,
it seemed useful, or at least worth the risk, to follow-up canvassing contacts
with second visits or telephone calls. Both were Intended to increase the
commitment of the potential McCarthy voter, and to increase the probability
that the person would actually get out and vote. VThere it also
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appeared that the trend of the ca„vasoi„B return, showed especially strong
movement toward McCarthy, the THREE'S and even EOUR's were re-canvassed In
hopes that they ..ight be either encouraged now to support McCarthy or, in
the case of the FOUR's (leaning toward Johnson) they might be either neu-
tralized or shifted toward McCarthy.
The canvass produced a number of secondary effects that added Important
momentum to the campaign. When originally conceived the canvass was intended
as a simple contact between a McCarthy worker and the voter. The media hype
that the canvass received and the strongly positive response the volunteers
themselves received, had not been anticipated. The total venture became a
happening. New Hampshire residents were entranced by it and often were re-
ported anxiously waiting for the canvass to arrive in their community and at
their doorsteps. The Johnson campaign had neither an alternative strategy
to combat the canvassing flood nor a means of attacking it. The McCarthy
campaign leaders were less concerned about an attack from the Johnson cam-
paign leaders than some damaging event caused by the behavior of a volunteer.
From the first weekend of canvassing to the last the leaders anxiously waited
for that telephone call reporting a drug bust, an automobile accident, some
sort of violence or any other embarrassment that might sour the public's
taste for the canvass. Wiile there were minor incidents, an occasional traf-
fic violation or nervousness on the part of a local police force, nothing
developed to the point of an embarrassment. In all cases the volunteers
exercised extra caution and courtesy taking to heart the campaign's warning
that their behavior was a direct reflection of the campaign. Habitual
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speeders cut their .peed. Having a McCarthy sticker on a car. especially
one with an out-of-state registration, was a heavy burden. It was carried
by the driver as if it was a personal credential from the campaign that this
person was the Senator's ambassador.
Direct Mail
Although the canvassing activity assumed the spotlight of the campaign
during the last weeks, the preparation of the mailing continued. In some
cases it became so difficult to extract usable mailing labels from voter
registration lists and address sources that other ways had to be found to
mail. At first the leaders resisted abandoning the idea that only registered
Democrats and Independents should receive the mailing but as the mailing
deadlines neared, they considered blanket mailings to all resident addresses.
Hoeh had used a commercial direct mail firm in Manchester during earlier
campaigns and had been pleased with the cost and the result. From the time
Cans arrived he and Hoeh discussed how the mailing should be handled. Both
agreed that the laborious process of creating the mailing labels should con-
tinue as long as it was feasible and there were enough volunteers to do the
work. They also agreed that when the volunteer power was needed in other
aspects of the campaign there would have to be a shift away from the mail labe
preparation. About three weeks before the election Cans saw the mail effort
lag in his assessment of priorities. He thought the canvass would accomplish
much of what the mailing had been originally conceived to do. He shifted
volunteers away from the mailing. Cans concluded that in those communities
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where the mailing labels had not been nrcmrpH n io p epared and where the canve.ss shox^ed
trends toward McCartliy that it wm.T^l un I ould be acceptable to blanket mail to all
addresses and not be concerned about wasting mailings on Republicans. At
the sa.e ti.e the campaign managers reviewed their strategy for the
.ailing
m light of the canvassing returns, especially given the strong returns fro.
many of the smaller co^^nunities. These returns showed that the percentage
favorable or leaning to McCarthy was substantial. To reach more potential
voters tucked away in the less populous towns, the leaders extended the list
of tov^ns that would receive mailings. The only way to mail to these towns
in the time that remained would be to use a commercial mailing house and
blanket all addresses. They hoped that some of the Republicans who received
the HcCartliy mailing would write-in the Senator's name on their ballot es-
pecially since Governor Romney had withdrawn from the Republican contest.
This change was purely one of strategy and did not affect the mail pre-
paration work that had been going on in the basement of the Concord head-
quarters for more than a month. During that period the labels had been typed
filed, sorted, pasted on canvassing cards and on envelopes. The envelopes
were sorted and boxed by city and zip code. A letter that was drafted early
in January came back from the printer toward the middle of February. Two
versions had been prepared, one addressed to Democrats that other to Indepen-
dents. A third version for the blanket mailing had to be printed quickly
that was addressed simply to voters. Stuffed with the letter was the brochur
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The nulling reached the post office and the co^ercial
.ailing hou.e on
schedule. The original thought was to have the mailing arrive during the
wecK before the election. For those who had been contacted by the campaign
the mailing would reinforce whatever positive impact that contact had had.
For those who had not been reached by the campaign the mailing might encourage
the recipient to consider learning more about McCarthy in the time remaining.
What was omitted from the mailing was a return card. Hoeh and Studds had
originally intended to enclose a return postcard much as the Lodge campaign
organizers had done in 1964. When the "pledge card" issue broke the return
card idea was dropped. However, the canvassing results tended to work for
the McCarthy cam.paign much as had the return card in the Lodge effort. The
canvass gave the McCarthy manager an approxiination of the impact of the cam-
paign that revealed trends more accurately than did the Lodge return cards.
The initial mailing plan was expanded considerably. First, many more
towns were added to the priority list than had been advised in the beginning.
Secondly, the idea of blanket mailing to parts of the state where the campaign
was succeeding better than expected was an important change. Thirdly, some-
thing that; is usually tried in campaigns that have a longer development period
than did the McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire was also accomplished. A
number of special group mailings were prepared. The mailing effort worked
according to target priorities. First the originally planned mailing, then
the additional to\^ mailings, then the special group mailings, and finally
reminders to vote addressed to residents in communities that would not have
on election day organization.
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Preparing materlaJs for canvassing, distribution of raaterials to area
head.uart.rs, special pre-election literature drops, and other distribution
efforts were handled by the volunteers consigned to the cave-like environ
of the Concord headquarters basement. The space had the appearance of the
galley of an ancient Roman ship. Hands moving constantly in steady rhythm.
stuffing envelopes, pasting labels or collating canvassing packets. The
workers stretched along folding tables with their arms reaching for the work.
In the background a stereo played the latest rock. Stavis wrote:
During the week, we philoeophers
.
theologists, sinolo-
gists, lawyers and a few people with only bachelor's
degrees all tore mailing labels, pasted them on enve-
lopes, stuffed, sealed, stamped, and sorted by zip code.
When masses of volunteers came for the weekend, we
learned how to supervise. We did appropriate time and
motion studies, developed executive training programs,
analyzed the relationship between endurance and commit-
ment, and moved cartons, tables, and chairs. We had
seminars in folding, advanced stuffing, elementary seal-
ing and interdisciplinary stamping. All this work was
geared to the throbbing rhythm of the hard-rock records.^
When the mistake in the weight of the mailing was discovered Stavis recalled:
A butcher's scale revealed that it was slightly over-
weight, and the post office would not accept that extra
fraction of an ounce without extra postage. Not being
able to afford that, we developed nev/ courses in ad-
vaxiced unstuffing, resealing, and stamp saving.^
Issue Targeting
Alan Shepard, v/ho had skillfully oriented the early testing of the can-
vass had shifted his attentions to Manchester at Hoeh's suggestion, miat
Shepard did was explore what was on the mind of the potential voter and then
advise strategies that would orient the campaign to these concerns. His de-
briefing sessions with the canvassers helped him to plot the issue profile
of the voter. He found the voters were concerned about taxes, inflation.
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crodibil:Uy or a general feeling that things had become unsettled since
^Tohn Kennedy's assassination. His technique was to list those issue subjects
that were mentioned most often by those canvassed. He would examine the list
noting links between subjects and from that compile strategies that would
make the campaign relevant to voter groups. Shepard recognized that for the
ca.,paign to succeed in the time remaining, it could not begin an educational
effort to get people to respond to issues not uppermost in their minds. He
felt that the war was a difficult issue to deal with in the context of the
campaign. He sensed that people wanted the war over, wanted it won or wanted
the United States to get out, but were not comfortable with a lengthy dis-
cussion of the details. Their level of frustration tended to increase when
faced with an account of U.S. policy failure in Vietnam. The frustration
seemed to produce a defense reflex that was masked with expressions of loyalty
to the administration or a form of close-mindedness that expressed hostility
to the source of the frustration. To avoid direct and unsettling confronta-
tion with voters on the war policy, Shepard advised an oblique approach.
In Kanchester, news of the Johnson administration's proposed surtax on
incomes to support the federal budget was greeted with great hostility. The
administration was already viewed with considerable suspicion because of the
fallings of the war, an increasing rate of inflation and a general souring of
credibility. The proposed surtax was the final straw. Shepard discovered
that the tax proposal was mentioned most frequently by contacted voters.
Shepard suggested that a new piece of campaign material be prepared that would
tie McCarthy's opposition to the war and the continuation of the war to the
voters' opposition to the tax surcharge.
most
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The itcn that was produced was a card the same s:l.e as the Internal
Revenue Service's 1040 A for. - the short form - of the ta. return that
workers in New Hampshire file. The text of the IRS form was screened
background for the message printed in red ink. "Will LBJ's proposed 10% tax
increase put your family budget in the red?" Beneath the phrase was the
suggestion printed in blue, "Your 'X' for Senator McCarthy says NO." The
card helped re-enforce the tax issue, demonstrate McCarthy's opposition to
the tax proposal and open the subject of taxes when McCarthy campaigned,
^^en the cards arrived from the printer Shepard grabbed all the volunteers
he could find and sent them to the factory gates to distribute the cards
to workers changing shifts. The card was included in the canvassing kits,
distributed at factory gates, included in some mailings and was used in
all of the cities where there was a concentration of Democratic voters.
Shepard did much of the same thing with a number of other issues that
he garnered from his research effort. The feedback which Shepard was con-
stantly monitoring provided intelligence that came as close as the campaign
would come to having direct poll information. Shepard spent almost three
weeks in New Hampshire checking, testing, researching and then advising cam-
paign approaches. His influence was pronounced in the final pattern of ma-
terials, advertising and through the telephone canvass that operated in
Manchester especially. He developed the telephone message that was used and
adjusted it almost on a daily basis as he perceived that voter issue concerns
were changing. He was especially effective in tying McCarthy and his posi-
tions buck to the things that were on the mind of the New Hampshire voter.
To him the voters had to be motivated to vote for McCarthy. To get them to
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a ,ci„.hl„ with McCarthy it was ossentlol that the campaign reach for
these concerns. Shepard worked as a consultant to the n,anaaers and In that
capacity helped shape the the„,es that would bring McCarthy In closer touch
with the New Hampshire voter. To so„e extent Shepard was able to Influence
McCarthy's approach during the final weeks. Several of the themes which Shepard
identified were given more emphasis in McCarthy's speeches than before.
McCarthy, however, had found his own stride. Shepard' s work accomplished some
minor adjustments. Shepard Influenced canvassing, the re-orlentatlon of some
campaign materials, the content of the radio and newspaper advertising and
press release program.
The Celebrities
During most of the campaign there had been a number of what were described
as "secondary speakers." Most of these had been scheduled independently of
the McCarthy campaign by organizations concerned about the war policies. Work-
ing through church groups, local peace committees and responding to campus
invitations, a regular procession of critics had brought their views to New
Hampshire cities and towns. Some were more closely allied with the McCarthy
effort than others. Allard Lowenstein, Sandford Gottlieb, the Executive Direc-
tor of SANE; Zolton Ferency, former Democratic Chairman of Michigan; and seve-
ral others v;ho had been involved early in the search for an alternative candi-
date came to New Hampshire as speakers. Others, like David Luce, a disillu-
sioned AID officer in Vietnam, or several exiled Vietnamese critics of the
current regime in Saigon were not connected to the campaign at all. Their
ta.lks and the press coverage which these meetings received did expand public
information about the personal and political impacts of the war. Occasionally
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durin, the early weeks of the campaign, the New Hampshire leaders would re-
ceive calls fro. outside New Hampshire fro. organisations concerned about the
war, offering to send speakers to New Hampshire. In all cases they rejected
the offers. They felt that their energies were already extended too far to
manage other schedules. Further, they did not want to risk additional contro-
versy. If there was to be controversy in the campaign they felt it should
come from McCarthy's own activity. They did not want to be in the position
of having to defend or deny the comments of secondary speakers. Those who
came to New Hampshire at the behest of other sponsoring organizations could
not be tied to the McCarthy campaign.
When Curtis Cans arrived to manage the campaign he brought with him
from the national headquarters a person to schedule celebrity and secondary
speakers, Sandra Silverman. When she arrived the McCarthy managers concluded
that the campaign had gro;m to the extent that it could support this addi-
tional activity and that it could also sustain any controversy that might
result.
Her first task was to develop campaign schedules for members of Senator
McCarthy's family. Mary, the Senator's second child, had just begun her
freshman year at Radcliffe. She had become a part of the student group that
swirled around the effort to find an alternative to President Johnson in 1968.
As Richard Stout wrote concerning McCarthy's decision to run for the presi-
dency :
Though many people urged him ultimately, his decision to
run was a private one. His daughter Mary had been sug-
gesting it for months. Didn't he want to be remembered
in history for some nobler act that support of Lyndon
Johnson's re-election? she had asked.''
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Fro. that ti.e on the ,ulet Mary McCarthy beca.e one of the .ost important
secondary campaigners for her father in New Hampshire. Sandy Silverman would
schedule her to meet with community groups, McCarthy committees, for radio
and newspaper interviews, and for school visits as well as to encourage
volunteers who had not seen her father in person. Eventually, her time
was in such great demand and her own ability to concentrate on her studies
had diminished in the excitement of her father's campaign that she arranged
for a leave from Radcliffe for the duration.
"It's difficult to assess the exact role played by Mary McCarthy,"
wrote Barbara Underwood, "probably most important was that she was there in
the state of New Hampshire and gave credence to the fact that her father
was a decent and intelligent man. Local people who got to know her tended
to judge the Senator based on Mary's o-,^ intelligence.
While Mary McCarthy was Sandy Silverman's first scheduling subject, the
task that brought her to New Hampshire was different. She expected to imme-
diately begin scheduling a parade of notables who had been attracted to the
McCarthy candidacy. Shortly after she arrived she met with Hoeh and Studds
to discuss her Intentions. They told her to be extremely careful and to
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clear with then, each person she intended to schedule into New Hampshire.
They explained that they felt the campaign was beginning to takeroot. It
was succeeding because they had avoided appearing frivolous, dis-establish-
ment. or less than masculine in approach. They had carefully selected
as references for the anti-war positions quotations from prominent military
officers such as General James Gavin and former Commandant of the Marine
Corps, General David Shoup. They were concerned that Sandy Silverman might
now turn this aspect of the campaign into a sideshow. To explain to her
what they meant they said they felt that only those celebrities who project
strong, masculine images should be scheduled for New Hampshire. They did
not want women or performers from the arts who did not associate easily
in the public's mind with the masculine aspects of national pride. To be
an effective critic of the war policy Hoeh and Studds felt that the celebrity
would have to have an image of prowess that was established in the public's
mind. To be less than that both felt that the charge which the Manchester
Ulli2Il Leader enjoyed repeating, that all anti-war protesters were "sissies,
fags, cowards, or other social deviates" might be re-enforced. Their ex-
ample of someone v;ho would be an effective celebrity visitor was Paul Newman.
To their surprise, Sandy Silverman scrapped the list of actresses and per-
formers she had compiled and began trying to get Paul Ne^vmian to visit New
Hampshire.
Although the Nev/ Hampshire leaders were conservative in their approach
to using celebrities they understood the value of the celebrity role. A
celebrity created excitement, attracted attention and reached people who
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..iOht not c,t.o.„l.c ,tve t^ou„„ u,o c„.„.i,n. „oe„ TeU that McC.rt,.,
had too little ti.e renaming to generate enou.h excUc.ent on Ms o„n to
bring out a significant voto. „ the voter Interest level could ho Increased
then, perhaps, more of the marginal voters m-^nv r.f ^^bxudx , any o them young and new voters,
might just vote.
Sandy
.Silverman arranged visits for several academic celebrities, such
as John Kenneth Galbraith, who came and went without stirring either much
attention or controversy. Late in February she announced that Paul Me^n
had agreed to campaign in New Hampshire for McCarthy. Sandy Silverman had
connections with a group in New York who was soliciting celebrity help for
the campaign. Wl.en she reported that her first list of notables had been
rejected by Hoeh and Studds she explained how important it was to the cam-
paign to have someone like Newman campaign in New Hampshire. The New York
group had been soliciting successfully celebrities for fund raising benefits,
parties and possible campaign activities. Many had already been used in New
York to make recordings supporting McCarthy that would be used as commercials
during the closing weeks of the campaign.
The New York committee arranged a private airplane flight for Newman
which arrived in Manchester late in the afternoon of Monday, March 4th. No-
tice of Newman's availability and arrival times were so short that Sandy
Silverman had to scurry among the better organized local campaigns trying to
find places for him to go and things for him to do on such short notice.
Keeping in mind Hoeh's warning about possible controversy, she planned a
dinner in Manchester v/here David Hoeh and Richard Goodwin might talk with
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Newman about how ),e .i^ht be effective in New Hampshire, He had admitted
that he had not done this sort of thing before and needed some help with his
approach. Over dinner Newman was briefed about McCarthy. New Hampshire and
What his Visit :night contribute. He was then trotted out to the airplane
for a flight to Lebanon. Then he was driven to Enfield where Sandy Silverman
had arranged a reception for hi. in a private home. Like other tests in the
campaign little damage would have resulted if Ne.^an's performance bombed in
Enfield. With fingers crossed, Hoeh and Silverman waited for the report of
Newman's foray into the New Hampshire winter night.
Shortly after 10:00 p.m. Hoeh received a telephone call reporting that
all had gone exceptionally well. With a house full of people, Newman was a
bit unsure of himself at first, but after fielding a few questions effective-
ly he relaxed. Even several of the campaign's more skeptical academic members
from the Dartmouth faculty found Ne.^an competent and engaging. The test
satisfactorily completed, Sandy Silverman began final scheduling plans for a
full day of visits in Nashua, Manchester and Dover where Hoeh felt Newman's
attraction could greatly help the campaign.
Wiiat Newman accomplished was immediately shown by the crowds he drew
the next day and by the press clippings from his brief visit to Enfield.
The campaign had progress ed about as was normal for New Hampshire campaigns.
The candidate usually receive good media attention when in a city or town but
fade to the inner pages v/hen campaigning outside the state or when surrogates
are active. Paul Newman was an exception. He attracted radio and newspaper
attention for his visits and, for the first time in the campaign, there were
Ion in
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crowds waltlns. >*at ho did and what he .aid received prominent attenti,
the local newspaper, and .nore than passing notice in the others.
The l^b^on Vallcz Nens carried two photographs of Newroan in Enfield.
The front page was captioned "McCarthy Supporters - Paul Newnnan. tough-guy
filn. star, gave Knfleld area citizens a soft-sell pitch for Minnesota Senator
Eugene McCarthy for president Monday night. He said U.S. needs change of
policy in Vietna„."10 The page 3 photograph was captioned. "Female Fans -
Actor Paul Newman is surrounded by the distaff side during brief call at
Enfield gathering Monday night...." The story the Valley Ne^s carried on
his visit described how Newman experimented with his campaign style.
Newman, who has been nominated for an Academy Award forhis performance in "Cool Hand Luke." is also a McCarthybacker and he's here in the Granite State "to do every-thing I can for him."
When Ne^^an finally arrived, about an hour later than
scheduled, most of the crowd pushed into the front hall
to watch him come in the door. And that's exactly what
happened. A woman or two gasped as he walked in chew-ing Spearmint gum, but no one immediately uttered a
greeting or even shook his hand. They were all spell-
bound and Nev,Tnan appeared embarrassed.
But he finally walked on into the house, shook some hands
and threaded his v/ay to the front of the living room to
say a few words for McCarthy — very few.
"I'm no public speaker," the actor began, "an in about
30 seconds you'll know why."
Newman spoke softly, thoughtfully, a far cry from the
tough guy characters he's protrayed, such as Hud and
Harper.
"Coming up today," Newman said, "I realized that Eugene
McCartliy doesn't need me, I need Eugene McCarthy."
Newman, his face tan and his hair greying, looked at the
floor and fumbled with the Spearmint package in his hand,
"I don't want any more of the last four years," he said,
"I've had it,"
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to all ^or McLrt^.;. '''' -^<^^
llTuTul "Zt ^i'" questions and shakehis hand. One young man asked for an autograph.
"That's not what I'm here for," Newman replied "I don'twant to turn this into an autograph party!"
Ne.^an would not sign a single autograph while campaigning but would sign
McCarthy literature between stops that would be distributed following his
visit. Instead of an autograph or a kiss, Newman adopted his own trademark,
lie would look a stunned admirer in the eyes and quietly say, while pinning
a McCarthy button on the woman's coat, "Listen to what Senator McCarthy is
saying, that is important." He would move slowly through a crowd shakixtg
hands, pinning buttons on lapels and reminding people that they, like himself,
needed Senator McCarthy.
Several days after the first Newman visit, several canvassers were
stopped by a state policeman in the western part of the state for speeding.
Their car carried an out-of-state plate. As the tropper was writing out their
ticket he said, "I'm doing this to show you that Paul Newman isn't the only
one who can write autographs." Then as he handed them their warning he said,
"By the way I'm a number one."
VHiile serious candidates of presidential caliber, and especially McCarthy,
dislike sharing the stage with other stars, the Newman phenomenon in New Hamp-
shire lent celebrity status to the campaign. McCarthy did not meet Newman when
he was in New Hampshire and did not want to be photographed with Newman at that
time. Ho did not reprimand Hoeh or anyone else who planned Newman's visit,
t McCarthy resisted was having the nature of his campaign changed from thatWlia
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oi one foc„ssl„a on t„c is„ue. to on. u.t pc.aonaU.od U.e cirort. To
<.t ic,.t „t the H... „..pshire s.a,«. «e„.a„
„.p.e.se„.ea what Hoped .o
avo«. «,e hoopla of a conv.nUonal ca.paisn. While he would not p.o.ote
the Idea of celebrity visits or lend hl.self to the., his silence allowed
his managers to do what they felt uao ir, ^t,„ t . ^ui l w s In the best interests of the campaign.
Althongh Nev^an was a bit pu.zled that he had not met McCarthy during his
visit, he too appeared to understand the importance of separating the two
images at this juncture.
In the days that followed Newn-an's February 4 and 5th visit, the size
of McCarthy's crowds increased and were notlcably more excited and intense.
By the mysticism of association, McCarthy had gained some of Newman's cele-
brity status and was now viewed himself as a celebrity. McCarthy's manner
and style had not changed but he had become charismatic. With this status
McCarthy thrived. The total pace of the campaign began to quicken notlcably
at just the crucial moment.
Following Newman came Tony Randall. His style was quite different. His
response to questions tended to be brittle, occasionally irritating and defen-
sive. He cameto campaign for approximately three days, but after the first
day his responses caused concern. He tended to answer questions on the war
with emotion rather than reason. His forte as a campaigner was that he kissed
every woman at each of the well attended coffee parties and practically every
woman that he encountered during his visit.
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A separate, loglotical activity aLnct exactly the sa:ne as that which
supported Senator McCarthy when campaigning had to be organized for the cele-
brities. This meant schedule preparation, advancing, cars, drivers and a
host or hostess to accompany the celebrity. Sandy Silverman had to manage
as many as three celebrities campaigning in the state at the same time.
The heaviest flow of celebrities was during the final ten days of the cam-
paign. During that time Paul Nev.-man returned, Robert Ryan, Rod Serling and
Jack Parr came to campaign. Some like Serling and Parr came to assist with
the media campaign as well, and would spend much of their time in the record-
ing studio of Weston Associates advertising agency. Each celebrity who came
to New Hampshire made an endorsement tape which was added to the tapes
recorded by Harry Belafonte. Robert Vaughn, Dustin Hoffman, Lauren Becall,
Jason Robards, Lee Reraick, Joan Bennett and Joanne Woodward in New York.
Perhaps Nexvman's most successful visit was the one that was planned
with the greatest skepticism. McCarthy volunteer, Marc Kaski, firmly in
control of campaign affairs in Berlin, reluctantly agreed to host Newman
during the last x^eekend of the campaign. Kaski recalled:
Concord was feeling guilty about how little they had done
for me. They wanted to do things for me but... I was...
v/ay up north of the ^-.Tiite Mountains. They kept offering
me Paul Newman for a day to campaign in Berlin.
^
Hoeh and Silverman were offering Kaski Newman because they felt he would be
well received in Berlin and would help in the final push before the election.
They also v^ere offering him because a plane was available to shorten the
trip, an advantage vjhich was not available to the others. Kaski reacted
to the offer:
Belli
.
I wasn't sure that the people in Berlin wantedPaul Ne.™u to tell them who to vote for. so I ask^daround to find out. » ^ t>Kea
The people I spoke to (asking) do you think he shouldcome said they didn't think it was a good idea. (Theysaid) the people were making up their own minds, andthis would make it just like any other campaign where
some labor boss or the mayor comes out for a candidate.It s no longer the people's decision. It's who do youlisten to? Do you listen to the mayor or the labor
union council or a movie star? 12
Kaski coiicluded:
If what we wanted to do was have them make up their own
minds, this was defeating our primary purpose, so I
turned Concord down a couple of times.
Then, I found, many did suggest that the people of Ber-
lin usually made up their minds by the last weekend.
If Nev/man were to come up here the last day or two be-fore the primary, no damage would be done. It would
sor of be... a fitting climax to the campaign. Frankly,
they just thought it would be a fairly exciting thing
for Berlin to have Paul Newman there. They also
thought that there might be some people who had not
been contacted during the campaign and who knew very
little about McCarthy who might be swayed by the visit—
and many people would.
The reason they figured that Paul Ne^v-roan would be able
to reach some people who hadn't been reached during the
campaign was that there was a championship hockey game
in to\m. that final weekend. The whole town goes to the
hockey game or listens to it on the radio. Most of those
\7ho go to it are those from the mills who weren't at
home when, the canvassers visited.
A radio aiaiouncer who had persuaded me twice from having
Paul IJewran come up said, "Ok. Have him come up that
weckeiid and I'll arrange for him to drop the puck at the
hockey game and make a speech over the loud speaker."
The radio announcer had not declared for McCarthy him-
self. He was just being helpful. 13
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MK.,. KnsV, Hn^ny called Sandy Silverman to say Ne„,na„ could co.,o he out-
lined a
.chodul. t„at «o„ld .cate „o3t candidate. „uch leas a novice ca.pal.ne.
lil.0
.cv^n. Not giving No^^an a chance to say anything but yes. Sandy
Silverman got Dick Goodwin to >„lte a brief speech for Newman to read over
the hockey rink's speaker and. incidentally, the radio station covering the
hockey game. Newman prepared for the visit with Goodwin's "script" while
flying to Berlin.
Well, Paul Ne^^an came up to Berlin and visited a shoppingcenter, went to the hockey game, spoke on the radio, reach-ing about everybody, and creating a great deal of e:^cite-ment in the city. Everybody loved him. He spoke very
well and people all kind of looked around and started
nodding at each other. "McCarthy is in this thing for real.He s not one of the - you know, a number of strange candi-dates enter the New Hampshire primary and they come throughtown one day every four years and that's all people see ofthem.
This sort of cre<nted some feeling of permanence and deter-
mination on the part of Senator McCarthy — that he was inthis seriously, he was not playing games, and that this
city was very important to him.
I think his visit, coming at the time that it did was very
successful and might even have made the difference in the
campaign. 14
During the evening of March 12th Kaski would report the unexpected. Eugene
McCarthy would carry the city of Berlin.
A celebrity of a different sort but of no less importance was Richard
Goodwin. At 31 years of age Goodwin abandoned his recently acquired teaching
position at MIT to join the McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire. He arrived
to meet Senator McCarthy in Berlin Friday, February 23rd. Goodwin had become
convinced that Johnson was vulnerable and that since Robert Kennedy would not
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be a cnndldate. the only ,a.e regaining wa. McCarthy in New Hampshire. Coodw
had been a youthful
.e.ber of the Kennedy administration and was the first of
Kennedy's political operatives to support McCarthy. A skillful speech writer
and strategist, Goodwin had .bitten an article for the New Yorker under a
non^-d'pW outlining how Johnson might be replaced as the nominee of his
party. The Tet offensive was the final straw for Goodwin.
An unlooked-for consequence of Tet was the arrival of DickGoodwin. Speculation at the time suggested that Goodwinhad been cunningly insinuated into the operation to over-
see Kennedy's (Robert) interests. He did. of course, but
Ills initial motivation was uncharacterisically impulsive.At home in Boston, Goodwin read about the bombing of thetemples in Hue and decided the situation demanded more ofhim than mere private proddings of Bobby. So he threwhis typewriter into the back of his car and motored toNew Hampshire. 1-5
While the Amerlxan Melo^^ had Goodwin arriving in Manchester, the
fact was that he first met with McCarthy at his overnight stop in Franconia,
The next day Gcodwin joined Sy Hersh, McCarthy's travelling press secretary
in Berlir,, where he said, "Sy. with these two typewriters we're going to
overthrow the government ."16 Goodwin began vnriting immediately. He was
dis.urbed that only a small group of the national reporters had bothered to
follow McCarthy on his northern swing. He had Hersh place a series of calls
to the major national newspaper and wire service editors chiding them for
not covering the campaign. Goodwin told Hersh to announce that McCarthy
would be making a major policy statement the next afternoon in Manchester
and thai if thoy did not wish to be scooped by their competition they better
get someone up to New Hampshire to cover the event quickly. Goodwin then
sat down to write the statement.
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McCarthy.. Invitational reception in Berlin drew a large and enthusias-
tic crowd hut the next afternoon many times the number of invitations drew a
.uch smaller crowd to the Alpi.e Club in Manchester. Not a candidate who
used a pre-prepared text. McCarthy departed from his norm and read Goodwin's
speech. copies of the speech had been prepared for release once McCarthy be-
gan speaUing, For the first time in the campaign a McCarthy address received
lengthy coverage in the major newspapers across the nation. It was Goodwin's
speech, read by McCarthy to a crowd that was approximately one half reporters.
In 1963, we were told that we were winning the war. In19o4 we were told we were winning the war. In 1964 weweratold the corner was being turned. In 1965, we ^eretold the enemy ..as being brought to its knees. In 1966,in 1.6/, and now again in 1968, we hear the same hollow
cairns of programs and victory. For the fact is that theenemy is bolder than ever, while we must steadily en-large our own comrJ.tment. The Democratic Party in 1964promised no wider war." Yet the war is getting wider
every month. Only a few months ago were told that
sixty-five percent of the population was secure. Now
we know that even the /auerican Embassy is not secure. 17
Goodwin brought more than a talented typewriter to the campaign. He
brought the experience of one who had been involved in a successful national
candidacy and one viho understood the dynamics of national politics. His
perspective bolstered the efforts of the New Hampshire leaders, none of whom
had had previous national campaign experience. Goodwin was himself a cele-
brity who had lived and worked at the pinnacle of domestic politics. His
reputation as tlie "infant terrible" of the State Department in the period
immediately following the Bay of Pigs fiasco gave him both respect and credi-
bility fimong those concerned about the Vietnam War. His writing had received
wide circulation since he left the Johnson administration. Goodwin knew how
to attract the attention of the national press. \^i.le few, if any, of his
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apeeCcs „ere
.ubso,ue„cly read by McCarthy. Goodwin was U.ere to hel, shape
the, reporters' reaction, to McCarthy's own spcakin, stylo. Coodwin became an
Important, advisor in the rrur^a^ i ^r-^ a r ,c ci l last days ot the campaign who helped the New
Hampshire managers to avoid mistakes, to capitalize on the errors of the
Johnson organization, and to build on the momentum that was growing.
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t n A 1' T i; R XII
ABVERTIMNG. M^VIERIALS. ffiDIA, AND CA>a.AIC,N FINANCES
:^£^iMnC and Campaig n M„f».-<„1-
Mervm Weston „a„ been given the go ahead to prepare a .edla program for
the McCarthy campaign by lUalr Clark. Through a .emorandu. that had been
developed as a result of conversations with Clark and ,Ioeh. Weston outlined
a "Media strategy and Plan" which also carried costs for each of the Items.
The memorandum read:
I. MEDIA STRATEGY
We are plann.ing a short but strong campaign peaking in the final d-^vsbefore the primary. Radio minutes, newspapers and outdoo? signs)
'"'^
will provide continuity, television and radio ZD's, the crescendo!
The campaign uses radio minutes. TV minutes, direct mail and large
^iJ^M r^'-^rr^
'^"^^^ awareness and understanding of Sera-tor McCarthy's position on Vietnam and present administratL poUcies-television and radio ZD's and small space newspaper ads to provide
maximum noise" during the final days of the campaign.
In all media placement we are depending upon continuing news of theVieunam war to increase the relevance and impact of our messages,in the broadcast media particular attention will be paid to schedul-ing announcements in nev/s adjacencies.
T-I. MEDIA PLAN
1. Duration: Four weeks starting Tuesday, February 11 and ending
Monday, March 11 (Tuesday. March 12 for morning newspapers).
2' Media Cost: $59,b52 Media costs have been reduced by 15% where
media are coimnissionable
.
3. Media;
^' Radio ($17,000)
This is the basic medium. We are planning 175 : 60 's and
50 : 10 'e on each of 2.5 stations during the four weeks. We
will attempt to place announcements adjacent to news broad-
costs for maximum impact and concentrate in the 6-9 A.M. and
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3-6 r.M. time periods for greatest reach. The schedule willbuild to maximum weight during the final days of heIL-paign (see flow chart).
Radio costs assume local rates (50% of national). Jf ratesare higher, the per-station schedule can be reduced in ?^esix multi-station markets.
B. Newspapers
Dailies ($8,661)
We are planning four 1750 line ads in each of the nine NewHampshire dailies. This one-a-week schedule will be stag-gered for the different newspapers to minimize reader dup-lication. The final ad will be scheduled for Monday.March 11 in evening editions and Tuesday, March 12 (PrimaryDay) xn morning editions. (If copy suggests a larger num-ber of smaller space units, these can be substituted for
one or two of the 1750 line ads.)
The local "political rate" has been used for our costing.
In some cases the national rate is lower, so contracts
will be noted request lov/est available rate."
Weeklies ($3,646)
During the final week of the campaign one 1750 line ad in
each of New Hampshire's 25 weekly newspapers will be sche-
duled
.
C. Television ($13,525)
Boston television will be used during the final week to peak
the ciunpaign.
We will schedule 10 prime time ID's; 5 early fringe minutes
and 5 afternoon minutes during the last half of the final
week. The schedule will use all three Boston stations but
will be concentrated on WBZ which has the best New Hampshire
coverage. The prime ID's will be placed preceding high-rated
progrcjms. The fringe minutes will be purchased following the
early evening news. The afternoon minutes will also be news
adjacencies.
In addition to this spot schedule, two afternoon women-
oriented half hour programs are planned. These would fea-
ture the Senator discussing his candidacy with groups of
local ladles.
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^' 9^L^Ji ($2,035)
K. Direct_Mail (414,885)
^9 nom'''^' f "'^^ '° ^''^^^^ li^t of Democrats(89,000) and Independents (120.000). Because of husbandand wife duplication th-ic ,t-{ti u ^ ui. a bo a
150 nnn ' estimated total of,000 The first mailing will be done early in the cam-paign; the second, in the last week.l
With the proposed Media Strategy and Plan was attached the following Flow
Chart which projected each element across the campaign calendar.
2S Stations
)?5 iCO's
SO tlO'B
CHART 12.01: MEDIA FLOW CHART
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The
...ai. pl„„ p„p„,,,
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
overall ca.pal,„ «,,,egy tha. ccul.
^^^^
.ho .eaia options available In .e„ Ha.p^.l.e.
„oel, and Cla.U accepted ehe
Plan and Ueseon Associates Wdlately began acquiring options for tl«,e
Reserving tl.e or space fro. New Hampshire radio stations or newspapers Is
not dlfflcu. Kadlo stations reduce progra. tl„e to Insert advertising and
newspapers will print n,ore pages. Pre^lu. placement In so,„e New Hampshire
newspapers
.ust be reserved ahead. The KancheHer Union Le^^^ sells space
on its front page other papers do not. Television schednllng Is less flexible
Channel 8 £ro„ Poland Springs. Maine, broadcasting fro. Mt. Washington, and
Channel 9 broadcasting from Manchester, were reasonable and covered a useful
portion of the New Ha.„pshlre market. Channel 6 from Plattsburg. New York
penetrated western New Hampshire and was also used for political advertising
occasionally in New Hampshire, the Republican candidates, Romney and Nixon,
had booked much of the oetter television space for the New Hampshire aimed
stations. Boston television, while predominant in the New Hampshire market,
was exceptionally expensive for the time alone disregarding the high cost of
preparing effective television advertising. The original plan called for
"final" week use of Boston television. In all but the Instance of direct
mailing and billboard advertising, the ffiDlA PLAN and budget specified tl-e
or space acquisition not preparation or production of the actual media inserts.
The first item on the plan that opened was the billboard space. Weston
Associates was able to acquire most of the billboards they had advised In the
"nine key" areas of the state. The billboards were the first media evidence
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thac ehero
„ „eca«„.
,,„,^3„,^^_
^^^^
type, ana colo..
.e.e use.
.o p..pa.e st.tlono.,. envelopes an. oU,e. p.in.ea
necessities of the campaign.
Mo«
.ajo. campaigns are planned well before
.he beslnnln^ of .he actual
campaign. Cu.ln,
.hat preparation period an extensive resource of photographs.
£11. footage, draft advertising cop,, advertising and materials layouts are
developed. This was not the case with McCarthy In 1968.
The file materials that the McCarthy senatorial staff maintained related
entirely to his Minnesota constituency. His family had been photographed with
farmers. In meetings and with appealing backgrounds, but not New Hampshire
backgrounds. Much of the material was dated not having been used since
McCarthy's last senatorial candidacy in 1964. When anyone went to prepare
New Hampshire advertising materials for McCarthy they had to begin from
scratch.
During the early weeks of the New Hampshire campaign and right to the
end, McCarthy would have to take time from his campaign schedules to record
advertising copy or prepare television materials. In addition to the void
in visual material on McCarthy there was also very little that had been re-
corded. His positions on the critical issues were best described by him in
response to questions, as the part of a speech, or in casual exchange while
street campaigning. His verbal skills were not translated easily into writ-
ing that he could then read for a radio advertisement. To' capture vintage
McCarthy it had to be recorded as it happened, not as it was contrived in a
studio.
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He.U..„,
_
^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^
McCarthj durln,
„,„ch of his early campaigning. I„
-ddltlcnfa iig. m a i io , arrangements were
made to acquire film ^hQ^ i,4 .li t at had been taken by the televi-lon r,^*-, i/ cu L j.evisi network crews that
haC
.,1.0 loHowea McC.^Hy. o.aduall, a library ol ne« £11., recording, and
PhotograpH.
..lu np. 1. .oo. the Ne„ Hampshire leaders some
.l„e to realUe
that: U.e delay In producing campaign
.edla In New York and Washington was be-
cause the resource file did not exist.
Weston Associates managed the printing of the mailing portion of the Me-
dia Plan. February 9th Weston reported his progress:
r:v^r:harhL-":rd^L:in^-^h^r.-rto-hr^^^^^^^
~ ^^g^ -Of Mallln^^oprnnTc
1. Mailing to solicit funds from colleges
Being printed: 1,500 letters - one page two colors.
1,000 #6 3A envelopes - one color. This has aBusiness Reply Indicia, which means each return
will cost you 8c.
Outside envelopes being supplied by headquarters.
2. Mailing to Democratic Party members
Being printed: 60,000 letters - two colors first sheet, one
color second sheet.
60,000 number 9 envelopes
60,000 folders out of New York
3. Mailing to Independents
Being printed: 80,000 letters, two colors first sheet, one
color second sheet.
80,000 number 9 envelopes
80,000 folders out of New York
A. Mailing Procedures
The niaiJiiiC's to Mnnr1^oe^«-,T- xt i
third IJ^lZTlT^alL
Ml ether ,„aJllngs will go first class, at 6c each.
Voter brealcdo™ In the 4 third class cities are as follows:
DEMOCIUTS INDEPENDENTS
Manchester 25»500 8,200
Nashua
8,500 11,100
Concord 1,675 5,428
Portsmouth 1,164 4,750
36,839 29,478
Concluding his Deraorandum, Merv Weston advised:
Total number of Democrats and Independents is 66,317. Weguesstimate a shrinkage of 25% because of homes with two
adults registered in the same party. We are thereforeprinting 49,737 (or 50M) third class envelopes for th^spurpose. The remaining 90M envelopes will be printed
with a first class indicia.
Both mailings will have to be stuffed and sealed. Theletters are being folded by the printer in a special way
so that the second sheet slips into the first sheet, soit will be picked up as a two page letter. This collat-ing of both sheets must be done by hand, i.e., volunteers.
The third class mailings must be addressed with zip code,
sorted and tied into zip coded packages, with both address
sides faced out, top and bottom.
On first class mailing, zip codes are not necessary, but
preferred. They can go out in bulk, but for expediency,
have them broken down into cities and towns.
Checks have to accompany deliveries to the post office.
The //9 envelops that will be delivered to you are practi-
cally free, so don't get mad if they are not perfect.
Some of them will stick together in one spot - simply
break them open. A few may tear. Discard them. We have
supplied an oveyage.-^
•Ihe envalopo.8 did stick and without th. ,e extra patience and energy oJ: the
volunteers they would have delayed the „nii^j-a^e ma ling. More than a "few" had to
be "discarded."
The fund raising letter „.s to be the New Hampshire campaign's onl,
erfcrt to ral.e r.nds locally to support the campaign, since It vas thought
that McCarthy loyalists were on the state's campuses a .ailing soliciting
funds fro. faculty and administrators
.Ight be worth the cost. The returns
did exceed the cost of the .ailing but the exact total was never calculated.
The .ailing did stl.ulate other ca.pus organizing and provided the New
Hampshire con^ittee with names that .Ight not have co.e fro. other organlz-
ing efforts.
Materials for Distribution
Most of the caiBpaign materials used in New Hampshire were prepared and
printed either in Washington or New York. The first generation of these ma-
terials was composed almost entirely of one sheet flyers developed from text
and file photos available in Washington. The first of these to appear in
New Hampshire hit an important theme of the 1968 McCarthy campaign, "What's
happened to this country since 1963?" The blue printed flyer carried a
photograph of Eugene McCarthy with President John F. Kennedy, and read:
John F. Kennedy got this country moving. Now the fabric
of that great achievement is unravelling.
All around us we can see that the last five years have
brought decay to replace progress, despair to replace
hope, and failure In war to replace success in the pur-
suit of peace.
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lowered:
't.:Ti7es^Tj:T^'''-' "'1 "-'^^
Slewing dcw„;.,';d'::^' \ L:!"t'uertfrf
'
"'--^"ij iibked Lo aitje taxes.
In 1963, our great cities were relatively tr-inn,HiNow, the streets of our cities are s'^JL briati;ss-ness, violence, and desperate fear. Now, the Presi!
. ^iolen^L'^^-^^^'^'
'^^^ '^^^ continuing"'
In 1963, the deep concerns of American young peoplewere the peace corps and civil rights. Now t^ere aredemonstrations and draft protests.
In 1963, we were at peace, just as we had been atpeace for the eight previous years under Eisenhower.Now, we are at war.
Gene McCarthy stood shoulder to shoulder with Kennedyin the Senate, and he will stand head and shoulders
above Johnson as President. There is one candidate
who can get this country moving again, and carry onthe traditions John F. Kennedy began.
That man is Gene McCarthy.'^
Shortly after the Kennedy flyer appeared, the New Hampshire campaign
prepared one of the few flyers generated entirely in New Hampshire. It
carried a copy of the Johnson campaign's "Pledge Card" and read, "UThat
ever happened to the secret ballot?" and then a picture of McCarthy with
the message, "You don't have to sign anything to vote for Senator Eugene
McCarthy on March 12, let Johnson know it. McCarthy for President." A
duplicate of this flyer was prepared in Washington for New Hampshire except
that it used black ink in reverse and i^as printed on both sides. Both the
"Kennedy" flyer and the "pledge card" flyer were used throughout the cam-
paign and v^ere included in the packet of materials delivered by canvassers.
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Wit. a ro.n,al p).ot:o,raph of McCarthy whlcU
.ead,
..HcCa.U.y for Preside... i.
l.^.rse type
.ith the ,.ote. '.This can a^ain he an America of Confidence,' helow
and adjacent to the photograph. On the back side under the heading
.'The
Spirit of America." excerpts of a McCarthy speech read:
John Kennedy set free the spirit of An^erica. The honestoptiinisn, was released. Quiet courage and civility be!ca.e the n,ark of American govern..ent, and new pJo'ramsof pronuse and of dedication were presented: ?Je Peace
tht ier^ • f^^i^^^^ just the proMse, bute b ginning of the achievei>,ent of that promise.
All the world looked to the United States with new hope
futur:" r confidence and an openness to th^
hmTof --IT T ''T''''^ ^'^'^S held by the dead
^he fuL;^ '
frightened by the violent hand oft ture which was grasping at the world.
This was the spirit of 1963.
What is the spirit of 1967? mat is the mood of Americaand of the vjorld toward America today?
It is a joyless spirit — a mood of frustration, of
anxiety, of uncertainty.
In place of the enthusiasm of the Peace Corps among theyoung people of America, we have protests and demonscra-
tions.
In place of the enthusiasm of the Alliance for Progress
we have distrust and disappointment.
Instead of the language of promise and of hope, we have
in politics today a new vocabulary in which the critical
word is war; war on poverty, war on ignorance, xcar on
crime, war on pollution. None of these problems can be
solved by war but only by persistent, dedicated, and
thoughtful attention.
The message from the Administration today is a message
of apprehension, a message of fear, yes — even a mes-
sage of fear of fear.
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This is not tho roal c^n-Jvit- a ^
that it is. This is ? f ^ Aiucrica. 1 do not believei a Lime to tect the mood and spirit:
To offer iu place of doubt — trust.
In place of expediency - right of judgment.
nitres" '"'""'^ neighborhoods and conunu-
In place of incredibility - Integrity.
^^Sond^'°^^
'''''
^^^^ ^^^^^^ agam re-spond to the trumpet and the steady drum. 5
"
The flyers were designed to give McCarthy identity, tie him to the lost
spirit of the Kennedy era, and to introduce McCarthy to a public that did not
know him. To aid in this process of introduction and legitimacy, the
Washington headquarters prepared a weekly flyer called. "Newsbriefs from
McCarthy for President." The publication was composed entirely of clippings
pasted and reproduced from the original newspaper type. A batch of "News-
briefs" would arrive at the end of each week in time to be used as the wrap-
per for the packet of canvassing materials to be distributed that weekend.
With the exception of the "Pledge Card" flyer almost all of the first
Pha£.e printing carried few photographs or illustrations and a great deal of
text. The thinking behind such material was that the campaign literature
should provide the recipient with sufficient information about McCarthy for
the person to make an evaluation. The extensive text, especially in the
"Newsbrief" would substitute for McCarthy's early difficulty in getting
print or electronic media coverage. The flyers served as a digest of McCarthy'
positions, and a glimpse of his character. During the early weeks of the
campaign the objective of the printed materials was to stir interest among
The second generation of printed mafPr^ni. kte ials became more specific to New
H»psM.e a.a .o U.e i...e= on .He .i„.3 of spe«„. of vo.o.s en,.Me
to vote „..eh a^th. were af.ed at pa«.e.la. oonsUt.encies a„on, the
Democratic Party vot^r-- nf v«,, u i.
.
'-J' uL^ro oi iNiew Hampshire. TItp f^•rot-uxi.t,. ine iirst of these was one ad~
dressed to New Hampshire union members. The photograph on the face showed
McCarthy shalcing the hand of a worker arriving at his factory in the dark-
ness of a New Hampshire winter morning. On the reverse under the heading.
"Sure, George Meany tells you to vote for LBJ - but:" the flyer compared
McCarthy's voting record on issues of concern to organized labor as opposed
to Lyndon Johnson's record on the same issues. Following the sugary of
the issues and voting records was a quotation under the heading, "For twenty
years Gene has been an inflinching defender of the rights of labor!"
In 1908 the AFL conference headed by Samuel Gompersdeclared: "We now call upon the workers of our Lmmon
country to stand faithfully by our friends, oppose anddefeat our enemies whether they be candidates forpresident, for congress or other office, whether ex-
ecutive, legislative or judicial."
What was true 60 years ago is still true today.
6
Another flyer of the same generation titled "Shrinking Dollar - Growing
War" showed a 1964 dollar at full size with a toy-sized battle dressed sol-
dier in contrast. The next panel showed a 1966 dollar crumpled and smaller
with a photograph of the soldier growing in size. The third panel labelled,
1968, showed a miniature dollar and head of the same soldier now filling
more than half the panel. The text on the reverse, titled, "The Bigger the
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tl.o Vou. BoU,.V co„..a..ad the economic situation «,e .ni.ed
States dnrlng t.,e period 1961-1965 vith the impact of the war ,n the year.
Gince 1965. From "unprecedented prosDPr^^v•• t, .ULCQ perity the war had produced
"inflation"
of "10%," shrinking Social Security benefitq n oni^ i .j-i-y D r s, a gold drain, trade deficit.
Which had already set off uncertainty in the dollar not seen since the "Great
Depression." The flyer concluded,
.'Vote March 12th - McCarthy for President.
Most of the flyers produced in Washington during this period were ai.ed
for use in the New Hampshire primary. One flyer was produced that could be
used in other states as well. With a photo of McCarthy backed by people
shown waving a McCarthy for President poster on a stick, the text read,
••McCarthy for President
- 'Let Us Begin Anew....- On the reverse, McCarthy
was shown photographed in his Senatorial office with bookshelves behind him,
looking toward a window. The draperies woven with a presidential-looking
eagle, softened the light cast across his face and three piece suit. The
text, "McCarthy is the Man...," summarized McCarthy's career under the head-
ings, "Courage and Integrity, Leadership and Achievement, and Time to Act."
The latter read;
America in 1968 is a deeply troubled nation. We need newhope, new leadership. And we need it now.
Eugene McCarthy and the Democratic Party can provide that
leadership.
. .in the spirit of Adlai Stevenson and John F.
Kennedy. Let us begin anew.
Help stop the War in Vietnam.'
.
We reject the notion that the people's choice Vv-ill be
turned down by the Democratic National Convention.
Eugene McCarthy for President.^
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buted reprinted froiB the February 6th issue of t v> b Look magazine was by McCarthy
titled,
"UTiy I'm Battlinc LET tv,a-ng BJ. There was a reprint from the Catholic
church's weekly publication, Our Sunday Visitor, titled "Th.^ ±±y-L.^ xcx , e many lives of
Abigail McCarthy." whlcli »^cr^ r^r.y. v lch also contained a photograph of the McCarthy'., three
Oldest cMlaren.
.„ ,a p.,. .,„eo,raphe. puhXicat.on prepare, fro. speech
excerpts and biographical material was assembled for New Hampshire titled
"McCarthy for President
- His Record and His Message for America."
Following McCarthy's second campaign tour of New Hampshire beginning
February 6th enough photographs of McCarthy campaigning in New Hampshire had
been taken to produce a campaign flyer. The first of these was titled.
"McCarthy Speaks to New Hampshire," and used a tabloid format. A series of
high quality photographs, printed on offset paper rather than newsprint,
gave the flyer an attractiveness not typically seen In political printing.
Beside or beneath each photograph was a text paragraph on the issue repre-
sent ed by the photo. The photos were large, of New Hampshire people and
places, and showed McCarthy as a candidate in New Hampshire. The printing
ca^e as the result of New Hampshire leaders' complaints that most of the
material prepared for New Hampshire either had too much text or too few
photographs, or were not specific to McCarthy as a candidate in New Hamp-
shire. For several weeks afterward, the "McCarthy Speaks to New Hampshire"
piece would be the wrapper for the packet of materials used by the canvassers.
492
"Ue Co c„nv...i„,
.l.eo,raphed a.or prepared U,e tl... e.nv.se 1.,
Keen..
.
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
.hei. o™ ec„.„,.i,3. Ka„, of U..o contained ,uoLuo„s fro. McCe„„, an.
ether nocaues concerning current issues or problems
.hat the local co..lt-
tees relt were of special interest to their area. Occasicnall, an i.sue
vould develop locall, «>at would not he responded to with existing material.
In these cases the local eoo^ittee would find an appropriate response and
print the answer. The federated nature of the campaign continued to the end.
usually the response would be cleared through the Concord headquarters before
being printed to be sure that It was consistent with what was happening m
the campaign elsewhere.
The only .ajor publication and .ailing effort outside those authorized
and paid for by the McCarthy campaign ca.e fro. the national organization of
Clergy and Layxnen Concerned about Vietnam. Their six page, tabloid sized
mailer was sent to 200.000 New Hampshire homes March 1st. The mailing was
announced by press release, in Washington which asked, "Who's right on Viet-
nam?" with the answer, "McCarthy is." Intended as a non-partisan, voter
education mailer, when Governor Romney was still a candidate, the organizers
of the mailing now aimed it, by press release, at Democrats, Independents
and Republicans urging them to vote for or to write-in McCarthy as the only
candidate opposed to U.S. policy in Vietnam. An expensive effort that may
have aided McCarthy ultimately, it scarcely stirred the political air during
the time that it was arriving.
ena-
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The final generation of printed materials for M,.u i J:or the campaign evolved Jn
response to what was fplt to bo th. oe e successes and questions produced by the
campaign. The final mailing was a t^b^n^^ • .8 o a loid sized, newsprint, two color
flyer. It would be sent to those names on thn l.K ie labels prepared by the vol-
unteers and blanket mailed in the^ larger communities that showed a strong
trend for McCarthy as the resuH- oflt the canvassing. The front had a photo-
graph Of senator McCarthy in a factory surrounded by workers, one with his
finger blurred in motion as he emphasised his point. The title read
tor McCarthy Answers the Three Questions Most Tre.uently Asked by New Hamp-
shire Voters." Thp ^ ^. i jquestions had come from the canvassing and from Al
Shepard's motivational research. Opening the flyer the reader found the
three questions with an appropriate matching photograph to the left and the
answers to the right. Question 1: "why are you running for President-
(Photograph: McCarthy with President John F. Kennedy)
. The answer:
I hope to restore the principles and the sense of hope
tion ofJohr f ^-ty during the Admin^^La-f n F. Kennedy. In 1963, the country wasbooming; our cities were tranquil; we were at peace,and we felt that our problems were being solved. Americawas respected and admired around the wo^ld. Today ourcities are filled with misery and lawlessness. Our
arhomf '%r"'^' """"^ ereat problemst h me the need for better schools and parks, fordecent housing and clean air - are not being solved.We must concentrate our energies on the huge, unsolvedproblems Ox American society. In this way we can, per-haps restore the sense of idealism and high purpose
"
which we knew under John F. Kennedy. The issue is not
merely Vietnam or riots. If you share my feeling thatthere is something wrong with the direction of American
society today, then I ask your support. We cannot chart
a new direction until we also have new leadership.
The second question, "Uo vou rliint <y thi k It Is possible to
.chicvo peace with honor
Vletna. „Uhont e.c.lflcln, the Interests c£ the co.ntr,,.. had ne.t to It
a
.hotosraph of McCatth. seated m a Ke„ Hampshire Xlvln, roo. dlscussln. his
concerns with a group of women. The answer:
flve'ye:;s'" M?er"n%f°''°" ^"^^ """^^^ °' l«st
fact Jc, iuir -Lucreased the size of the war. Thet Is that we are now involved in an Pnriiooc. •
-re"?.>:ro-j,t :-tLa-j
-\¥if =rTf ^- , ^""-t-j-t-j-xuxa or at the conference fnKlc^
LricaT.: in! tr r-hou.andrLrf''"
It seer>.s clear to me, therefore, that we need a change.
Zl^ withdrawal and defeat. Kos^
table "?hft r\'" settlement at the conference. Tha is what I want, and what I will try to achieveif I am elected. I think we should make some effort Joachieve that peace Thnc -} ^ ; ci.xull. l
of ono nf t-L
necessary to take advantaget e o he many opportunities to begin negotiations ~
opportunities which have been pointed out by'mlnrwo'dleaders such as Pope Paul and Americans suc^ as SenatorGeorge Axken. It is necessary to devise a workable poli-tical compromise which will allow all the people of SouthVietnam to share in choosing their governinent. No onecan guarantee that new approaches will work. However, wedo know the old ones have failed. As vou ^ to the pojlsask zour^lf if^ think we are doi^-VsklllfuTTnd-ifT'fectxve job in Vietnam .
The final question, "Why do you oppose the President's proposal to increase
taxes by ten percent?" had next to it a photograph of McCarthy, talking with
a jovial policeman, with the background of Newport, New Hampshire's Main
Street. The answer completed the summary of McCarthy's New Hampshire cam-
paign and led to the back page and a reprint of a marked primary ballot.
McCarthy responded to the question:
495
LeScd " "-'^^ -^ly take badly
•
rather t! f^-'
millions of Americans, but will hurthan help the economy. The purpose of a tax
iTolli: '^'^ '""^ economy'which ifgrowingtoo fast. Our economy is growing more slowly anl
InaZlllTn t^™- ^^"^ers of I recession.
Prn^ff i ^'^"^s-the-board increase - as theesident had proposed - would hit lower income fami-
ItTnT/' ''^T^y- It— to me that housewLesand older people have
. difficult enough time kelpL
adV o'thelrb' r^'^^ r^'^' ' '^'-^ - '^-Iddd t eir burden by imposing taxes which are likelyto become a drag on the entire economy and thus dimi-nish the total wealth of the nation.
In addition to the ballot that ended the flyer there was a message
addressed specifically to Independents. It was a reminder that they too
had a stake in the outcome of the New Hampshire presidential primary.
"Independents. Vote for McCarthy or You May Have No Choice in November."
Independence means freedom of choice. Yet New Hamp-
shire Independents may lose their freedom of choicein November if they fail to vote March 12th. Thereis only one candidate in either party who promises
to restore the spirit of John F. Kennedy, and get
America moving again. There is only one candidate
who promises to bring an honorable peace. That
candidate is Eugene McCarthy. If you believe there
is a need to change the direction of the nation and
its leadership, vote McCarthy, March 12th.
Be sure to ask for the DEMOCRATIC BAI.L0T.9
The last major printed piece of the campaign proved to be controversial
within the campaign itself. Besides direct mall, another way to reach the
dispersed voters of New Hampshire was to insert campaign material with the
regular editions of the newspapers. A special supplement was prepared by a
group of volunteer writers, editors and photographers based in New York.
It was arranged for the supplement to be inserted in the March 3rd edition
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or the N^i.,^
^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
N-s. The insert orders fro. Weston Associates, dated February 26th, said the
bundles of supplements would arrive the day before the edition that vould carry
the insert.
.T,ile this media device had not been mentioned in the original
plan for the campaign the Insert cost of ?8,896.96 was made possible when the
budget for media was substantially expanded during the last weeks of the cam-
paign.
To produce such an Insert meant a considerable lead time to assemble
photographs, texts, prepare the layout, and publish enough copies for the dis-
tribution. To meet mailing requirements the inserts for each newspaper had
to carry the name of .the newspaper on the supplement which meant at least
twelve title changes during the press run.
After the problem which Hoeh and McCarthy had experienced with the flyer
that used the photograph of the Pope, McCarthy insisted that all copy and
materials used in the campaign should be cleared through his Senatorial Office.
Because of the necessities of the campaign a number of items used in New Hamp-
shire were not specifically cleared through the Washington office but were re-
viewed carefully by Hoeh. Studds, and/or Cans before printing and distribution.
The supplement was prepared and printed in New York. The text was changed
through Washington but the photographs were not. A number of photos used were
from McCarthy office files which had been used in his earlier campaigns or
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earlier in the New Hampshire camnidcvn ti,«P paig . The exception was the photograph that
heen selected fo. the cover. Xt showed Senator McCarthy reaching across
a work table in a New Hampshire factory to shaUe the hand of a plump, older
worker. It was a sensitive and friendly event capturing the moment of contact
between a person who had obviously spent most of her life working in a factory
and a presidential candidate who cared enough to come and visit her in her
Place of work. U^en the first copies of the supplement were received from
the printer one was sent to McCarthy's Senatorial office. There Mrs. McCarthy
saw it and reacted negatively to the cover photograph. To her the out-
stretched, bare-to-the-shoulder, heavy arm of the older woman worker was un-
attractive. She felt that such an unflattering photo might hurt her husband's
eandldacy. This reaction filtered quickly back to Curt Cans in New Hampshire,
with a specific instruction that the insert was not to be used. Cans was
about to call the newspapers that had instructions concerning the supplement
telling them to cancel the order when Hoeh arrived. Hoeh took one look at
the supplement and said that it was excellent. The front photo, he said,
••was a picture of the real Miss New Hampshire ~ the one who spends her life
working in the state's mills." He told Cans not to place the cancellation
calls. Such a call, he said, this late in the campaign would be an embarrass-
ment. Certainly greater than any problems that the supplement might cause as
it now stood. Cans responded that ha was in charge of these activities and
that he had been instructed by McCarthy's Senatorial office to keep the sup-
plement from circulating. Hoeh said he would call McCarthy immediately to give
the Senator his thoughts on the matter directly. McCarthy was not in his of-
ece
was
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flee when Hoeh placed his call „o.h did leave a detailed
.essa.e for
McCarthy. A short tl.e later Hoeh received a return call fro. McCarthy's
ataff saying that the Senator okayed the supplement distribution. The pi
circulated as scheduled. Many felt that the supplement was among th. most
effective items used in the campaign.
For election day itself, a 3 by 7 handout card was printed. On it
the campaign photo of McCarthy, advice to Independents about asking for the
Democratic ballot, and on the back the segment of the primary ballot showing
Eugene J. McCarthy's name and the phrase, "Vote for all McCarthy Delegates
and all McCarthy Alternates." This card was used in the cities where tradi-
tion held that something should be handed to the voter as he or she was
entering the polls. Most were distributed in Manchester.
Newspaper Advertising
To begin building momentum for the campaign the newspaper advertising
schedule and budget proposed by Weston Associates was implemented. The
changes were in the size and the number of the ads which increased as the
campaign eiided and the budget expanded.
Working with Weston's modest initial budget, the first newspaper ads
began appearing February 20th with a large. 6 column by 11 inch, ad. The
ad reproduced the Johnson campaign's "pledge card" with text advising that
the voters didn't have to sign anything to vote for Senator McCarthy. The
large ad was followed on alternate days by a 2 column by 3 inch identifica-
tion ad which read, "Don't Sign Anything! Vote Eugene McCarthy for President,
Lze
on
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The next wee...
.e.ies began with an ad of the large si.e followed by the
alternate day sequence of the small identification ad. "what had happened to
America in the years since John P. Kennedy's presidency," theme of the large
ad was amplified by the small ad which read. "Let's get America moving again!
McCarthy for President." In the final days before the election the ad si.
and sequence increased, but the identification ads remained to re-enforce
the theme of the larger ads. One of the n^ost effective of the smaller ad.
caae from a slogan developed by a New York agency, "New Hampshire can bri,
America back to its senses. McCarthy for President." One ad reflected
the challenge McCarthy had been given early in his campaign when he had been
told not to come to New Hampshire because the state was felt to be too
"Hawkish." Another dealt with the reasons why he did come to New Hampshire
and the importance of the New Hampshire primary. At the same time the
Johnson campaign responded by repeating an ad which had a line drawing of
Johnson, the slogan, "A Strong Man in a Tough Job," and the text, "to vote
for President Johnson you must WRITE-IN his name on your ballot."
The March 6th McCarthy ad read, "This time let's elect a President we
can believe. McCarthy for President," with the quotation:
And as far as I'm concerned, I want to be very cautious
and careful and use it only as a last resort when I start
dropping bombs around that are likely to involve American
boys in a war in Asia with 700 million Chinese. . .so, just
for the moment, I have not thought that we were ready,
our Aicerican boys, to do the fighting for Asian boys.
And what I've been trying to do with the situation that
I found was to get the boys in VietniiDi to do their own
fighting with our advice and our equipment, and that's
the course we're following. So, we're not going North
and drop bowbs at this stage of the game...."
Lyndon Johnson
September 28, 1964
Campaign Speech in Manchester, N.H.
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appeared March 8th had a photograph of th. He„
...apahire State house with the
.:.Ule. •!„ the next seventy-two hours
.ore .oney will be spent in Vietna.
than the state of New Hampshire spenife all year • Th» .I iuauo-i . i e explanatory text read;
PovcJti'Jn f'^f ' money to eliminatep ei y i America, but also to build all the roadsschools, COIIgJ^O'7 hnc-n-I^n^., j iOdQS,
wp'H c.^^^ u '
hospitals, and houses we need. Ande d still have enough left over to invest in under-developed countries so we don't have more VietnaL in
?n r":'
^^^'^^^y^^ for a tax-cut after that.I 195., General Eisenhower promised peace with honorin Korea. lie was elected, and he delivered. SenatorMcCarthy can do the same. An honorable man can brLgan honorable peace. ^
Then a photograph of McCarthy and the line, "McCarthy for President." com-
pleted the ad.^^
In the same edition of the Concord Monitor
, there appeared the first ad-
vertisement from several special groups that had raised their o.^ advertising
money to make appeals for McCarthy. The ad was addressed to "Republicans"
and was placed by the Republicans for McCarthy Com:.ittee, in newspapers where
an independent Republican vote was thought to exist. Concord, Keene, Lebanon
and Laconia were tl)e cities selected for the ad which showed the segment of
the Republican presidential primary ballot that listed the candidate names,
nine names in total, and showed, written in on the ballot, "Senator McCarthy."
The text read, "Republicans — You can vote for Senator McCarthy. Write in
his name on your Republican ballot. "H
The advertising that appeared during the last three press days of the
New Hampshire campaign used three formats for what were seen as different
political markets. The Monday, March 11th ad for McCarthy in the Concord
.Monitor, a market with a large Independent voter population, had a photo of
Lso
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the SUatue of Liberty. The text challenged Independents to vote In the prl-
mary or lose their freedom of ehoiee in the November eleetlon.l2
The Hareh 11th edition of the >Whester Union Leader carried ten sepa-
rate advertisements for McCarthy and a reminder that McCarthy would be speaUin.
that evening. On page 2. the New Hampshire McCarthy Con^ittee had placed its
ad offering transportation and babysitting service for McCarthy voters. Al.
on the page was an ad placed by a private citizen who signed his ad, "A con-
cerned non-New Hampshire Democrat, W. Hirsch, 9601 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly
Hills, California." It read;
An Open Letter to New Hampshire Democrats
The presence of Senator Eugene McCarthy on the primaryballot provides an opportunity for New Hampshire Deioo-
crats to directly register their concern or approval
of the State of the Union.
Perhaps when the history of the 1968 campaign is writtenit x^ill record that only the New Hampshire and Wisconsin
Democrats had a clearcut possibility to affirm theirposition as to the main issues.
At this point in the campaign what is being decided is
not a contest between two candidates but an answer to
the question: "Has this administration handled the prob-lems of Vietnam, civil rights, balance of pa^Tnent, crime,foreign aid, draft, etc., to your satisfaction?"
Do^ have confidence in the administration's progress
reports and predictions of future success in solving
today's problems?
IF YOU ARIZ NOT SATISFIED, YOUR ONLY CHANCE TO BE HEARD
IS BY A VOTE FOR SEI^iATOR EUGENE MCCARTHY.
The American dream was born In New England and Tuesday
the future of that dream will once more be at stake.
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The eyes of all thinking Americans who do not have theprivilege of voting in this election will be on the out-
• corae. If the New Hampshire Democrats within the con-fines of their polling booths show their historic courage
and by their action say that things are not right thenperhaps the start of a meaningful change in direction
will have been effected through a traditional electoral
process.-'--'
On page three of the same edition, an ad appeared as the statement of
forty-four, "New Hampshire Artists, Writers, Musicians and Craftsmen," sup-
porting Senator McCarthy for President. Their message:
Because we believe...
That he is a man of integrity, courage and reason.
That he is a man who offers an honorable and feasible
solution to America's third war.
That he is a man who understands the issues we face.
That he is dedicated to redirecting our energies to-
V7ard pressing domestic problems.
That he is putting his political future on the line
for the sake of his beliefs.
We support Senator Eugene J. McCarthy for President....
A formal waist-up photograph of McCarthy looking directly from the advertise-
ment was included.-'-^
On the same page v/as another privately sponsored advertisement which
filled the other part of the lower portion of the page. It read:
An Open Letter to All Fellow Democrats:
Our country is in deep crisis, as well as in Vietnam.
Our vote this Tuesday is too serious to be decided by
partisan politics as usual.
WE IIRGK ALL FELLOW DEMOCRATS TO VOTE FOR THE CANDIDATE
OF YOUR Cmi choice! Disregard any numbered pledge
cards, with their "arm tv;isting" copies to V/ashington,
as an invasion of privacy of your secret ballot; reject
any unfair, last minute attacks against a genuine Demo-
crat and distinguished American, Senator McCarthy.
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c can-
cide
dLl \ ^. you. vote count for the
AMERICWS, to meet theL-^., MOffll ALLese real needs of our count?^:
war. IS^Slr'srSi ™ iff^^ ^W^l^.s«-'^<-'iJ-iining m desperation.
a^tl^"^- "'^-i"" Hore increases in
—
To ensure an open Democrat ic Convention
.
(Signed) Joe Myers, Chairman,
Manchester Democratic City Committee, 1956-1965
G. Allen Foster, Chairman,
Plymouth Democratic To™ Committee, Exec. SectYDemocratic State Committee of New Hampshlrer^WlS
This advertisement grew out of the work that Al Shepard was doing in his
effort to develop support for McCarthy in the Manchester area, shepard dis-
covered that the former city Democratic chairman. Joe Myers, was deeply
disturbed by the behavior of the democratic State Co.^ittee in their support
of President Johnson's renomlnation. He took special umbrage to the use of
the "pledge card" and to the pre-primary endorsement tactics being used by
the Democratic State Committee. Shepard suggested that he develop a state-
ment that reflected his feelings that could be run as an advertisement.
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The leaders of the New Hampshire "RPk" ^n Vq .1 nx kt i 68 Comittee placed a onehalf page ad which appeared on pare 6 nr m m ,c 6 of the Manchester Union Leader which
recid, "At the Request of Robert F v^r. aK 1. Kennedy, we urge that you do n_ot
.^ite
in the name of Robert- vK Kenned, on the March 12th President!.! Primary Ballot
vote
.„,ene a. KeCarth,
.or President." xhen Included In the ad was the
complete list Of delegate and alternative delegate candidates ,or the two
congressional districts.16
..„ss .ro„ the KPK ad. on pa.e 7. was a two
thirds page ad signed hy Governor John W. King and Senator To. Mclntyre
which read:
We urge you
SUPPORT OUR FIGHTING MEN
We know the communists in Vietnam are watching the
sal H'^'r '° " - home have theme determination as our soldiers in Vietnam!
To vote for weakness and indecision would not be inthe best interest of our nation.
Writ'^J.T fighting men in Vietnam.rite-.xn President Johnson on your ballot on Tuesday.
The presidential preference portion of the ballot was included with the
printed names blurred and "President Johnson" written in the space provided.l7
The same edition of the newspaper contained several other advertisements
placed by delegate candidates favorable to the nomination of Lyndon Johnson
urging the voters to find their names on the ballot and vote for them.
Page 9 of the same edition carried the advertisement addressed to the
"Independent Voters" that had been placed by the McCarthy campaign in the
Concord Monito r, mentioned before.
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The Maryland CitlzenG for McCartl>v nin. aarthy placed an ad that appeared on pnge 12
for us. Vote for Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy. "18
A delegate candidate pledged to McCarthy fro. the 2nd Congressional Dis-
trict, Ceorge Marrow, placed a s.all ad soliciting votes for McCarthy and h^.
self. The ad appeared on page 14. Across fro. Marrow's solicitation, there
appeared an unsigned ad reading:
"is it Unpatriotic to Oppose U.S. Involve-
ment in Vietnam... The question was answered "No.' with quotations fro. Gene-
ral David Shoup, ret., for.er Con^andant of the Marine Corps; Brig, Gen.
Robert Hugos, ret.. Aide to General MacArthur; Lt. Gen. Ja.es Gavin, ret
for.er Chief of Ar.y Research, and a for.er Vietna. Green Beret, Master Sgt.
Donald Duncan. The ad had been developed and placed by a group of anti-war
students and clergy working fro. Hanover. Concord and Manchester . 19
To avoid the crowded political advertising that appeared on the news
pages of the edition, and to take advantage of the high readership that the
sports sections receive, a group of twenty New Ha.pshire college students,
all enrolled in military officer progra.s placed an effective ad. Titled,
"Don't Call Ue Draft Dodgers," it read:
The undersigned New Hampshire college students all re-
ceive ^comrai ssions as officers in the United States Armythis June. V/e believe in our country. VJe will all
serve. Some of us may die.
But we strongly oppose the war in Vietnam. We think itis tragic for Vietnam and for the United States.
America has its own problems to solve. Our cities face
crisis alter crisis while we use our resources to con-
duce a senseless vjar thousands of miles away.
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We are concerned for America.
We ack New Ilampshir'^ vofPrB ot.
The most important advertisement of Mip i.o^-c the last two days was the one placed
in the most prominent position for salp -fne i the various New Hampshire daily
newspapers. The n,,,^^ ^^.^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
CO sell advertising space on Its front page, earrled the ad there In a space
approximating two-fifths of the page. A serene, presidential appearing.
Photograph of McCarthy in profile, arms folded, looking toward the curtained
window of his senatorial office, shrouded with the eagle embossed drapes,
was to the left of the ad with the title, "Profile of Courage." The text:
Itlt^'A^T'^T P'=°Pl'= N» Hamp-shire and debate the critical issues of our time EuceneMcCarthy brings a fresh approach to securing a skftand honorable peace in Vietnam. He has challenged thenational priorities which put Improved education and
a^Ldi'''°f''f ^" " "^"^ l'""™ °f ':he nationalgenda. He has proposed economic policies designed to
restore the Kennedy boom - a growing economy with stable
The issue is leadership. If you are not satisfied with
our present course as a nation - if you want to returnto the principles which got America moving under PresidentKennedy then, Eugene McCarthy is your only alternative.
He, and he alone, has come to New Hampshire to give you a
choice. That's not only courage. That's what the demo-
cratic process is all about.
McCarthy for tri-sident
The high readability and sophistication of the advertisement captured the
tone of the McCarthy cai-.ipaign and the importance of the New Hampshire result.
It solicited from the voter a demonstration of courage comparable to that which
McCarthy had shown by becoming a candidate. The courage to support his candl-
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a^cy to .ea.U
.eyon.
...
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^
the current national state. The ad eff=.n ii effectively countered the Johnson ad-
vertisement that shared the adiacenr f^„„fn j t front page space. The Johnson ad was
the format that had heen used In th» tm e main brochure, a sketch of Johnson and
the slogan, "A Strong Man In a Tough Job."
All New Ha,npshire campaigns use the Informal medium of the Letter to
the Editor as a way to state support for a candidate. The Mscl^PJar Union
Leader has an open letters policy and prints most of the letters It receives.
Other New Hampshire newspapers limit the number of letters It prints and will
not publish letters that simply reiterate a candidate's position or that add
little except simple support for the candidate.
Since the Union Leader's editors are less likely to be selective and the
newspaper will publish extra pages just for the letters, a contest begins.
Which candidate will receive the most favorable letters? McCarthy attracted
more than his share of the letters. A number came from outside the state.
For the devotee of the letters-to-the-edltor-columns the McCarthy supporters
were successful with the numbers In the Union Leader and with the quality that
passed by the editors of the newspapers that limited publication.
Radio Advert:lsin|>
As advised by Weston Associates in the MEDIA STRATEGY AND PLAN, radio
would be the "basic medium" of the media campaign. Of the $59,652 media cost
budget. Weston had allocated $17,000 to radio time and production. A highly
flexible medium and one that was especially suited to New Hampshire coinmunica-
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tlons habits, rudlo wca lnpiiDi,n„<„„<.xp.n.lvo. coolly proB>.a™,od
. and had an almost
lead Cl„e.
.
,„e3sa,e cold he changed „Uh a telephone call
The avc.a,e price per spot adverel„»e„t
„aa approximately
.5.00 ,.,hlch.
given the proposed Weston radio advertl^-i.o k ^l avertismg budget, would pay for 3,^00
spot announcements. Weston ni-.r,,^^^„ planned to uoe mostly 30 and 60 second messages
but. occasionally, they did program 10 second announcements.
The first radio time purchased was used to announce Senator McCarthy's
St. A„sel..s college speech. The major radio campaign hegan hy scheduling
Advertising to coincide with McCarthy campaign visits to particular co^unl-
tlcs. Thirty second ads were placed during the "adult drive" (con^tlng)
time and adjacent to ncvs broadcasts during the conunuting hours.
While originally the radio messages were scheduled to begin February
13th, budget problems and delays In production of expected radio tapes from
New York pushed the start beyond the planned date. The first placement
orders were written February 15th to begin Wednesday, February 21st. The
first tape contained two one minute messages and four thirty second messages.
These were scheduled to run from February 21st to February 27th during
"drive times" only. The delay meant that the Johnson campaign messages be-
gan before the McCarthy ads. This flight of nine Johnson messages which were
used intermittently during the campaign dwelt on the "Strong Man in a Tough
Job" theme. They used citizen endorsements for the President Johnson write-
in effort. Within an hour of the first Johnson messages' arrival at the
various radio stations Weston Associates had a complete tape of the ads. 20
Cut 1: (Johnson ad)
(Announcer) Listen.'
knows that surrender L v^^^ f^'^"' """^ he
country down tl" rjver v'" '^'"^"S '"^ *ole
running is oylTtll lZ't '""^"^ °" back and
love to see. And^rJi^ve L'theTu^H
as we run. But heU r,H „^ ^ } J"=' as far
m Vietnam olTT^'t^^AT^rulV:. ^
it"Klr""on '1^: ^^'^ ""="^"8 to John Martlne
preswt,"'':^ t % :t:fjob t„e toushest-j„^ ;;rrd!"Sn\,:?:.i,:,';:f
preference p^taaryO "
"^"P^hire presidential
j^hnson.'"" '^•'^ ""^ °£ President
Cut 2: (Johnson ad)
(Announcer) Listen!
...I know he's right and sometimes what I see on TV makesme ashaB^ed. I see these draft card burners and peace
marchers
- they're nothing but surrender marchers in my
he's 7iZ"" t'?";.'"" ' ^'^^^ ^^i-SS I knowright. If there was a better way or even a fasterway in Vietnam or any other place.
.
.
(Announcer: voice over: You are listening to Nancy Lorden
of Manchester. The man she is talking about is LyndonJohnson, President of the United States - a strong man in
a tough job — the toughest job in the world. On ^farch 12thyou will have an opportunity to endorse this man by writingin his name on your ballot in the New Hampshire presiden-
tial preference primary.)
...and believe me I'm writing in the name of President
Johnson.
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Cut 3: (Johnson ad)
(Announcer) Listen.'
...backbone or all out determination but whatever it 1.
r:n:er;^oi;rc:i::;cLl: 5rf ---rand^^ir-
thc world. He kn^^S:t^thr:^o?: Zr:^^^^'^to see xf we are going to turn tail and run f^J ho^^!.
.
(Announcer: voim n^rof. -i .
Knightly of SaL") ^""^ listening to Willia.
...we've never given up yet and we shouldn't start now...
(Announcer: voice over: The man he is talking about is
e f iob i";T"* ' ?r^"^ ^ ^-Sh Job -? ?he tough-st j n the world. On March 12th you will have anopportunity to endorse this man by writing in h^rname
Terence
"^^^'^^^ presidential p^l primary.)
...what wa say cone hell or high water and that's whyI m writing In the name of President Johnson.
When Hoch came to "Cur. 4" he heard something that did not sound as It
being represented. The voice and the nai..e used did not match and Hoeh
recognized the voice.
Cut 4: (Johnson ad)
(Announcer) Listen!
...I don't think any man has ever worked harder for his
country and I don't think any man has ever faced moredifficult times. I think he's doing a fantastic job and
I m proud he's standing firm and refusing to surrender
in Vietnam. One of these days when the history books
are written I'm sure people will realize that he, per-
haps more than anyone else, knew exactly what had to bedone to preserve this country...
(Announcer: voice over: You are listening to John
0 Connell of Keene. The man he is talking about is
Lyndon Johnson, a strong man in a tough job... etc.)
was
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and that's w ; ^„'^.rt' i'"\^''^',""" "'f '""''^ " -
Oohnaon.
' lclns In the name of President
The voice „as fa.lXl„ to „oeh and Wdiatel,
.eco^nl.ed as beln, that of
Charles McKahon. Senator Mclntyre's l„-state representative, not that of
John O'connell. a Keene school teacher. Hoeh ^ot a volunteer to call o'Connell
O'Connell stu.nbled a hit, said he would call haCc later, and hung up his tele-
phone. Hoeh. Studds and Cans then played "cat with a „ouse" for several days
threatening to relea.e the mls-representatlon, as the Johnson campaigners
struggled to cover-up their error. vmUe not a .ajor flap It did upset the
Johnson campaign plan further - a campaign that was already reeling fro. the
impact of the "pledge card" gaff.
The other five Johnson messages pursued the same themes as had the first
four. Johnson would not "knuckle under to the peaceniks, dreamers, fuzzy
thinkers, draft card burners, and communists" but was doing his best in spite
of the "criticism" and the "terrific pressure" to accomplish peace in Vietnam.
One praised his "sticking with men like General Westmoreland and not listening
to those peace-at-any-pricc fuzzy thinkers..." while another said he's "not
about to pull out and surrender because he knows as we all should know, that
could never mean peace." The war, Johnson's leadership of the war, and the
possible consequences of getting out of Vietnam were the only themes pursued
in the Johnson messages. There was no attempt to defend the administration
against charges of domestic neglect or economic uncertainty that wore the
substance of the broader issue spectrum of the McCarthy messages.
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The fl.«, ,„hnson messages
.o.e hca.d Tebruary 17t.h and continued with
incroasin, frequency th.ouch to March I2th. The six McCarthy nd.. hurriedly
asscnblod, began February 21st with the following sequence:
Cut 1: (30 sec.)
(Announcer)
^;i;atever happened to the secret ballot?
Do you want to abandon your right to examine all of theifasues between now and March 12th?
What does Lyndon Johnson have in the cards for you?
Will the New Hampshire primary be just a formality?
Senator Eugene McCarthy offers a choice, not an echo.
There is an alternative - McCarthy can get America
moving again.
Vote Senator McCarthy for President.
Cut 2: (30 sec.)
(Announcer) Senator Eugene McCarthy has come to NewHampshire because people are concerned. Concerned
about higher taxes and rising prices, concerned about
riots in the cities and the unending land war in Asia.
Concerned because our national leadership is unable to
meet these problems. Concerned because it wasn't like
this five years ago.
Eugene McCarthy is a proven leader in the tradition of
Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy. He i£
man v;ho thinks clearly and speaks honestly.
Senator McCarthy can get America moving again.
.s a
McCarthy for President.
Cut 3: (30 t;ec.)
(Announcer) Let
'
s get America moving again.
llTloZ """"^^T- -o^'- to New Hampshire as a
be aus Nc" Sr'^'"' '
'^^'^^^^^^ candidate! Concernedc e ew Hampshire people are concerned.
You don't have to sign anything to vote for McCarthy.
McCart^i'Lfp""L'''^ '° ''^^^ EugeneiiCL-a tny tor President.
Cut 4: (GO sec.)
ihirr:peech!"'^
^^^^''^^^
^^^^^^^ ^ "-P"
"... there are a nui::ber of reasons, of course, for mycoming to New Hampshire. I want to come here, princi-pally, to talk about the issues which I think are of
concern to the country...
(Announcer: This is Senator Eugene McCarthy speaking inNew Hampshire) b -^^^
...there is kind of a special challenge in coming to NewHampshire, to, really, test oneself against what's sup-posed to be the harshest political judgment in America,
and also to find out whether the people of New Hampshire
really are V7hat they have been said to be. Some of your
Democratic leaders have said that you're all so well or-
ganized and disciplined now that there really is no
point in my coming in, that the people of New Hampshire willvote pretty much as their party leaders tell them to
vote. 1 doubt that this is true but in any case, this
is one of the matters I hope to test along the primary
trail.
(Announcer: Will the New Hampshire primary be just a
formality?
Senator Eugene McCarthy offers a choice not an echo.
There is an alternative ~ McCarthy for President.)
5U
Cut: 5: (30 sec.)
(Senator McCarthy snp^HnrrN
In what has becoL Ha or 7" ^W^- nation,
ccct
. that „a. has^ !J^f^^J^^^^^Jl^l^
a^r::t^?i:L'-?h:ti^\^^'"-"- -has Imposed upon us In V-^.^r, o endless escalationf ^^uu i ietnam. Senator ^Tr^nv^^T<^ i -iaway from our responsibJ 1
-f f-foo -i ,
NcLarthy will not turn
avenue to he.in
.l^^i^sfirn::o^Ltio„^^":r'';e:^^! ^^"^"^ ^^^^
There Is an alternative. McCarthy for President)
Unlike the Johnson advertising, the MeCarthy messages could and did contain
material taken fro„ McCarthy
-s speeches or specially recorded messages fro. the
candidate. To have used Johnson material directly would have oeant Johnson's
tacit approval of the write-in activity. The final McCarthy cut in the first
flight of radio advertising was excerpted froo another McCarthy New Hampshire
speech. Like other aspects of the media preparation for McCarthy, the bank of
audio tapes available to create messages did not exist. Only a few tapes that
had been made of McCarthy's New Hampshire speeches were available during the
weeks when the radio material was prepared. Until later in the campaign, when
the travelling staff of the .Senator expanded to Include a taping crew, did the
volume of taped material increase to the point where it could provide useful
audio material. The best McCarthy material was the spontaneous McCarthy, not
the McCarthy reading a prepared announcement. The sixth cut used in the first
flight drew on the scanty recordings that existed early In February 1968.
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Cut G: (GO sec.)
\r ^^^°^r^' '^^'^—
«
cost of that war has been L?! T'' °^
tinning... ^^^"^ ^"'^ ^^^'^^^ those costs are con-
(Announcer: voice ovpr-^ ^
to tl,e continulnrdrlJn'of II ™
honorable alternative
e^rnl ,f ,-„ k V materials that endle?^
no tu^r "T" "'^ Senator McCarthy
peace, "xhere is^^rternlu::-!
Eventually recordings
.ade In New York did arrive 1„ New Hampshire and were in-
cluded m the second flight of radio ads circulated by Weston Associates, m
this „,aterlal was an assortment of taped endorsements that had been prepared
by cooperating celebrities. This collection became an audio bank which was used
to assemble attractive radio messages for McCarthy. Familiar voices such as
that of Harry Belafonte. Robert Ryan, Dustln Hoffman. Rod Eerllng, Paul Ne^an,
Joanne Woodward and others read messages or made personal endorsements of McCarthy.
Weston Associates bought as much radio spot advertising time as seemed
feasible while Cans, working with the graduate student volunteer writers and
Weston Associates personnel, turned out ad copy and recorded cassettes for dis-
tribution to the 25 radio stations used In the campaign. During the final
week. Rod Serllng spent several days in New Hampshire recording messages and
introducing endorsements from other celebrities. Each celebrity to visit New
Hampshire spent at least a few hours recording messages for the McCarthy radio
campaign.
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The f.equency Increased fro. 35 spou announcements per station per
.eolc
during the period oc February 21st to 27th. to a schedule of 28 sixty second
spots and 70 thirty second spots to be played between February 28th and 5:00 p...,
March 12th. The frequency per station per day was ordered as two 60 second spots
and five 30 second spots per station. The messages shipped with the order
.ailed
February 26th "kllJod" the preceeding tapes and substituted new material. In
the final throe days a third flight of messages, to be used up to the election,
were substituted for those shipped with the original February 26th order. The
final advertising was developed over the last weekend before the election.
The campaign bought more time just before March 12th to run a single new
message which was: "New Hampshire voters, Think how good you will feel when you
wake up on Wednesday morning March 13th and hear that Senator Eugene McCarthy
has won the Wew Hampshire Presidential Primary. Vote Senator Eugene McCarthy
for President.- Like the "Profile in Courage" newspaper advertisement used
during the last three days, the radio message was the capstone of the cair.paign.
The total spent for radio advertising time, as tabulated from the remaining
invoices, was approximately $23,000. Another $3,000 to $5,000 was probably
spent on radio message production and distribution. The radio campaign was in-
tensive and confirmed the emphasis that Weston Associates had advised in their
plan, mile technical skill and familiarity with the medium were more important
in the electronic media work than in other aspects of the campaign, the effort
succeeded because of the volunteer cooperation it attracted and the creativity
of those involved.
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Tel evls lonj' r rammln
^
WiCh al„osc no .one, avaUaMe
.o
.-adio and newspaper ca^pai^n.
projected to .e^in d..i„, Pebruax,. television was abandoned as a ca.pai,n
-diu.. Weston Associates had originally budgeted 513.646 ,o. television to
be used durino the final week. The plan was to:
...schedule 10 prime Mtop rn'o. t; ^ i ,
~ ite^ -i.r:h? i ^-the-b-t »::i--u^e-" -coverage. The pria.e Id's will be placed precedirg hlrh-rated programs. The fringe minutes will L purchased fol-
dxso De ne\vs adjacencies.
oricnto'd'halT.''''
schedule, two afternoon women-
tu^t th'
hour programs are planned. These would fea-
ioc^l J:di"?2r candidacy with groups of
For each minute of broadcast a production cost exceeding $1,000 was expected in
order to make the messages credible. Without the resources to produce such
programming in New Hampshire nor funds to underwrite the cost of the time, much
less the cost of production, nothing was done to develop a television package.
McCarthy received seme television attention by arriving and departing through
Boston, was interviewed on Manchester's low market Channel 9, and several cable
distributed local stations elsewhere in New Hampshire. He did not appear on an
"afternoon women oriented half hour" nor did he appear on any of the several
Boston-based afternoon "talk" programs that sometimes invite candidates. The
yield from such non-prime time progranmiing was not thought to be sufficient for
McCarthy's New Hampshire effort to be worth the time he would have had to spend
away from the campaign.
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A "stand by" package oC television lueseagea to fill Weston's plan had been
prepared In Washington. Senate. MeCa.thy video-taped several messages as well
whleh dwelt on the ^,o. then.es he had developed through the New Hampshire cam-
paign. Toward the end of the campaign the McCarthy campaign found Its own fi-
nancial angel. Pro. having hardly the resources to buy radio advertising time,
the campaign found that it could not only accomplish the radio program but could
also expand its television effort. It was. however, too late to develop sophis-
ticated television material or to begin any programming before the final week
of the campaign.
A progran. of 10 second ID's, 60 second announceraents
, and five-.inute pro-
grams was quickly developed fro. the "stand by" material, and that which Senator
McCarthy had video-taped earlier in February. Weston Associates was able to buy
time on three Boston television stations and two New Hampshire stations for
the shorter announcements. V^en the option to develop two one-half hour pro-
grams came, Weston Associates ran into a problem. They sought to reserve time
for the two programs on WBZ-TV. The times they wanted were early evening - the
first, several days before the election, and the second, election eve. WBZ was
reluctant to sell the time to Weston for the near prime half hour periods he had
selected. He had no difficulty reserving the time slots on New Hampshire stations,
but found that the Boston station did not want to sacrifice network programming
for a political production of interest to the small portion of its market, l^hen
word of this refusal got back to New York, Blair Clark and Howard Stein, the
angel, contacted the programming executives of the National Broadcasting System,
told them of their problems, and a few telephone calls later, the New Hampshire
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McCarthy campaign had Its prc-elocMon television time. The pro.ra™ v-ould bo
aired on ,«.,-TV betv.-cen 7:30 and 8:00 p.,.. March 11th and between 8:00 and 8:30 p...
on Channel 8. WOT-TV broadcasting from Poland Springs, Maine, via Mt. Washington.
New Hamprihire.
The first of the two one-half hour programs was produced in a Boston studio,
with Senator McCarthy discussing his campaign with a group of the volunteers who
had worked in his New Hampshire campaign. The objective of the program was to
capture visually some of the wide interest that had been generated by the stu-
dents who had worked in New Ha-^pshire and to use their enthusiasm as a foil for
McCarthy's own sincerity and concern. The program was an engaging dialogue
that ranged across the major issues of the campaign and closed with McCarthy
turning toward the camera with a closing statement.
The second program was taped in Boston on the morning of March 11th, the day
It was to be shoim. Jack Parr, the recently retired "Tonight Show" host, had
been quietly managing the television station he oxmed in Maine when his daughter.
Randy, a student at Radcliffe, became Involved in the New Hampshire campaign.
She had become one of the weekend volunteers and a regular among the anonymous
workers In the backroom and basejuent of the Concord headquarters. Her accounts
of the campaign and concern about the U.S. Vietnam policy had motivated her fa-
ther to breech his retirement to help McCarthy. Dick Goodwin conceived of the
idea of using something like Jack Parr's old "Tonight Show" Interview format as
the setting for the election eve program. Parr agreed to be the host and the
McCarthy campaign had an entertainment event as well as a campaign concluding
political program. Parr had been seen only occasionally on television during
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the .evc.al yoa.s since retirement. His willincness to serve as the inter-
viewing host for the McCarthy telecast
.eant that the show would attract the
curious who had not seen Parr for several years.
A somewhat rusty Jack Parr attempted an interview of Senator McCarthy
.uch
as he had done each late evening for al.ost a decade. Senator McCarthy,
.ore
relaxed than Parr, responded to the questions Parr offered, questions that
Goodwin had developed fro. Al Shepard's motivational research. Why was McCarthy
running? my had he entered the New Hampshire Primary? What were his diffe-
rences with the Johnson administration? ^^at were his concerns about the impact
of the war on domestic affairs? And then questions which Parr hoped would probe
McCarthy as a personality and as an elected official. Toward the middle of the
program McCarthy rose from his chair, walked a few steps to the corner of a desk
that had been placed away from the chairs he and Parr had occupied during the
interview. He perched on a corner of the desk, settled slightly, and began
talking directly through the camera. In the ten or fifteen minutes available.
Senator McCarthy explained his candidacy, what the next day's vote could mean,
how he would change policy, and what kind of President he would be. It was an
effective media moment. The "cool" candidate had met the "cool" medium. McCarthy
I
projected through the camera into the living room as a striking contrast to a
harsh Johnson or a tense Richard Nixon ~ the two most prominent political fi-
gures then on television. McCarthy, the television candidate was in harmony with
I McCarthy the "Profile" newspaper advertisement and McCarthy the "bring America
back to its senses," radio message. Jubilant, McCarthy left the taping session
to complete the last day of his New Hampshire campaign.
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Flnanc i r)^i_the_ Campa±p^n
The New Ha.,pshiro political
.eallty is that ,.o„ey for ca^pai^ns i. limited
under the best of circumstances and .o„ey to support the primary condidacies of
presidential candidates is rarely, if ever, derived totally fro. the Ke„ Hamp-
shire populace. The Johnson campaign sought to fund its activities with
locally raised money and felt they could do so since the continuation of Johnson
in office meant continued emplo^w^nt for some and potential rcvards for others.
It was also a part of the New Hampshire McCarthy strategy to make it embarrass-
ing for the Johnson Committee Co import c.-.mpai£n money and also to use noncy that
had been raised for the Kew Hampshire Democratic Party to run the Johnson cam-
paign. The McCarthy strategy worked. The Johnson Kew Hampshire war chest was
limited. Not until very late in the campaign did the Johnson Co-^ittee begin to
spend extensively for radio, newspaper and television advertising. Until that
time almost an of the Johnson campaign was supported by a few volunteers.
Democratic State Committee Staff, and staff loaned by Senator Mclntyre and
Governor King. Urhen their "pledge card" strategy failed, their campaign all
but collapsed. Then and only then did they spend money in an attempt to re-coup
their losses.
Much like other aspects of the McCarthy campaign the financing pattern fell
into three distinct periods. The first, described earlier, was the period prior
to and jufit shortly after Senator McCarthy's announcement of his New Hampshire
candidacy. The Kev^ Hampshire leaders had been able to collect a small pot com-
posed of one $250 contribution from Sandra Hoeh's Hartford, Connecticut aunt and
uncle, and a number of smaller sums that had arrived spontaneously. The first
contributions listing from the campaign read:
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Rebecca Z. Solomon, 65 Middlcbrook Road
Hartford, Conn.
^,50^^^
Robert L. Finley. Tamworth, New Hampshire 100.00
David G. Underwood, 29 Runford Street
Concord, New Hampshire 100.00
Elinore M. Adams, Box 101, E. Concord,
New Hampshire
qq
George M. Marrow, P.O. Box 797, Brattleboro,
^^^'^^^ 20.00
Gerhard Lenski, ADA Westwood Drive, Chapel Hill,
North Carolina ' 25 00
John Stevens, V/atkins Hill, Walpole,
New Hampshire
2 QO
Mary Scott-Cralg, 2 Chase Road, Hanover,
New Hampshire 10.00
Norman R. Torrcy, Jaffrey Ctr. , New Hampshire 10.00
(N.H. McCarthy for President Committee contributions report) 22
This fund of $527.00 was the total resource of the campaign until the second week
of January 196S. All previous activities of the New Hampshire McCarthy Committee,
principally mailing, travel and telephone calls, were paid for by the individuals
' Involved — principally, David Hoeh and Gerry Studds. Hoeh had received a per-
sonal contribution from a New Hampshire supporter to help pay for his travel
and that of his wife to attend the Chicago meeting of the Conference of Concerned
^
Democrats, early December 1967. Gerry Studds financed his own travel to that
conference as did the others of the New Hampshire delegation that attended.
s| Studds used his own personal checking account to vnrite deposits for telephone
installation, headquarters rental, furniture rental and some of the early equip-
ment rentals needed to open the Concord headquarters. Once McCarthy had announced
hI his entry in the New Hampshire primary the first $527 in the fiscal agent's ac-
count v;aa quickly expended.
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The New Hampshire leader, had agreed that they would not permit the campaign
to .pond more than was on hand to pay the campaign's obligations. Studds ven-
tured c.t on the liiBb with his checking account as a minor violation of this
principle but had reasonable assurance from the National Campaign Manager, Blair
Clark, that he would not be stuck. There was, however, a delay between the time
that money was needed to begin New Hampshire activities and the time money began
to arrive. Until this delay developed, the New Hampshire leaders were under the
impression that sufficient money was available from national sources to fund the
campaign budget. Allard Lowenstein had referred repeatedly to substantial funds
already pledged to an alternative candidacy if only Senator McCarthy would run.
There had been press conferences in Chicago during the early December CCD.
meeting where large contributors had pledged hundred of thousands of dollars to
support an anti-war candidacy. When it came time to pay the early New Hampshire
bills it came from the personal fortunes of two individuals who had not been
involved in the Chicago braggadocio. Martin Peretz, Harvard professor and
Singer Sewing Machine heir, and Blair Clark, Clark thread heir, each sent a
check for $5,000. Clark's check came through the National Office of the McCarthy
campaign and was listed as such on the contributions report filed in New Hampshire,
Shortly after the Peretz and Clark checks were received, Ann Raynolds of Spring-
field, Vermont, and Mabel B. Harrison of Hanover, New Hampshire sent checks of
$1,000 each. The second phase, the middle of the campaign f inane ii\g, was underway.
During Blair Clark's visit to New Hampshire January 2nd and 3rd he met to
revicv^ Weston Associates' outline of the campaign's media components. From this
discus&ion Weston drafted his first advertising budget. A budget that would be
revised again as the Ml'DIA PLAN MJ) STRATEGY discussed earlier. The first tabu-
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laU.o., for c..,pal8n
.dvortl^in, vas S/.3.007. This would continue to Increase
by the t^ae David Hoch su..„Uted an overall bud^oc to Malr Clark.
.,anuar, 18th
Obviously, the ?50.000 flgur. that Hooh and Studds had suggested as being the
amount required to fund a McCarthy candidacy m New Hampshire
, In their December
22nd ..emornndum. had been exceeded by the advertising budget alone.
Clark had negotiated the essentials of an advertising budget with Weston
which Weston then forwarded to I.oeh for his revisions and inclusion with Hoeh's
proposed overall ean^paign budget. In a memorandum prepared by the McCarthy
leaders and submitted to Blair Clark, were projected the financial needs of
the campaign.
1. Media budget (attached to the original memo) $50,500.00
2. Headquarter.?: Costs include: rent, heat
(vjhere necessary)
,
act.ivit)'-
related advertising, tele-
phones, signs, personnel-
limited, transportation,
and covering of some costs
for volunteers.
Concord - State
Nashua
Manchester
Keene
Laconia
Lebanon-Hanover
Dover
Portsmouth
Berlin
Home headquarters: up to
45 H.H. at $50 per spot
3. Personnel:
Scheduling $ 1,000.00
Advance 2,000.00
I'ress 1,500.00
Overall 2,000.00
Volunteer coordination 1,000.00
Contingencies 2, 500.00
$10,000.00
4. Transportation
3,000.00
2,400.00
2,600.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,500.00
1,000.00
750.00
1,500.00
2,250.00
10,000.00
2,500.00
5. Television (all should be programmed
out of Boston)
6. All other items that will come up that
I can t think of at this moment
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????
TOTAL: $82,500.00
NOTE: The headquarters costs are higher than had been expected
^.e are having difficulty finding store-front locations
tlrt t } u
^° allocate budget to a headauar-
We wi?f tr'"' ""'^^ "-^^^'-^y possible.ll hen supplement if they are in desperate need.
The staff situation remains critical. We need full-timepeople to carry the daily load. We are making some pro-gress but need the bodies as ^v^ell as the money. 23
Clark accepted the budget from the New Hampshire leaders. The fiscal agent
monitored the obligations according to the budget plan. The middle phase of the
campaign followed the expenditure pattern advised in the memo.
One of the early mailings was to a list of approximately 1,500 contacts
that it was presumed might contribute to the campaign. The mailing stimulated
a modest but steady flow of money and began some local fund-raising initiatives
as well. A Dartmouth history professor, F. David Roberts, began organizing the
Dartmouth College faculty to contribute to the McCarthy cam.paign. He recruited
colleagues in other departments to help him. Each pay day he would remind his
contacts to collect a contribution for the campaign. He then would bring his
collection to David Hoeh's office, pouring it like a tribute across Hoeh's desk.
With the bills, checks and change, Roberts provided a careful account of the
amount and the contributors' names for the records.
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Tvo UniverHity ol New mnup.hlre professors raised all of the funds needed
to support the Dover Area headquarters. In Keene. a Joint Keone State College
and loeal citizen con:mittee raised funds to support their local activities en-
tirely. Other corro^Kltteea submitted budget requests to the campaign but most
had raised at least a part of their needs locally.
The Hampton chairman sent his local budget to Concord for approval before
going ahead.
Tentative proposed budget for Hampton area:
Rental of trailer headquarters (half price) $100 00
Advertising
Paper, envelopes, etc. 150 qo
Telephone 50] qq
Lights 25.00
^^^^ 25.00
Miscellaneous 250 00
TOTAL: $1,500.00
Sound fea&ible? With adequate funds, we are optimistic that
we can do a job in this area. Do we have your approval?
Please send us - as soon as possible - literature, buttons,
bumper stickers, large signs and posters for the headquar-
ters, etc. We plan to have our committee organized by next
week; and will attempt to get pictures and a blurb in the
five local papers that service this area.
Will inform you on our progress.
Sincerely, Dave Morin
Our slogan in this area will have to be along the line: "Be
proud to be an Ame rican
. Vote McCarthy I" (Democrats are
virtually non-existent.)
Although a steady flow of contributions was regularly received at the
McCarthy headquarters in Concord, the amounts did not keep pace with the proposed
budget much less an expenditure pattern that was projected to exceed the budget.
Many contribuLi ons came spontaneously from McCarthy sympathizers across the
country with states like North Dakota, North Carolina, Illinois, Georgia, Cali-
fornia, Washington, Ohio and Florida, included with New York, Washington D.C.,
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Pennsylvania. Maryland. Virginia and the other New England states. Some state
McCarthy connnittees, either with no primary or later primary elections, raised
and forwarded n.oney to New Hampshire for the campaign. The National Campus
Concerned Democrats sent $1,000 and a New Jersey Coalition supporting McCarthy
made a special trip to New Hampshire to give David Hoeh a check for $5,000.
In SDite of the good intentions and hard work, the flow of funds was not suffi-
ciently predictable to con^mit all aspects of the media plan as each deadline
came due. The campaign period, 10 weeks, meant that little time could be de-
voted to fund raising and without funds, valuable time would be lost. The cam-
paign faced this dilemma early in February.
Early in February the flow of funds from Washington almost stopped. Clark
could not supply the New Hampshire campaign with the money to begin the radio
and newspaper campaigns, to pay for mailings, to reserve television time, to
open headquarters, or to supply the paraphenalia of posters, buttons, flyers,
bumper strips, etc. For the first two weeks of February it looked as if the
campaign might die of starvation. Volunteers made the money go further, but
without money the campaign would die and no one involved in New Hampshire \^yas
financially capable of assuming the debt to go forward. Weston Associates had
extended their agency credit to the limit. Desperation began to pass over the
leadership of the campaign both in New Hampshire and Washington. It was apparent
that McCarthy had not stirred sufficient attention in the national media to at-
tract major contributions.
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Two struggles were going on among those attempting to manage the campaign
outside New Hampshire. The first concerned the dispute between the powerful
and well financed Coalition for a Democratic Alternative of New York City and
Blair Clark.
The second struggle was between Clark and Russell Hemenway, Executive
Director of the National Committee for an Effective Congress (NEC), concerning
potential sources of campaign funds. Hemenway, and NEC's principal backer,
Maurice Rosenblatt, also was trying to build a campaign organization and fund-
ing base for McCarthy. Urhile doing this he had discovered that the young,
financial genius. Howard Stein, director of the Dreyfus Fund, was attracted
to McCarthy. Under Hemenway's tutelage. Stein became a willing student of
national politics opening both his purse and his power to Hemenway's advice.
Being a cautious invester Stein was reluctant to release his money or his con-
tacts to Hemenway or
.
anyone else vjithout having a substantial role in the deci-
sions as to how these resources were to be used.
Hemenway brought Stein with him to New Hampshire during McCarthy's first
campaign visit. Several days after the visit, David Hoeh received a call from
Hemenway saying that Stein would like to help with the campaign and asked Hoeh
to find a house that Stein might rent for the duration of the campaign. Hoeh
called Clark to check on this offer. Clark advised Hoeh to let him handle Stein
and to delay responding to Hemenway. Early in February, Stein himself called
Hoeh. Stein said he wanted to help with the campaign and had arranged to bring
several professional people with him who could provide assistance to the Senator,
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Stein's InLercst caused concern
.luce the one thing that the New Hampshire
leaders feared was having their role in the can^paign over-ridden by supposedly
expert outsiders. They felt that they had the pulse of the McCarthy potential
under their own fingers.
Again Hoeh contacted Blair Clark relaying his conversation with Stein.
Clark instructed Hoch not to have further conversations with Stein nor to make
arrangements for him to become involved in the New Hampshire activity. Several
weeks passed with no contact with either Hemenway or Stein. Clark feared that
Stein would move-in on the campaign in a way that V70uld side-track Clark's ef-
forts to build the national campaign organization. He had convinced McCarthy
of possible dangers in becoming too closely associated with Stein and Stein's
experts. Both Clark and Jerry Eller, McCarthy's Administrative Assistant,
feared that Stein's desire to become extensively involved in the campaign might
set off a series of negative reactions that would disrupt the fragile New Hamp-
shire venture and their ov;n efforts to regulate McCarthy's candidacy. The
impasse continued. Hemenway tried his best to keep communications open be-
tween Stein and McCarthy but was not able to resolve things until the New Hanip-
shire and national campaign practically died from a lack of money.
Early in the third week of February, Hoeh received a series of telephone
calls. Hemenway called to say that Stein would be calling again; Hoeh called
Clark to find out what he should do, and Clark said that Hoeh should listen and
work out something with Stein that suited Hoeh's needs in New Hampshire. Hoeh,
feeling a bit like he was walking on eggs, accepted Stein's call, agreed to dis-
cuss the campaign's financial situation with him, but promised nothing else.
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He assured Stein that the New Hampshire aspects of the campaign were progressing
well but v;hat he needed was help paying bills. Stein said he would corue to New
Hampshire and help as he could - quite a different posture from that Hoeh
sensed in the earlier conversations.
Wliat Hoeh learned later was that Elliot Janeway, a friend of the McCarthy's
had called Abigail McCarthy and suggested that Howard Stein really should be
used and that he could help. Through Abigail McCarthy, Senator McCarthy sug-
gested that Clark welcome Stein but do so on a basis agreeable to Clark. Clark,
by this time, acutely felt the pressure to get money for New Hampshire, the
national office and to meet media reservation deadlines in the other primary
states. Stein, his wife, and several friends came to New Hampshire, took a
suite at the Sheraton Wayfarer and began quietly helping, much like the many
other volunteers.
Clark v;ent through a similar experience with the leadership of the Coali-
tion for a Democratic Alternative. An agreement was worked out v/here Harold
Ickes and Sarah Kovener would have important roles in the campaign and especial-
ly in the leadership of the McCarthy effort in the New York presidential pri-
mary. Ickes came to New Hampshire to help Cans. The Coalition opened its war
chest. The New Hampshire campaign received a check for $9,700. The Coalition
printed much of the material used in New Hampshire
Howard Stein's arrival in New Hampshire began the third and final phase of
the financing of the campaign. With Clark's caution in mind, Hoeh and
Studds arranged to meet Stein to explain the status of the campaign. Stein as-
sured both that he admired v;hat they had accomplished to date and wanted to
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assist In ways that they thought might produce a McCarthy victory. Both Hoeh
and Studds relaxed as Stein made clear that what he wanted was to find his niche
in the campaign and to contribute from that place as much as he could. Hoeh re-
viewed the campaign plan and their view of its status at the time of the meeting.
He noted that his principal concerns were about money and that for some unknown
reasons the national campaign had been slow in supporting the New Hampshire ac-
tivities which were essential to the success of the campaign. Stein said that
he felt he could help with the money problem if Hoeh could specify what was
needed, how much it would cost, and what priority the items were in the scheme
of the campaign.
Several days before, Hoeh had prepared an inventory of the campaign acti-
vities and the probable cost of each. He carried the list with him at all times
and had brought it to the meeting with Stein. The outstanding balance was ap-
proximately $70,000.. On the list were items such as printing, mailing, postage,
radio time, extra billboard space, newspaper advertising, television programming,
headquarters costs, hotel/motel bills, telephone installations and several other
major items. Stein thoughtfully listened then took the list and checked a number
of items. When he finished he said, "Okay, I'll take care of these. You get
Clark to pay for the others." The items Stein had checked were the principal
media items, radio, television, mailing costs, postage, and some aspects of the
headquarters operation such as the telephone costs. His total exceeded half the
value of the list or more than $35,000. Stein said that in addition to v/hat he
had checked on Hoeh's list he had gathered approximately $6,000 worth of first
class stamps and these would be sent to the headquarters immediately. The items
532
remaining on Hoeh's list that Stein said Blair Clark should fund wore materials,
campaign support and ' operations expenses. These had been included in the ori-
ginal budget for the campaign and had remained the same throughout. VJhat Stein
assumed were items that had either been added to the plan or substantially ex-
panded as McCarthy showed increasing strength in New Hampshire.
The brief, approximately one-half hour meeting ended with Stein asking Hoeh
to make a photocopy of the list and agreeing to check his progress with Hoeh
regularly. Hoeh suggested that Stein meet with Weston Associates as soon as
possible to work out the details of the space, time and production orders that
Stein now had assumed. Hoeh and Studds had come to the meeting with Stein feel-
ing as if they were referees in a bankruptcy hearing. They left with not only
the venture in tact but with almost all of their "v/ish list" funded.
Hoeh bailed Clark in Washington to report the details of the conversation.
Clark was uncomfortable with the result but agreed that the only other option
would be to scale the campaign back significantly and jeopardize McCarthy's
chances. He especially did not appreciate being put on the spot by Stein con-
cerning who would fund what. But Clark accepted, recognizing that he had lost
a certain freedom of action in his own situation as the result. Hoeh recognized
this loss as well but felt that unless McCarthy did well in New Hampshire there
would be little after Nev7 Hampshire to manage.
Stein recruited several of his friends to assist him in his role of media
financier and producer. Among these was a wealthy, young, Boston shoe manufac-
turer, Arnold Hiatt.
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Stein and Hlatt controlled the funding and production of the final media
push including newspaper advertising and radio messages, but, especially, the
heavy for New Hampshire politics, television prograiTuning. They worked directly
with Weston Associates, contracting and paying for the advertising they ordered
The content of the messages and the theme of the advertising did receive clear-
ance through McCarthy, Iloeh and Cans In most instances, but for all intents and
purposes, the Stein/Hiatt activity was another of the separate departments that
evolved in the campaign.
Senator McCarthy once described the financing of his campaign as being
like the spending of a poor man. There was never enough money at any one time
to plan how it was going to be spent. Consequently, when the money did appear,
as it did when Stein arrived in New Hampshire, it was spent with little more
than winning the New Uauipshire primary in mind. If the money had been avail-
able earlier or budgeted smoothly through the campaign, the cost of the cara-
paign might have been reduced. Managing the finances was not a high priority
for the campaign at that stage and consequently proper fiscal controls did not
occur. The New Hampshire loaders kept close tabs on spending during the early
weeks when they vjere concerned that they might incur a debt that they would be
obligated to pay off after the election. They relied on earlier campaign ex-
periences to cut costs, shifted funding of many activities to local communities
and resisted spending when the money was not in the bank. Much of this changed
when Stein came to New Hampshire and Curt Cans assumed much of the day-to-day
C£unpaign spending.
eContributions
As important to' the campaign as Howard Stein's participation was the rol
of the small contributor., and fund raisers. David Roberts' fund raising effort
in Hanover produced more than $1,200 through more than fifty individual contri-
butions. Approximately 360 individual contributions were received directly by
the New Hampshire campaign. The total sum received and recorded by the fiscal
agent was $98,808.39. Of this amount $33,756.27 came to the campaign's fiscal
agent from the National headquarters of the McCarthy campaign and $30,700.00
came to him from the New York based Coalition for a Democratic Alternative.
The remaining $34,332.12 came from individual contributors ranging from $1.00
to $3,000.00 each. Seven contributions between $500 and $1,500 were received
as were five checks above $1,500 to $5,000 not including the early checks from
Blair Clark and Martin Peretz.
Expenditures
An exact listing of all expenditures of the New Hampshire campaign docs not
exist. The records of the fiscal agent only include those disbursements which
he handled. He received and spent the $98,808.39 in contributions and transfers
that he received and had a debt in unpaid bills as accounted March 26, 1968, of
$18,284.80. That figure, as noted in the report, did not include "bills for
telephoiie service and rented autoes" which had not yet been received. The
telephone bill, when finally received was more than $8,000.00 and the car rental
bill exceeded $2,000.00, totalling $127,093.19 as the amount that was recorded.
Not included were the costs of supporting the New Hampshire campaign at the
national level, nor the. printing that was done in New York, nor the obligations
that Howard Stein accepted and paid himself or through the national headquarters,
nor
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No account, were gathered from the operation of the local committees
were contributor records compiled for these committees. A conservative esti-
mate of what the monetary cost of the campaign was would be between $225,000
and $250,000. To this figure it would be reasonable to add the equally conser
vative value of the volunteer time. $250,000, for a total value of close to
$500,000. a sum considerably more than the New Hampshire organizers estimated
when they outlined the campaign in December.
Ultimately, it was the money that made it possible to build the momentum
of the final weeks of the campaign. Without Stein, the Coalition for a Demo-
cratic Alternative, Blair Clark's promise to assume the debt that would result
and the media purchased in the final 10 days, the sense of a building climax
would not have resulted. The campaign might well have withered badly, forced
to retreat to protect itself from a post-campaign debt. Through the energy of
the volunteers and the skillful work of their taskmasters, the impact of a
dollar contributed to the campaign grew considerably. Ultimately, however,
there could be no substitute for the money that supported the final push of
the campaign.
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CHAPTER XIII
CONCLUDING THE CAMPAIGN
McCarthy Adds Campaign Days
Shortly after McCarthy returned to Washington after his middle February
visit, he announced that he would increase his campaign schedule in New Hamp-
shire. He was obviously reassured by the welcome he had received and felt
that he could best focus the attack on the stumbling Johnson campaign himself.
He could think of no better way to support his candidacy than by doing very
well in the primary voting.
The expanded schedule meant that more of the larger to^vns could be in-
cluded in McCarthy's appearance schedule. Instead of being able to campaign
only in the cities and a few of the largest tovms, McCarthy could visit most
of New Hampshire's regional centers. McCarthy v/ould spend almost all of the
time after March 2nd through primary election day, March 12th, in New Hampshire.
VJithin forty-eight hours of McCarthy's arrival in New Hampshire for the
five day schedule, March 2 to 7, most of the campaign's activity that either
supported McCarthy in the field or was part of the candidate-related press
activity moved from Concord to the V7ayfarer Motel just outside of Manchester.
A New Hampshire campaign press office stayed in Concord as did all other aspects
of the campaign, including the volunteer support, canvass management, mailing
preparation, celebrity scheduling and election day planning. The two headquar-
ters worked closely on those activities that required coordination, but much of
the campaign was now on pre-deterrained tracks that allowed only slight modifi-
cation. Cans headed the Concord activities with the staff which had come from
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W..shi.ngr.on and New York. Iloeh coordinated the Wayfarer operation with Richard
Goodwin. Scheduling remained a three part activity. Sandra Hoeh was the prin-
cipal manager cf the schedule working through Concord and McCarthy office staf-
fer
»
Grace Bassett, to coordinate the Senator's activities.
The national press, now practically in awe of the McCarthy campaign, be-
came almost part of the campaign. With little to cover except McCarthy, they
spent the days traveling with him and the off hours watching the volunteers,
finding new stories, and even helping with some campaign tasks. The campaign
had become professional almost before their skeptical eyes. With attractions
such as Dick Goodwin, a seasoned notable who had been at the national pinnacle
the youthfulness of the McCarthy venture was quickly overshadowed. Goodwin's
experience and confidence lent certainty to the work of those near him, es-
pecially when crucial decisions had to be made and made without mistake or
hesitation.
McCarthy's earlier campaigning was nov; amplified by wider press attention
the enthusiasm of the local committees, and the excitement that presidential
campaigning lends to a Nev7 Hampshire winter. It began to manufacture that
elusive commodity essential to a successful campaign, charisma. Now when
McCarthy arrived in a community he was recognized, people came out of their
shops to meet him, went out of their way to shake his hand, and crowds even
gathered anticipating a visit. McCarthy had reached New Hampshire's taciturn
voters in a way that had not been seen since Estes Kefauver's campaigns of
the 1950's.
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McCarthy, the candidate, broke into full stride during the final days of
the campaign. One night he spoke to thunderous applause and many interruptions
in a Nashua Hl^h School, the next he spoke before a Dartmouth College audience.
It was the same hall that had held George Wallace's hostile audience almost one
year before.
McCarthy had been advised that Dartmouth student audiences tended to be
reserved in their reaction. If he could stir them to interrupt his speech
with applause it would be a significant response, but not to expect other than
attentive listening. McCarthy, with the editor of the Daily Dartmouth
, came
on stage before a packed Webster Hall. The applause was courteous, no shouting,
no standing, no signs, just more than 1,500 people clapping. David Hoeh sat
next to E. M. "Ned" Kenworthy, New York Times reporter, who had been with
McCarthy the evening before in Nashua. Kenxrorthy leaned over to Hoeh and said
that he felt this was a different audience.
McCarthy was introduced and began his speech. Kenworthy leaned over again
saying that McCarthy v/as about to use a speech similar to that he had given the
night before. It went on with McCarthy's best illustrations and rhetorical
allusions floating out across the silent hall like a breeze in a sound absorbing
room — no response, no reaction, no hand clapping, almost no sound at all. The
Nashua speech, V7hich had stirred more excitement than any other McCarthy speech
in New Hampshire, seemed almost totally without impact on this Hanover audience.
The only noise in the hall came from the outside when a few late arrivals found
the door cJosed. The hall was filled to capacity. No more could be allowed
inside.
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His speech ranged across the arguments of his candidacy and criticism of
the administration's policies and behavior. Inserted in his frequently used
arguments were sections that had been prepared by Sy Hersh on the problems of
the cities which David Hoeh thought might be of particular interest to the
largely urban oriented Dartmouth audience.
"This priority is not being recognized by the present
administration. The time» as the President's Riot Com-
mission tells us, is short if we are to prevent more
bloodshed. I believe that this nation can stem future
riots and bloodshed — we have the potential, we have
the intellect, and we have the will."
"But we cannot solve any problems if we persist in
wasting manpower, money and moral energy in the war
in Vietnam."
McCarthy noted that two years before Johnson had said the United States could
fight the war in Vietnam and the war on poverty at home. But "the president's
recent budget message was nothing more than a signal of surrender, a sign of
abandonment of the War on Poverty and the special needs of America."
"The people of this nation and the Congress have not had
a chance to pass objective judgment on this vrar. As our
military component has grown so has our commitment to
South East Asia. And no place along the line did anyone
pass a reasoned judgment on what was happening in South
East Asia."
"I'm a messenger bringing this message and it's not a
popular one. In ancient history, such messengers were
usually the first ones executed. I may be in that came
situation," he said with a laugh.
McCarthy quietly brought his speech to an end as he frequently did, with a
series of poetic allusions.
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The message from the Adrainistration today is a message
Ox apprehension, a message of fear, yes — even a message
of fear of fear.
This is not the real spirit of America. I do not believe
that it is. This is a time to test the mood and spirit:
To offer in place of doubt — trust.
In place of expediency — right judgment.
In place of ghettos, let us have neighborhoods and
communities.
In place of incredibility — integrity.
In place of murmuring, let us have clear speech;
let us again hear America singing.
In place of disunity, let us have dedication of
purpose.
In place of near despair, let us have hope.
This is the promise of greatness which was stated for us
by Adlai Stevenson and which \ms brought to form and posi-
tive action in the v;ords and actions of John Kennedy.
Let us pick up again these lost strands and weave them
again into the fabric of America.
Let us sort out the miusic from the sounds and again re-
spond to the trumpet and the steady drum.^-
As McCarthy ended and returned to his chair on the stage, the audience rose
almost as if it were one person. Their silence during the forty minute speech,
as if bottled, was expelled in a sudden rush of extended standing applause.
Hands beat against each other as if the action might re-enforce their own con-
viction so effectively pronounced by the speaker and at the same time somehow
vent their own individual frustration with the course of national events.
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Wien at last the applause subsided, the student moderator called for ques-
tions. The first to rise was an Army lieutenant, in uniform. The lieutenant
asked McCarthy whether he had received any roilitary support during his campaign?
His reply was that it was interesting to see "who was willing and free to speak
out," and that some retired military officers have expressed views which paral-
lel his own. The lieutenant went on, "Well, I just want you to know I drove
two-and-a-half hours to get up here from Ft. Devens, Mass., to show my support
for your campaign." (The lieutenant received a standing ovation from about
half those in the hall.)3
A scries of questions followed concerning McCarthy's position on the war,
how he proposed to end it, and what might be the effect on the U.S. economy of
ending the military effort. On this latter point he said, "This is the first
time in our nation's history war has not stimulated economic growth. Economic
transition from v/ar to peace is the least of our worries." He then received
several questions about the Selective Service law, draft resistance, and
conscientious objection policies. To these McCarthy advised, "Act according
to your conscience," and stated that he favored a policy of "Selective
Conscience Objection." An emotional and polarized subject, McCarthy satisfied
his listeners with his responses to these questions without suggesting that the
students ignore the Selective Service laws, or promising unconditional amnesty
to those who had broken the law. It was on this last point that McCarthy spoke
with considerable courage and sincerity. He reviewed his own feeling of quali-
fied support for the notion of war in national self-defense and the idea that
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a nnliou so threatened mlBhl: compel citizens to- engage in defense. He then
distinguished this view from what was then occurring in the United States to
support the unjustified war in Vietnam. He closed by suggesting that when
the war concluded, then a policy of amnesty should be proposed for those who
have been jailed or exiled because of their objection to the war. A calmly
stated, well reasoned, expression of concern, a gesture toward healing the
damage of the war went unreported by those covering the speech. Kis answers
to the questions had brought repeated applause, even cheering and several
standing ovations.
Election Day Organization
Several v/eeks before the election the McCarthy managers began developing
the election day plans. As with other aspects of the campaign the first task
was to assign one of the volunteers to the job of evaluating v/hat V7as needed
to bo sure that the McCarthy vote got to the polls. For this task Richard
Korling, a Yale undergraduate student, who had abandoned his education for the
campaign, was selected. Rich drafted a get out the vote program which was
approved by Hooh and Cans and sent to the local McCarthy committee chairman
February 22nd. The memorandum read:
Tuesday, March 12, Is fast approaching, and it is time to
give some thought to preparations for activities on elec-
tion day itself. Our main activities will include pro-
viding McCarthy poll-watchers, rides to the polls and
volunteers to get out the McCarthy vote.
We are asking you to appoint one person (it could be your-
self) to coordinate election day activities for your local
area. This person should plan to spend some time each day
getting local volunteers to work for McCarthy on election
day, and should be able to spend election day at your lo-
cal headquarters coordinating these volunteers.
Enclosed is a list of cltios and towns with a large num-ber of registered Democrats in your area. Your electionday coordinator should be responsible for recruiting and
coordinating volunteers in these cities and towns. Ob-
viously, the largest towns are most important, and shouldbe organized first.
Here are some things your election day coordinator should
start on right away:
- Call city or to\m clerks to obtain opening and closing
times and addresses of polling places for each city
ward or town. Keep a copy of this information for
yourself, and please also send me a copy as soon as
you get it.
- Find a person in each city ward or town to coordinate
drivers on election day. This job can best be handled
from a home in each area. The only necessity is a
telephone, and somebody who will answer it on Monday
and Tuesday, March 11 and 12, Ads containing these
telephone numbers will be placed in newspapers prior
to the election.
- Find drivers to take people to vote. An approximate
guideline for the number of drivers you will need in
each city ward or town is one for every 400 registered
Democrats — your own local experience may suggest a
different nuir.ber of drivers. You should also try to
have a few extra drivers on hand at your headquarters
to help out in areas that need extra drivers.
- Find poll-watchers for uach polling place.
- Obtain naps for drivers. The location of the polling
place and the driver coordinator's home should be
marked on each map. If canvassing is being done in
your area, copies of the maps provided to canvassers
can be made
.
- Find a volunteer la\'0'er to be available to your head-
quarters in case of election procedure complaints on
election day.
5A6
- Stockpile election day supplies, and set them away in
a special place reserved for election day. Suggestions-
a 3 X 5 note pad for each driver coordinator and seve-
ral for your headquarters, 2 posters for the sides of
each car you plan to have, crepe paper and masking tapefor decorating cars, enough McCarthy buttons for ejec-
tion day workers, and enough McCarthy literature to put
a small stack in each car on election day.
- As you get volunteers for election day activities,
please send me their names, addresses, telephone num-
bers, and where and what they have volunteered to do.
Also keep a copy for yourself. The week before the
election, I will send out instruction sheets to the
volunteer workers; they will also receive thank-you
notes after the election. Your volunteer workers
should be on duty all the time polling places are open.
You may want to set up shifts for volunteers who can
work only part of the day.
Please try to keep me continually informed on your progress
in acquiring an election day organization. I shall try to
keep in frequent contact with you by telephone.
Your estimates of the number of drivers, poll-watchers, and
volunteers to distribute literature outside polling places
or to turn out the McCarthy vote are important. VJe expect
to have out-of-state volunteers to fill in gaps where you
are unable to obtain your own local volunteers. Hov/ever,
local volunteers are much more effective because they knov;
a large number of voters, known their way around to^m, etc.
In addition, the job of assigning out-of-town volunteers
where they are needed most will probably be a large one.
For all these reasons, it is extremely important for you
to do as much as you possibly can to build your own elec-
tion day organization.
I expect to be in Concord Headquarters at the following times:
February 26-27 Monday evening through Tuesday afternoon;
March 1-5 Friday evening through Tuesday afternoon; and,
March 7-12 Thursday evening through Tuesday evening.
If my help is required at other times, I may be able to make
myself available.
Please appoint an election day coordinator as soon as poss-
ible. I shall contact you next Monday evening (February 26th).
Sincerely yours, Richard Norling.^
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Attached to tho letter was the following listing titled, "Election Day
AssigniT.ent Regions." A note on the list stated, "Numbers in parenthes
the number of registered Democrats in each town or city."
ises are
Berlin
Berlin - 4 v/ards (4,378)
Northumberland (563)
Gorhara (547)
Littleton (387)
White'field (174)
Concord
Concord - 9 wards (1,680)
Pembroke (903)
Aliens tov7n (648)
Pittsfield (271)
Boscax^on (157)
Dover
Dover - 5 wards (2,306)
Somersworth - 5 wards (3,002)
Rochescer - 6 wards (2,011)
Newmarket (920)
Rollinsford (483)
Farmington (4J.0)
Durham (255)
Milton (192)
Hampton
Hampton (454)
Exeter (667)
Epping (373)
Seabrook (244)
Hennlkcr-Hillsborough
Hillsborough (199)
Henniker (127)
Keene
Keene- 5 wards (1,353)
Walpole (275)
Swanzey (242)
Troy (218)
Winchester (213)
Hinsdale (164)
Laconia
Laconia - 6 wards (1,958)
Franklin - 3 wards (1,046)
Conway (326)
Meredith (288)
Tilton (226)
Ashland (186)
Belmont (183)
Andover (168)
Alton (147)
Barnstead (157) (?)
Plymouth (142)
Lebanon
Lebanon - 3 wards (854)
Claremont - 3 wards (2,688)
Newport (903)
Hanover (500)
Lincoln (327)
Enfield (133)
Manchester
Manchester - 14 wards (24,549)
GoffstovTn (1,254)
Kooksett (654)
Bedford (477)
Raymond (196)
Auburn (171)
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Nashua
"GtGi-'boroufih
Nashua - 9 wards (8 0R2^ n , .
Solem (?.000) Peterborough (287)
11 1 /, Greenville (.i,15)
D«rv°"( 8
^
I'lalstcw (550) ElL rnw/"'^
Pelham (505) . '"^^
Merrimack (476) t,^^^
- ,
,
^
'
,
Portsmouth
Loncjoaderry (278) ~ "
Windham (148)
The strategy that Hoeh and Studds had developed early in the campaign had
now been refined into a series of target cities and towns clustered around area
headquarters. In addition to the preparations which Norling outlined in his
February 22nd letter, area committee chairmen and election day activity coordi-
nators were asked to attend a meeting at the Concord headquarters, Sunday even-
ing March 3rd. There Hoeh and Cans reviev7ed preparations for election day add-
ing several aspects that had not been covered in Norling' s earlier letter. The
most important of these additions was the suggestion that each area headquarters
organize telephone or canvassing re-contact procedures to remind those who had
been canvassed to vote. The basis for this re-contact was to be the canvasser's
card and the notation on that card indicating whether the person contacted was a
"1", "2" or "3" respondent to the canvass. Those "favorable to McCarthy" (the
"1" voter), and those "leaning toward McCarthy" (the "2" voter), would be called
or re-canvassed to remind them to vote. The "3" voter, would also be contacted
In hopes of convincing them to vote for McCarthy. This re-contact would be made
especially in the case of those who had been canvassed earlier in the campaign.
The recent escalation in the campaign and McCarthy's extensive press attention
was' presumed to be having a sufficient effect on the "3" voter to justify the
re- con tact.
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What the election day activity depended on the most was the competence of
the respective local organizations. Persons experienced with the political
campaigns and the vote production of their respective communities were the key
to reaching the McCarthy vote. The canvassing results gave the basis for know-
ing where McCarthy was strong or weak. In the strong districts the local com-
mittees organized to pull voters, concentrating their planning where the work
would produce the best returns. Familiarity with the election day ethos of
each district gave the local workers the background to adjust their efforts
to avoid irritating voters by doing things that would not be well accepted,
and at the same time not omitting activities that had come to be expected from
a candidate organization on or immediately before an election day.
As the demands on the local organizations for candidate and celebrity
schedules ended and the canvassing activity reached its final peak during
the weekend of March 9th and 10th, election day preparations took the highest
priority. In addition to the advertising blitz on the radio, television and
through the newspapers, a number of local committees distributed printed remin-
ders to vote and last minute appeals to vote for McCarthy. For Docal organiza-
tions with extensive manpower and thorough going organization, a number of
simultaneous activities could be supported during the final weekend. Those
local committees that were less well organized took on only the highest priority
tasks as directed from the state headquarters. As had been the case throughout
the campaign, the managers had tried to offer a shelf of activities that would
stimulate the weaker and more recently formed area organizations as well as
challenging the strong and well developed committees.
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Only one. separate activity was allowed to develop with the sanction of the
ca,npaign. That was the effort of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Their
members spoke separately to separate audiences. They campaigned in their own
way on street corners with leaflets and placards. They organized their own
press conferences using their own spokesmen, presenting their own view of the
issues, and asserting in their own way, support for Senator McCarthy.
The McCarthy Machine
A few days after the New Hampshire presidential primary vote, an adver-
tisement appeared in the New York Times
,
sponsored by the Coalition for a Demo-
cratic Alternative, soliciting funds for the "McCarthy Machine." A full page
ad, the heading read, "McCarthy's Machine Needs Money." A picture showed
twelve serious-looking student-aged men and women, coats in hand with a caption,
"The Machine." The text of the ad read:
Senator Eugene McCarthy is backed by the most improbable
political machine in American history.
It works for nothing, runs on peanut butter sandv/iches
and soft drinks, and spends the night in sleeping bags or
empty warehouses.
You can't buy a machine like this, even with the offer
of money. . .
.
And you can't con them either, with a lot of overblown
promises.
They're looking for a new kind of leadership for our
country and they believe that Senator McCarthy is the only
one who can provide it.
That's why they went out and rang every doorbell in the
state of New Hampshire. . .
.
Unless every person reading this ad sends a few dollars,
McCarthy's mightiest v/eapon will be stilled.
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And the bantle will have to be fought by a lone man with
a limited staff.
If you've already given, we thank you. And ask you to
please give again.
If you've never given, there's no better time than now.
$1 from you will feed one student for one day.
$10 will provide 20 students with lunch.
$50 will feed 25 students for two days or 10 students
for 5 days.
And there's also the cost of transportation ^
For the last 10 days before the primary the "McCarthy Machine" was In high
gear and ready for the critical final days. A mistake, a national crisis, an
international incident might shift the voters' attention from an insurgent can-
didacy back to the President, ^vliile a national crisis or international inci-
dent was beyond the control of the New Hampshire campaign, the first, a mistake
that could cost voter support, was on everyone's mind. It was going to be a
close election. The canvass said it; the leaders felt it; and the media had
come to recognize it. .
As the tide turned in favor of Senator McCarthy, the Johnson campaign
leaders fought back. The "pledge card" had become a serious liability by the
middle of February. Their remaining alternative was to attack McCarthy's
positions. Until this time, the strategy of the Johnson campaign had been to
ignore McCarthy, minlmi:;e his possible appeal, deny that loyal New Hampshire
Democrats would support his insurgency, and refuse to concede more than a
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small portion of the vote to him. Senator Hclntyrc's early prediction that
McCarthy would not get looro than 3 to 5 percent of the vote - not more than
3,000 to 5.000 votes total - remained the party line of the Johnson campaign
well into February. A vote toti.1 better than Mclntyre's projection would, by
their own definition, have to be considered significant.
The Johnson leaders had received an analysis of the probable voters in
the New Hampshire presidential primary from Oliver Quayle and Associates,
public opinion pollsters, that showed first, that the voter was essentially
a "hawk" toward Vietnam policy, and secondly, that these same voters did not
know McCarthy's stand on Vietnam issues. Quayle 's advice to the Johnson
leaders v/as to step up their attacks on McCarthy as an advocate of peace and
also to get McCarthy to define his peace plans precisely. The combination of
strategies, Quayle suggested, would solidify support behind a v.rtrite-in effort
and at the same time, drive McCarthy into a corner. Quayle 's advice justified
the Johnson leaders' shift from ignoring McCarthy to attacking him directly.
The radio commercials and Governor King began the assault. What both missed
in Quayle' s advice \jas that there is a difference between questioi.ing a policy
position and questioning one's political and national loyalty. King went for
the jugular and concentrated on the question of political and national loyalty,
Mclntyre, when he actively campaigned, sought to drav* McCarthy out on policy
differences. Unfortunately, King had jumped the gun and by the time Mclntyre
arrived in New Hampshire to begin campaigning for Johnson much of the damage
had already been done.
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Instead of a coordinated and sustained policy attack on the McCarthy cam-
paign, Hclntyre had to separate himself from the position King had taken. In
addition to the split which had developed in the Democratic Party between the
Johnson and McCarthy supporters there was now a split within the Johnson camp
between its leaders, King and Mclntyre, a split that would be especially
troublesome to the Johnson campaign as the election approached. Mclntyre
and his supporters within the Johnson campaign became increasingly uncomfort-
able with King's rhetoric.
From the beginning when the Democratic State Committee vjas asked to endorse
the Johnson renomination, the McCarthy leaders had sought to have the machinery
of the New Hampshire party remain neutral. ^^Jhen this tactic failed, the leaders
saw political advantage in reminding voters that the basic ethos of New Hamp-
shire primary politics was being violated by the endorsement. \Ihen Governor
King launched his attacks on the loyalty of the McCarthy supporters they in turn
felt it was time to again remind the public of the trampled ethos of primary
election neutrality.
Once again the McCarthy leaders called upon the Democratic State Committee
to reconsider their earlier endorsement of the Johnson renomination and to open
the Democratic Party to the organizations of both of the candidates. In a
letter from David Hoeh to the Democratic State Committee membership he requested
that all Johnson campaign material bearixig the Democratic State Committee attri-
bution be recalled and that a complete audit of Democratic State Committee ac-
counts be made in order to determine hov/ the funds were being used. The request
was rejected at the February 18th meeting of the Democratic State Committee but
the tactic aided the McCarthy effort.^
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The mooting producod at least two new supporters for the McCarthy effort
frora the n^embers of the State Conui^ittee attending including one, Robert Proulx,
Chairman of the Grafton County Democratic Comirdttee, who had previously sup-
ported the endorsement of Johnson's renomination. A number of others were
deeply disturbed by the behavior of Craig and Boutin, who attended the meeting,
toward friends who had shared the earlier battles of the Democratic Party.
The net effect of the confrontation was positive for the McCarthy leadership.
It illustrated to what extent the Johnson leaders would go to deliver New
Hampshire to Johnson, spiting both friends and political sensitivities. The
Manchester Union Leader picked up the dispute in an editorial titled,
"'Pedigreed' Democrats," with an editorial cartoon. The editorial read:
Wliatever else might be said of the heated controversy cur-
rently raging within the Democratic State Committee it
should be stated, for the record, that it is completely
unnecessary and need not have grown to such proportions.
In any fair contest. President Johnson figures to run
roughshod over Minnesota Sen. Eugene McCarthy, whose
voice of appeasement falls on deaf ears in a state whose
motto is "Live Free or Die'."
What concerns us, and should concern all Democrats, is
the unbridled arrogance of those who, despite LBJ's in-
superable advantage, nevertheless feel the need to "stack
the deck" and to run roughshod over all who disagree with
them. Apparently they care not a whit about the party
disunity their actions are fostering.
State Chairman William H. Craig of Manchester, who threw
the parliamentary book at McCarthy backers at Tuesday
night's State Committee meeting in the Queen City, won
at best a technical victory. But it could prove to be a
costly victory indeed over the long haul.
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As far as parliamentary procedure goes, Craig was correctin ruling out of order several indirect attempts to over-
turn the State Committee's official endorsement of Presi-dent Johnson. Craig said he v/ould entertain only a spe-
cific motion to "reconsider" the previous action of the
committee.
However, it is the Democratic S tate Commi t tee itself that
Ig^PJ^P^' o rder in endorsin g LIU and violatin ^i thejm^-
trality that al l Democrats have a ri ght to expect it will
adhere to faithfully .
This newspaper opposes the candidacy of Sen. McCarthy with
every fiber of its being, but we cannot help but sense and
sympathize with the feeling of outrage of McCarthy's sup-
porters when they see the State Coirmittee attempt to trans-
form the Democratic Party into an exclusive club v;here
only "pedigreed" candidates and their supporters are wel-
come . 7
The editorial was merely a minor break in the pattern of editorial attack
which the Manchester Union Leader^ aimed at the McCarthy campaign, but it did
revive in the final weeks of the campaign the issues of fairness and party
neutrality. Somehov/, after the February 20th meeting, the Johnson campaign
lost its momentum.
Symptomatic of v/hat the Johnson campaign was encountering v/as reflected
in an Art Buchwald column that appeared February 22nd. He wrote, "A few weeks
ago David Brinkley reported that a scientist had programmed all the pertinent
military information about the U.S. and North Vietnam and fed it into a computer,
raising the question: 'Wlien will the v/ar be won and which side v;ill win?' The
computer answered that the U.S. had v7on the war two years ago.^ For some pecu-
liar reason, the Johnson campaigners were under the impression that the public
was satisfied with the progress of national and international events and that
all they needed was an answer.
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Like Buchvnld's computer, each time the question was asked the computer
produced an answer, but the answer did not quite fit the situation. \^.ile the
administration called on the voters to trust the President and support his
policy, the TET offensive produced bloody photographs and frightening casualty
lists. In spite of what the public saw, the military leaders proclaimed a victory.
At one moment the leaders in Washington and New Hampshire talked of freedom and
the right to dissent and the next such expressions were viewed as disloyal, even
traitorous acts. The bastion of democracy x^as embattled. Basic freedoms
seemed in immediate danger. The powerful were threatening and the weak were
resisting. Battle lines were beginning to form as the rhetoric became strident,
the threats more frequent, and the bitterness more intense. The middle ground
evaporated. \-Jhat had been a confident renomination effort on the part of the
Johnson leaders in New Hampshire now became a frightened, disorganized and
desperate back slide. While Quayle's polling results had provided a basis for
a revived campaign, the leaders, principally Bernard Boutin, who had to report
his activities to the Wiite House regularly, seemed to panic. He held frequent
meetings of the remaining workers exhorting them to circulate more pledge cards,
line-up local committee members, and to remind those v.'ho had benefited from the
party's incumbency to renew their support now. As the Johnson fortunes began to
fade the meetings became more and more unpleasant. Boutin would not tolerate
disagreement or criticism within the organization any more than Governor King
would outside. In the last days only those who had to attend the meetings be-
cause of their employment did so while the others drifted to the sides and away
557
from the hostility. On election
.i,ht. several of the major Johnson workers
would spend the evening at the McCarthy headquarters to await the returns. They
had become disillusioned by the Johnson leaders and disgusted by the direction
the campaign had taken.
The "Red Herring" Charge and New Hampshire Politics
Legends of New Hampshire politics and especially Manchester politics are
filled with tales of how last minute charges changed the results of close elec-
tions. Almost a political fossil in the way the city frequently reacts to the
last minute charge, Manchester acts as if it were still in the age of the "yel-
low journalists" and the issue distorters of the late 19th century rather than
in the age of multi-media news and skepticism. A charge need not be made
through public media to be given credibility. It might simply be a rumor cir-
culated in a few crucial places and spread rapidly in the ethnic communities of
the city during the last hours of a campaign. Manchester is a divided city
physically, socially, ethnically and economically. The physical barrier is the
Merrimack River v/hich separates the city's predominantly French-Canadian West
side from the commerical district and the Irish, Yankee, Greek and upper income
communities of the East side.
A long history of social, economic, religious and especially ethnic con-
flict has bujlt numerous unseen barriers between neighborhoods, parishes, social
clubs and even financial institutions and professional organizations. Each has
created its own communications networks and response mechanisms. The most sophis
ticated of these, of course, was the network within the French-Canadian community
The church, parochial schools and the French language kept the community a tight,
provincial and socially regulated entity for generations.
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Only since the advent of television in the post World War II period has
the tightness of that community begun to crack. The first cracks began to
appear in the late 1950' s and widened in the 1960's as the younger members of
the community sought education, jobs and status outside the traditional commu-
nity.
In a city like Manchester, which was once dominated politically by the
Republican Yankees and then for several generations by the Irish, the French-
Canadians were usually at the bottom of the socio-economic-political ladder.
As the French-Canadian population grew beyond the 50 percent mark, an inevit-
able conflict developed between the two principal ethnic populations, the
politically skilled Irish and the culturally isolated-French Canadians. In
Manchester city politics an eventual accommodation v/as achieved between the
two groups that centered on politically sensitive jobs. If the police chief
were Irish his deputy would be French, and the fire chief would be French and
his deputy Irish. The scheme carried into the political jobs in the Postal
Service, city boards and commissions, and into the Board of Mayor and Alder-
man. A French mayor usually meant that the chairman of the Board or Alderman
would be Irish and vice versa. The unwritten but carefully observed political
accommodation preserved harmony within what might have been a seriously frag-
mented and dangerously rense city.
Politics outside of Manchester were quite another thing. In order for a
Democrat to win one of the three statewide electoral offices, Governor or the
two U.S. Senate seats, that candidate would have to carry Manchester by a sub-
stantial margin. From 1912 until 1962 only once had the Democratic Party been
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i^uccesGful ia electing one of its candidates to statewide office and that was
In 1932 when ex-Governor Fred Brown was elected to the U.S. Senate. In order
to reduce what would normally be expected to be a substantial Democratic plurality
from Manchester leaders of New Hampshire's Republican Party had learned to play
the Manchester political instrument with great precision. It was possible to
manipulate the issues and the fears of the ethnic communities of Manchester
in such a way as to reduce the Democratic plurality in almost any election for
statewide and even congressional district office until U.S. Senator Styles
Bridges died in 1961, and John W. King and Thomas J. Mclntyre were elected
Governor and U.S. Senator, respectively, in 1962.
The first line of battle for those v.-'ho sought to play the Manchester poli-
tical instrument was in the selection of candidates before the state primary.
Often the Democratic ticket was loaded with unknown candidates with convenient
ethnically recognizable names. For the most part these were "straw candidates"
who had entered or been encouraged to enter solely to reduce the vote for the
one candidate with the highest potential for seriously challenging the incum-
bent Republican. In other words the ethnic instrument of Manchester was played
by the Republican officeholders to select their own challengers.
If by chance a strong candidate did slip through the maze of the nominating
primary, then several other tactics were still available, principally the "Red
herring charge" and the "backfire" issue. By generating a plausible rumor and
then spreading it judiciously within the communications netvrork of one or more
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ethnic co.u'aunitieG just before the election, it was possible to change the
Manchester vote enough to defeat the Democrat and elect the Republican. The
rumor had to be reasonably credible, spread through credible channels, spread
so late that it would be impossible to answer, and usually carry some emo-
tional tone such as an ethnic slur or some damned if you answer or damned if
you don't aspect.
The most famous of these many final moment rumor campaigns occurred in the
tight gubernatorial contest between the Republican H. Styles Bridges and the
Democratic candidate, John L. Sullivan. Neither was an incumbent and both were
respected in their o\m parties. Sullivan, a highly regarded Manchester at-
torney, expected to draw a heavy vote from his home city. Bridges knew that in
order to win the election he had to cut Sullivan's Manchester plurality. To
do this he found a ready made and classic Manchester problem, the Merrimack
River and its bridges. Several bridges had been washed out during a flood.
The construction of bridges linking the French-Canadian West side with the
Irish-Yankee East side was alvjays an issue that churned political emotions.
In the waning hours of the 193-^! campaign a rumor \vras spread in the French-Canadian
community that when Irish candidate Sullivan had been asked what he would do
about the bridges he had said, "Let the frogs swim." The rumor surfaced in
the last several Jiours before the election, spread throughout the French-
Canadian community
J,
could not be answered by Sullivan, and rekindled the al-
ways smoldering emotions betV7cen Manchester's principal ethnic groups, l^/hen
the votes were counted Sullivan lost the election because his Manchester plural-
ity had eroded. The margin was 2,362 votes. ^ Bridges went on to a long career
in the United States Senate and John L. Sullivan was appointed Secretary of the
Navy by Franklin D. Roosevelt.
561
As the New llampshiro Democratic Party revived durlnc the late 1950's and
early 1960's, itc principal fear was the rumor problem in Manchester. The last
few hours before each election required special vigilance on the part of candi-
date organizations in order to head off and to neutralize the last moment charge.
The difference between what had happened in 193A and the 1960's was that now
V/illiam Loeb, using his publications, played the instrument in the open. Loeb
has so successfully played the Manchester instrument in his favor that since
1950 no candidate had succeeded to the governorship of the state of New Hampshire
who has not taken Mr. Loeb's pledge to veto any state sales or income tax legis-
lation. Even a slight equivocation on the part of a candidate toward the "broad
based tax issue" has been enough for Loeb to set in motion the machinery that
would destroy the candidate's margin in Manchester.
In fact Bernard Boutin, the Johnson Committee Chairman, had lost his 1958
bid for election when he did not secure a sufficient plurality of Manchester
votes to overcome the Republican strength outside the Democratic cities. Loeb
alleged that Boutin was a "broad based taxer" and in spite of Boutin's fervent
deniajs, Loeb's viev; stuck, especially in Manchester.
As the final days of the 1968 presidential primary neared, the Johnson
campaign was searching for a way to reach the voters who were slipping rapidly
toward McCarthy. They knew the Manchester political ethos and felt that they
could play the instrument to their benefit if the right issue could be found.
Oliver Quayle's polling revealed a conflict in the perception between the New
Hampshire voters' issue profile and the position that they attributed to Senator
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McCartl.y. The profile showed that voters held "hawk" views toward the Vietnam
War solution and yet seeraed to be moving toward Senator McCarthy in their sup-
port. To counter this trend. Governor Kins escalated his attack on McCarthy
during the last weeks of February. Unable to gain much attention for these
charges, especially since Senator McCarthy did not hesitate to explain his
Vietnam position, the Johnson leaders shifted their efforts.
First they had to recognize that McCarthy had gained considerable strength
in New Hampshire. Boutin began back-tracking from Mclntyre's early prediction
that McCarthy x,70uld have to get more than 3,000 to 5,000 votes in order for the
result to be considered significant. Boutin now said McCarthy would have to
get more than 30 percent of the vote. On the eve of the election Boutin said
he was interested in securing just more than 50 percent of the vote for Presi-
dent Jolinson. The convention delegates had always been conceded to Johnson.
Secondly, Boutin's organization had been scouring the record of the McCarthy
campaign to find an error, inconsistency, mis-statement, or issue position that
they could use to their advantage in the final hours. Their strategy to hit
McCarthy hard on his war position was failing. Wliat the McCarthy leaders had
discovered was that the New Hampshire voters found McCarthy credible and were
willing to support him even though when asked their own position of the war the
answer was that of a "hawk." Wlien given the alternative, win the v;ar or get out,
the respondents took the win the war position. \That seemed to be happening was
that even the "hawks" were attributing to McCarthy their own view of how to end
the war and because they found McCarthy reassuring as an alternative to Johnson
they had become McCarthy supporters. This was baffling to the Johnson campaign
leadership
.
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The Johnson Campaign Fiphts Back
The first evidence of the increased Johnson campaign pressure came with a
blast from Governor King and the first newspaper advertisements placed for the
final weekend. The Governor charged that Senator McCarthy was "perpetrating a
massive hoax on the voters of New Hampshire by claiming friendship and support
for the late President John F. Kennedy." King charged that McCarthy had, "tried
to scuttle President Kennedy's nomination at the 1960 Democratic National Con-
vention," and that since then McCarthy was the "biggest thorn in President
Kennedy's side." He went on to note that the "Senator has fooled no one who
remembers how much damage he tried to do to the late President's candidacy and
legislative program of the early I960' s. "10
The second attack came through a newspaper advertisement that echoed the
same theme but added, "Sen. McCarthy promises an 'alternative,' but he refuses
to give one significant detail of his alternatives. Because of this he has not
gained the support of a single member of the U.S. Senate. Don't vote for in-
decision and wispy promises. ... "H Both King and Mclntyre signed the advertise-
ment.
While King tended to reach for the jugular of McCarthy's issues, Mclntyre
represented McCarthy as being "vague and oftentimes contradictory in his state-
ments, "l^ Mclntyre would read excerpts from McCarthy's comments as reported in
the newspapers, and charge that McCarthy's statements V7ere "poor substitutes
for positive and definitive policies." McCarthy, Mclntyre contended, was simply
"exploiting the frustration so many Americans feel about Vietnam. "^^
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King, on the other hand, ended the final full week of the campaign with
the charge that any significant vote for McCarthy in the presidential primary
would be "greeted with cheers in Hanoi."
King's comments, made during a press conference at the
capitol, v;cre obviously inspired in part by a McCarthy
charge on Wednesday that supporters of President Johnson
were using tactics like those employed in the 1950' s by
the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin, the
Republican red-hunter.
"That'e political poppycock," said King. "He (McCarthy)
is using smear tactics himself."
King's harshest comments were directed to McCarthy's po-
sition calling for an early end to hostilities in South-
east Asia.
King said: "The question to be answered is, shall we
continue to resist naked Coita:nunist aggression with all
the resources at our coumiand, or will v;e say the price
is too high, trie going is too rough. We are ready to
negotiate on terns laid do\m by Ho Chi Minh.
"That is why the people most interested in this election
are Ho Chi Minh and his Conmunist friends. They will be
scrutinizing the returns for signs of a weakening of
Merican will."
King was asked if he thought his attacks on McCarthy might
not be a bit strong. "I have always used the hard sell
approach," said King. "I am a hard sell person, I guess."
King concluded the press conference by revising his predictions for the election
"His earlier estimate that McCarthy vjould receive only 12
to 18 percent of the Democratic vote" v;as revised with
the Governor stating that McCarthy "could get as much as
25 percent. "lA
Within a day a major controversy began to brew that V70uld splinter the Johnson
campaign as it entered the final weekend of the campaign. Governor King had
been Intep.perate in his remarks before, but now the comments revived images of r
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baltJng by demanding the sort of unquestioning, unthinking loyalty that Joseph
McCarthy had demanded during his scourge of the 1950' s.
In response to King's comments McCarthy held a press conference vs^here he
played several of the radio tapes, sponsored by the Johnson campaign, that had
urged against voting for "fuzzy thinking and surrender" and called for a vote
on March 12th in "support of our fighting men." He also showed, as further ex-
amples of the Johnson Committee's campaign style, copies of recent nev/spaper
advertisements that repeated the same themes.
"In my twenty years in Congress," McCarthy said, "I have never been the
target of such charges from fellow Democrats." He then went on to compare the
statements that King had made and that Mclntyre had endorsed to those made in
the 1950' s by the "more irresponsible" Republicans, like an earlier Sen.
McCarthy, the late Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin. He added that the same
charges could be aimed at his fellow members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee such as the Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield, and Vermont's
Republican Senator George D. Aiken. In fact McCarthy noted, "The Senate
Foreign Relations Commii tee was lined up about 2 to 1 against the administra-
tion's conduct of the war. "15
McCarthy charged the New Hampshire Johnson campaign leaders with following
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other administration spokesmen in trying to
"prevent free discussion in the United States. There might be people who would
resent it some, and I hope so," McCarthy added. It was McCarthy's feeling that
the tactics to which he objected could be controlled by the VJliite House and the
Democratic National Conunittee if they wished. Earlier McCarthy had called upon
the Wliite House to repudiate the tactics of Johnson's campaign managers in New
Hampshire but there had been no response.
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Concluding the press conference McCarthy denied advocating surrender and
said that he felt his campaign had encouraged voters to ask hard questions
about the war. In fact the reaction of the Johnson leaders in the final days
seemed to McCarthy to be an indication that he had "thrown a scare" into their
campaign and that their tactics would "generate resentment among New Hampshire
Democrats" bringing him more votes.
Governor King's attack and McCarthy's measured response gave the press
the chance to shape the public view of the last charges of the campaign. To
the reporters and their editors, King's attempts to snuff out the McCarthy
challenge by tactics reminiscent of those of Joe McCarthy sparked their in-
tense interest at a critical moment in the campaign. Now with the Johnson
surrogates apparently unleashed to attack McCarthy at will in a manner that
struck a certain horror of the past in the editors' minds, the full power of
the press shifted perceptably behind McCarthy. McCarthy stories moved from
inside pages to the front page. Value charged wards such as "appeaser" and
"surrender" found their way into headlines and sub-heads. It was as if the
Johnson leaders and, especially Governor King, had handed the "lavid" in this
contest the rock to slay themselves, the "Goliath." It became the combined
function of McCarthy and the press to shape that weapon into something that
might actually slay Goliath.
The Portsmouth Her_a.ld led the editorial attack.
Arrogance and Deception — Editorial Opinion
New Hampshire's Democratic party leaders have shovm a bound-
less capacity for insulting the intelligence of their poli-
tical brethren; now they seem bent upon a campaign aimed at
impungiiig their loyalty as well.
First there was that arrogant business about the pledge
cards. The party's hierarchy triggered understandable
resentment among the rank-and-file with this coercive
device, and the effort to obtain such pledges has since
been all but abandoned.
The pledges were sought, of course as a means of "lining
up tlie troops," so to speak, for a President Johnson
write-in movement. Those who signed were made to feel
that they were irrevocably committed, wnile any abstainers
were left to wonder about their future standing with the
party.
In fact. Gov. John W. King, one of the principal promoters
of the pledge cards even went so far as to threaten the
laggards. Democrats x^ho didn't join up with Johnson could
later expect to be "counted out," he warned.
Such talk obviously didn't give much credit to the menta-
lity of Democrats, nor did it take into account the
fierceness of their independence. By and large, they
reacted with predictable hostility at such a brazen at-
tempt to regiment them, and the pledge card veiiture thus
collapsed of its o\m dead weight.
It's a hard-headed hierarchy that presumes to direct the
thinking of Nev/ Hampshire Democrats, however, and the
mischief goes on.
The latest sample of it is even more shocking than what's
gone before, since it constitutes an attack upon the
patriotism of Democrats who don't happen to agree with
the party leaders as regards President Johnson and the
extent of American involvement in Vietnam.
U.S. Senator Tom Mclntyre and Gov. King are the principals,
if not the perpetrators of this particular outrage, for it
is they who lend their names to a large, page-deep news-
paper advertisement which clearly seeks to trick the read-
er into believJ.ng that a vote for President Johnson is
somehow essential to showing "support of our fighting men
in Vietnam."
In other words, according to the rationale of the ad, the
voter \rho doesn't cast his ballot with Johnson might be
doing his country a disservice. The same reasoning applies
and the doubts that go with it, to any critic of the v/ar.
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It is particularly appropriate that the advertisement was
.placed with the Manchester Union Leader, since the language
of it is strictly the language of Loeb.
The ad, incidentally, lists the Democratic State Committee
as the sponsor of record. This means that it probably was
paid for out of regular party funds. Hence, all Democrats
are made to share the responsibility for it whether they
agree with the ad or not. Furthermore, a lot of party con-
tributors of adverse persuasion probably have been charged
with the cost.
Interest now forms around the question of how disdainful
Democrats will respond to the ad after they realize the
ruthless manner in v/hich their right to think differently
has been trampled down. Theirs is just cause for violent
protest against the excesses of the party's leadership,
and it will be surprising indeed if the rebellious clamor
doesn't make itself heard from one end of the state to the
other. 16
The Concord Monito r published two editorials restating similar themes,
the first titled "Dirty Pool" written by the newspaper's general manager,
Thomas W. Gerber, read:
The activities of New Hampshire's Democratic machine poli-
ticians in the presidential primary campaign are little
short of revolting.
Their actions and statements are a disservice to their
candidate. President Johnson, an insult to the state's
Democratic voters and a violation of the democratic pro-
cess.
The three v/ho are responsible are Gov. King, Sen. Thomas
J. Mclntyre and Bernard Boutin of Nashua, one time Small
Business Administrator.
Their activities hark back to the darkest days of American
politics — big city bossisra and the era of the smear and
the innuendo characterized by the late Sen. Joseph R.
McCarthy (R. Wis.).
The tragedy of these tactics is that they are invoked at a
time when there is an aching need for the injection of
ethics, responsibility and statesmanship in the operation
of the American system.
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The word "politics" still has a derogatory tone. Arm-
twisting tactics, implied threats of retribution, and the
dictatorial denial of the right to dissent only sour
further the public's attitude toward the honorable pur-
suit of public service.
New Hampshire's Democratic bosses began their bulldozer
operation in November.
On a snowy Sunday, they rammed through a meeting of the
Democratic State Committee a resolution backing President
Johnson in the primary campaign.
State committees of both political parties traditionally
have refused to take sides in primary contests. This is
because state committees are supposed to represent rank-
and-file Democrats or Republicans who support a particular
candidate
.
Then came the numbered pledge card bit.
Wliile we are confident the original intent was not to
tv/ist arms — a "you support us or else" tactic — that
is just the V7ay it came across.
In the public vievj, names of loyal Democrats could be asso-
ciated with numbers, and thus checked upon. The distinct
impression was that if you didn't sign, tlie bosses would
get even.
But by far the most disgusting aspect of the Democratic
CcUTipaign has been the statements of King and Mclntyre
against the President's opponent, Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy
(D. Minn.).
\That they say is that a vote for Sen. McCarthy is a vote
for Ho Chi Minh, communist premier of North Vietnam.
This is a smear. It suggests that to disagree is treason.
We hope President Johnson can stay aloof, or even disasso-
ciate himself, from such irresponsibility. — T.W.C.l^
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The second editorial writteii by the assistant editor, George W. Wilson, titled
"Short Memories, Convenient Ethics," was especially pointed since it was aimed
at the politically vulnerable Senator Mclntyre and Governor King. Support
from the Concord Monitor and the independent minded Concord voter, had been
particularly important to both in their 1966 elections. Wilson wrote:
Gov. King and Sen. Mclntyre, as chairmen of the cairipaign
to corral write-in votes for President Johnson, have
stooped to reprehensible smears to discourage votes for
Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy.
In advertisements and public statements, the two have
suggested it would be unpatriotic not to support Presi-
dent Johnson when the nation is at war, that a vote for
McCarthy "will be greeted with great cheers in Hanoi."
King and Mclntyre suggest that the normal democratic
process of criticizing U.S. policies should be suspended
when the nation is at war.
They say "the Communists in Vietnam are watching the New
Hampshire Primary to see if we at home have the same
determination as our soldiers in Vietnam."
Writing in President Johnson's name is equated with "sup-
porting our fighting men in Vietnam."
With this nonsense, they invoke the flag and primitive
enthusiasm to line Democrats up behind the President.
Has it occurred to King and Mclntyre that the very pur-
pose of elections is to test the policies of the incum-
bent office-holder or administration? That Senator
McCarthy's dissent and presence in New Hampshire is in
the finest tradition of American government?
If they disagree with McCarthy, let thera discuss the
weaknesses in his proposals. Let them emphasize the
differences between the President's Vietnam policies
and the Senator's views.
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Statements by King and Mclntyrc violate "good tnste,
fair campaign procedures and are a direct insult to
voters of New Hampshire."
They seem to 'feel that anyone who disagrees with them
is un-American."
Those sentiments, shared by King and Mclntyre, were
voiced in September 1966 by Hugh Bournes of Laconia,
who now is a Superior Court Judge but then was a
national committeeman for the N.H. Democratic Party.
He made the comments in response to signs erected by
retired Brig. Gen. Harrison Thyng that said: "Think
American, Vote Thyng for U.S. Senate."
Thyng 's injured opponent? Senator Thomas J. Mclntyre.
G.W.W.18
Other New Hampshire newspapers echoed the themes stated by the Portsmouth
Herald and the Concord Monitor
. The Boston Globe joined the discussion v;ith
an editorial titled: "McCarthy on the new McCarthyism.
"
The managers of the Nev^ Hampshire write-in campaign for
President Johnson have placed ads in various newspapers,
and Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D-Minn. ) hopes they will
boomerang just as some say the famous pledge cards have.
"The Communists in Vietnam are watching the Nev; Hamp-
shire primary," a typical ad reads. "They're watching
to see if we here at home have the same determination
as our soldiers. .. in Vietnam. Don't vote for fu?:zy
thinking and surrender. Support our fighting men..."
Sen. McCarthy charges that these are essentially the
same tactics used by the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy
who was, needless to say, no relation.
And, whether or not one supports him or the administra-
tion's war policy, he has a point. It would be better
to concede that the motives are good ones on both sides.
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The question of our involvement in the war has been raised
in an entirely legal, democratic way and, should be decided
in the voting booth on its and the candidates' merits, and
not on the basis of name-calling or appeals to emotion.
Almost all Americans support our boys in Vietnam, though
they differ over the policy that sent them there. To
charge an opponent with lack of patriotism, over an issue
that has divided the country so deeply, can only do grave
damage to the national interest. 15
Senator Mclntyre Criticizes the Johnson Campaign Tactics
The editorial barrage and the consequences of Governor King's attack be-
gan stirring the consciences of several prominent, liberal and fairrainded sup-
porters of President Johnson. The protest began to take shape when Sen.
Mclntyre arrived in New Hampshire to join in the final weekend push for the
President Johnson write-in. Under a headline that read, "VJording of Some Ads
Regretted by Mclntyre," the Senator was quoted as saying he was "sorry about
the v;ay certain advertisements pushing for a large write-in.
. .have been worded.
The Valley News had editorialized against the Johnson campaign tactics in the
same edition carrying Mclntyre 's interview. He stated that it had not been
his intent to "question the patriotism of Senator McCarthy" adding "He sits
right behind me in the Senate and I've never known a nicer, more gentlemanly
man. And I'd never question his patriotism. "^^
Either before or shortly after his interview, Mclntyre received notice
that five candidates for delegates favorable to the nomination of President
Johnson had signed a statement repudiating Governor King's remarks. Their ad-
vanced notice to Mclntyre of their action gave him time to disassociate himself
from King's charges.
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Datelined Hanover, the stateinenL hit. the afternoon New Hampshire news-
papers with great impact. The Concord Monitor headlined the news, "LBJ Dele-
gates Repudiate King for Statements," and led the story:
The hard sell Presidential primary pitch of Gov. King
was repudiated last night by five Johnson delegates who
said they could not claim the President "has cox-nerned
the patriotism market."
In a prepared statement signed by five delegates from
Lebanon and Hanover, King's contention that a vote for
Sen. Eugene McCarthy, D-Minn. , would be a vote for
"surrender" was rejected. 21
The statement was signed by Mrs. Jean Hennessey, Hanover, former head of the
Democratic State Platform Committee; Robert H. Guest, Hanover, a member of the
Democratic State Executive Committee; Robert C. Elliot, Lebanon, former Demo-
cratic City Chairman; Herbert Hill, ex-state Democratic Party Chairman, and
former history professor at Dartmouth; and Richard Sterling, a professor of
government at Dartmouth. They noted their support for the President in his
domestic programs, in foreign policy areas including the handling of the
"Pueblo" incident, and his "continuing to seek valid negotiations in Vietnam."
They concluded by saying:
We make clear, however, that in our opinion, those who
vote for Sen. McCarthy, will not be voting for "surren-
der" but for the second best candidate.
In addition, we believe that all New Hampshire citizens
who vote Tuesday in accord with their reason and con-
science contribute importantly to the Democratic process. '^'^
The Concord Monitor account of the statement v/ent on to note that "the
statement by the five delegates was mild compared to the private comments."
"I think the governor has gone way overboard this time,"
said one highly disgruntled delegate, whose name was
withheld.
"Some of us were around when Nixon did this to Stevenson.
And we don't like it,..."
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"it is all over, this feeling," said a spokesman,
"This is no Hanover syndrome. Everybody I know agrees
that McCarthy is a good Democrat. Talking about with-
drawal is a difference in judgment, not in patriotism."
"The governor is way over his head in foreign policy."
"1 don't think the governor has recognized that he has
gone too far," said one person.
"\^en it comes out in advertising from the Johnson com-
mittee it makes everybody look like they are supporting
this view, and I don't think it is the view that they
support .
"
"There was a lot of people who feel very uncomfortable
about the position they have been put into by Gov.
King." said a delegate.
"There are a lot of people voting for Johnson who feel
very uncomfortable about the war and wish there was a
way out of it."
"And they feel very uncomfortable about hurling names
at McCarthy, there is no question about it."
The story concluded that "VJhite House and officials at 'Citizens for Johnson'
headquarters had no comment on the statement from the delegates . "23
The controversy prompted additional editorials. The Boston Herald
Traveler wrote under the heading, "McCarthy vs. McCarthyism?"
Sen. Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota may be overstating
the case when he says that the managers of President
Johnson's New Hampshire write-in campaign are using
essentially the same tactics that were used by the
late Sen. Joseph McCarthy back in the 1950' s. But
he has a right to complain.
Democratic Gov. John W. King has called Sen. McCarthy
"an appeaser" and "a spokesman for the forces of sur-
render." Newspaper ads tell New Hampshire voters that
"the Communists in Vietnam are watching the New Hamp-
shire primary" and caution against a "vote for vzeakness
and indecision." In a spot announcement on radio,
William F. Craig, the Democratic State Chairman, ad-
vises voters: "Don't vote for fuzzy thinking and sur-
render."
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Political campaigns have strayed frcui issues into in-
nuendo before. But the Minnesota senator's foes seem
to have strayed especially far. One cannot help but
recall the late Sen. Joe McCarthy's charge that Adlai
E. Stevenson was "soft on communism."
There is no certainty, of course, that President Johnson
is responsible for such tactics. But there can be no
doubt that the Wliite House and the National Democratic
Committee could put a stop to them if they so chose.
The Portsmouth Herald took the opportunity to hammer away at Governor King
again through an editorial titled, "Disgraceful Political Tactics." Noting that
it is "customary to make allov/ance for a certain amount of devilry in politics,"
the editorial affirmed that within the bounds of usual political exchange it
is acceptable to promote a candidate while attacking the record, issues,
"flaws" and "shortcomings" of the opponent,
But these Johnson-minded Democrats are not content to
go by the usual rules. They turn their backs altogether
on the real issues in the process of inventing trumped-
up arguments deliberately calculated to trade upon fear
and confusion.
Until today we thought we had seen the worst of it when
Sen. Ton; Mclntyre and his co-conspirator. Gov. John W.
King, joined in placing a newspaper advertisem-ent which
presumed to show that a vote for President Johnson, be-
cause of his war policy, v/as proof of one's patriotism.
Readers of the ad were led to believe that since the war
in Vietnam was in the national interest, and since Presi-
dent Johnson was devoted to continuing the war, it
naturally followed that voting for Johnson was also in
the national interest.
Further, the inference was made that failure to support
the President v;as tantamount to "letting the boys down"
in Vietnam.
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This, of course, v/as a vicious and cynical repudiation of
•the vjholc idea of fair play in politics, since it was born
of utter flimfl amine ry.
That Sen. Mclntyre would lend his name to such evil tac-
tics was especially reprehensible since he has had so
much experience defending himself against the same kind
of chicanery.
As for Gov. King, he seems oblivious to any restraints
that decency would impose. And he remains so, for the
governor struck again only today with a further statement
designed to put the national loyalty of voters in ques-
tion if they dare to make a political choice other than
President Johnson.
According to Gov. King, a "significant vote" for Sen.
McCarthy in next week's primary would be "greeted with
cheers in Hanoi." He said such an illomened event would
be interpreted as "a sign that the iuuerican people are
ready to quit."
What gives Gov. King such strong feelings about this
forthcoming political decision? Considering that he
never was very active before in advancing the interests
of the party v/hich favored him with the governorship,
the matter of his present passion arouses interest.
There must be something in it for him if President
Johnson's good name survives the primary.
Could it be that he hopes by his efforts to clinch that
federal judgeship in Concord which is supposed to be
awaiting him? If so, it's a rotten bargain when the
people of the state have to be deceived as part of the
price . 25
The combination of the editorial assault and the statement of repudiation
by the five Hanover/Lebanon Johnson delegate candidates had a considerable impact
upon Senator Mclntyre. His statement of disagreement with Governor King domi-
nated radio news broadcasts that Saturday afternoon.
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The New Hnmpr.hir e Sunday Nevs printed a front page, iii red ink headline,
"Mclntyre Slaps at King," with a black ink addition, "Rebukes 'Unfair' Attack
on McCarthy." To McCarthy leaders and the reporters it now appeared that the
long simmering disagreement within the Johnson camp as to how their campaign
should be run had exploded to the surface. The McCarthy campaign sat back to
watch the fight develop further.
Senator Mclntyre was now in a most precarious position. To disagree
with King and the approach which King, Boutin and Craig had taken in the cam-
paign meant damaging President Johnson's chances in the election. At the
same time many of Mclntyre 's most vigorous supporters, both Johnson and
McCarthy supporters, objected to the tactics being employed. Further,
Mclntyre was faced with a certain retribution which comes from violating
the gentlemanly ethos of the United States Senate. To lend his name to ir-
responsible attacks on a fellow senator or to engage in such activities could
only damage his effectiveness in the Senate. Mclntyre had tried to clear him-
self of this dilempaa by standing on the- side of decency and the preservation
of the Democratic Party organization in New Hampshire. The New Hampshire
Sunday Nev^s knew how best to damage his record, especially in Manchester wher
Mclntyre had trailed King in both the elections of 1962 and 1966.
Sen. Eugene McCarthy's campaign to wrest tlie presiden-
tial nomination from President Johnson got a startling
boost this weekend from Sen. Thomas J. Mclntyre of
Laconia.
For Gov. John W. King it appeared to be a deliberate
slap in the face....
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In remarks Friday Mclntyrc defended McCarthy against a
series: of attacks by the governor — whom he did not name —
in which Mr. King has been warning that votes for McCarthy
will be greeted with cheers in Hanoi, the Coimunist capi-
tal of North Vietnam.
King, in those attacks has been joined by a number of
other Joluison lenders, notably State Democratic Chairman
William Craig, who has sponsored a series of ads saying
the ComiTiunists in Vietnam are watching the New Hampshire
primary."
Hclntyre called such warnings "unfair" and a grave injus-
tice to the Minnesota senator.
Less surprisingly yesterday, Mclntyre was joined in defense
of McCarthy by U.S. Sen. Robert F. Kennedy. He called the
attacks "baseless" and said they would dangerously increase
"the terrible strains and divisions" of U.S. political life.
Like McCarthy, Kennedy is a bitter critic of administration
war policy and an advocate of "de-escalation" in Vietnam.
Some McCarthy critics have looked upon the Minnesota Senator
as a "stalking horse" candidate, with Keimedy scheduled
later to emerge as the major Democratic opponent of Presi-
dent Johnson for this year's nomination.
Mclntyre, however, has recently paraded himself as a "hawk"
and strong backer of the Johnson war policy, although in
his campaign last year against Gen. Harrison Thyng he took
a pronouncedly "dovish" line against Thyne's proposals to
deal bellicosely with the Communists ....
In addition to the first page "news" story which the New Hampshire Sunday
News carried, the edition also contained two editorials. The first titled
"McCartliyisms" led, "New Hampshire Democratic leaders, especially Gov. John
W. King, are to be congratulated for getting out their shillelaghs last week
to give the peacenik's candidate, Senator Eugene McCarthy, a vigorous be-
laboring." It went on to congratulate the Johnson leaders for "borrowing"
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the editor's description of McCarthy as "The Hanoi Candidate," The editorial
contended that the "howls of anguish from the McCarthy camp prove the effective
ness of this attack. We have even the delicious spectacle of a McCarthy lament
Ing that he's the victim of McCarthyisml "27
The second editorial attacked Senator Mclntyre for his "boost" to Senat<
McCarthy's "flagging New Hampshire campaign." The title "Mac the Knife" cast
Mclntyre as stabbing the Johnson campaign in the back by criticizing King's
characterizations of McCarthy. The editorial contended:
We would be the last to suggest that McCarthy is less
patriotic than Mclntyre.
The fact is nobody in New Hampshire — certainly not
Governor King or Mr. Craig — has impugned McCarthy's
loyalty.
It is his judgment which is being questioned. Neville
Chamberlain at Munich acted out of the highest regard
for his country's welfare — "peace in our time." But
his tactics, like those of McCarthy, were those of
appeasement and surrender.
Hitler was overjoyed, just as will be Ho Chi Minh if
McCarthy gets a good vote on Tuesday. Indeed the Com-
munists must already be delighted at the boost given
their cause by President Johnson's New Hampshire co-
chairman I
Bad blood between Mclntyre and Gov. King long had been
rumored. They are reported to be rivals for the federal
judge-ship which LBJ will shortly bestow in this dis-
district. This latest bit of back-stabbing by Mclntyre
will not close any rifts but it should greatly assist
Pre.sident Johnson in making up his mind on the judge-
ship. 28
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Mclntyre Recants
When Senator McCarthy returned to the Wayfarer after his campaign visits
that Sunday afternoon, he accidently encountered Senator Mclntyre arriving
for a Johnson campaign sponsored event at the same motor inn. McCarthy thanked
Mclntyre for his moderation and courage in speaking out against the remarks of
Governor King. Mclntyre mumbled a response, appeared a bit stunned by the
encounter, and hurried off to the reception. Those watching were puzzled by
the exchange and especially by Senator Mclntyre 's reaction. 29 \vhat they would
soon learn was that Mclntyre had just come from a meeting arranged by Bernard
Boutin to get his co-chaiman back on the track of the campaign.
From subsequent accounts of the meeting, Boutin, using the full force of
his ties with the VJlilte House, insisted that Senator Mclntyre clarify his
earlier statements and re-affirm his full support for not only President
Johnson but for the campaign and its leadership. Mclntyre, who had been in
Washington for most of the campaign and had not been involved in planning the
Johnson write-in was obviously shocked by the direction the campaign had taken
in h;.s absence. What Boutin made clear to Mclntyre, during that Sunday after-
noon meeting, was that it was not only too late to change things but that un-
less Mclntyre came fully on board the carapaign he would suffer serious politi-
cal damage in Washington and in his relationship with the White House. I-Jhat
this implied was that the White House was in support of the tactics which the
Johnson managers had devised and that Mclntyre was the odd man and might well
be out if he did not return to the fold.
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The next morning the Manchester Union Lc^adcr carried a story headlined,
"Mclntyre Drops Defense of McCarthy," with a suh-head, "Does Complete About-
Facc, Joins Gov. King."
U.S. Sen. Tom Mclntyre of Laconia, reportedly under heavy
pressure from the regular Democratic establishment, last
night abandoned his defense of Minnesota Sen. Eugene J.
McCarthy against charges by Gov. John W. King that votes
for McCarthy "will be greeted with cheers in Hanoi."
Mclntyre 's clarification press release read:
Let me make it clear! Gov. King and I are united in our
support of President Johnson. Gov. King said that Hanoi
is watching the New Hampshire Primary. I say that is the
truth. Gov. King said that a 'significant vote for Sen.
McCarthy will be greeted with cheers in Hanoi.' I agree
100% — that is unfortunately true. Gov. King says that
McCarthy's charge that we are using foul techniques in
this campaign 'is a smokescreen.' I agree with Gov. King.
Gov. King and I have said repeatedly in this campaign
that we support President Johnson's stand in Vietnam.
We support our fighting men in Vietnam. We say, Gov.
King and I, that the people of New Hampshire can best
show their support of our troops in Vietnam by writing
in the name of President Johnson on Tuesday. VJe ask
that the people of New Hampshire join us.^^
In response to v/hat the Manchester Union Leader reported as "heavy pres-
sure from the regular establishment here and in Washington," Mclntyre not only
issvied the above statement, V7hich v^as released at about the time Mclntyre had
his chance meeting with McCarthy, but had sealed his resolve by making a radio
commercial tape. That tape v/ould be aired during the time remaining before the
election. It was Mclntyre who would be the vehicle for the famous last minute
charge of the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary.
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In what seemed to many the ultimate irony, Richard Nixon, when speaking
in Nashua "deplored" the attacks on McCarthy. "All of the candidates are
patriotic Americans. All deserve a respectful hearing," Nixon declared.
"There has been a tendency to let the campaign get down to personalities,"
and this he deplored . -^-^
Mclntyre's Recording: The Red Herring
A week had passed since Senator McCarthy had spoke before the student
audience at Dartmouth College. Saturday morning, March 9th, as McCarthy was
campaigning in Franklin, a radio station teletype carried a report of a charge
coDTiing from the Johnson campaign which referred to McCarthy's response to the
question he had answered in Hanover concerning amnesty. The teletype report
stated that McCarthy had promised blanket amnesty to all draft dodgers, re-
sisters, and deserters of the Vietnam period. Hoeh, then traveling with
McCarthy, called the VJayfarer press office to get them to monitor the release
and also to review the tape of McCarthy's Hanover speech. To him this ap-
peared to be the last minute charge that had been expected as the campaign
neared its climax.
Later that afternoon the McCarthy press office issued a release which
said that the remarks attributed to McCarthy had been taken out of context
and that the correct reading was as transcribed from the tape of the Senator's
speech. Since Saturday is a dead news day in New Hampshire the only motion
either the Johnson charge or the McCarthy rebuttal received was over the radio
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The matter seemed to have gone the way of many charges during the campaign when
it did not prominently appear in New Hampshire's only Sunday newspaper.
That evening David Hoeh received a tip from one of his contacts at a
Manchester radio station that Senator Mclntyre had recorded a political adver-
tisement that was scheduled to run at a saturation rate Monday and Tuesday.
The summary of the message was similar to that which had been picked up
Saturday.
Hoeh relayed his information to Richard Goodwin and explained to Goodwin
the potential impact of such a last minute accusation on the voter. To Hoeh
the charge sounded much like one that had defeated John Sullivan many years
before. It was a charge that could not be satisfactorily answered in the
time that remained, and further McCarthy's ansx^^er as transcribed from the
tape did lend at least a half-truth substantiation to the charge.
By the time Hoeh found out where the tape had been recorded it was after
midnight. Goodwin said that it was imperative that either the tape be de-
stroyed or that a copy of the exact text be secured. Sometime after 2:00 a.m.
Hoeh awoke the station manager who agreed to let him hear the recording. Hoeh
met the manager at about 2:30 a.m., and got an accurate transcription of the
recording. The manager also showed him the booking schedule for the tape.
The heaviest plays were for Manchester, Nashua and Berlin.
The substance of Mclntyre 's message was that McCarthy had promised blan-
ket amnesty to all Vietnam draft dodgers and deserters. He contended that
such an action would undermine the moral fiber of the nation. To vote for
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McCarthy, Mclntyrc contended, would be to turn a back on the boys fighting in
Vietnam and could do nothing more than please Hanoi. By implication, a vote
for McCarthy would be tantamount to endorsing treason if not actually an act
of treason. 32
The McCarthy managers were stunned by the charge, the distortion of
McCarthy's response, and by its potential impact during the last hours of
the campaign. They concluded that the message would have a serious impact
in Manchester and might also be damaging in Nashua and some of the Seacoast
cities, Hoeh advised that the campaign take steps to stop the message from
being aired. It seemed to him to be sufficiently inaccurate as to be libelous
and the threat of such legal action might be enough to keep stations from ac-
cepting the message for transmission.
While HoeJi explored this option, Goodv7in reacted differently. The like-
lihood of stopping the message seemed remote to him and perhaps the conse-
quences of letting the message go would be more destructive to Johnson's
candidacy nationally than blocking it in New Hampshire would be of help to
McCarthy. As the sun rose on the last full day of the campaign, Monday,
March 11th, Goodwin had worked out a strategy.
The Mclntyre message contrasted two perspectives of the campaign, that
of the New Hampshire leader and that of a person with national political cam-
paign experience. Hoeh felt the message should be stopped in order to keep
it from destroying the momentum for McCarthy. Hoeh felt that to let Mclntyre'
message play without a rebuttal, and no rebuttal was possible, would produce
irreparable damage to McCarthy's New Hampshire vote.
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Goodwin, on the other hand, saw in the charge the essence of Johnsoii's
national campaign. If the tactics embodied in King's characterizations and
Mclntyre's last minute message succeeded, then the Johnson managers would re-
produce the fear motive, the patriotism image and the characterization of
dissent in each subsequent contest. To Goodwin the damage to McCarthy's
New Hampsliire vote would be insignificant compared to the outrage of the
reporters, editors, columnists and television anchor men. To them, Goodwin
concluded, the Nclntyre charge would be seen as a severe threat to treasured
traditions of free speech, free press and civil dissent. Johnson might sur-
vive the New Hampshire primary through this strategem but the image of a
newly repressive political ethos would destroy his chances in other states,
especially the next primary, Wisconsin. It was with this response in mind
that McCarthy convened an early morning press conference.
With restrained outrage in tone, McCarthy gave the reporters transcripts
of the Mclntyre message, read it, then read the statement which had been pre-
pared as his reaction. The message was clear and needed little explanation.
What Mclntyre represented in his suatement was Wiite House ordered and White
House approved. This would be just the beginning of a campaign strategy that
would be used across the nation unless it was immediately and convincingly
shown for what it v/as. The reporters needed no further prompting. The proof
was at hand of what they had felt during the past week. A national reaction
against the Johnson campaign tactics and characterizations was growing. Re-
gardless of whether McCarthy succeeded or failed in New Hampshire his service
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had boen to rovcnl the naturo of the Johnson caiididacy and the ^^dllingness of
ite managers to repress dissent, limit debate and cast aspersion on the motives
of those questioning administration policies. A full blo;^ image of a national
politics shaped according to the model of the Texas unit rule caucus system and
the unquestioning loyalty which Lyndon Johnson demanded was not clearly pre-
sented to the nation. This would be a difficult, if not impossible, image to
shake. Richard Goodwin knew this image would be a consequence. He had the
experience to draw this from v;hat might have been simply another In a long
history of the infamous last minute, "Red-herring" charges of a close New
Hampshire campaign.
Predicting the Impact: What Will Be Significant?
The numbers game had been a favorite topic of the reporters throughout
the campaign. Now in the final hours they each had to pick a number, a per-
centage, which each candidate would have to achieve in order for the results
to be significant. For Lyndon Johnson the figure had to be above 50 per cent
and to be a decisive victory at least 60 per cent would be necessary. For
McCarthy the subheadline of a March 11th Herald Traveler story summed up the
problem: "And the Experts Are Still Baffled."
Throughout the campaign the McCarthy leaders had refused to be trapped
by the numbers questions of the reporters. McCarthy refused the bait himself,
answering that he expected to "win" the New Hampshire primary but refused to
define the word "win."
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Evans and Novak in their coluivm dated January 25, 1968, said "A McCarthy
vote of luore than 20 percent would be a surprise and a total of less would be
a significant disaster. "33 A mail-in Manchester Union Leader poll, reported
February 7th, had Senator McCarthy receiving 28 votes to Johnson's 388 and
Robert Kennedy's 36. The Johnson campaign leaders began their campaign with
the assumption that almost all true New Hampshire Democrats would be voting
for the President, '90,000 Strong' was the theme. To concede even a few votes
to McCarthy was upsetting.
By February 18th the New York Times reported: "Neither the New Hampshire
Senator nor the Governor seemed unduly concerned.
. .about the possibility of
Mr. McCarthy's staging an upset — the official party estimate is that the
Minnesota Senator v;ill be lucky to get 12 per cent of the vote. "3^'
Boutin commented in an interview February 26th:
"If we're free of snow storms or sub zero weather, I
would guess we'll get a vote of somewhere in the area
of 50,000 to 55,000, and I think more than that is well
conceivable."
How many of those votes would be for President Johnson?
"t^liat we're looking for is a substantial majority. We're
out to better the record of 196A when the President got
something in the order of 29,000 and I would hope we
could rollup 60, 70 or more per cent."
Does Boutin think a Johnson winning margin of two to one
enough to have Johnson look good in New Hampshire?
Boutin replied, "I v/ouldn't couch it in those terms.
I say the President should do as well or better than he
d±d in 1964 wlien he had everything going for him... no
opposlti on. . . and he got around 29,000 votes.
"Now, I'd say anything 25,000 and up is a very clear
victory. "35
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Governor King predicted a Democratic vote of "42,000" with Senator
McCarthy receiving "between 12,000 and 18,000 votes. "36 The Boston Globe re-
ported the findings of a Time magazine poll of New Hampshire voting that gave
"President Johnson 62 percent, Sen. McCarthy 11 percent, and Robert Kennedy
9 percent." A Newsweek article in the March 4th edition reported "Wiat is
disheartening to the insurgent forces is a survey conducted by a McCarthy-
prone University of New Hampshire political science professor: it gave LBJ
49 percent of the vote. Sen. Robert Kennedy 21 percent and the Minnesota
senator only 9 to 10 points. "^8
Wlien Evans and Novak looked at the New Hampshire situation again just
before the election they wrote, "So unpredictable is the size of the voter
turnout and the number who will actually write in the President's name that
scientific pollsters cannot guess the outcome. But contrary to early boasts
by the Democratic regulars here that McCarthy would be held to 10 percent,
his total is likely to exceed 25 percent and conceivably could climb to 40
percent — enough to give him momentum for next month's Wisconsin primary. "39
To add to the fun, the result-; of New Hampshire high school polls began
to trickle into the newspapers. Remembering that former Deaiocratic National
Chairman, John Bailey, held much stock in such polls, the results were en-
couraging to the McCarthy leaders.
...In a mock primary election held yesterday at Concord
High School, on the Democratic ballot, Sen. Eugene McCarthy,
D-Minn., easily topped the list polling 184 votes while
President Johnson, whose name did not appear on the ballot,
received 37 write-in votes.
A total of 542 students, 48 percent of the student body,
turned out to take part in the mock election. '^0
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This was an iir.portant indication of the ir.pact that Senator McCarthy had made
on the New Hampshire populace. Concord was an importcint city for him and
contained an independent voting population. If his candidacy had been this
attractive, the returns in like communities on election day would be encourag-
ing.
With a headline, "McCarthy Drive Snowballs Through New Hampshire," the
l3ogton Herald Traveler concluded, "If McCarthy pulls more than 25 or 30 per-
cent of the vote he is a "winner."^! Such concluding analyses began to
frighten Bernard Boutin and he raised his expectations of what McCarthy
would need in order to be termed a "significant" vote.
Neither the Johnson people nor McCarthy is making any
broad predictions. Bernard Boutin. .. said last week
that if McCarthy does not get 40 percent of the vote
his campaign will be a failure.
But V7hat will be interpreted as a dramatic win by most
in New Hampshire is roughly 35 percent to 37 percent
of the vote. With this McCarthy could capture all of
the V\ delegate votes to the Democratic convention in
Chicago in August. ""^2
In this item was the first mention of delegates. Virtually everyone except
this writer, Robert Healy, the Globe ' s Political Editor, had conceded the del
gates to Johnson. This was certainly the case among the McCarthy leadership.
Boutin's struggle to escalate his prediction of the McCarthy percentage
was reported b>' the New York Times.
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Two months ago leading New Harapshire Democrats gave Sena-
tor McCarthy less than 15 percent of the vote. Two weeks
ago a top Johnson Administration strategist raised this
to 30. With five days to go, the Johnson campaign di-
rector, Bernard Boutin, said it would be "a disgrace if
McCarthy gets less than 40 per cent," based on his spend-
ing and campaigning.
McCarthy backers said they would be well satisfied if the
Minnesota Senator got 25 per cent of the vote.*^-"^
The New Hampshire Sunday News handicapper set the odds at: "Johnson, 6-5,
'pledged' to win; McCarthy, 3-1, slow starter, but closing ground. "^^ James
Reston wrote: "If McCarthy gets 25 or 30 per cent of the vote against a
President of his own party in that election, the President's victory will
not be a triumph but a warning." And in the same issue the Times reported
that "49 percent, believe the United States was wrong to have become involved
nrJ.litarily in Vietnam, according to the latest Gallup Poll."*^'^
During the final week an advance staff for the NBC coverage of the elec-
tion had been preparing a background book on the 1968 New Hampshire primary
for David Brinkley and Chet Huntley. Part of that assignment was to determine
the percentages above which a "significant" result could be ascertained. In-
to the mysterious "black box" that was used to produce their calculation were
numerous interviews, some spot polling, the wisdom of pundits such as Richard
Scammon, former Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and the expectations
of the candidates' managers. The McCarthy managers set 25 per cent as their
figure hoping the network would not set its mark much above 30 per cent.
Boutin scrammbled to get the networks to accept his threshold for McCarthy as
being 40 percent. Late Monday afternoon, March 11th, NBC's conclusion was set
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and rumored about, the halls of the Wayfarer. Anything above 35 percent for
McCarthy was determined by the network as being "significant." Given what the
canvassing results had shown, the McCarthy managers protested like Cheshire
cats. NBC had placed the figure a bit higher than they had wanted but not un-
reasonably so. For Johnson, the NBC threshold was 50 percent. No delegate
count prediction was included nor a projection of a vote total in the Demo-
cratic primary. Now that NBC had come to its conclusion, the election could
be held.
New Hampshire Votes
Curtis Cans had learned from the reporters that Waterville Valley would
be the first community voting in the presidential primary. As has become a
New Hampshire tradition, he arranged a special mailing for those on the Water-
ville Valley voting list. He suspected that the result would be favorable for
McCarthy from v;hat he had learned from those campaigning in northern Grafton
County.
Soon after midnight, March 12th, the first returns trickled back to Man-
chester: for Richard Nixon all eight Republican votes. On the Democratic
Party side: eight votes for McCarthy, 2 v/rite-in votes for Robert Kennedy,
and not a single vote for Lyndon B. Johnson. With that omen, most campaign
workers and reporters straggled off to sleep.
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Tvo activities occupied the McCarthy workers election day. The first v/as
to get out the McCarthy vote. The second was to get ready to tabulate that
vote once the polls had closed. At the state headquarters in Concord and the
cair.paign headquarters in Manchester at the Wayfarer, tally sheets, name cards
and tote boards were carefully lettered and arranged for those v7ho would later
conie to watch the returns. Someone had had credential stickers printed that
would be distributed to the campaign workers to insure that they would be al-
lowed into the rooms where the excitement would be the greatest. How these
would be distributed no one had quite figured out, but each of the principals
involved in the campaign v/ere given a pack to hand out to those they recog-
nized when the crowd would arrive that evening.
NBC had reserved the convention hall of the Wayfarer and had been spend-
ing the V7eek building sets, erecting computerized tally boards, having instal-
led numerous telephone lines, teletypes, and setting up tally tables with add-
ing machines to aggregate the vote. David Brinlcley and Chet Huntley had ar-
rived a day or so before and their evening news broadcast had originated from
the Wayfarer studio the previous evening.
CBS, once again interested in the New Hampshire result, had set up a mini-
studio in a downto\im Manchester hotel where Walter Cronkite would report,
"That's the v;ay it is." ABC relied on the primitive facilities of their Man-
chester affiliate, Channel 9, as their base. Volunteers from the New Hampshire
League of Women Voters and university students had been organized to collect
the vote at each polling place and report to the wire service pool which then
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relayed the tallies to their network, newspaper and radio station subGcribers.
NBC had conunli^Eloned Richard Scaimiion and Oliver Quayle to select sample pre-
cincts for early analysis and projection purposes. These results could be
gathered and reported separately. Since with only a few exceptions. New Hamp-
shire voted by paper ballot, the results v/ould take some time to tally.
Also, since there were a number of local issues to be voted upon at the town
meetings, and town meeting polls do not usually close until the warrant for
the meeting has been completed, some towns wou]d not have their presidential
vote tallies completed until late in the evening. With all of the local is-
sues, presidential candidates and write-in candidates on both the Democratic
and Republican ballots, and numerous candidates for delegates and alternative
delegates to the national conventions, completing a vote tally for even the
small towns was a demanding and time consuming task. The ballot that faced
each voter v;as the size of a newspaper page.
McCarthy spend the day with friends, chatting with reporters, being
photographed watching volunteers preparing placards, posters and trimmings
for the evening. He was relaxed, seemed confident that the returns would be
favorable, and visibly enjoyed v/itnessing the final burst of energy that was
concluding tlic campaign. The same thoroughness that had become the trademark
of the campaign carried through the preparations for the evening. An image
of what had been accomplished in New Hampshire would be projected from the
McCarthy headquarters across the nation and even the world that evening.
That image had to summarize and exemplify what had been accomplished in New
Hampshire and what the New Hampshire vote should signify in terms of the
McCarthy candidacy and the McCarthy position on the issues. \^at had become
an exceptionally exciting political event for the reporters, the volunteers,
the professionals and an important part of the New Hampshire electorate now
had to be encapsulated for transmission outside New Hampshire. To do this
the McCarthy campaign rented the largest meeting room left in the city, an
expandable banquet room at the Wayfarer, set up a stage, decorated the stage
with tally boards, and a large McCarthy for President banner. The television
networks set up their cameras, special telephones and tables were set aside
for the reporters, radio connections, and tape recording equipment was in-
stalled. V7ith all the electronic equipment, the stage, backdrop, and other
paraphenalia, even a few people standing in the remaining space would like
like a monstrous crowd.
Each local McCarthy committee and headquarters kept close track of the
voting. In the afternoon they began calling those names on the canvassing
cards that were identified as number "1" and "2" favorable to or leaning to
Senator McCarthy. If time and volunteer power allowed, the "3" were also
called in hopes that the last minute Johnson campaign charges and steady
McCarthy response might have motivated them toward voting for McCarthy.
To make getting to the polls more convenient for the voters, rides and
babysitting were offered. Radio and newspaper ads carried headquarters tele-
phone numbers for voting help. Au the final jog to the voter, an advertisement
with a message that was also repeated on the radio appeared in the newspapers:
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How will you feel Tomorrow Morning?
Just stop and think for a minute. How would you feel
if you woke up tomorrow to find that Eugene McCarthy
had won the Democratic primary? Wouldn't you feel
that suddenly there was new hope for America — that
perhaps we might break out of the dreary circle of
rising discontent and continuing stagnation? Wouldn't
you be proud that New Hampshire had changed the entire
political picture of the nation — and restored vital-
ity to the democratic process? And, wouldn't you be
pleased that the independence of New Hampshire voters
had enabled a lone man of conviction to triumph over
huge odds and all the prophets? You can m.ake Wednesday
that kind of morning... by voting for Eugene McCarthy.
McCarthy for President. ^+6
With almost no information about what was happening during the day, ex-
cept turnout figures from some of the cities' ballot box totals, McCarthy
workers busied themselves throughout the day. In spite of the cold, sno\vry
weather, the turnout of voters selecting the Democratic ballot appeared to
be ahead of the projected 50,000 to 55,000 total. Spot checks of voters by
NBC at selected polling places and reports from. McCarthy workers suggested
that the McCarthy vote was holding about as had been projected from the can-
vassing results.
The city polling places closed at 8:00 p.m. Partsmouth, voting by
machine, reported first.
Ward'^^ McCarthy Johnson
1 157 44
2 122 68
3 115 38
A 119 48
5 A3 46
6 _A_3 24
599 268
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The Port: City, locaLion of two important military installations, had voted
more than two to one for McCarthy. The excitement produced by this first
serious return rippled through the Wayfarer. As the returns filtered in it
soon became clear that McCarthy V7as solidly above forty percent and had a
good chance of electing a majority of the delegates.
In the excitement of the returns, two other surprises emerged. Those
arriving from the polling places reported something that had not been assimi-
lated by the networks. McCarthy had received a significant vnrite-in vote on
the ballots of Republican voters, especially in communities like Concord,
Peterborough, Hanover and others with disaffected Romney supporters and
liberals disguised as Republicans. This information led the McCarthy leaders
to immediately call for a careful tabulation of all of these votes.
The second surprise came when the results were called in from Berlin.
Ward^S McCarthy Johnson
1 AO^ A29
2 AOl 361
3 358 294
4 A73 A40
1,636 1,524
McCarthy had carried BerlinI
At about 10:30 p.m., McCarthy slipped out of his cottage to drive into
Manchester for an interview with Walter Cronkite. McCarthy enjoyed Cronkite's
manner and the fact that he had come to New Hampshire during the past weekend
to see what was happening himself. McCarthy was also amazed that NBC would go
to such elaborate lengths to cover the voting but not really cover the campaign.
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AG a persor..-.,! tweak at NBC's extravagance, he let CBS and Cronkite have the
first: interview. He returned to the cottage in tine to be summoned for a live
interview with David Brinkley and Chet Huntley on the 11:00 p.m. news. With
Blair Clark, Hoeh, Studds and several others, he plov^ed a path through the
snow from his cottage to the rear of the Convention Center, arriving minutes
before the live broadcast V7as to begin.
Introducing McCarthy, David Brinkley said that McCarthy had scored a •
stunning upset not only in the preferential vote but by the election of dele-
gates as xcell. McCarthy summarized his o\<m reaction to the results evd the
moaning which he felt it conveyed. To Brinkley 's question as to whether he
had talked to Robert Kennedy, he said that he "had talked with Robert Lowell,"
which McCarthy felt was at least as important that evening as having received
a congratulatory telephone call from Senator Robert Kennedy.
As the concluding rite of the campaign, McCarthy then strode across the
covered bridge into the Bedford room where his supporters, workers and the
curious, waited for their hero. Amidst cheers that erupted with the slightest
provocation, McCarthy thanked all for their help, urged them to continue, and
expressed the possibility that what had started in New Hampshire now would go
all the way to the Chicago Convention and, perhaps, even beyond. In the few
hours of that evening, McCarthy had become a serious presidential contender
and everyone in the room sensed the importance of the change.
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C II A r T E R XIV
THE VOTE, THE RESULT, AND THE IMPACT
Introduction: UT^at Produces the Impact of a New Hampshire, Pr1...rv?
Observers assess the results of the New Hampshire presidential primary
from two immediately available returns. The first, and n^ost important, is the
return from the presidential preference portion of the ballot -- the "beauty
contest." In this return there are two aspects which draw attention. The
first is the percentage of the total vote, and the second is the actual number
of votes each candidate receives.
For these returns the analysts have calculated a significance projection
for each of the principal candidates. In 1968 the NBC projections (35 percent
for McCarthy and 60 percent for Johnson) were the accepted significance points
in the Democratic primary. For either candidate to reach or exceed the signi-
ficant percentage would mean victory. Beyond the 60 percent for Johnson figure
was another agreed upon threshold, that of a normal "win-lose" election, 50
percent. If President Johnson received less than 50 percent of the Democratic
vote then it would mark a political disaster for him, at least as elections
are interpreted by reporters.
Presidential primary voter turnout helped to determine the appeal of a
candidate or of a particular contest. If the total vote was less than that
recorded in previous contests then it could be concluded that interest was low
and the respective candidate appeal was low; therefore, the significance of
the contest v;as less.
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The secor.d sicniflcant return examined by election observers is the result
of the delegate selection portion of the ballot. Although the New Hampshire
delegation to a national convention is minute, the fact that voters vould trans
late their support for a candidate in the preference portion of the ballot, to
support convention delegate candidates is a further indication of candidate
appeal.
On both accounts (percent of the preference vote and delegate selection)
McCarthy scored impressively. As for turnout, the number of votes cast in the
preference primary exceeded that of the previous high vote in John F. Kennedy's
1960 presidential primary. For that election a significant turnout for Kennedy
had been predicted by Governor Wesley Powell as having to be above 20,000 votes
The total turnout of Democratic voters was 53,652 with 50,899 casting ballots
for candidates, a return far in excess of the threshold of appeal that Governor
Powell had projected. as of significance. Participation in both party primaries
in 1960 was 41.5 percent of the total voter registration.
The significance figure for the 1968 election was set at the 40,000 total
vote figure which John F. Kennedy had received in the 1960 presidential primary
(Kennedy's vote total was 43,372.).-1- This was the figure both Boutin and
Mclntyre used as their reference point in predicting primary returns and turn
out significance. The total Democratic vote cast for candidates was 55,464 of
a total Democratic vote cast of 60,519. The percentage of the total vote cast
in both primaries was 46.4 percent although the total number of registered
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voters had increased by 9.0 percent from 1960 to 1968. lloeh had predicted that
the intra-party contest would produce approximately 10,000 new Democratic party
registrations as the result of new voters and Independent voters selecting the
Democratic primary ballot in the election. He had contended that regardless
of the outcome of the primary and the fact that the number of registered Demo-
crats in New Hampshire would increase importantly, the primary would be a
success for the Democratic Party. VJhen the next tabulation of Democratic Party
registrations was made shortly after the March 12th result, the New Hampshire
Democratic Party exceeded 100,000 registrations for the first time in its his-
tor}^. Instead of the "90,000 strong" which had been the Johnson campaign's
campaign cry in support of the President there were now 10,000 more persons
identified as Democrats. The Republican Party, dominant by approximately 60
percent to 40 percent, declined. Both the issues and the contest had attracted
increased participation generally and specifically increased participation
within the Democratic Party.
TABLE 14.01: Votes Cast, Presidential Primary 1960 and 1968^
A. Democratic Vote
Vote cast
Yea.r for Candidates
1960 50,899
1968 55,464
Democratic
Vote
53,652
60,519
Principal
Candidate Vote
43,372
50,783
Year
1960
1968
B. Voter Turnout
Total Names
on Checklist
325,885
368,503
Total Votes
Cast
135,216
168,762
Percent
Votes Cast
41.5%
46.4%
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While the. candidates of one party often receive a scattering of write-in
votes on the ballot of the other party, the 1968 presidential primary produced
a significant Democratic vote on the Republican Party ballot. A total of 7.
A
percent of the Republican votes were cast for Democratic candidates with
Eugene McCarthy receiving 5.3 percent of that total. On the Democratic ballot
5.1 percent of the vote cast was for Republican candidates with Richard Nixon
receiving 4.6 percent (See Table 14.02)
Presidential Preference Vote Analysis
As the principal objective of the campaign the result of the preference por-
tion of the ballot was of the greatest significance in the evaluation of the
McCarthy campaign strategy. The totals were what counted on election evening
and the next day. The totals caused the impact and the media's evaluation of
those totals created the impact. As Table 14.02 shows, Lyndon Johnson failed
to achieve even the 50 percent mark. Senator McCarthy's showing of 42.0 per-
cent exceeded the significance projection of 35 percent by 7 points, an accom-
plishment that gave the election its startling interpretation. When the full
returns were available March 13th, the Republican write-in totals for both John-
son and McCarthy added further impact. VThen the Republican write-in vote was
added to the Democratic vote totals, Johnson received 46.7 percent of the total
to 45.9 percent for McCarthy^ a vote difference of 524 between the two principal
Democratic candidates.
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TABLK 14.02: Ofiicial Results, New
1968, By Candidates-^
Hampshire Presidential Primary
,
March 1
Democratl c Primary
XT L XUlaVy
Lyndon
Johnson 27,520 (49.6%)
Lyndon
.7 o Vi n CInn 1 77 fl
(. 1. /A>)
Eugene
McCarthy* 23,263 (42.0%)
Eugene
McCarthy 5 511
Richard
Nixon 2,532 ( 4.6%)
Richard
Nixon* 80.666
Robert
Kennedy 606 ( 1.2%)
Robert
Kennedy None
Paul
Fisher 506 ( 0.9%)
Paul
Fisher 374 ( 0.4%)
Nelson
Rockefeller 249 ( 0.5%)
Nelson
Rockefeller 11,241 CIO S7)
George
VJallace 201 ( 0.4%)
George
Wallace None
John
Cromiuelin"''^ 186 ( 0.3%)
George
Romney* 1,743 ( 1.7%)
Richard
Lee* 170 ( 0.3%)
VJillis
Stone* 527 ( 0.5%)
Jacob
Gordon* 77 ( 0.1%)
Harold
St assen* 429 ( 0.4%)
Scattering 154 Ronald
55,464(100.0%)
Reagan
Herbert
Hoover*
362
247
( 0.3%)
( 0.2%)
David
Watumuli* 161 ( 0.2%)
William
Evans* 151 ( 0.2%)
7 3 ( 0 11)
Don Dumont* 39 ( 0.04%)
Scattering 636
103,938 (100.0%)
* Indicates that name appeared on ballot.
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It Is not clear exactly where the Republican vote for the Democartlc candi-
dates ca.«e from except as a product of particular campaign events and sugges-
tions. The principal event was the withdrawal of Romney as an active candidate.
Some Republican voters may have intended to vote for Romney as an anti-war ges-
ture but shifted their vote to McCarthy as the only active candidate opposing
U.S. Vietnam policy.
Write-in voting suggestions were widely circulated in the campaign. The
principal suggestion, of course, was that promoted by the Johnson campaign on
behalf of their candidate. A secondary suggestion came from Republicans working
for McCarthy v/ho urged Republicans to write McCarthy's name in on their ballot.
A third suggestion came from the editors of the Manchester Union Leader to dis-
satisfied Democrats urging them to write Richard Nixon's name in on their Demo-
cratic ballots. The background for each of these suggestions had been the suc-
cess of the Henry Cabot Lodge write-in effort in the 196A presidential primary.
A potential surprise write-in for Robert Kennedy did not occur on either ballot.
Active Kennedy support had been completely incorporated v;ithin the McCarthy
campaign.
Noting Table 14.03, 1968 Republican Vote for McCarthy and Johnson, the
county returns show some relationship between effective McCarthy organization,
the activity of Republicans for McCarthy, and the county McCarthy vote as a
Republican write-in. With rare exception, where McCarthy did well as a Demo-
crat he also did well on the Republican ballot. The McCarthy caaipaign was well
organized in those counties where McCarthy drew more than 80 percent of the
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: 1/..03: 1968 Kcpubllcan Vote, for McCarthy and Johnson, by County/*
^My_ % % LBJ/McCart.hy
Johnson McCarthy % of
Total Co. Rep. Vote
Belknap 17.0% 83.0% A 9 7
(65) (318) (6143)
Carroll 25.4% 74 . 6%
(53) (156) (5329)
Cheshire 21.0% 79.0% 7 07
(109) (409) (7430)
Coos 41.0% 59 07 / . O/o
(166) (238) (5173)
Grafton 19.9% 80. 1%
(129) (521) (9601)
Hillsborough 28.
1
71 9/ J- •
(466) (1192) (25434)
Merrimack 19.8 80.
1
7 87
(223) (899) (14355)
Roc kins?ham 24 4 7 5 6
(347) (1078) (22994)
Strafford 16.9 83. 7.1%
(88) (436) (7350)
Sullivan 33.3 66.7 8.9%
(132) (264) (4464)
24.4 75.6 6.7%
(1778) (5511) (108,273)
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comblacd Ropubllcon write-in vote for McCartl,y /Johnson
. The impact of the heavy
McCarthy vote in the university/college towns of Durham and Hanover is reflected
in the totals for Strafford and Grafton Counties. The strong McCarthy organiza-
tion centered in Concord influenced the total for Merrimack County as did the
organization in Laconia upon the Belknap County result. In each instance where
the McCarthy campaign was strong the Republican write-in percentage increased.
Only in Coos County did this increase not significantly benefit McCarthy.
Of those communities that had been targeted for special attention by the
McCarthy campaign and those McCarthy subsequently carried, only in two did John-
son get more Republican write-in votes than McCarthy and was even with McCarthy
in three others. (See Table 1A.04) The McCarthy percentage of the Republican
vote seems to increase with the size of the McCarthy percentage of the Democratic
vote. This is indicative of the legitimizing effect of strong Democratic support
for McCarthy among those liberals within the Republican Party, VThile there does
not exist a specific study of the McCarthy Republican write-in vote, the fact that
the vote tends to be strongest in communities producing significant Democratic
results for McCarthy leads to the conclusion that the vote represents that same
voting inclination as the Democratic McCarthy vote. It is also possible to con-
clude that there was little calculated anti-Johnson voting for the sake of harm-
ing Johnson as a potential opponent for the Republican nominee. No institutional
or editorial source advised voting for McCarthy to hurt Johnson's political future
as a Republican opponent. Voting advice when given was straightforward, either
based on issue positions or direct candidate preference. \^hile it is possible
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combined Republican write-in vote for McCarthy /Johnson. The impact of the heavy
McCarthy vote in the university/college towns of Durham and Hanover is reflected
in the totals for Strafford and Grafton Counties. The strong McCarthy organiza-
tion centered in Concord influenced the total for Merrimack County as did the
organization in Laconia upon the Belknap County result. In each instance where
the McCarthy campaign was strong the Republican write-in percentage increased.
Only in Coos County did this increase not significantly benefit McCarthy.
Of those communities that had been targeted for special attention by the
McCarthy campaign and those McCarthy subsequently carried, only in two did John-
son get more Republican write-in votes than McCarthy and was even with McCarthy
in three others. (See Table 14.04) The McCarthy percentage of the Republican
vote seems to increase with the size of the McCarthy percentage of the Democratic
vote. This is indicative of the legitimizing effect of strong Democratic support
for McCarthy among those liberals within the Republican Party. While there does
not exist a specific study of the McCarthy Republican write-in vote, the fact that
the vote tends to be strongest in communities producing significant Democratic
results for McCarthy leads to the conclusion that the vote represents that same
voting inclination as the Democratic McCarthy vote. It is also possible to con-
clude that there Vv'as little calculated anti-Johnson voting for the sake of harm-
ing Johnson as a potential opponent for the Republican nomii^ee. No institutional
or editorial source advised voting for McCarthy to hurt Johnson's political future
as a Republican opponent. Voting advice when given was straightforward, either
based on issue positions or direct candidate preference. VJhile it is possible
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REPUBLICAN VOTE FOR MCCARTHY/JOHNSON In McCARTHY COMMUNITIES^
REPUBLICAN •
Community % Mc * Total % %
Dera. Vote Rep. Vote Mc LBJ
Berlin 51.7% 100.0% 8.9 7.8
(1649) (146) (129)
Rochester 51.0 100.0% 4.3% 0.8
(1608) (69) (13)
Concord 53.9 100.0% 10.% 2 . 5%
(139)
Portsmouth 69.
1
100.0% 12.5% 5.2%
(1759) (219) (91)
Salem 56.5 100.0% 3.1% 1.6%
(2430) (75) (39)
1st CD.
Pelham 57.9 100.0% 2.2% 1.2%
(597) (13) (7)
Hampton 57.9 100.0% 8.0% +
(1419) (114) (1)
Plaiston 60.3 100.0% 5.1% 0.2%
(707) (36) (2)
Exeter 57.5 100.0% 10.5% 5.5%
(2210) (232) (122)
Seabrook 63.0 100.0% 1.8% 0.3%
(666) (12) (2)
Fariningtou 56.5 100.0% 2.3% 0.8%
(614) (14) (5)
Meredith 100.0 100.0% 5.6% 0
(595) (33) (0)
Durham 8^1.6 100.0% 14.3% 0.4
(961) (137) (4)
Milton 55.
A
100.0% 1.9% 1.9%
(316) (6) (6)
* Communities where McCarthy received 50% or more
+ Less than o. 1%
TABLE lA.OA (Cent.)
RErURLlCAN
Coraniunity Z Mc Total % %
Dem. Vote Rep. Vote Mc. LBJ
2nd CD.
SI iUU
.
uA 1 A«y1 . O/o 2 . A.4
(All) (A) (10)
\y L t-L.llVJLj.Xt- 1 r\r\ rwiUU
. v/o 0. 09%
(1A8) (6) (0)
T? r%^Tay Rs r> i UU . UZ, 21 . 6 /. A A P/0.9%
(1062) (229) (10)
1 "i /*\ 1jLiXTiuoxn SI 7 1 nn n"/i UU . ()/o i • t A1 . 9a
(157) (3) (3)
rlllton DD . O inn n*v 1 . O/o
(A27) (21) (7)
Pet erborough J / . / i UU . [J/o y . OA 1
.
(10A6) (100) (12)
New IpswJ ch C U . (
)
iUU
.
Ua b . OA 1 o^yi • y/o
(267) (23) (5)
Lancaster 59 .
9
/ . 6/i u . uy/i
(628) (A8) (0)
Ashland to oDO . O 1 nn r\°/iUU . KJ/o 1 n"/JL . V /o Z . 0/!i
(306) (3) (8)
Troy CI *7 1 UU . U/o U . 0 /o
(160) (7) (1)
Hinsdale 60. 0 inn o"/IUU. U/o VJ , VJ/o
(305) (7) (0)
Andover 53.6 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
(2A9) (0) (0)
Hillsborough 63.8 100.0% 1.1% 0.9%
(561) (6) (5)
Source: N.H. Manual of Gen. Court 1969 pp. 325-363
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irm
that some. votci-B wrote-in McCarthy's nmne on their Republican ballot to ha:
Johnson's political future there is no evidence of a drive to et.courage Republi-
cans to write-in Johnson's name on their ballot as a means of diminishing his
chances against a Republican nominee.
The 1968 presidential primary was the first election of this sort where
votes cast by use of another party ballot were calculated in the election
assessment. Previously such votes had been insignificant. John F. Kennedy
attracted 2196 votes via the Republican ballot in 1960 and Lyndon Johnson drew
an unrecorded scattering of write-votes in the 1964 presidential primary. The
New Hampshire McCarthy leaders had anticipated that some Republicans might
wish to participate in the Democratic contest to express their concern about
the situation in Vietnam. VJhile they had avoided actively soliciting Republi-
can votes until after Governor George Romney withdrew, their anticipation of
a Republican contribution to the final McCarthy vote was important to the suc-
cess of the McCarthy campaign. If McCarthy had announced his New Hampshire
candidacy before the end of the primary voter registration period, a number
of those who ultimately voted for McCarthy on the Republican ballot might have
re-registered as Democrats. Not having re-registered, their only voting option
was the Republican ballot.
Preference Results by County
Johnson and McCarthy split the ten New Hampshire counties each carrying
five. Of the five that Johnson carried, two, Hillsborough and Sullivan, were
carried by more than 50 percent of the vote — 56.8 and 54.7 percent respective-
ly. McCarthy carried Grafton and Rockingham Counties by more than 50 percent
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- 3/k7 ^>ud .SO. 3 percent respectively. (See Table 14.03) In no instance did
Johnson carry a county by the 60 percent that had been set as his significance
point by NBC prior to the election. McCarthy failed to reach 35 percent target
in only one county, Hillsborough, and there missed by 0.9 percent.
With 48.7 percent of the total Democratic vote cast by Hillsborough County,
the doiT:inance of that county in the election is shown. Of the total vote cast
for candidates, Hillsborough accounted for 40.6 percent of the total and 46.4
percent of the total vote received by President Johnson statewide. As will be
shown later, Manchester dominates Hillsborough County Democratic Party voting
as does the county in statewide Democratic contests.
McCarthy carried the next most populous county, Rockingham, which sprawls
east from Hillsborough County along the Massachusetts border to the seacoast
city of Portsmouth. Rockingham County's rapid growth communities, outside the
sphere of Manchester and politically tied to Massachusetts, supported McCarthy
significantly. Along with Rockingham the surprise counties for McCarthy were
Coos, New Hampshire's most northerly county, and Strafford, a county containing
three traditionally Democratic cities adjacent to the Maine border.
Other than the two counties which produced exceptional results for McCarthy,
the results were relatively uniform, demonstrating the particular dynamics of
the Democratic party in each. Other counties that McCarthy carried, or nearly
carried, were ones with smaller populations of Democrats or counties not domi-
nated by a single large urban center. Johnson's support came from the city
dominated counties sucli as Hillsborough, Sullivan, and found strength in Merri-
mack by carrying the populous near Manchester Democratic towns of Pembroke and
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Table )A.05: 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary Results, by County
PARTICIPATION
County
Belknap +
Carroll
Cheshire +
Cooj
Grafton
Hillsborough +
Merrimack +
Rockingham
Strafford
Sullivan +
%
Johnson
A7.0
(949)
44.0
(292)
45.
9
(1220)
45.6
(2231)
36.5
(1093)
56.8
(12,791)
48.0
(2503)
41.0
(3155)
45.4
(2076)
54.7
(1210
%
LBJ
Total
3.5
1.1
4.4
8.1
4.0
46.4
9.1
11.5
7.5
4.4
McCarthy
42.5
(858
+ 45.7
(303)
45.5
(1210)
+48.5
(2373)
+54
.
7
(1639)
34.1
(7684)
43.0
(2242)
+50.3
(3866)
+48.9
(2235)
38.9
(859)
%
McCarthy
Total
3.6
1.2
5.1
10.1
7.0
34.0
9.5
16.5
9.5
3.5
%
County
Total
3.6
(2020)
1.2
(663)
4.8
(2657)
8.9
(4889)
5.4
(2998)
40.6
(22,535)
9.4
(5214)
13.9
(7692)
8.3
(4574)
4.0
(2211)
% Total
Rep. & Dera,
Participation
46.1
52.2
41.3
52.4
47.0
47.0
47.6
51.7
34.2
43.2
%
Dem
of Total
27.1
(2279)
12.6
(766)
27.9
(2868)
52.4
(5697)
25.9
(3355)
48.7
(24,105)
28.3
(5667)
27.0
(8501)
39.8
(4865)
35,
1
(2416)
Totals 49.6% 100.0% 42.0% 100.0% 100.0% 46.4 35.9
(27,520) (23,269) (55,454) (168,792) (60,519)
+ WINNER
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Allcnstown. Failure to carry Berlin and Coos County. rortsn,outh and Rockingham
County, and to domindte in the Strafford County cities was dan^aging to the
predicted totals for Johnson.
Participation in the election as calculated in Table 1A.05 is based upon
total vote cast (Republican and Democrat) as a percentage of the total checklist
of registered voters. Total figures for registered Democrats and registered
Republicans are not available. The only way to reach a semblance of a partici-
pation index is to use the total vote cast as a function of the total voter
registration. To a degree, participation can be shown to be a function of com-
munity governmental form. Those units of local government organized as towns
held town meetings that coincided with the date of the presidential primary.
Town issues are likely to boost election participation in the presidential pri-
mary; whereas few if any issues or electoral contests are offered to the city
voters. As examples of this effect, Strafford County, with three cities, Sulli-
van County with one city and a few small towns, t;.-ailed in participation with
3^.2 and 43.2 percent participation. Cheshire County with 41.3 percent partici-
pation reflects the Jjnportance of the city of Keene, and the fact that rural
Cheshire County Is a popular retirement area. March is a good time not to be
in New Hampshire and many retirees travel then. Absentee voting was not permit-
ted in the 1968 presidential primary.
Town meeting issues boosted the participation in Carroll, Coos and Rocking-
ham counties especially, and kept it above 45 percent elsewhere.
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Portlcipatioa of Democrats as a percentage of the total vote cast reveals
the relationship between Democrats and Republicans in the counties. Of the ten
counties only Coos produced more Democratic votes than were produced for the
Republican party with Hillsborough's 48.7 percent close to the 50 percent mark,
Strafford County with 39.8 percent and Sullivan with 35.1 percent Democratic
vote of the total vote cast are next in line. The remaining six counties are
dominated by Republican voters with Carroll County the most Republican County
in New Hampshire. The relationship between percent Democratic participation
to percent Republican participation will be explored later as a means of prob-
ing the origin of some of Senator McCarthy's support.
McCarthy Strategy and Vote Production
Hoeh and Studds prepared two vote targeting/campaign resource allocating
memoranda. The first of these was sent to McCarthy prior to his announcement
and allocated his campaign time to concentrations of Democratic voters. This,
the December 22, 1967 memorandum, showed that using ten campaign days McCarthy
could campaign in cities or clusters of cities and towns, that would contain
75 percent of the Democratic vote usually cast in New Hampshire. The second
memorandum was prepared by Hoeh for the first meeting of the Campaign Committee,
January 9, 1968, and listed twelve large Democratic vote producing cities and
towns, 23 First Congressional District communities, and 22 Second Congressional
District communities In priority for campaign attention. This memorandum be-
came the basis for the organizational time, candidate time, volunteer efforts
and other campaign efforts to these communities in relationship to their im-
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portanco as Democratic vote producers. At least some activity for McCarthy was
carried out in each of the targeted conmiunities. The success or failure of the
campaign is reflected in the vote result from these communities and is especial-
ly important in the case of the twelve large city/ town targets.
Targeted City/Lar<^e Town Re.qiiltR
The McCarthy leaders' strategy identified the twelve priority Democratic
vote producing communities. Of the twelve, eleven were cities and one, Salem,
a town. Two other cities, Franklin and Lebanon, had not produced Democratic
primary votes in an amount sufficient to displace Salem on the list.
Reviewing Table 14.06, the importance of the target cities to the campaign
is evident. 50.2 percent of the total Democratic vote cast in the election is
accounted for by the twelve communities. Of the total vote produced by the
twelve conmiunities, Manchester accounted for 40.6 percent or slightly more than
20 percent of the total vote cast in the Democratic primary. Manchester pro-
duced a 69.0 percent margin against McCarthy v/ith that vote representing 45.9
percent of Johnson's vote among the tvjelve communities. In spite of McCarthy's
difficulty in Manchester, he did receive 14.7 percent of his statewide total
from that city. Of the twelve communities, Johnson carried seven, which ac-
counted for 80 percent of the total vote he received among the twelve. The re-
maining 20 percent v/as distributed among the five communities that McCarthy
carried. Of the twelve only in Manchester did McCarthy slip below the pro-
jected 35 percent figure and his victory in Berlin had a dramatic impact on
both political camps. With the vote for both candidates cast in Manchester
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TABLE 1A.06: TARGET LARGE CITY/TOWN RESULTS, 1968
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY
Participation
Community %
LBJ
%
LBJ
%
Mc
%
Mc
%
Comm.
% Dem. Vote
of Total Reg.
% of Total
Dem. Vote
Total Total
Manchester + 69.0
(7591)
A5.9 31.0
(3A12)
29.5 AO.
6
(12,351)
27.7
(A6,921)
21.5
(13,031)
Nashua + 59.3
(2585)
15.6 AO.
7
(1776)
15.3 1A.9
(A527)
21.1
(22,579)
7.9
(A, 755)
Berlin AS.
3
(152A)
9.1 + 51.7
(1636)
1A.2 10.8
(3282)
36.2
00,398)
6.2
(3,768)
Somersworth +57.5
(600)
A.O A2.5
(AAA)
3.8 3.6
(1,103)
21.2
(5612)
2.0
(1189)
Claremont + 62.1
(673)
A.l 37.9
(All)
3.5 3.7
(1131)
16.6
(7266)
2.0
(1207)
Dover + 52.0
(676)
4.1 A8.0
(625)
5.
A
A.
5
(1352)
11.
A
(12,256)
2.3
(lAOO)
Rochester A9.0
(39;)
2.3 + 51.0
(AlO)
3.5 3.7
(870)
16.6
(9205)
2.0
(930)
Laconla + 60.5
(527)
3.2 39.
A
(3AA)
3.0 3.2
(963)
11.8
(850A
1.6
(999)
Concord 46.
1
(606)
3.
A
+ 53.9
(707)
6.2 A.
6
(1,392)
8.9
(15,736)
2.3
(1399)
Keene + 53.3 2.8 A6.7
(All)
3.6 3.2
(979)
10.5
(9A72)
1.6
(992)
Portsmouth 30.9
(268)
2.0 +69.
1
(599)
5.2 3.0
(92A)
12.6
(8586)
1.8
(1080)
Salem A3.
5
(597)
3.5 + 56.5
(776)
6.7 5.0
(1,520)
39.5
(83A5)
2.7
(1633)
58.8%
(16,511)
100.0% A 1.2%
(11,551)
100.0% 100.0%
(30,39A)
19.7%
(16A,880)
53.5%
(32,393)
% Total
Vote LBJ
60%
(27,520
% Total
Vote Mc.
A9.7%
(23,263)
% Total
Dem. Vote
50.2%
(60,519)
Total Reg.
Voters
16.7%
(363,503)
Dem. Total
Vote
100.0%
(60,519)
+ WINNER
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reir.ovcd, McCarthy would have received /.7.y percent of the total for the eleven
remaining conimunitiGs to Johnson's 52.3 percent, a relationship that comes much
closer to understanding the importance of concentrating campaign energy among
these few communities in a Democratic primary. Manchester, of course, cannot
be ignored. It must be dealt with in every New Hampshire political contest in
x^hich Democrats are involved.
Participation as evaluated in Table 14.06 presents a contrast to that dis-
cussed in Table 14.05. In this case, participation is the percentage that the
Democratic vote constitutes of the total of registered voters in the locality.
While not as satisfactory a measure of participation as V70uld be the percent
Democratic vote of the total Democratic Party registration, it is the only de-
vice to assess participation as a function of the Democratic vote cast given
the data available. Contrasting participation percentages do reveal something
about the nature of the vote cast, a subject which will be explored in a subse-
quent section of this analysis. Generally, those communities with small percent
Democratic vote of the total voter registration are communities like Rochester,
Laconia, Concord, Keene and Portsmouth which have substantially more Republican
voters registered than Democrats. Those cities with higher Democratic percen-
tage participation arc those like Manchester, Nashua, Berlin and Soraersworth
,
where the Democratic Party has traditionally been strong, although less so in
the case of Nashua. The anomaly appears to be Salem. There two factors com-
bined to increase participation. The first was the strength of the Democratic
Party in the comm>unity, but of equal importance is the fact that the towns, with
town meetings, had more reason to turnout for the election. Subsequent examina-
tion of this factor shows the relationship between increased participation and
the comTnun.i ties where the town meeting form of government prevailed.
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The McCarthy campaign targeted 23 communities In the First Congressional.
In order to be sure that campaign activities were not just concentrated on the
basis of priority Deraocratic vote producers but also related to the geographic
dispersion of the New Han^pshire population, the congressional districts were
selected as targets as well. The strategy related to the delegate selection
part of the election which was separated according to congressional districts.
If a strict priority ranking of Democratic vote producers had been used to
manage the McCarthy strategy, relatively few communities in the Second Congres-
sional District would have received campaign attention. In terms of the final
result, the fact that nearly equal emphasis of the campaign was allocated to
the priority communities of each district appears to have been important.
The First Congressional District list shows the importance of the radial
effect of Manchester on the top Johnson vote producing towns. Pembroke, Goffs-
town, Aliens town, Hooksett, Merrimack, and to a considerable degree Derry and
Londonderry are within the communications and commuting sphere of Manchester.
As the participation percentage for each indicates, many of these communities
show high levels of Democratic voter participation indicating that Democratic
Party registration is heavy if not dominant. The table also reveals the
McCarthy ability to attract voters from the academic communities such as Durham
location of the University of New Hampshire, and Exeter, home of Phillips
Exeter Academy.
Of considerable significance in terras of where the McCarthy campaign suc-
ceeded and where it had difficulty are the returns from communities with
strong local Democratic Party loyalties. Old mill communities with sizable
•fAli:/; U.07t TARCKT COMMUNITIKS, tat ConK.reuBlonal Dlotrlct
1968 Prei.lii«:ntifll Prlin«ty
PART ICl TAT ION
Z Z Z X Mc Z
Commiin 1 1 y t-BJ 1.BJ _Mc Total Comni. 2 Dcm. Vote of Z of Totnl
Tot al Totnl Regl Nt riit Ion r><'in. Vote
Hudson + 50.0 12.4 44.0 10,2 11.4 29.8 1.9
\ - / (412) (1028) (3882) (1158)
Pembroke + 57.4 8.5 42.6 6.5 7.7 33.2 1.4
KJjy J (267) (698) (2548) (847)
Cof fotovfn + 58.7 10.8 41.3 7.9 9.3 21.3 1.7
V*» } (318) (843) (4714) (1004)
Mcwmarket + 59.6 7.3 40.4 5.2 5.9 30.8 0.9
(Z09) (53£) (1880) (579)
Allenstown + 60.3 6.8 39.7 4.6 5.6 46.4 0.9
(188) (510) 0214) (563)
Derry + 52.5 6.1 47.5 5.7 6.0 10.7 0.9
(232) (545) (5319) (557)
Pelham 42.
1
4.3 + 57.9 6.2 5.3 27.4 0.9
(252) (480) (2007) (549)
Hooksecc + 59.3 6.5 40.7 4.7 6.0 18.5 0.9
(189) (543) (3079) (569)
Hampton 42.1 4.3 + 57.9 6.2 5.3 12.1 0.8
C 183} (252) (477) (4050) (490)
Plalstow 39.7 1.6 + 60.3 2.6 2.2 10.1 0.4
/AO \toy; (105) (198) (2136) (216)
Exeter 42.5 4.1 +57.5- 5.7 4.7 9.6 0.8
(172) (232) (430) (4719) (454)
MerrlmacV. + 53.2 4.6 46.8- 4.3 4.4 14.5 0.7
(195) (172) (398) (2844) (413)
Rolllnsford + 51.1 2.8 48.9- 2.9 2.7 25.6 0.5
/ 1 1 £ ^(1 16) (Z'iB) / ^ ions / T ft? %
Bedford + 52.0 4.4 48.0 4.2 4.4 14.6 0.6
(185) (171) (398) (2723) (398)
Epplng +64.0 2.3 36.0 1.3 1.7 15.1 0.3
(96) (54) (151) (1304)
Seabrook 37.0 1.4 + 63.0 2.4 2.0 15.2 0.5
(58) (99) (1/9) / 1 too
\
TUton + 57.6 2.5 42.4- 1.9 2.1 14.2 0,3
(103) (/b) / 1 Q*i\\ If 3/ ^ 1 A 0 ft ^
ranaingtoti 43.5 1.7 + 56.5 2.3 1.9 10.1 0.3
(70) (91) (177) / f Q A I \ 1 1 nf>'\V 1 od;
Londonderry + 51.9 3,3 48.1 3.2 3.6 19.9 0.6
(139) (129) (32/) f \ n c\\(1 / /U)
Meredith 0 0 + 100.0 2.0 1.0 11.1 0.7
(0) (82) (Bit) ^ 1 D / I / f 186^
PlttBf iold + 62.3 1.6 37.7 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.2
(66) (40) ^ 1 ^ iH
;
(140)
DurKam 15.4 1.3 + 84.6 7.4 4.0 17.3 0.6
(54) (298) (363) (2109) (364)
Mlltoa 44.6 1.3 + 55.4 1.6 1.5 17.5 0.3
(53) (66) (132) (941) (165
50. 9Z
(4206)
Z Total
Vote LIU
15. 3Z
(27,520)
100. OZ 49. IZ
(4050)
100. OZ
Z Total
Vote Mc
17. 4Z
(2 ).263)
100. OZ
(9056)
Z Total
DcB. Vote
15. OZ
60,519)
18. IZ
(56,184)
Total KeglBtercd
Voters
15. 5Z
(363,503)
16. BZ
(10,139
Den. Total.
Vote
100. OZ
(60,519)
+ DENOTES UINNKR
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democrats
FreuOi-Canadian populations and traditionally conservative and loyal D(
supported the President impressively. Pembroke and Allenstou-n share the voting
population of the old mill center, Suncook. where the French-Canadian comn^unity
loyally supports Democratic candidates. Similarly Pittsfield, Newmarket, Tilton,
and Epplng, though isolated from other influences such as proximity to a domi-
nant urban center, contain pockets of Democratic Party identifiers.
The towns where McCarthy's support was shown tended to be those which had
experienced considerable growth in the post-war years like Pelham, Hampton,
Plaistow, Seabrook and Exeter. The in-migrants were mostly from Massachusetts,
many Democrats, and influenced by political experiences different from the older
Democratic populations of the declining mill cities and towns. Bucking the
trend were towns like Hudson and Goffstown. Hudson, adjacent to Nashua had be-
come the bedroom town for many employed in Nashua as Goffstovm had become the
bedroom town for many employed in Manchester. Hudson's population tends to be
In the tradition of the older Democratic inclined working population of Nashua;
a generation or so removed from the original migration to the textile mills of
that city but still closely tied by family and perspective to the old city's
politics. Nashua is geographically small and if the Merrimack River did not
separate Hudson from Nashua it is possible that the area occupied by the two
communities would have been one city. Nashua's Johnson vote of 59.3 percent
is sufficiently cJ.ose to the 56.0 percent for Hudson to support these inferences.
The difference may easily be accounted foi by the recent migration to Hudson from
Massachusetts which has also followed the migration to Hudson from Nashua.
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The Goffstown explanncion relates in part to the fact that Plnardville,
enclave just outside Manchester, votes as does the west of the Merrimack River
wards of the city. Goffstovm has also become a bedroom community for those
leaving Manchester but still retaining strong ties to their former home city.
Wlien the percentage returns for the two candidates are added, Johnson re-
ceives 75.3 percent of his statewide vote from the twelve targeted communities
(Table 14.06) and the returns from the First Congressional District towns
(Table 14.07). On the other hand, McCarthy received 67.1 percent of his total
vote from the two targets and came within 0.4 percent of equalling Johnson's
vote in the First Congressional District.
The participation calculation shows that there is a slight overall decline
in the relationship between the number of votes cast by Democrats and the total
number of registered voters. The decline relates to the decline in Democratic
Party registrations in the small communities. At the same time McCarthy's vote
begins to increase. The smaller towns where the Democratic Party is weaker
produced more votes for McCarthy on a percentage basis than did the large com-
munities and a relationship between Republican strengtli and McCarthy vote be-
gins to appear.
The relationship becomes more evident when the inspection turns to the
target communities of the Second Congressional District, larger, more rural and
less populated of the tv/o New Hampshire districts. Again, Johnson does well in
the old mill cities and to\-ms of the district (Franklin, Newport, Milford , Leba-
non, Northumberland (Groveton)
,
Jaffrey, Littleton, V/inchester , and Swanzey)
but has difficulty in the academic communities (Hanover and Andover) , and in
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communities
..Ith retirement or suburban residents such as Hillsborough, Lancas-
ter. New Ipswich, Gorham, Peterborough and Wilton. As the population of Demo-
cratic voters declines, McCarthy's margin increases. The 22 target communities
of the Second Congressional District produced 12.3 percent of McCarthy's total
vote and a 51.5 percent edge over Johnson.
Wlien the results of the tx-jo target community lists are combined with the
Second District percentages (Table 14.08) the importance of the 57 communities
is sho\TO. 85.1 percent of Johnson's Democratic vote came from the 57 and
McCarthy received 79.8 percent of his total. 20.2 percent of McCarthy's total
was derived from other than the target cities and to^^s which raises several
interesting questions.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the respective campaigns an assessment
has to be made of the result as a product of the effort. It V70uld appear from
the results that as the campaign activity of the McCarthy organization decreased,
the percentage of McCarthy's vote increased. Wliere both campaigns concentrated
their efforts, in the cities and large toxins, McCarthy was the loser. The fal-
lacy 5.-1 this assessment is a presumption that both candidates started either at
zero or equal in their vote gathering appeal. Using this presumption one cam-
paign appears to be more successful than the other in attracting votes in compe-
titive situations. If this is so and the presumption is correct, then the
McCarthy campaign produced disproportionately to its effort. In those conmiu-
nities of low priority or without priority McCarthy did better than in those
communities of increasing priority.
623
TABLE I4.0;i: Target Co.nrnunU ion
,
2nd Congressional District, 1968 Presidential Primary
Z Z X z X PAPTTPT PAT! f^M
Community
LDJ LDJ
Total
He MC
Total
Conint
Total
Ai Ul III , V o c o o 1
lOL.ii Kcf, 1 s I rac ion
lot Total
Dem. Vote
Franklin +58.7 11.2 41.3 7.3 9.3 1 .OZ
Newport
(302) (213) (567^ (594)
0.9Z
+59.9 9.7 40. 1 6.0 7.8 1 S Q
Mllford
(260)
+62.0 9.1
(174)
38.0 5.1
(480)
7 .
2
mnn)
5 7 S
(^26)
0.8
Lebanon
(245) (150) V .J u / \ J J
)
(456)
0.9+51.2 9.3 48.7 8.2 8.3 1 n P
Gorhan
(250) (237) (509) (4908) (534)
.
48.7 7.1 +51.3 7.0 6.5 7s n n oU . O
Greenville
(190) (204) f 398') \ i O t H ) (4do )
0.638.5 3.7 +61 .
5
5.5 4 S
Ranover
(100) (160) (275) v,3ou)
15.0 3.2 +85.0 16.0 9.7 70 7 1 c\I . U
Northumberland
(86) (485) (596) ('2928')
+59.3 6.6 40. 7 4.2 5.8 31 1 U . o
Lincoln
(178) (122) (357) (1400)
48.3 3.3 +51.7 3.3 3.3
Jaf frey
(88) (94) (200) (731)
+51.1 4.4 48.9 4.0 4.2 13.5 U.J
Wilton
(119) (114) (254) (208'')
44.2 4.1 +55.8 4.7 4.4 24.4 U.J
Littleton
(110) (139) (265) (1219)
+59.7 4.8 40.3 3.0 3.9 9.8 U.J
(129) (87) (236) (2905) <'?RA)
Winchester +63.9 3.7 36.
1
1.8 2.7 15.6 0 1V.J
(99) (56) (166) (1253) n96)
Peterborough 42.3 3.5 +57 .7 4.4 4.
1
12.9 u
.
(93) (127) (247) (2079) f?68)
New Ipswich 40.0 1.8 +60.0 2.5 2.3 18.9 0.
1
(48) (72) (138) (778) fl47)
Lancaster 40.
1
2.2 +59.9 3.0 2.5 11.5 V/ • J
(59) (88) (158) (1688) (194)
Swanzey +54 .
5
2.9 45.5 2.2 2.5 9.2 0.2
(78) (65) (152) (1814) (166)
Ashland 41.2 1.6 +58.8 2.
1
2. 18.7 0.3
(42) (60) (125) (829) (155)
Troy 48.3 2.7 +51.7 2.7 2.6 23.0 0.3
(72) (77) (161) (739) (170)
Hinsdale 40.0 1.8 +60.0 2.5 2.0 11.7 0.3
(48) (73) (124) (1316) (154)
Andover 46.4 1.9 +53.6 2.1 2.2 19.4 0.2
(52) (60) (131) (758) (147)
Hillsborough 36.2 1.4 +63.8 2.3 2.1 9.2 0.2
(38) (67) (127) (1459) (134)
48,5% 100.0% 51.5%
(2686) (2851)
100.0% 100.0%
(6102)
16.0%
(42,713)
11. 3Z
(6,815)
Z Total
Vote LB
J
9.8Z
(27,520)
Z Total
Vote Kc
12.3%
(23,263)
Z Total Total Registered Dem. Total
Dem. Vote Voters Vote
IG.IZ 11.8% 100.0%
(60,519) (363,503) (60,519)
•f Denotes Winner
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The fallacy Is. of course, that the candidates did not start either at zero
or at equal shares. Tresident Johnson's share was considerably more than McCarthy's
share at the beginning. None of the foregoing data analysis of the returns pro-
duces an explanation of whether the campaigns were effective or why McCarthy
should draw increasingly from communities with larger numbers of Republicans.
Some subjective analysis has been provided based upon an understanding of the
political dynamics of the voting in some of these communities but other tests
seem to be required in order to test the relationships.
One attempt to find an explanation was undertaken by Robert Craig when he
developed a tabular analysis of vote return as related to the size of the voting
district. While a similar pattern of increasing McCarthy support with declining
vote district size is shovm (Table 14.09), the explanation does not go beyond
summarizing the data. The questions which need further study concern the rela-
tionship between community size or some characteristic related to size and the
vote percentages produced for the tv;o candidates. Secondly, it is important to
determine whether the respective campaigns had either a positive or negative
effect relative to the vote percentages produced for the respective candidates.
These quet^tions v^ill be explored subsequently, as will the assessment of where
the respective candidates stood relative to each other in the mind of the vot-
ing public at the beginning of the campaign.
Delegate and Alternate Delegate Selection
The second mark of electoral success in the New Hampshire presidential
primary comes from the tabulation of delegates and alternate delegates selected
to represent the parties and the candidates at the coming nominating convention.
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As will be recalled, the McCarthy campaign managers opted for the delegate fil-
ing control that a pledged slate offered. On the other hand the Johnson campaign
managers chose not to control delegate candidate filings. Because President
Johnson did not declare his candidacy in New Hampshire, his managers were limited
to the "favorable" delegate candidate option. Not wishing to create controversy
by selecting those who should file as Johnson delegate or alternate delegate can-
didates, an open filing season followed. The result was that in the First Con-
gressional District there were 27 delegate candidates listed as "favorable to
the nomination of Lyndon B. Johnson as President," 12 candidates for the 12 dele-
gate slots listed as "Pledged to the nomination of Eugene J. McCarthy as Presi-
dent," and one candidate listed as "favorable to the nomination of Robert F.
Kennedy." The total list of candidates was 40, with 12 to be selected.
The vote for First Congressional District delegates as shox-m by Table 14.08
reveals the success of the McCarthy strategy. \*Ihile Johnson defeated McCarthy
56.6 percent to 43.4 percent in the First District only three LBJ delegates were
elected. Two of the three were the most prominent Democratic officials in the
state, U.S. Senator Tom Mclntyre and Governor John W. King, and the third was
the Democratic Party chairman, William Craig. The vote for Johnson favorable
delegates vas concentrated on the two top Democratic Party elected officials
then widely scattered among the other candidate names. On the other hand, the
McCarthy vote was concentrated among the twelve with no McCarthy delegate candi-
date receiving less than 8,395 votes.
TABLK 14.10: ItFl.FCATE SFJ.ECTION. Int ConRveHflonnl District.
1968 Dcmociatlc Prculiitnt lal Prlmnry S
NAKZ AlleRlonce PL?.nCED
KAVOKAULE
Other
I . BeauvnlB McCarthy X
2. Blsnchard McCarthy X
3. Bouraaaa Reynolds X
4. Brecon LBJ X
S. Bunker LBJ X
6. Burke LBJ X
7. Cannell LBJ X
8. Carrier McCarthy X
9. Connor McCarthy X
10. Craig LBJ X
11. Daaals LBJ X
12. Devlne LBJ X
13. Dlsl-iman McCarthy X
14. Cupula LBJ X
15. Eckcr LSJ X
16. Farrell McCarthy X
17. Rail Kennedy X
18. Healy LBJ X
19. Holland McCarthy X
20. Kantercs LBJ X
21. Kelley LBJ X
22. King LBJ X
23. Lemleux LBJ
_
i
X
24^ Leslie LBJ X
25. HacLelLan McCarthy X
26. Kaicel, A LBJ X
27. Kartcl, L LBJ X
28. KcDonough LBJ X
29. McEachem McCarthy X
30. Mclntyro LBJ X
31. HcKay McCarthy X
32. Killlmet LBJ X
33. Morln McCarthy X
34. Mycro LBJ X
35. O'Calloghnn McCarthy X
36. Prcacon LBJ X
37. Quinit LBJ X
38. Qiiinney LBJ X
39c Rob* McCarthy X
40. £.ulllv«n LBJ . X
yOTK
8729+
6572
2110
8210
4336
6164
4420
8722+
6694
8888+
7550
7123
8395
7870
4603
8852
2159
6176
8716+
5807
5628
9630+
5970
4118
8694+
5554
7029
5745
8840+
10315+
8419
6626
8994+
S686
8675+
5374
7009
4440
8929+
7963
f Denotes Election
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Ay Table 14.10 suggests, residence and ethnic background, as revealed by q
surname, aided the McCarthy delegate candidates in their voter appeal. David
Morln, French-Canadian surnained, topped the McCarthy delegate list in spite of
the fact that he was not from Manchester. All of the McCarthy delegate candi-
dates from Manchester were elected as were the Irish surnamed delegate candidates
from outside that pivotal Democratic city. Surname and residence are important
vote attractors for the mostly anonymous names appearing on the McCarthy delegate
slate. The concentration of votes kept the pack of McCarthy delegates close to-
gether with the next closest Johnson delegate. State Senator Henry P. Sullivan
of Manchester, placing 16th with a vote A30 less than the 15th place McCarthy
delegate, Professor Robert Dishman of Durham.
Delegate voting in the Second Congressional District followed a similar
pattern as that in the First. The concentrated McCarthy vote elected eleven of
the twelve delegate candidates V7ith only the Johnson campaign manager and former
gubernatorial candidate, Bernard L. Boutin, bucking the trend. There v;ere no
other Johnson delegate candidates of the prominence of Boutin or with other than
localized appeal. It was a contest between relatively anonymous Johnson candi-
dates against similar McCarthy candidates. (Table 14.12)
Although the number of Johnson delegate candidates was less by 8 candidates
than that In the First Congressional District (total 19) the preferential vote
In the Second Congressional District was almost even — McCarthy 49.2 percent to
Johnson's 50.8 percent. McCarthy voters concentrated their delegate voting while
the list of 19 candidates dispersed the Johnson delegate vote sufficiently to
eliminate all but one of their delegate candidates.
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TABLE lA.ll: Delegate Selection, 1st CD. Elected
Delegate Vote, 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary^
Name
1) Mclntyre (senator)*
2) King (Governor)
3) Morin
A) Ross
5) Craig
6) Farrell
7) McEachern.
8) Beauvais
9) Carrier
10) Holland
11) MacLellan
12) O'Callaghan
13) Blanchard
U) McKay
15) Dishman
16) Sullivan
Candidate
Residence Allegiance Vote
Laconia LBJ 10,315
Manchester LBJ 9,630
Hampton McCarthy 8,994
Manchester McCarthy 8,929
Manchester LBJ 8,888
Manchester McCarthy 8,852
Portsmouth McCarthy 8,840
Manchester McCarthy 8,729
Manchester McCarthy 8,722
Bedford McCarthy 8,716
Manchester McCarthy 8,694
Laconia McCarthy 8,675
Portsmouth McCarthy 8,572
Hudson McCarthy 8,419
Durham McCarthy 8,395
Manchester LBJ 7,965
* 12 To Be Elected
Results: 3 LBJ, ( McCarthy Delegates Elected
'ABLE 1A.12: DILFCATE SK.1.F.CT10N. 2nd CongrcoBlonal Dlotrict. 1968 ITcBldmtl.l
PrJaary
NAME
Candidate
Allcplancc Pledged
Favorable,
vote
1) Bouchard McCarthy • X
2) Boutin UU T /•IX li"
3) Brvnmer LBJ
4) Burelle Kennedy TA X 1 1
U
5) Coutermfirsb LBJ
6) Sanlell McCarthy X 7^22+
7) Daoust LBJ 5372
8) Dion LEJ 5584
9) Farley LBJ 5219
10) Elliot LBJ 4607
11) GrandmalEon LBJ 5075
12) BacV.ett LBJ 4S98
13) HUl LBJ 5083
lit) Hoeh, D. McCarthy X 6967->'
15) Kennedy McCarthy X 7555+
16) I^fiiDontagne LBJ 5833
17) Leonard LBJ 5176
18) Marrow . McCarthy X 6952+
19) Kartell LBJ 5197
20) Meloney McCarthy X 7108+
21) Morin LBJ 5221
22) Mlms LBJ 4641
23) Oleson McCarthy X 7240+
2«) Proulx McCarthy X 6905+
25) Shea LBJ X 5383
26) Spanos LEJ X 4893
27) Studds McCarthy X 6895+
26) Underwood McCarthy X 6768
29) VallLcr LBJ X 5444
30) Wall In McCarthy X 7108+
31) Whclton McCarthy X 7033+
32) Vlnn LBJ X 6366
4- Denotes Election
Sourrr! N. H. Munual for the
General Court 1969 No. 41
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As Table 14.13 shows, the combination of French-Canadian surname and Nashua
residence was the most powerful at tractor of votes. Secondly, French-Canadian
or Irish surname was the second most powerful attractor, with the third being a
measure of prominence either produced by the campaign or derived previous to the
campaign. Bouchard was then a Nashua alderman; Daniell a previous congressional
candidate in the district; Oleson was a popular state representative and Wallin
was a prominent Nashua state representative. Only the perception of Concord as
a Yankee Republican city appears to have handicapped the vote gathering of Studds,
who was elected, and Dr. David Unden-.'ood who was not. The next highest Johnson
candidate was Miss Cecilia Winn, a prominent Nashua civic leader and long-time
Democratic Party loyalist.
Alternat e Delegate Selection
Only for the afficionados of politics does reaching for the essence of an
election extend beyond the selection of delegates to the selection of alternate
delegates. But when the fate of a presidency is involved in the reading of the
electoral evidence, alternate delegate selection gains considerably in importance.
For the First Congressional District the combination of overfiled delegate
candidates and dispersed vote that elected nine delegates for McCarthy when he
received only 43.4 percent of the vote did not hold up for the selection of
alternate delegates. There were a total of 27 candidates filed: 12 McCarthy,
13 Johnson and 2 undesignated. (Table 14.14).
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TABLE 14.13: DELEGATE SELECTION, 2nd CD. Elected Delegate Vote,
1968 Democratic Presidential PrimaryU
Name Residence Candidate Allegiance Vote
1) Bouchard* Nasliua McCarthy 7684
2) Kennedy Keene McCarthy 7555
3) Boutin Nashua LBJ 7421
4) Daniell Franklin McCarthy 7322
5) Oleson Gorham McCarthy 7240
6) Wallin Nashua McCarthy 7108
7) Meloney Clareniont McCarthy 7108
8) Whelton Nashua McCarthy 7033
9) Hoch, D. Hanover McCarthy 6967
10) Marrow Chesterfield McCarthy 6952
11) Proulx Ashland McCarthy 6905
12) Studds Concord McCarthy 6895
13) Underwood Concord McCarthy 6768
14) Winjn Nashua LBJ 6366
* 12 to be Elected
Results: 1 LBJ, 11 McCarthy Delegates Elected
TABLE 14.14: alternate delegate selection. Ist Congressional District,
1968 Democratic Presidential Primary
Name
Candidate
Allegiance Pledged Other Vote
1) Abbot Jr. LBJ DATA
2) Barnard McCarthy X 0/7 J
3) Bcaiilieu T 1030
4) Belair LBJ 0 / 0j+
5) Bergeron LBJ
6) Chaplain McCarthy X 7QQQ
7) Cleveland McCarthy X / Dy 1
8) DesJardin, G. McCarthy X
9) DesJardins.H. LBJ O / (JOT
10) Eshoo McCarthy X
11) Rowland X
12) LaCrolx LBJ 9146+
13) LaFleur LBJ 9336+
lA) Laplante McCarther X 8274
15) Levest^ue LBJ 9293^
16) Nardi I.BJ 8450
17) Kontiandin LBJ 908^
18) O'Callaghan McCarthy X 8183
19) Onlgman McCarthy X 7770
20) Preston LBJ 9476
21) Ralche LBJ X 9579+
^i) Sanders, Jr. TUT
23) Simpson McCarthy X 8170
2A) Spalding McCarthy X 7767
25) Tobln LBJ X 9881+
26) Wesiton McCarthy X 7982
27) Windhausen McCarthy X 7853
+ Dcnoten Election
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As Table U
. 15 ^hows the Johnson vote concentrated, as had the McCarthy vote
for delegates. The combination of Manchester residence, Irish, or French-
Canadian surname, assured election of the Johnson list with the exception of the
Yankee-surnanied Ray Abbott Jr. of rural Jackson. The only McCarthy candidate to
slip to election was the French-Canadian surnamed Gertrude DesJardin of Manches-
ter. Robert Preston, a former State Senator, placed high in the voting by the
chance of having his name at the top of the alternate delegate ballot.
If the Johnson campaign leaders had exerted control over delegate candidate
filings to produce a list which more closely matched the candidates with the
slots available, the delegate election, probably would have patterned that for
alternate delegates. The fact that the Johnson candidates carried all but one
of the alternate delegate seats in the First Congressional District was lost in
the amazement produced from the election of the nine McCarthy delegates.
The alternate delegate filing for the Second Congressional District slots
matched the number of seats; 2A total candidates, 12 pledged to McCarthy, 12
favorable to Johnson. While the preference vote was almost equal between McCarthy
and Johnson the alternate delegate \oting elected 9 McCarthy candidates to 3
Johnson candidates. As Table 14.16 displays, the voting clustered with only one
candidate, John McCarthy, above 7,000 votes and the Hanover resident, Robert
Guest, trailing as number 24 with 6,247.
As Table 14.17 suggests, a Nashua residence attracted votes as did the one
surname popular to New Hampshire Democrats. John McCarthy, a political unknown
from a northern towii near Berlin topped the voting followed by the former chair-
man of the Hillsborough County Democratic Party, LBJ favorable, Robert Philbrick
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14.15: Alternate Delegate Selection, 1st CD., Elected
Alternate Delegate Vote, 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary
Name Residence
Candidate
Allegiance Vote
1) Tobin* Manchester LBJ 9881
2) Bergeron Manchester LBJ 9607
3) Raiche Manchester LBJ 9579
A) Preston Hampton LBJ 9476
5) LaFleur Manchester LBJ 9336
6) Levesque Rochester LBJ 9293
^
7) LaCrois Rochester LBJ 91A6
8( Normandin Laconia LBJ 9089
9) Belair Salem LBJ 8763
10) DesJardins, H. Rollinsford LBJ 8708
11) DesJardin, G.
. Manchester McCarthy 8617
12) Sanders, Jr. Hampton LBJ 8552
13) Abbot Jr. Jackson LBJ 8476
IM Narci i Manchester LBJ 8450
15) Barnard Gof fstown McCarthy 8295
* 12 To Be Elected
Result: 11 LBJ, 1 McCarthy Alt. Del. Elected
TABLE 14.16: Alternate Delegate Selection, 2nd CD.,
1968 Presidential Primary 1*^
Name
Candidate
Allegiance Pledged
rcivorciDj.e
Other Vote
1) Boggis McCarthy X 6861+
2) Bunce LBJ X 6329
3) Coniaris McCarthy X 64A2
^) EberharC McCarthy X 6A51+
5) Fairbanks LBJ X 6346
6) Gallen LBJ X 637A
7) Guest LBJ X 6247
8) Harrison LBJ X 6286
9) Hennessey LBJ X 6425
10) Hoeh, S. McCarthy X 6482+
11) Makriu LBJ X 6687+
12) McCarthy McCarthy X 7027+
13) Morse McCarthy X 6461+
1^) Philbrick LBJ X 6862+
15) Richardson McCarthy X 6462+
16) Sapc io t es LBJ X 6371
17) Sheridan McCarthy X 6447
18) Short 1 id ge, Jr. LBJ X 6433
19) Stanley McCarthy X 6768f
20) Sterling LBJ X 6424
21) Taylor McCarthy X 6725+
22) Torrey McCarthy X 6387
23) Wood McCarthy X 6568+
2/0 York LBJ • X 6569+
+r)rMinrr>R F.I or t Ion
TABLE 14.17;
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Altcrnnte Delegate Selection, 2nd CD. Elected
Alternate Delegate Vote. 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary^^
Name Residence
Candidate
Allegiance Vote
1) McCarthy* Gorham
1 juv^a r L iiy 7027
2) Philbrick Milford LBJ 6862
3) Boggis Nashua Mr P:^ r f Viv* iL-o CI 1. L. 1 1 y 6861
4) Stanley Nashua
6768
5) Taylor Nashua
6725
6) Mokris Nashua LBJ 6687
7) York Concord LBJ 6369
8) Wood Keeno li^—V-^di. Lily 6568
J J nut- n y L> • Hanover McCarthy 6A82
.0) Richardson Fitzwilliara McCarthy 6462
. 1) Morse Nashua McCarthy 6461
2) Eberhart Concord McCarthy 6451
3) Sheridan Concord McCarthy 6447
4) Coniaris Hoilis McCarthy 6442
* 12 to be Elected
Result: 3 LBJ, 9 McCarthy Alt. Del. Elected
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of Milford. The other two Johnson favorable alternates to be elected were Harry
Makris, a fonder Nashua state representative, and Edward York, a long-time state
representative frora Concord's only Democratic ward, Penacook. The remaining
alternate delegate candidates elected as pledged to McCarthy were facing their
first electoral experience as political unknowns.
The result supports the notion that a McCarthy voter backed McCarthy with
sufficient intensity to carry that support through the list of alternate dele-
gate candidates. That intensity was at least sufficient to cast those few addi-
tional votes to elect McCarthy alternates over Johnson alternates in a tv;o to
one ratio. Without either strong residence or ethnic attractors to distort the
voting, the notation of candidate support was sufficient to concentrate the
McCarthy vote once more in the election.
In summary the effectiveness of the McCarthy delegate strategy cannot be
over-emphasized. 20 of 24 potential delegates were elected pledged to the nomi-
nation of Eugene J. McCarthy and 10 of the potential alternate delegate candi-
dates were also elected pledged to McCarthy's nomination. Not only had McCarthy
done unexpectedly well in the preference portion of the ballot, but he had sur-
prised all observers by actually translating his support into delegate strength
— strength that would control a state's convention delegation and elect McCarth}'^
delegates and the next Democratic National Committeeman and Committeewoman.
Wlien this additional success was combined with McCarthy's unexpected strength
as a Democrat and surprise support among Republicans, the picture was one of
total victory for McCarthy in New Hampshire. That was the message that eminated
frora New Hampshire the evening of March 12th and in the days following the elec-
tion as the final details of the voting were compiled.
639
Who Voted and V.'hy
One political ccientist, Robert E. Craig, examined the data gathered
through a commercial survey sponsored by the American Broadcasting Company. The
survey was conducted by Audits and Surveys. Inc., New York, N.Y., with the con-
sultation of the Survey Research Center, Political Behavior Section, of the Uni-
versity of Michigan. The ABC survey, Craig reported, was conducted in two parts,
the first during the week of February 12, 1968 and totaling 581 respondents, and
the second during the week of February 19, 1968 and consisting of 562 respondents.
For the purpose of his analysis Craig combined both samples and then sought
to duplicate, whenever possible, the approach and measures used by the major vot-
ing studies, principally The American Voter, and measures which represent vari-
ables found to be Influential on voter choice in other non-party competitive
elections. He then also examined long-term influences on voting behavior such
as party identification and ethnic background as well as short-term influences
such as issues and candidate evaluation. He sought to determine the relative
Importance of these proximate forces in determining candidate choice when party
labels arc the same. As the conclusion of his analysis he assessed the overall
relative importance of influential factors in the psychology voting for a Presi-
dential primary election. '•^
The first part of Craig's analysis v;as to examine some seventeen social
and ecoiioEiic factors which had been measured in connection with candidate pre-
ference. He found that less than half were in any way related to candidate
preference and of the half these were only moderately related.
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Subjective social closs Identification, age. marital status,
number of dependent children, occupation, number of years
spent outside New Hampshire, education and family Income
were weakly related to candidate preference.
'
Size cf place of residence, type of occupation (white collar/
blue collar), place of birth, race, sex, membership in labor
unions and religion, were all insignificant factors in the
preference of Democrats for cither McCarthy or Johnson. 18
Craig concluded that the "generally weak relationships" of the social and economic
measures as related to candidate support meant that social explanations of the re-
sults were "not sufficient." Craig went on to note however, that this did not
mean that these factors played no part at all in an explanation of the phenomenon
of the McCarthy insurgency. The unique character of the social base of McCarthy
support v;as revealed in the close examination of the relationships of socio-
economic factors and candidate preference . 19
The pattern of socio-economic support for McCarthy has two
clear features, mille the first conclusion about McCarthy
support must be that it did not come exclusively from any
one group in the population of Democrats, the second con-
clusion is that some groups did respond to McCarthy's candi-
dacy more than others and that these groups tended to be at
opposite ends of the social and economic dimensions which
v/e normally use to analyze social and political phenomena. 20
Consequently, Craig concluded that McCarthy's support came from many groups
not from any one. group's disenchantment with President Johnson. The insurgency,
therefore, came from "widespread social disenchantment with the course of
government," Craig concluded.
Picking apart this conclusion Craig found first that McCarthy attracted in-
creased support froai "both older and younger groups" while those of the "middle
age group" heavily supported Johnson. The same division Craig found when he
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examined education as related to candidate preference.
-Those Democrats with
high school diplomas tended to prefer Johnson much more than those with less than
high school education or those with more than high school education. "21
A similar finding came when Craig examined for income and occupation rela-
tionships. The upper incomed, professional and technical occupations and the
unskilled, blue collar workers tended to support McCarthy more heavily than did
other occupational and income groupings. 22
When Craig collapsed the income range the difference vanished, which he
noted demonstrated the "crucial x-^ature of the categorization in observing rela-
tionships." To an extent he experienced the same problem when he sorted his
occupational groupings. The class distinction was less clear when occupations
were clustered by whether or not they are self employed. The analysis did show
that McCarthy attracted support "despite wide differences in occupational status
and work experiences. "23
Marital status produced a strange mixture of support for the candidates ac-
cording to Craig. "Those who were single, married with one child, or never mar-
ried i'nd with one or two cliildren, tended to support McCarthy more than others."
The analysis profiles what Craig defined as a "coalition of unlikely colleagues."
Examining "residential mobility" Craig found that McCarthy drew his sup-
port more heavily from those v;ho were recent residents of other states and those
who had lived in other states one, three, or six years. When he examined the
"subjective social class" data he found another mixed pattern but one which
tended to support the overall conclusion that McCarthy drew more heavily from
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those worklng.-class identifiers than from the middle-class identifiers. When
Craie sorted for strength of identification he found that McCarthy's support
came from "those vho were strong middle-class identifiers and working-class
identifiers, weak or strong, but more likely from weak. "25
Concluding his socio-economic analysis Craig summarized that while such
factors did not explain candidate support they did produce interesting observa-
tions. "McCarthy support was not isolated among only a few segments of the
social groupings of Democrats, but rather drew some strength from almost all
social groupings." At the same time Craig noted that McCarthy's support was
strongest among "unlikely electoral colleagues" — the richer and the poorer,
the most educated and less educated, the older and the younger, the highly
skilled and the unskilled, the middle-class identifiers and working-class iden-
tifiers. This was the social base of the McCarthy candidacy. 26
Reaching for other explanations of the result, Craig searched the politi-
cal background of what he labelled the "protest."
Psychological political background factors include partisan
attachment, feelings of political efficacy, habits of inte-
rest, information and participation, and positions on gene-
ralized issues of domestic politics which appear to be an
enduring part of American electoral competition. 27
These political background factors were more directly political in content than
the socio-economic factors and yet, as Craig noted, "are not particularly cam-
paign objects and, as such, are factors which might play a prior role in influenc-
ing voters' choices between candidates." For two party confrontations Craig said
the political background factors arc "indirectly influential as screening devices
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for incominc Information." In this way he suegested they help indirectly to
influence the ultimate direction of the vote as well as the decision whether or
not to actually vote. The factor which usually serves as a "major referent"
for the voter is party identification, Craig noted. 28
His analysis of the New Hampshire presidential primary of 1968 found that
these factors d_id not serve as major reference points for the voters' decisions.
At the same time, Craig found that these factors were significant influences on
candidate preference and that an "interesting pattern of such influences emerged. "2
His study showed that while party identification as such had not a "major refe-
rent for all vote decisions," he found that Democrats with weaker attachments
to the Democratic party were more likely than strong Democrats to support
McCarthy in his challenge to the Democratic President.
A Democrat's view of the efficacy of political activity which was less, or
one with less political information, or one who participated less in primary
voting tended to prefer McCarthy over those "who were uiore efficacious, partici-
patory, or knowledgeable." At the same time, Craig found that liberals split
their vote between the two candidates, as did conservatives, except that the
more educated liberals tended to support McCarthy much more than less educated
liberals. Craig described the McCarthy Democrat as a "sort of political under-
class." \{hat he then found was that those who supported McCarthy came from
opposite poles of various social and economic stratification measures. The "lower
efficacy blue-collar workers and higher efficacy white-collar workers, lower in-
come, weaker Democrats and higher income weaker Democrats, highly educated libe-
rals and not very educated conservatives, all showed Increased tendencies to
support McCarthy. Craig concluded that these "disparate groups" produced a
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coalition which had a "ba.e in so^e sort of political underclass but which was
Joined by what can only be called part of the old Dcunocratic elite structure."
Craig concluded that no background factor of a psychologically and politically
enduring character served to orient all individual voters to the objects of the
campaign in the way that partisan identification does in two party competitive
campaigns. Without this factor Craig notes that the "less permanent objects of
the campaign itself" are left to explain the major portion of the voting deci-
sion, 31
The voting decision for McCarthy from the standpoint of what Craig called
a "social movement" was founded on a "political and psychological underclass"
which he saw as reacting favorably to McCarthy as "the underdog." This "under-
class" as Craig called it, was joined by some members of the politically domi-
nant class, and this "coalition of under- and upper-class Democrats was a hall-
raark. of the McCarthy, coalition." A hallmark that also had socio-economic links
as well in Craig's analysis. ^
2
Developing this conclusion Craig controlled his data to search for rela-
tionships that might reveal the actual dimensions of the McCarthy coalition.
As he noted from his review of the voting research literature:
If early voting research v;as dominated by a search for
social causes of voting behavior, more recent research
has been dominated by a psychological approach to the
same behavior. And, at the heart of the psychological
approach to voting behavior lies the concept of party
identification. -^3
Since party identification in a primary election can at the best be considered
only as an indirect factor influencing the formation of a voter's decision,
645
Cral, conciudcd. It night ca.lly b. neglected in a search for voting behavior
explanations. Instead of skipping the factor. Craig controlled his data care-
fully to sketch the possible relationships that .ight exist. Again, the unusual
coalition that Craig was finding as the basis of McCarthy's New Hampshire sup-
port, demanded that he not overlook any possible explanations.
Using his first finding, that weak Democratic Party identifiers were more
likely to support McCarthy than strong Democrats, and that strong Democrats
overwhelmingly support Johnson, he went on to control for significant socio-
economic factors. He found that strong partisanship was enough to outweigh
residential mobility as a candidate preference factor. McCarthy's support came
from those with "less residential permanence" and a "weaker" sense of "partisan-
ship," while Johnson's support was the reverse. Craig found similar phenomenon
when controlling for occupational type. "Strong partisanship erased differences
of support between white and blue collar workers." He found that blue collar
Independent Democrats were more likely than white collar workers who were Inde-
pendent Democrats, to support McCarthy. The relationship was less clear with
what Craig labelled as "weak Democrats . "3^^ The phenomenon of "sccial opposites"
being attracted to McCarthy was revealed again in the occupational analysis.
When controlling for income Craig found a different condition. Lower income,
less partisan Democrats tended to prefer McCarthy more than the upper income,
less partisan Dcraocryts. Among the stronger Democrats Craig found that those of
moderate income preferred McCarthy "more than those of lower or higher income
levels." The spread favored the conclusion that weaker feelings of attachment
to the Democratic Party produced the coalition of "dissimilar socio-economic
groupings."
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Using a "Domeatir J'^supc^ Tnrlo^^" t-^ i
^ "''^ ^''"^'^^'^ ^'^"1^ respondents according to a seven
point scale ranging fro. "strong liberal" to
-strong conservative," Craig sought
to reach beyond the en.otional attachment to a political party that voters .ay
reflect to o ".ore broadly cognitive meaning." He found that the voters did
use their opinions on the questions that composed the cognitive scale to diffe-
rentiate between the candidates; although, as he noted, "not in any overwhelming
V7ay." The responses showed that the more "liberal" tended to prefer McCarthy
than did the more "conservative." The "strongly liberal," he found, "preferred
McCarthy less than did the "moderately liberal," and that the "weakly liberal-
group showed the strongest preference for McCarthy of all the groups. Wat re-
mained significant as in other evaluations. McCarthy drew some support from
among all groups - even the conservatives. Something that apparently sur-
prised Craig. 35
To Craig the use of educational levels clarified the relationship between
domestic issues and candidate preference. He found McCarthy's strongest sup-
port coming from liberals with "some college education and consistently signi-
ficant support among non-high school graduates, regardless of their position
on the liberal-conservative index.- Johnson, on the other hand, derived his
support from those with high school diplomas, regardless of their position on
domestic issues. CraJg found that the ability to differentiate between issues
and the candidates and to relate these voting decisions was constant. Those
with no high school diplomas supporting McCarthy and those high school graduates
supporting Johnson remained consistent regardless of their domestic issues
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pc.itlons. Beth croup. lalled to ai££e.e„tl„te between the two candidate, on
the srcund. of their dc.eatie issue positions, of this group those with a high
school diploma tended to support Johnson while those without shifted toward
McCarthy . 36
Examining further, Craig controlled for voter attitudes toward the effi-
cacy of political participation and candidate preference. To develop the rela-
tionship Craig created a "Political Efficacy Index" which scaled responses fro.
"Low Efficacy," in nine levels to "High Efficacy." Again the analysis produced
the "strange mixture" of those sensing "fairly high" value in political activity
and those sensing "nodorate" and "low efficacy" were the McCarthy supporters.
The middle levels and the ambivalent level favored President Johnson. 37
Controlling for social class identification, the relationships shown
earlier were repeated. McCarthy retained support among working-class identifiers
who sensed lower feelings toward the efficacy of political activity. This led
Craig to conclude that "McCarthy's candidacy represented those who felt left out
of the political system, either through representation or reward." Craig found
that the support for McCarthy was the highest when "low income and lower effi-
cacy converged. "-^^
The relationship between socio-economic status, sense of political efficacy,
and support for McCarthy remained constant across the analysis Craig developed
of factors such as employment status, income and education. The disaffected
by social circumstance tended to be higher in their support of McCarthy than
those whose sense of political efficacy was higher along with their socio-
economic status.
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In l,t. atuc.„„t to rol.tc the Democratic prclcrenco to ethnic background,
Crnlu tcond that McCarthy's support Increased a„,ons the Canadian born, lower
efficacy. Democrats, but a.aone the non-Canada, forel,n-born. he found aU.ost no
support lor McCarthy "except a,nonc the lowest efficacy sroup." There he found
support to bo "overwhelminji (77. 2%). "39
Craig's analysis of the religious backgrounds of the voters found that
concerning a sense of political efficacy Protestants were more likely to sup-
port McCarthy than Catholics except in the lower efficacy scales where a rela-
tionship between Catholics and candidate support was shown. ^0 Although McCarthy
was a Catholic it did not seem to lessen his appeal to Protestants or increase
bis appeal to Catholics. Religion was not a factor in the campaign.
Crai,- measured for levels of interest in the primary and knowledge about
the primary as a way of further exploring this aspect of efficacy in the voter's
preference decision. He found that tendencies to support McCarthy increased with
jjess interest in the primary ami. with .lower efficacy ratings. He found that a
similar relationship developed when he controlled for "knowledge as to when the
prima y would be held." As for participation, Democrats who reported less pre-
vious participation more consistently supported McCarthy.
The conclusions which Craig developed from the efficacy analysis showed
that McCarthy served to unite Democrats who were less attached to the Democratic
Party, were lower in feelings of efficacy about their involvement in politics,
had less specific knowledge about this primary, and who had less previous ex-
perience in participating in this kind of election. At the same time Craig
found that "these Democrats were joined by others who were very unlike the
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first £«up...." Those „.re the ^.^t highly educot.d and polltlcnlly c££lcaclc.us
Democrats who were dra,™ together by the McCarthy candidacy. Democrats who
ordinarily would be found 1„ opposing camps, separated by their "very different
longer-range view of polities and their own political and social experiences
.
To relate political opinions to the voters' candidate preference. Craig used
data produced from the survey where the respondents were asked to identify three
issues on which they thought the government should take action. The highest re-
sponded issues were:
1. Ending the war in Vietnam (7354)
2. Racial problems (1747)
3. Crime (1348)
4. Inflation (906)
5. High taxes (874)
6. Unemployment (190)
The spread between the first issue and the second was so great that Craig con-
cluded that Vietnam was the dominant issue of the campaign. \^hen testing the
relationship between "awareness" and "importance" Craig found that Vietnam was
held by most (6950) respondents to be "extremely" important with 8535 responses
which identified the Vietnam issues as either "extremely" or "very" important
while, at the same time, he found that fev/ of the respondents were willing to
class any of the issues as "completely unimportant. "'^2
Sorting through the issues as related to candidate preference Craig found
that those who thought it was a mistake getting involved in Vietnam tended to
support McCarthy. The "pull out" voters supported McCarthy while the "try to
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end U,.e fi.htin," and the "Btrongor stand" voters tended to support Johnson.
As the voter tended to .ore "hawkishness" Craig found they became less supportive
of the President, criticizing him for not being :.ore "hawkish.- Craig concluded
that "approval" or "disapproval" of the way Johnson was handling the war was more
important than the respective voter's specific policy toward the war in Vietnam.
To examine more closely the relationship between "Hawk" and "Dove" opinions,
Craig created a "Dove" index and tested the index against background factors and
candidate preference. Background factors helped explain partially the "Hawk"
support for McCarthy and the "Dove" support for Johnson but not entirely, as
Craig noted. Younger Democrats, the least educated, with leas political expe-
rience, and lower efficacy feelings profiled those "Hawks" who tended to support
McCarthy. The same profile of "Doves" produced a mixed result. Craig concluded
that the critical measure was "lack of knowledge" about the primary which in-
creased McCarthy's support among both "Hawks" and "Doves. "^3 ^his , he noted,
partly explained the relationship between low education and McCarthy support.
Craig discarded civil rights opinions as having little relationship to can-
didate preference but found that two other issues, credibility and the current fi
nancial satisfaction of the voter, v-ere factors. Especially after the Tet Offen-
sive in Vietnam, voters' support for McCarthy increased as their sense of the
believability of the Johnson administration declined. Those less satisfied with
their financial situation tended to support McCarthy v;hile those "pretty well"
satisfied leaned toward Johnson. '^^ Regardless of their view of the Vietnam situa
tion, Craig found that those least satisfied with their financial situation
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supported HcCarchy. The x-evcrse was the ease with those of higher financial
satisfaction, belief in the administration, and war policy approval. A dis-
satisfied and skeptical "Hawk" tended to support McCarthy, revealing the dis-
satisfaction and skepticism as dominant over that voter's war view/*5
Party images and candidate images are related to candidate preference in
two-party contests as the A^erl^ Voter studies revealed. Craig found that a
similar relationship occurred in the New Hampshire presidential primary. His
analysis showed that as important as the voter's perception of the candidates,
perceptions of the Democratic Party were as important if the credibility of the
incumbent Democratic administration was included in the party image measures.
The anti-Democratic Party voters tended to support McCarthy while the pro-party
Democrats leaned toward Johnson. But Craig also found that neither candidate
was overwhelmingly embraced or rejected by the Democratic electorate. As for
candidate image, the more favorable the image of the candidate in the mind of
the voter the more likely that voter was to vote for that candidate, a factor
that Craig found to be "slightly more pov/erful in explaining voter preference
than party image. "'^^
Craig concluded his analysis of candidate images, party images, and candi-
date preference by noting:
Voters' images of the two candidates and their images of
the credibility and efficacy of the Democratic party were
both major influences on candidate preference in the New
Hanipshire Presidential primary of 1968.
Voters who favorably evaluated either candidate, relative
to the other, were very likely to prefer that candidate.
At the same time, voters who saw the Democratic party as
credible, as represented by the incumbent administration,
and efficacious, in terms of future prosperity and the
avoidance of larger wars, were much more likely to prefer
President Johnson than were those voters whose opinions
did not favor the Democratic party in these areas.
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In ccneral, then, candidate images and party images at
P r::crir::his'^^:'
^^^^ influentia/m^^fSdld: epreic tn c in this primary as they appear to have beenIn two-party election contests in the past. Opinions onVietnam wore also important influences" but less thanparty or candidate images. 47
Cralg then examined
"Candidate-Issue Proximity, party images, candidate
Images, opinions, and candidate preference." ;vi.lle he felt the effort was "less
than a total success," he did find it to bo the "most powerful variable" he had
found "explaining candidate preference ."^8 The question used to represent the
variable was "Which of the candidates can best handle this issue?" Kn.ile Craig
did see the proximity of the voter to the candidate as being an important eva-
luator of the result he did feel that its status as a measure was "unclear"
because it "measured many things at once but not clearly." The power of the
measure seemed to come from the fact that it combined other individual measures
into one index which was found to have a higher value than any of the single
measures he examined. He then had to condition his conclusion by stating that
"other major factors continued to exert influence on candidate choice, altering
the effect of candidate-issue proximity on candidate preference. "A9 This latter
conclusion noted that "llawk-Dove" opinion, credibility, and handling of the war
"continued to influence candidate preference," and with about the same power ob-
served prior to Craig's use of the candidate-issue proximity measure. These
Ihl^ factors , Hawk-Dove opinion, credibility, and handling of the war, must,
therefore
,
be considered the important concerns of the New Hampshire voter in
12^1^' Millie the sum of the issues analyzed by Craig may be slightly more power-
ful than the three individual factors as an explanation of the vote, it is the
three factors that seem to relate most closely to the pattern of the campaign
and the reason why McCarthy, and the campaign's strategy succeeded.
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Cralfi concluded his analysis of the primary voting behavior by noting that
-voters' decisions... were influenced by evaluations of the candidates, largely
m personal ter..s. short and long-range opinions on the Vietna. war, and evalua-
tions of the current and future prefot^ance of the Democratic party." He noted
that the "order" of the above is about correct but that the "evaluation of the
Democratic party" was about "equal in power" to the "effect of the Vletnana war
Issues on candidate preference."50 ^he voter in the primary "behaved rationally
accordins to their values and their information and understanding to that point."
"To this extent." Craig concluded, "the results of the New Hampshire Presiden-
tial primary of 1968 did not undermine belief in the rationality of the American
voter but reinforced such a belief. "^1
The one factor that Craig's analysis and the data he used did not account
for was the role of the non-Democratic party adherent - especially the Indepen-
dent voter. Without the Independents joining the election In significant numbers
the result would have been as Craig's data revealed. Approximately three voters
to one would have voted for Johnson over McCarthy. This would have produced a
victory for Johnson comparable to that which his supporters had predicted during
most of the campaign.
The Polls
Polling is an important part of most political contests and especially pre-
sidential campaigns. Host potential candidates make their plans many months be-
fore the beginning of the presidential campaign season. Part of this planning
is an activity known as "testing the water" — an activity which is divided
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between public and private actinnQ •n,^ v-i j
.
\ c o s. Ihe public actions are usually visits to
a state, meetings with important officials, and overtures designed to stimulate
electorate interest. The private actions occur below the surface through polls,
selection of voter targets, and determining probable campaign issue content.
The New Hampshire McCarthy campaign did not have the resources or the time
to pre-plan the campaign. There were no polls for the candidate, no issue ex-
periments, or even much other "water-testing. " There was a perceived vacuum;
there were issues that were not being addressed, and there was a candidate
willing to respond. The campaign planning and management had to rest on the
instincts cf the candidate and the experience of its principal managers. All
else resembled tinkering with a watch, to m^ke it run a bit more accurately.
Although there were public opinion probes that evolved out of the McCarthy
campaign (such as canvassing, Dr. Al Shepard's motivational research, rumors of
the results of polls taken by other candidates, and polls taken by academics,
and the networks) a complete survey was not available to the McCarthy managers.
In this section several polls, taken during the campaign, will be examined.
Two questions seem most intriguing since all of the polls missed the final re-
sult by a considerable margin. The first is whether the polls did contain an
inkling of the result and the analysis failed to bring that result to the sur-
face. The second concerns the adequacy of the survey either as to the questions
asked or the sample used for the assessment.
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^i?f_£Iii^_A9.rv^ys roll Commission ed by ABC Ncvb
.
This survey Is the same as that used by Robert E. Craig in his analysis of
voting behavior in the New Hampshire primary. The principal criticism concerns
the sample universe. As a descriptor of the electorate and as a basis for ana-
lysis the survey appears thorough. The election result and the attitudes which
the survey detected show the Democratic vote in the primary to be a product of
a number of interacting events and attitudes. \^en taken together the result
was a picture of a voting community making rational decisions. These vote
decisions were based upon a perception of events, candidates, party image,
and information received. If the survey had been available prior to the elec-
tion and had been analyzed properly it would have helped refine the McCarthy
campaign strategy.
The survey failed in its capacity to predict a relative final position
for the principal Democratic candidates. It failed because it did not evaluate
the attitudes of those not registered as Democrats. Wliat attracted Independents
to vote was an aspect of the 1968 primary that was not probed nor its importance
appreciated until after the votes had been counted. A profile of the Indepen-
dent voter, an asse^sraent of what might or might not prompt voting would have
been an Important descriptor for campaign planning and for post-election voter
analysis.
Unlveri;ity of Ncw Hampshire Survey
.
A political science class at the University of New Hampshire conducted an
early survey to assess issue opinions and voter candidate preference. The
survey Included a sample drawn from the registered Independents as well as the
registered Democrats and Republicans. Taken January 5, 1968, the survey pre-
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ceded the public announcement of McCarthy's New Hampshire candidacy and reflect
opinions set at a time when McCarthy's candidacy in New Hampshire was seriously
m doubt. The findings of this survey are instructive although limited in
sample size and. to some extent, in its interpretation.
IVo assumptions had been made by the New Hampshire McCarthy leaders.
First, anti- Vietnam war sentiment was not strong in New Hampshire as evidenced
by the low level of organized anti-war activity.
The second assumption was that Robert Kennedy might well receive a useful
protest vote in the primary much as Lodge had done in 1964. This latter aasump
tion was based upon Kennedy's prominent name and regional identity rather than
a sense that he would himself broaden and legitimize anti-Vietnam war opinions.
When the UNH students analyzed their survey (see Table 14.18) they came
close to predicting the primary election result. With "all voters" included,
the percent support for President Johnson was 49.4, The actual return was 49.6
percent of the Democratic vote. What is of special interest is the total per-
cent of "all voters" supporting candidates other than President Johnson as of
the January ,5th date of the UNH survey. Robert Kennedy, the most, prominent
name in the survey, received 21.0 percent; Eugene McCarthy, 8.9 percent; and
George Wallace, 5.1 percent. The total recorded for the three alternative can-
didates v/aa 35.0 percent. The "undecided" percentage was 12.8 percent. It may
be concluded that the campaign began with 35 percent willing to identify with a
name other than that of the incumbent President. Further, an additional 12.8
percent indicated a wait and see attitude. This gave an alternate candidate
to Johnson an important early advantage that few recognized.
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ir tUe McCa„Hy loa.er.
.eea u„a,ao to foia into the... or«™i.„ic„ tUo
Ke..„,e., W.Ue-i„ e„c« of Ku.ene Baniell. « Ce,o.,e Wallace the
e.b..ras..ent of Ms Ap.U 1967 visit to
.a.t.outh College, the final vote .l,ht
have been badly splintered. McCarthy received 42.0 percent of the Democratic
ballots cast. His campaign had been successful In directing those voters dis-
satisfied with President Johnson toward McCarthy's candidacy.
While the data used In the UNH Student Survey was compiled from all voters
and not Just Democratic party registrants. Robert Craig concludes that the
"...primary was similar to a Presidential election in all respects except that
it took place within a party's primary. "53 ^he data drawn from this early sur-
vey and analyzed by Including "all voters" revealed important aspects of the
1968 Hew Hampshire primary environment in 196S. These aspects were omitted in
other surveys which focussed on the specific category of voter - Republican.
Democrat > or Independent.
When the data was disaggregated by party label the results were as the
Johnson campaign organizers predicted. Table 1A.18 shows President Johnson
having 60.7 percent support among those "strictly" identified as Democrats,
with Kennedy having 25.6 percent; McCarthy 5.2 percent; Wallace 1.7 percent,
and 6.8 percent "DK, NA. other." The figures shift considerably when "Indepen-
dents" and "Republicans" are included. Johnson's percentage drops to 45 with
the McCarthy and V/allace percentages increasing considerably, as does the "DK,
NA, other" class.
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on the one. hand when the analysis incorporates "all voters" the finding
approximates the actual result of the Democratic primary, while on the other
hand, when the analysis excludes the Independents and the Republicans, the re-
sult shifts heavily in favor of President Johnson. The Republicans
.ust be ex-
cluded fro. the analysis because they are ineligible by law to vote for a Demo-
cratic candidate on a Democratic ballot. Nothing the following table, with
Republicans excluded, the relationship again shifts favorably toward the al-
ternative candidates against President Johnson. With the "DK, NA, other-
responses dropped, the three alternative candidate possibilities gather Al.5
percent of the responses against 53.1 percent for the incumbent president.
Allotting 60 percent of the "DK, NA, other" responses to the alternative candi-
dates' total and 40 percent to Johnson, the gap closes much as did the gap be-
tween the principal candidates in the actual primary. McCarthy's appeal to
Independents and Republicans showed some early strength in this survey, a
factor that became important in the final result. Wlien the Republican write-in
votes for McCarthy and for Johnson were added to the Democratic total, the
Johnson edge shrank to 524 votes or less than one percent difference in total
votes cast on both party ballots. The UNH student survey contained an important
prediction of the final result that was not interpreted at the time of the cam-
paign.
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__JolHlsoj^,Kcn^ Wallace DK.NA,0ther_JV^t-n2___
Democrats^ 60.7% 25.67 97 -i tcv5.2/ 1.7% 6.8% 100%
(117)
IndependentsB 45.5 22.2 lo.l 6.0 16.2 100%
( 99)
^3.1 29.9 7.7 3.85 11.5
DK,NA, Other 4.6 29.9 41.5 3.85 6.9
100%
(216)
48.
A
Allocated 57,7
^iot including Meaning" Independents including "strong" and "not so stronr"party ident3.f iers. ^
^Il^±iAlm "leaning'-' Independents as well as those with no party identification.
In addition to producing a voter survey that was close to predicting the
final outcome of the primary, the UNH survey spotted attitudes on the most im-
portant issue of the campaign, the handling of the Vietnam x^ar. Table 14.19
shows the analysis of responses to a scale of three questions from "Pull out"
to "Take a stronger stand" in Vietnam. The analysis is based on the "all
voters" universe of the survey. Again, the "all voters" aggregation appears
not to reflect the actual voting situation, where only the registered Indepen-
dents had a choice of primary ballots, except that in the end the "all voters"
aggregation proved a better predictor of the results than did the strict party
registration identification.
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TABLE 14.19: OPINION ON "WH^T TO DO IN VIETNAM
JANUARY, 1968-^-*
NOW" BY POLITICAL PARTY,
"Stay "Take a
i.T. in M Stronger DK, NA ah
,^^ut" fighting" stand- Other Total VotLs
Democrats^
Independents
Republicans^
DK, NA, Other
All Voters
7.7%
6.1
9.2
AO. 2%
37.4
30.3
38.5%
55.6
48.1
13.7% 100% 28.2%
(117)
100% 23.9
( 99)
12,4 100% 44.6
(185)
100%
( lA)
8. 0 34.5 47.0 10.6
3.4
100%
(A15)
^^£1 including those "leaning" toward political party.
A contention aade by the organizers of the McCarthy campaign was that a
dissatisfied voting population existed who described their position on the
Vietnam war as being "Let's win the v/ar or get out." As Craig wrote in his
re-cap of the survey conducted by his students, "The Hoeh group was quite ac-
curate in their perception that strong anti-war sentiment in New Hampshire was
rare. "^^ (See Table 14.19) Wliile the McCarthy organizers did recognize the
rarity of vocal and organized anti-Vietnam War sentiment they also recognized
that a statement like "Let's win the war or get out" did not reflect support
for the Johnson war policy. To develop a campaign that would capture this
sentiment and produce a vote from this feeling would require considerable care.
This was the justification for the careful preparations of the pre-campaign and
the care which the McCarthy leaders took to develop the early stages of the
candidacy.
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ners,
senses
The UNII survey couflrraed that the "PuH out" and "Take a stronger stand-
exceeded the percentage recorded for "Stay but end fighting" in every case.
WlUle the "Take a stronger stand"
.ight put off less imaginative ca^paig
it did not disturb the Hew Hampshire McCarthy leaders. Their political
were that the "Hawk" stance was an acceptable way for a New Hampshire person to
express concern about the way the war was being handled. It was also an accept
able mask for other concerns which were difficult to express, such as concern
about the impact of the war on the domestic economy, impact on U.S. world
status, and the success of domestic policies. To "Pull out" represented to
many a posture of weakness that they would not verbalize.
Wlien sentiments concerning Vietnam policy were cross-tabulated with can-
didate preference, the view held by the McCarthy organizers was supported.
Johnson gathe7:ed only ^.4 percent of those expressing "Pull out" sentiments.
The middle position "Stay but end fighting" did not generate even a majority
position among Johnson's supporters. Wliile Kennedy and McCarthy gathered the
highest percentage of the anti-war expression, they also did well among the
"Hawks." Public opinions with which the campaign for McCarthy had to deal,
were ones of dissatisfaction with administration policy but a dissatisfaction
that leaned toward an aggressive stance. From this the McCarthy organizers
felt that a positive alternative to the administration's stumbling Vietnam
policy would be welcomed. 55.0 percent of all the voters surveyed endorsed
a policy that proposed a change in the current situation in Vietnam.
66:
TABLE 14.20: OPINION ON "WiLVr TO
Lyndon
Johnson
Robert
Kennedy
Eugene
McCarthy
George
V7allace
Undecided
NA, Others
All Voters
•'Stay
"Take a
"Pull Out- f'l^ht'lnt" "T""^.^" All^^^^^"S stand" other Total Voters
4.4%
16.1
10.8
9.5
3.8
8.0
39.5%
35.6
27.0
9.5
30.2
34.5
47.8%
36.8
51.4
66.7
49.1
47.0
3% 100% 49.4%
(205)
11.4
10.8
14.3
17.0
10.6
100% 21.0
( 87)
100% 8.9
( 37)
100% 5.1
( 21)
100% 12.8
( 53)
100%
100% 100%
(415) (415)
Given the fact that Eugene McCarthy was little known by the respondents at
the time the survey was taken (8.9 percent of all voters January 5, 1968) and
the other possibilities (Kennedy and VJallace) receded as McCarthy's candidacy
developed, it is not surprising that the "Hawk" and "Dove" sentiments clustered
around the candidate offering an alternative, ^^at is striking is that the
Johnson campaign organizers neglected to recognize the deep weakness of their
candidate as registered by the voters' response to the Vietnam scale. The
Johnson managers seeir.ed to have jumped over this soft spot to a strategy trans-
ferring the popularity of New Hampshire Democratic Party notables to Johnson.
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..a..
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
Oove.no.,
.ohn W. Ki„«.
..3 stra.e,,
.«ch Bernard I,. Boutin
..opted to
cove, the wea,.es„. ^
,,,,
^^^^^^^^
the now o. event, m Vietnam, especially the let o«enslve. and the cater.l
devoloiwient of the McCarthy candidacy.
Oljverjjuayle and Coiipany Survey for NBC News
Oliver Ouayle and Co.pany ,,as co^lssloned by the National Broadca.tln.
company (NBC) to survey New Hampshire voter opinion. Quayle's survey was hased
on the "attitudes and responses of 247 A^Ot resident of New Hampshire who
Stated that they were ccrt£i:ir) tn '^7r.^,i -t^ t>y
-CJLLliLiil .to _vo_te in the DcmocT^a tic Presidential Primary
Eleetlo,.....- The respondents were interviewed between "December 9th and 16th"
1967 and were re-nterviewed on a "panel basis" between February 22nd and 24th
(1968)
.
The panel was composed of 157 of those who had been interviewed in the
December survej''.^^
From conversations between Quayle and the author, Quayle implied that these
data, or sir.ilar data, were made available to the White House. Writing to Koeh,
April 10, 1972, Quayle aaid, "NBC says OK so I enclose a copy of the survey I
did for them in ' 68
.
The other earlier survey w^ done for someone
_else and is
available," (Emphasis added) Several persons involved in the management
of the Johnson campaign stated to the author after the contest that they had
used a "Quayle Poll" as the basis of their campaign planning.
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The survey that is discussed hero vas prepared lor ••in.ediate internal use
at: NBC and for use on the air Election Night as NBC sees fit in accordance
.^th
its own policies. -39
^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^ specifically
stated, the survey sa.ple appears to include registered Independents. A note
to the effect that "8 percent are Independents and 92 percent are Democrats-
appears to confinn the conclusion that the survey reached beyond registered
and
-certain- to vote Democrats. The analysis was written to assist election
night reporting and to suggest how the results might be displayed for television
viewing. The internal analysis is instructive, first as a profile of the atti-
tudes evident at two stages during the election period, and second, as an im-
plied basis for campaign strategy adjustments that were made by the Johnson
campaign. The word "implied- is used because the author feels that either an
identical survey was supplied the New Hampshire Johnson campaigners or a similar
survey developing much the same conclusion was produced by Oliver Quayle and
Company for their use.^^
Quayle 's polling reached for factors which could serve as useful inputs
to campaign planning. His skill in discovering these relationships and then
advising a political strategy made him one of the most sought after pollsters
in the 1960* s. His approach Is demonstrated in the NBC poll.^^
It appears from the first item of the NBC analysis that someone wanted to
know v;hether the interests of the President could be adequately, or better
represented in New Hampshire by the state's top political leadership than by
the President himself. Although it appeared from Bernard Boutin's conversation
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with Sandra Hoeh, AuoukL 1967 tlm- p t-Ub/. hai the President's campaign would be conducted
without hie actual Dartir-^^•l^•f or.p iticipati n. the survey in December may have served as an
additional check for the strategv of hw-lno ^ .- uc y t avi g his interests represented by surro-
aate.. It was not too late at that time to change the strategy and have Lyndon
John.on enter his name as a candidate in the primary. Quayle's "Job Rating"
scale as of Mid-December read:
TABLE 1A.21: JOB rUTINGs62
All Democratic Party Primary Presidential
Voters as of Mid-Decemhpr
Johtnson McCarthy Kennedy Mclntyre King
74% 52% 55% 80% 90%
Unfavorable 26% 48% 45% 20% 10%
Quayle interpreted the Mid-December finding as meaning that if "the write-
ing effort for Mr. Johnson yields a higher percentage of the primary support
than is presently Indicated in this report, at least part of the credit must be
accoraad the state's Democratic Senator and Governor . "^'3 The Mid-December find-
ing tended to re-enforce Boutin's concept for the write-in campaign. King and
Mclntyre would be the leaders and, presumably, transfer their own popularity to
the somewhat less popular President. At the worst Johnson retained "74 percent"
favorable, a percentage that may have been the source of Boutin's and Mclntyre's
earJy optimism.
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)emo-
What «uaylc £o,...a
.,,c„ „e re.-s..vo,.d in February „<,s that "onl, two Dc
cratic rrl^ary voter. tooU a favorable view of the Presldeafs record for every
three who had done bo two and a half
.onths earlier."M j^e shift In the "Job
Rating" showed Johnson declinirf^ frnT^, Tt?o 7/c xining t ora his 74 percent December peak to 67 percent
favorable three
.eeks before the election. The unfavorable view had grov. fro.
26 percent to 33 percent in the sa.e period which Quayle interpreted as "a fourth
again as .any of the same Democratic Presidential Primary voters took a di. view
of the Job being done by the President in February as those who had held such an
opinion in December,..." The reason for the "ebb" in Johnson's popularity,
Quayle conceded, was because of the "loss of the Pueblo and the enemy Tet
offlnsive...." He then concluded that since "fully 33 percent of those Demo-
crats who are willing to rate Mr. Johnson give him an unfavorable score. We
regard this as a very reasonable potential for McCarthy ... or write-in for Robert
Kennedy. "^^
In a section titled "Standings" Quayle found that the "write-in support of
President Johnson declined more markedly between mid-December and late February
than did his job rating."
TABLE 14.22: DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY PREFERENCES66
All Democratic Presidential Primary Preferences
Voters
^Itji Undecided In With Undecided Out
Dec. '67 Feb. '68 Dec. '6 7 Feb. '68
% % % " %
Lyndon Johnson 65 55 82 72
Eugene McCarthy 7 16 9 22
Robert Kennedy 6 4 8 5
Others 1 1 X 1
Not sure 21 24 -
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Quaylc concluded chat "the sharp rise In McCartl>v'« a-,1 ^-isc 111 L iLhy s standing among the Granite
State's Democratic Primary voters rpP„^^o n^ iy esults at least partially from his active
campalgnlnc in the state." The switch of the Kennedy vrite-in to McCarthy was
underway at the ti.e of the first survey. This was credited by Quayle for
Kennedy's decline in the second survey. Also, McCarthy had not announced his
New Hampshire candidacy in December. To Quayle the movement away from Johnson
was •ominous." "Unless his supporters.
.. can halt aud reverse the current tide,
the anti-incumbent total on March 12th could well add to something over 30 per-
cent." This quayle surmised would be a "distinct setback to Mr. Johnson's
chances for re-election." He then pursued his analysis a bit further by not-
ing, "such an anti-Johnson percentage might be interpreted (falsely, as well
shall soon see) as an expression of dove sentiment on Vietnam. "^^
Quayle's reasons for predicting problems for Johnson resulting from the
shift were: 1. McCarthy has momentum; and, 2. the increase in the number of
undecided usually indicates that more movement in the same direction is to come.
The McCarthy canvass analysis had picked up the same shift. The McCarthy cam-
paign strategy also shifted to take advantage of both the momentum and the in-
crease in the number of undecideds that the canvassers were encountering during
Februa ry.
Using a "Key Group Analysis" Quayle concluded that President Johnson re-
ceived the "support of less than two thirds of the Democratic Primary voters
among only one of the eleven critical segments of the electorate" as of February,
Because of this Quayle felt that "subgroup" preferences were of considerable
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luipoi-tance in the con t pen- t»- l ,est. It may be th« In thlc. an.lysU Quayle lost sight
of the true contest, lie wrote " if n,„ r.,
...l£ the President runs better than 72 percent
on Primary Bay It „1U be due in large part to his strength a„o„g
.e.ocratle
Primary voters of 50 and over and those resident In Hillsborough County." The
earlier 72 percent figure cropped up again at this stage when his previous
analysis shewed strong trends wlttling at this figure. This conclusion
.ay
be the basis for Boutin's continued optin,is» and holding to the high percentage
for Johnson that he did until the last few days of the campaign. The .ost
(iuayle would concede was that the "McCarthy-Kennedy total would be something
topping 27 percent" which he felt would co.e fro. defecting Johnson supporters
among voters under 35 years old. ^8
Examining volunteered responses to a list of 32 selected issues, Quayle
found that the New Hampshire voters placed Vietnam as "far and away" the most
in^portant issue. Using nine of the thirty-two issues to profile the voter
opinion and to relate that to candidate preference. Quayle found that two thirds
of all opinions offered included taxes and spending, Vietnam, and racial rela-
tions. Of these Quayle found that live Democratic primary voters expressed
concern over taxes and spending and racial relations for ever^^ three concerned
about the war in Vietnam, and "on the fiscal issues of overtaxing and over-
spending and social civil rights... we find five McCarthy supporters volunteering
concern for every three backing the President . "^^
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TABLE U.23: KEY GROU?
,\NAI.YSls70
i2l»£231 Kennedy others (Not SJ.)
!lillaW
Overall
Sex
Male
Female
21-34
35-49
% 1/o % %
9 22 82 72
_8_ _5
9 24 81 67 9 8
9 20 83 78 4 2
14 24 75 67 11 9
5 28 83 68 7 4over 7 19 87 78 4
l^evel
• IJpper-Mddle 14 18 78 82 3
3 82 71 8 6
5 25 86 63 9 9
8 24 85 72 5 2
10 21 79 71 10 8
Middle
Lower
Area
1st CD
2nd CD
Special Area
Hillsborough County
% %
1 1
*
5
2
19 90 78
% %
(21) (23)
(17) (20)
(25) (27)
(24) (19)
(22) (26)
(16) (25)
(20) (27)
(21) (23)
(21) (22)
(25) (25)
(15) (22)
(24) (26)
* Less than 0.5 percent
When the issues were examined the pattern of "favorable" to "unfavorable"
views of President Johnson's performance was more striking than Quyale seemed to
perceive. While Vietnam was the top issue, the opinion split between the two
reactions was quite close — 53 percent favorable to 47 percent unfavorable. On
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s.ve.a e.o.o.ic issues U,e „pi„,„„
.,.,„3. aohnscn's po..o»»ee ™s st.cn,-
Keepi„,
.He cos. of Xlvl„, ao™. "unfavo.able 76 percent;
.olciins Che U„e o„
taxes, "unfavorable" 65 percent; stopping „.ste In
.overn.ent.
"unfavorable"
81 percent.
in his te« analysis of the following table. Quayle concentrated on the war
issue Which he explained with subjective vie«s of his own. Tor example,
"...doves
are notoriously
.ore vocal than hawks and frustrates." which see.ed to l.ply the
existence of
.
majority later labelled by President Nixon as the "silent
.ajcrlty."
His subsequent discussion of the issues concentrated on voter attitudes toward
the war in Vletna.. he did not pursue the economic issues that showed such high
levels of "unfavorable" response.
TABLE 14.24: SELECTED NATIONAL ISSUES^^
Handling the War in Vietnam
Working for peace and
Disarijiament
Keeping the cost of living
dovm
The War on Poverty
Holding the line on taxes
Fighting crirae
Help for older people
Handline riots In our
cities
Stopping waste in govern-
ment spending
All
Democratic
Presidential
Primary
Voters
Most
Imp or:.:ant
All Democratic Presidential
Primary Voters Rating
President Johnson's Job
Performance as:
% % %
47 53 47 ( 5)
28 65 35 ( 5)
22 24 76 ( 5)
19 54 46 ( 7)
17 35 65 ( 5)
15 50 50 (11)
15 80 20 ( 2)
13 41 59 ( 5)
13 19
.
81 (18)
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tha.
..dove feelings we.o fa.
„...,o,,,e. „o.H haw. and Ad.inlst.aUcn poin.s
Of vie„...'2
^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^
alnce .he Tec offeasive. he explained by noUng.
..we .ust
.e^.her that these
are the
.lews of Baoerat. and that they are less hawkish and „o.e In support of
our present policies than the general electorate across the nation... How this
interpretation related to the New Hampshire situation and the sentient of the
person who would actually be voting In the March 12th primary see.s obscure.
Wl^on quayle combined the two '.dove., questions he found a total percentage of 21
Which was less than the 27 percent which he had attributed to the McCarthy/Kennedy
group earlier. He concluded then that McCarthy/Kennedy
..are attracting
.ore than
dove support... but did not reach for a reason for this higher support. Instead
he wrote. "Rather surprisingly. Senator McCarthy's campaigning among Democratic
primary voters... has thus far left them surprisingly Ignorant of his stand on
the war. ..73 rm^ conclusion when given to the leaders of the Johnson campaign,
led them to change their strategy. They attacked McCarthy directly, charging
that ha had not communicated his policy proposals toward Vietnam effectively.
They assumed that If McCarthy did make clear his positions that his support
would recede to the ..dove" figure of 21 percent.
To determine the accuracy of his conclusion about McCarthy's Vietnam posi-
tion, Quayle analyzed the McCarthy favorable responses against the below sequence
of questions. He reported that '.in December only 19 percent of these primary
voters identified as a dove — about one in five." By late February, using the
same analysis he found that .'more than half" of the voters were "still unaware
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-
hi.
..a.ce on .He .a.- He
..en conclude.
...
-..Ms i.nor.nce o. McCa..,^
POsiUon on Vie.n.. ,.Ue s.a.aXngl, tu.ns ou. .o .e t.e .a,or reason He cur-
rently stands so well a.ong this electorate vis-a-vis JoHnson."
TABLE 14.25: ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM^A
"V;e should go all out, fight an
unlimited viar (short of using
nuclear weapons) and either win
or force negotiations"
"We should do as v.^e are. keep
on fighting a limited but
Increasing military operations
as necessary while seeking
negotiations"
"We should stay in Vietnam but
reduce military operations"
Not sure
Democratic President Primary Voter-.'
own Views
:
WitJlJir^decidelJ^ MthJJndeci^
^^L§1 Feb^liS Dec. '67 Feb. '68
%
47
29
5
7
%
35
36
5
9
%
51
31
39
40
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TABLE 14.26
Democratic Presidential Primary
Voters IVho Feel That McCarthy's
Hawk of LB
J
Dove
Votin^j, for
:
JohnKon
McCarthy
Kennedy
Other
(Not Sure)
^^il^li? Feb,_l68 Dec. '67 Feb. '68
70
22
4
A
(32)
31
21
( 9)
%
92
( 5)
%
73
16
8
3
(22)
Democratic Presidential
Primary Voters \;ho Don't
Know McCarthy's Position
on Vietnam:
Dec. '67 Feb, '68
%
90
A
4
2
(23)
%
77
22
1
(25)
Almost as a foocnote to this analysis. Quayle returns to the lack of support
President Johnson had for his economic policies as represented by voter response
to the taxing and spending questions. He noted that if Johnson received less
than "72 percent of the vote" then "it will be because New Hampshire's Democratic
Prl.:ary voters have turned away fro., him..." on the economic issues. "In other
words, if McCarthy/Kennedy come in at better than 27 percent it will be an across-
the-board dissatisfaction with Johnson generally rather than on any single issue. "76
Given the fact that President Johnson withdrew as a candidate shortly after
the New Hampshire primary, a reason for his action may well be attributed to this
conclusion. While Quayle does offer a campaign strategy for dealing with the
voter perception concerning McCarthy and Vietnam policy, he did not offer a stra-
tegy for reversing the President's weakness in terms of "across-the-board dissatis-
faction with Johnson generally . "^7
(VM
Returning., to his preoccupation with the voters uncertainty about McCarthy,
Quayle found that when asked to volunteer either praise or criticism of Senator
McCarthy, 62 percent were "Not Sufficiently Familiar With Him To Coniment." and
of those who did conunent, 16 percent were "unfavorable" because they did not
like his atand on Vietnam. 78 Testing this reaction Quayle developed the re-
sponses as follows:
TABLE 14.27: ATTITUDES TOWARD STATETiENT "I TEND TO THINK LESS OF EUGENE McCARTHY
BECAUSE HE WANTS US TO KmJCKJ.E WIDER TO THE COMMUNISTS"79
With Undecide d lu With Unde cided Out
% %
Agree 21 43
Disagree 27 57
Not Sure 52
Quayle concluded this portion of his analysis by noting " if the Senator is
weaker on March 12th than we currently shovz , it will be in large part because he
has not (or Mr. Jolmson * s supporters have not) made his position on Vietnam
clear to these vo ters. And as an obvious corollary, if McCarthy gains more
of the vote than we show, it will be because he has been able t o conceal his
Vietnam stance from this electorate
. (Or the President's supporters have not
been able to tag hira as opposed to standing firm on Vietnam. )"^^ Again, Quayle
prods the Johnson campaign to attack McCarthy as a dove.
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Although Quayle tried to determine whether McCarthy's candidacy
..as viewed
as being devisive by loyal Democrats he did not develop the issue to the extent of
Robert Craiii's analysis. Quayle found that one voter in twelve was dissatisfied
with McCarthy for causing "dissension" within party ranks. He did not question
for dissatisfaction caused by the way the Johnson campaign was structured or the
voters' perception of Johnson's New Hampshire campaign tactics (such as the
pledge cards) as these related to voter opinions of President Johnson himself.
Testing for what had been discussed as Johnson's "credibility gap," Quayle
concluded, by using a Major words and phrases association test, that the "gap"
did "not appear to be damaging the President severely among.
..
primary voters."
He noted that only "an eighth of the voters complained that he (Johnson) was
not completely honest. ... "^^
TABLE 14.28: MAJOR WOPJDS AND PHRASES ASSOCIATED WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON^^
Favorable
Hard v7orking
Honest, has integrity
Patriotic
Dedicated
Responsible
A fighter
Courageous
Unfavorable
Wheeler-dealer
An arm tv/ister
Ciin't be believed
Out for himself
Hits below the belt
Crude
Corny
All Democratic Primary
Voters
%
74
65
57
55
53
48
43
25
12
11
10
10
8
7
C)76
Uoins the «mne measure Quayle concluded that if Senator McCarthy fell be-
low the "mark assigned to hirn in this report, a part of the reason may lie in
the fact that many of these voters have come to think of him as a fuzzy-minded
and over idealistic living-room liberal,
.. this could «ell cost him votes among
hardhcaded Granite Staters. "^^
TABLE 14.29: M/iJOR WOllDS AND PHRASES ASSOCIATED WITH SENATOR MCCARTHY
Favorable
Dedicated
Patriotic
Responsible
Hard vrorklng
Honest, has integrity
Fon;ard looking
Courageous
Unfavorable
Out for himself
Can't win
Living-room liberal
Fuzzy-minded
A dreamer
Not entirely loyal
Too idealistic
Democratic Primary Voters Making
Associations
%
47
47
44
41
38
34
31
23
19
19
16
16
16
16
Quayle concluded his analysis with a small table representing attitudes in
response to the statement, "President Johnson has not been entirely forthright
in keeping us informed about Vietnam." 48 percent agreed, 38 percent disagreed,
14 percent were "not sure." Taking out the "not sure", the percentages increased
to 56 and 44 respectively. Although Quayle stated earlier that he did not consi-
der the "credibility gap" as "damaging" he concluded his analysis by writing,
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• 'lLll£^9hll^o}Ll3ll^ -short of 73 percent, some of the «hrlnkar.c of his sup-
2S!lS^^JL.hll±^J:k^i crcdlhillty r.ap . Indeed, V7e consider this one of the
very dramatic findings of this survey." The "56 percent" response to the ques-
tion concerning Johnson's f orthrightness seems to have startled Quayle in the
final stages of his analysis. To offer a possible critique of the Johnson cam-
paign strategy Quayle wrote:
If McCarthy climbs over the 27 mark tlie Johnson strategists
will have erred in placing too much emphasis on selling
Lyndon Johnson (title of basic literature piece is "A
Strong Man in a Tough Job") and too little on Vv'hether or
not the ]J.[]. should stand firm in Vietnam. "^5
Given the thrust cf Quayle 's survey and subsequent analysis, his comments
under the title "A Final Observation" seem to come late in his examination.
These observations conflict with his earlier analysis. His identification of
Vietnam as the major campaign issue and his lack of attention to the economic
concerns relfccted in his own data appear at odds.
Some political observers have called U.S. policy in Vietnam
the major issue in the Eemocratic Presidential Primary
Election in New Hampshire; as of late February it was not,
and if it should become so the fact will damage Senator
McCarthy. There is certainly frustration and unhappiness
with the fact of the war, and this certainly is a big fac-
tor contributing to the over-all dissatisfaction. But
domestic policies, particularly the economy and racial
disorders, contributed. And so the President as a person,
as witness the credibility gap.S6
1968 in New Hampshire presented those analyzing the activity with a con-
fusing picture. Quayle' s analysis seems to jump from reporting results, to
advising on campaign strategy, to interpreting findings for both a news
gathering client and to advising a presidential client. The misleading aspect
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of the survey is Quaylc's frequent reference to a "72 percent" vote for Presi-
dent Johnson — a percent that, given Quayle's own analysis, should have been
softened considerably. If it is true that the Johnson campaign managers relied
on thir. percentage it is not difficult to see how they were misled. Starting
a political contest with a large preference bulge is one thing but expecting
that bulge to stand up during a hotly contested election campaign is quite an-
other — especially when one candidate is not actively campaigning.
The Dartmouth College Survey.
Conducted by students in a Voting Behavior Seminar under the direction of
Professors Roger Davidson and David Kovenock, this survey assessed voter opi-
nion close to the date of the election. Unlike the UNH Survey, which was con-
ducted early in the election period (January 5, 1968) and was designed to deter-
mine voter concerns, the Dartmouth survey was taken betv/een February 16 and 26,
1968 and vj'as designed to anticipate the election result.
The survey sampled 360 cases on an area probability basis which was stra-
tified by county and size of place. 1965 population estimates were used and
the results showed general conformity with expectations based on previous cen-
sus data and professional polls. The interviewers experienced an unusually
high "turndovra" rate of about 30 percent. This had the effect of slightly
inflating the proportion of political actives and slightly deflating the pro-
portion of the less active. This v;as particularly true among the lower middle-
class in the city of Manchester, Kovenock reported. The estimated error based
on the likely primary voters was expected to be approximately 8 percentage
points.
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The poll used as "likely.- voters those .ho wore registered, vho had voted
in the 1964 Presidential primary and 1966 gubernatorial election, and who
planned to vote in the 1968 primary. If the voter was too young to have voted
in the 1964 Presidential primary then the 1966 state election served as evi-
dence of participation. "Unlikely voters were all others who were registered
but who failed to meet the other criteria as "likexy" voters. The Dartmouth
student pollsters used a paper ballot that appeared like an official ballot.
To cast a write-in vote one had to write-in the candidate's name on the paper.
The principal tabular report of the survey was a preference summary and
a choice sumD-,aiy regarding the Vietnam position. The survey covered both party
primaries and reported findings for the Republicans as well. In fact, the press
release issued by Davidson and Kovenock emphasized the Nixon lead (nearly 75
percent) and the "minima]" effect, on the outcome, of the Romney withdrawal.
Romney, they predicted, would get less than "8 percent of the vote."
Lest) certain of the Democratic primary result, Davidson and Kovenock sur-
mised that Jobns-on's write-in effort would give him a majority and that "peace
candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy should draw between one-fifth and one-fourth
of the Democratic primary vote."
TABLE 14.30: CANDIDATE CHOICE AE-IONG DEMOCRATS, BY LIKELIHOOD OF VOTING^
Candidate "Likely Voters" "Unlikely Voters" All Democrats
Johnson 48% 36% 43%
McCarthy 17 9 13
Kennedy 9 6 8
DK, NA, Other 26 50 37
Totals 100% . 100% 100%
( 65) ( 55) (120)
^ Registered Democrats plus all Independents who said they planned to vote
in the Democratic primary.
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For some reaaun not altogether clear, this survey failed to detect the sup-
port of a] ternative candidates that was found by the UNll students in their
January 5tb poll or the findings of the McCarthy canvassing. President Johnson'
support was at a level close to that which the UNH student poll reported and cer
taii^y closer to the vote result of 49.6 percent than the 72 percent that Quayle
mentioned In his survey. The softness in the Dartmouth finding must be attri-
buted to the .36 percent turndown of "likely voters" and the 50 percent turndovm
of "unlikely voters". VJhy the high turndown rate is not explained.
When Robert Craig examined this survey in his analysis he used it to des-
cribe a shift as contrasted with other data that he was examining. He wrote:
By the end of February, voters were moving toward McCarthy,
some simply moving away from Johnson, so that Johnson
still appeared to be the likely v;inncr in the primary but
his margin was eroding and the "undecided" groups were
closer to McCarthy type "protest" voters than Johnson
"support" voters. Large-scale shifts began during the
TET impact of early and middle February and continued
a movement of dissent from the administration's policy
handling of Vietnam, either reacting that the policy was
not enough or that it was too much. The Independent and
undecided voter began to move with the growing shift to
"McCarthy as protest. "^7
Referencing an earlier report of Johnson's support at 60 percent, Craig in
terpreted the findings of the Dartmouth Survey as a major erosion of Johnson's
support — from 60 percent to A3 percent with 37 percent "undecided" among all
Democrats. \^ieii he examined the second table produced from the Dartmouth Sur
vey relating Vietnam opinion, Craig concluded:
The "undecided" Democratic voter group (26 percent of
all Democrats) V7as heavily opposed to the "moderate"
solution to the Vietnam war and susceptible to a "pro-
test" which combined these points of view as McCarthy's
supporters did.^^
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Davidson and Kovenock lu their pre-prlmary election press release high-
lighted as "other findings," the following:
* Only 34 percent of the New Harapshirites who voted for
Johnson in 196A and only 23 percent of the state as a
whole now favor him for President in 1968. And des-
pite Nixon's commanding lead in the primary, only 36
percent favor him in November.
* Half those surveyed feel the U.S. should take a
stronger stand in Vietnam, even if it means invading
North Vietnam. Only 11 percent wanted to pull out.
* Surprisingly, none of this "dove" vote favored Romney
in the primary.
* Nixon's support, while high in all groups, is heavi-
est among voters with only a grade- school education
and lightest among those college-educated. Johnson
is doing equally well among less-educated voters,
but loses a considerable percentage of the college-
educated Democratic voters to McCarthy.
Declining support for Johnson among all voters should have been a tip off
to Davidson and Kovonock that a coalition of protest was developing that would
increase McCarthy's support. Romney' s departure, v;hile not effecting the Repub-
lican primary election, could be inferred to be of help to McCarthy. Indepen-
dents might have supported a Republican "peace" candidate, but when Romney
withdrew there remained only one candidate of the "peace protest" variety.
The Dartmouth survey analysis did detect some of v/hat Craig subsequently found
when he aiialyzed the ABC survey and that was the socio-economic split between
voters for McCarthy and voters for Johnson. Only the "college-educated" loss
to Johnson showed in the Dartmouth survey; whereas Craig found McCarthy drawing
from the lower socio-economic strata as well. McCarthy's problem was with the
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middle-strata according to the Craig analysis. With the socio-economic code
another descriptor, religion, was used in the Dartmouth survey. They found
that "Johnson is pulling a clear majority of Catholics, but only 28 percent
of the Protestants." This finding related to Craig's evaluation, lie found
middle-strata support for Johnson among those with more favorable views toward
the Democratic Party. In other words, the relationship between being Catholic
and being a long-term, loyal Democrat, and therefore, a Johnson supporter,
appear to relate; although none of the surveys sought to evaluate these fac-
tor 91
Perhaps an explanation for McCarthy's appeal among Protestants, tradi-
tionally Republican or Independent voters in New Hampshire, was the opposite
of that among Catholics. Higher education, higher income, and moderate- to-
considerable distain for the Democratic Party may be reasons for less loyalty
to a Democratic President and greater support for the critic of Johnson,
although McCarthy was a Catholic. If a religious issue had arisen in New
Hampshire, McCarthy might have benefited by drawing votes from the large
population of middle-strata Catholic Democrats.
As for tlie Vietnam issue, the Dartmouth students found the same situation
that the other pollsters found. There vjere few respondents willing to label
themselves as "Doves" or to identify v:ith a "Dove" policy; but, at the same
time, few respondents were willing to support the Johnson policy on Vietnam.
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TABLE
.14.31; ;;^^^J,j^^ATE^CHOICE AMONG LIKELY DEMOCIUTIC VOTERS, BY VIETNAM
Candidate
"Doves"^ "Moderates" "Hawks" DK
T v\ ^ n r'\ 11% 50% 61% 20%
nct.cirtny 56 15 6 20
Kennedy 10 9 20
DK, NA, OLher
.33 25 22 40
TOTAI.S 100% 100% 100% 100%
( 9) ( 20) ( 31) ( 5)
All Voters 11% 30% 50% 100%
( AO) (108) (180) (360)
^Respondents' Vietnam position determined by response to the question: "VTnich
of the follov;lng alternatives do you favor?"
(1) U.S. should pull out entirely ("Doves").
(2) U.S. should keep soldiers there but try to end fighting ("Moderates").
(3) U.S. should take a stronger stand, even if it means invading North
Vietnam ("llavks").
The McCarthy vote came from voter frustration with the administration's war
policy. That same frustration may have affected the tuirtiout of those who iden-
tified themselves as Johnson supporters. Participation of the Democratic Party/
President Johnson loyalists may have declined, while the participation of new
voters, Independents selecting the Democratic ballot, and less loyal Democrats
may have increased. This question will be examined later. What is important
from each of the surveys examined is that identifying with a "Hawk" position did
not prevent voters from marking their ballot for the "peace" candidate. A phe-
nomenon that can be explained by understanding the composition of protest and
the ability of the McCarthy campaign to draw that protest to their candidate.
I
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90Roger Davidson and David Kovenoclc, press release, (Haiiover: David C. Hoehfile copy, March 1968).
^ICraia conclusions: In sum, the Democratic voter behaved rationally ac-
cording to his knowledge at the time, heavily influenced by the fact that McCarthy
was not expected to be nominated and Johnson was. The New Hampshire primary vote
was more the diselection of a president than an election of a president The
voters behaved similarly to a presidential election with candidate images, party
Images and political issues influencing their votes in about that order of impor-
tance, even when the issue was one of the most inflammatory in a generation.
The results of the analysis therefore, support both the meta-theory results of
.TJ19. ^llS-j?:}} Voter studies and the belief in the rationality of the American
voter. (Craig, R.
,
Op.Cit.
,
abstract, p. 4.)
92Dartmouth College Survey, (Hanover: conducted by Political Science stu-
dents, February 16-23, 1968), David C. Hoeh file copy.
C JI A 1' T E R XV
THE CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
Bff ectiveiiess Questions
This cace study of the 1968 McCarthy ca^^paign in New Hampshire has had two
principal objectives. The first has been to document the origin and progress
of the campaign ir. sufficient detail so that it can be examined by those wlio
may V7ish to determine the nature of domestic politics a^-. that pivotal moment in
United States hiptory.
The second objective has been to examine the impact of such an event,
firut in the conte^ct of how votes are translated into political impact (see
Chapter XIV) tnd L:econdly, in terms of the effectiveness of a campaign strategy.
Together, tlie case history, the descriptive discussion of vote impact, end now
the empirical examination of campaign effect,, complete a profile of a political
event that has already significantly affected AiD.erican politics.
To conclude this study the vexing question of the campaign's impact on
vote production must be tested. Did all of the activity make a difference and
mere importantly, does the strategy which guided the campaign offer the politi-
cal scientist a chance to empirically measure its effect?
The quefition to be examined in this concluding section is the empirical
question oi T/hether the campaign efforts produced the McCarthy victory or whe-
ther t:he campaign was merely ancillary to some larger effect such as a national
trend agalxist President Johnson and the Vietnam War.
This question takes on added significance when one examines the aggregate
election results. A cursory examination indicates that McCarthy's vote appears
negatively related to campaign effort. In those large cities and towns where
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tl'c McCarthy caii>paisn wos concentrated the percent return for McCarthy vas less
L)>an in t)'o«e tcwnc where the campaign effort was less or non-exietent
. Was
there a consistently negative relationship between campaign effort and McCarthy's
vote tota;i.? Could it be that the more effort the campaign expended the lower the
percentage vote for McCarthy? Conversely, could it be that by not campaigning in
fi locality the vote for McCarthy increased? A second and equally troubling ob-
Sv-rvation was the positive relationship between percent vote Democratic for
McCarthy and the obvious dominance of a voting district by the Republican Party.
Does it ft)llo;.7, therefore, that v;here Democrats, as a party, are weakest McCarthy
did better and, conversely, where Democrats are strongest McCarthy's percentage
dnclJnes? The strategy adopted by the McCarthy organizers was to prioritize
cauipaigr. efforts according to Democratic primary vote output by voting district;
a strategy which meant that voting districts with relatively fewer Democrats
received less attention from the campaign.
Generalizing from these tv70 descriptive observations it is h.ypot:hcsized
that canpaigu activities on behalf of Eugene McCarthy were: (1) negatively re-
lated to McCarthy's vote in "traditionally" Democratic areas; and, (2) positive-
ly related to McCarthy's vote in "traditionally" Republican areas.
The above hypotheses are consistent with the findings of the post-primary
researchers who concluded that many of those voting for McCarthy were "hawks"
who did not understand McCarthy's position on the war in Vietnam, ^ This conclu-
sion is vuisettling in that it appears to refute the role and effectiveness of
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the HcCarlby can.palj^n. Civon those findings no .i^'niUcant rclntionahip would
appear to exist between the vote decision of a Nev. Hampshire presidential pri-
mary voter mul campaign efforts directed toward influencing that vote decision.
This conclusion, however, fails t-.o consider the complexities of voting be-
havior. Intervening factors may have been operating in the 1968 New Hampshire
primary which marked the "real" effect campaign activities had upon voter choice
and aggregate election outcome (e.g., party identification, socio-ecouomic fac-
tors, etc.). It is these secondary factors which require further study before
making any final judgment about the impact of the campaign's activities on
voter behavior.
Thesis
There is a significant relationship between partisan vote turnout (i.e.,
Republican - Democrat) and McCarthy's vote (r - -.2665, S = .001). This rela-
tionship has not been identified in earlier research on the New Hampshire pre-
sidential primary. Though negatively related to turnout, McCarthy's vote total
v/as positively related to Republican voter turnout (r - .2880, S = .001). Con-
versely, McCarthy's vote \,fas negativcl}'' related to Democratic voter turnout
(r « -.2369, S - .001). The fact that McCarthy's vote was highest in tradi-
tionally Republican areas (i.e., smaller, rural to^vTiis of New Hampshire) and
proportionately lower in Democratic areas (i.e., the larger cities and urbanized
larger towris of New Hampshire) suggests that party identification played a sig-
nificant role in th^' outcome of this election.
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To discover the nature of this relationship It is iir.portant to distinguish
between the rural Rejiublican vote and the rural Democratic vote in New Hampshir
Given the above relationship one might conclude that rural New Hampshire Demo-
crate are distinguished from their Republican neighbors only by party label.
•Rural Democrats covld be seen as voting for McCarthy to weaken the incumbent
president rather than to support an actual candidacy. While this would be a
convenient way to explain the rural Democratic vote for McCarthy it does not
support that conclusion when the characteristics of that vote are exarcined.
The argument fails for two reasons. First, to vote in a primary election
one must have registered to vote not less than 90 days prior to the date of a
primary and be either registered as a Republican or Democrat, or be listed as
an Independent. Only the Independent voter has the option of choosing one or
the other party ballot. This means that a strategy to weaken an incumbent
president would have to be well developed before the close of the registration
period, V7hlch it v;as not, or be successful in drawing Independents into the
Democratic prlmaTy as a protest as opposed to a direct vote for a Republican
candidate with a chance for nomi:iation. The closed registration of the New
Hampshire primary mitigates against cross-over voting for the purpose of weak-
eni^^g candidates. Historically, candidate weakening has occurred in the candi-
date filing stage of the election rather than in t'ne actual voting (i.e., fil-
ing stravj candidates to disperse ethnic votJ.ng blocks).
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Tlie second argument i« ,„ore. difficult to .,ake in that the substantiation
for the arguiBent con-.es. first, from observation and second, from an analysis
th.nt will be. reported subsequently In this chapter. If the rural Democratic
vote were i^erely a label difference between Republican and Democrat, then that
•difference would fade in general elections as the Democrats would tend, logi-
cally, to vote for the Republican candidate. This docs not happen. In fact,
Democrats in dominant Democratic Party cities have tended to support Republi-
can candidates in close elections, while the rural Democrats having Republican
characteristics, iiave remained loyal to the Democratic Party. (See Manchester
in the calculation of the Republican Normal Vote 1S60.) What results from this
observation is a sense of both similarity and difference in the description of
the rural Deiuocratic voter. There is similarity in terms of shared location
and, to varying degrees, socio-economic status, but different in terms of poli-
ticals even ideological persuasion from their Republican neighbors. A reason-
ably strong thread of liberalism tied to the national image of the Democratic
Party tends ro remain among the rural New Hampshire Democrats as opposed to the
more conservative tendency of the New Hampshire Democrats residing in Democratic
Party dominant voting districts. This distinction was explored by Robert Craig
in his exauiination of the efficacy of being a "loyal" Democrat and also a Demo-
crat more closely in agreement with the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy.
(See earlier discussion of Craig findings.)
A part of tills examination lies in a conclusion about party ideological
orientation drav/n by E. E. Schattschneider . He concluded that as one party
came to dominate the politics of a state, conservatives tended to dominate the
politics of that party. For the South the dominant party was the Democratic
and for the North the dominant party was the Republican. In New Hampshire the
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phenomenon that Schattsdmcider identified took several forms. The dominant
party was conservative Republican, principally rural in its base. Though the
Republican l^arty had dominated state politics since the Civil War, its influence
in the cities declined with the industrialization of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century. and the migration of ethnic blocks to these same indus-
trial centers. The industrial centers, though conservative in their politics,
were Democratic by party label.
As Schattschreider notes, the consequence of a decline in competition and
greater conservatism is a decline in turnout and partisan loyalty. While the
two party split in New Hampshire left the state V7ith a dominant rural Republi-
can Party and a dominant urban Democratic Party vrith little inter-party compe-
tition at the local level, at the state level (gubernatorial), and especially
in elections for national office (i.e., congressional and senatorial) competi-
tion was strenuous. Consequently, turnout for both statewide and national elec-
tions has traditionally been high, but the success rate of the Democratic Party
in electing statewide officials has been low until the 1960s and 1970s. In this
century the Democratic Party has controlled the governorijhip for a total of four
terms or eight of the last seventy-seven years. The U.S. Senate has been occu-
pied by Democrats for a total of 22 of the past 154 years of senatorial incum-
bency in this century. The tvjo congiessioncl seats have been occupied by Demo-
crats for a total of seven years in the last 15A years of incumbency iu this
century.
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mat thi,: overwhelming dominance by the Republican Party in actual office-
holding masks is the fact that elections for governor, for Congress in the
First Congressional District, and for the two United States Senate seats have
frequently been close, inter-party contests. Depending upon the candidate and
the times these elections \.-ere decided by narrow margins. The numerical strength
of the urbaa-based Democratic Party has approached that of the rural-based Repub-
lican Party for much of this century. This fact has frequently presented the
dominant Republlcar- Party vrith a substantial challenge lu the larger than local
elections. To continue to dominate these elected offices the Republicans have
had to couriler Democratic Party numbers with a variety of vote dispersing stra-
tegies, first at the candidate filing stage and then by turning out a higher
proportion of their members to vote in the general election. The combination
of these strategies kept Dem.ocrats out of office and out of the state-based
political pover structure that might have converted New Hampshire into a more
obviously competitive two-party state. Part of the failure of the Democratic
Party to vrin largei'-than local elections may also be explained by the fact that
the dominant urban DeBiocratic Party and the dominant rural Republican Party
have often been ideologically compatible, both shared a conservative philosophy
although widely different in terms of ethnic composition and socio-economic
characteristics.
New Kampshiro is illustrative of an additional explanation concerning its
relatively high turnout rate in its elections. Because competition for state
and national offices remained intense in spite of the fact that inter-party
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competition had all but vanished at the local level, turnout in statewide and
congressional district elections had to be sustained in order to preserve the
don^inance of the Republican Party. Reflecting on the phenomenon of high turn-
out rates in electoral situations where neither competition or ideological
difference would prompt such participation, Flanigan noted:
The high rate of turnout may not have been the resulC of
political i'jvolvement by an interested, well-informed
electorate!, but on the contrary, may have been possible
at all only because of low levels of information and in-
terest. A largely uninformed electorate was aroused to
vote by means of extreme and emotional appeals. Presum-
ably these alarming bits of information in the absence
of a more general awareness of what was at stake produced
firm commitments to vote. But, by and large, the parties
iPiuipulated the electorate ™ a manipulation possible be-
cause the electorate was not well informed.
3
The political chronicles of New Hampshire are peppered with legends of how
infoxr:.'jtion was manipulated to influence voting, hew absentee ballots were
solicited to expand rural voting, and how candidacies were filed to disperse
the ethnic voting blocks that gave the Democratic Party potential strength in
statewide elections.''* Through these tactics and the inability of the Democra-
tic Party to either unify in the face of manipulation or to mount its own
counter-of fensi\e, the Republican Party dominated New Hampshire statewide
politics through the 1960s. It is still possible to manipulate the Democratic
vote in Manchester to prevent a Democrat from succeeding to the governorship or
to reduce the vote for a particular candidate, such as McCarthy, by applying
the right last-minute charge or presenting the potential voter with a reason
to vote agair.st a particular candidate. ^ Instead of the party organization as
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t-.ho manipulative and vote ge-neratlng
.ourcc. the activity now 1« carried out
by candidate orgavKlzatious. and
..ost especially, the don,inant information source
In Kew Hampshire, the Hmiclijcs ter
_Unl£^
Given the pattern of party dominance and the description of the dominant
party as being ideologically conservative, a number of alternative consequences
have evolved wliich offer a basis for explaining aspects of the vote which Sena-
tor McCarthy received in the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary.
First, a liberal vote had survived both within the Republican and the
Democratic parties of New Hampshire. In both parties the liberals survived in
the minority but existed through re-enforcement that was partially internal and
partially externr.l to the state. The liberal minority of the Republican Party
survives partially «is a vestige of a once powerful progressive movement that
developed in New Hampshire during the beginning of the 20th century. The des-
cendants of the progressives tended to rem.ain in the Republican Party for
reasons of social status and power. The Republican progressives sporadically
influenced and frequently controlled the Republican Party during the period
through their activism^ financing and administrative skills. In other states
where the progressives had been strong, like Wisconsin, they gradually migrated
to the DemccraLic Tcrty as their own party became more conservative and the
Democrats absorbed the principal themes of progressivism.
6
A second aspect of the surviving liberalism within the Republican Party
comes as a function of New Hampshire's governmental structure and the closed
registration process of tiic primary system. To have inf].uence in the selection
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of a sovernor, the only state official elected statewide, as has been mentioned
before, some liberals, who might otherwise have been Deniocrats, registered as
Republicans in order to participate in the Republican primary. Given that the
Democrats succeeded in electing a governor only four times in the last 77 years,
the Republican gubernatorial primary was viewed by liberal activists as being
the election, not the inter-party contest held in November.
7
What appears, therefore, is a continuum in which liberal Republicans and
liberal Deiiiocrats share concerns and issues but not party label, and conserva-
tive Republicans and conservative Democrats share political perspectives but
not labels. The party label becomes a commodity masking ideology depending upon
an individual's need for social-political status (i.e., a la\\Tyer having to work
closely with the Republican power structure or an ethnic Democrat seelcing a
federal appointment), or sense of political efficacy (e.g., being a Democrat
is to be on the right side of deeply felt social welfare issues, etc.).
Figure 1
Conservative Liberal Liberal Conservative
Republicans Republicans Democrats Democrcits
The continuum, might also be expressed as a circle with the liberals and
the conservatives sharing respective ideological halves of the circle with the
principal distinction being party identification.
As an example how the liberals of the two parties responded to the options
of the 1968 president d.al primary provides a useful case. VJhen Governor Romncy
withdrew as a candidate, for the liberals in the Republican Party several op-
tioiis remained. One, which was most attractive to the strongly identified
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Republican liberal wac to vrite-ln tha name of Governor Nelson Rockefeller on
the Republican ballot. 11,241 Republican voters took this option. Those with
what must be presumed to be less attachment to the Republican Party and. pro-
bably of more liberal inclination, wrote in the naiue of Senator Eugene McCarthy
on Iheir Republican ballots. McCarthy received a total of 5,511 votes from
Republicans. Another 1,778 Republican voters Xvrrote in President Johnson's narae
on their ballots. V.Tiile precise evaluation of the motives of these voters does
not exist, it seeiDS reasonable to assume that the Republican voter writing-in
the nam:-, of a Democrat is in some manner and for some reason misplaced in the
partisan spectrum of New Hampshire. The reason for this misplacing ties back
to the role the respective parties play in the selection of candidates and the
control of the state government as discussed earlier.
A second factor which helps to distinguish the rural Democrat from the
counterpar-t rural Republican and which may help explain the McCarthy vote among
rural Democrats is the strong pull of the national Democratic Party. Those
Democrats who respond to issues and political concerns beyond local and state
politJ.cs tGnd to identify more strongly V7ith the policies of the national Demo-
cratic Party. Wli.lla the liberal wing of the national Democratic Party may not
be significant in the New Hampshire cities, where conservative Democrats have
traditionally coutrollcd local politics, their importance is far more pronounced
in Republican dorr.inated areas.
701
To survive as a liberal Dei.ocrat in a rural community where one is in the
minority both ideologdcally and in terms of partisan preference, required sub-
stantial Ideological re-enforcement. This obser^'ation leads to the conclusion
that high socio-economic status is a pre-condition determining the survival of
the rural Mew Hampshire Democrat, a status that presumes a national political
awareness rather than a more provincial intra-state political orientation. A
powerful individualism does survive in the small New Hampshire towns which,
while not accounted for by normal indicators of socio-economic status, does sus-
tain a few Democrats in Republican dominant areas for that reason alone. To
what extent such pockets of individualism explain a McCarthy vote is not knouTi.
The only test available is one of socio-economic status which will be explored
more fully later in this chapter.
For a number of rural Nev; Hampshire voting districts population growth has
been substantial. A horseshoe of growth communities now extends along the
southeastern border witVi Massachusetts, along the seacoast to Rochester in the
east, and northward through the Merrimack River valley to Laconia. Southeastern-
most ;.\ockiiighaia Count)' v/as among the nation's most rapidly growing counties as
reported by the 1970 U.S. Census.
Many of the in-caigrants are former Massachusetts residents who bring with
them a more liberal and, usually, Democratic political orientation. While the
Republican Party continues to dominate the local politics of many of these
growth communities, a new Democratic Party was growing — one which had not
been influenced by the Democratic Party tradition of the remainder of the state.
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These new No..w Hampohlre DcB^ocrats tend to bo nationally oriented in their poli-
tical perspective and retain Inforn^ation sources, such as the Massachusetts
press and media, that continue their political orientation. It would not be
surprising to find a higher percentage of these growth communities supporting
Senator McCarthy even though the number of Democrats voting are far less than
the number of Republicans voting.
A third factor can only be described as a vote of frustration and dissatis-
faction with the status quo (i.e., an expression of alienation, confusion, or
cross pressure)
.
It is a voce that went to McCarthy because he V7as perceived
to be an anti-ei^tablishment figure, an under-dog. These voters, v;hen registered
as Republicans, tend to follow the editorial lead of William Loeb. He strikes
out in a random manner that dees not reflect a particular consistency nor does
he ask hit; :ceaders to react intellectually. It is gut, yellow journalism which
stimulates an emotional response — especially from those who sense alienation
and frustration in their own lives. ^ in state politics these voters have fol-
lowed Loeb's lead ajnd supported the reactionary, Wesley Pov;ell, in his quest
for public office and more recently, Meldrim Thompson in his incumbency as
govei-nor. In national politics these same voters tend to support Loeb's favo-
rites: Go.ldwater in 196^+, Mixon in 1968, and most recently, Governor Ronald
Reagan.
As Democrats these voters differ v/lth the liberalism of the national Demo-
cratic Party preferring as does William Loeb, candidates like Governor George
Wallace, Mayor Sam Yorty, or Senator Henry Jackson. In the 1968 presidential
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j.rlin.ry Loeb split UhiB bloc of Democrats. He attacked the Johnson cnmpaign for
its endorsements and urged voters to reject them as arrogant and establishment
oriented. The message which Loeb sent was that if being against the establish-
ment was of a high personal priority then one should vote for McCarthy. Since
Loeb could not support McCarthy's anti-war position he garbled this message and
urged the anti-establislunent bloc to write-in Richard Nixon's name on their bal-
lot. 2,532 Democratic voters did this. An unknown number of those Deir.ocrata
did, however, vote their anti-establisliment view and supported the candidate
they felt was anti-establishment, Eugene McCarthy. Robert Craig found a sugges-
tion of this vote v;ithin his analysis of the Democratic voter. Both high and
low socio-economic status Democrats supported McCarthy more strongly than did
middle class Democrats.^
The Socio-Economic Status Thesis: An Empirical Test
Wlien Robert Craig examined the outcome of the 1968 New Hampshire Democratic
presidential primary he focussed on the relevance of socio-economic status (SES)
and the individual vote decision. He did not examine the outcome of the election
(in micro ternis) nor did he attempt to relate the findings of a pre-election sur-
vey to the aggregate election outcome. Three factors did emerge from his analy-
sis that were signif icantJ.y related to individual vote choices. The first was
socio-economic status. McCarthy received proportionately more support among the
higher SES and lower SES Democrats than he did from middle class Democrats. This
finding is supported by the following table and by the summary of pre-election
surveys presented earlier.
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TAISLE 15.01 CANDIDATE PREFERENCE AMONG DEMOCPATS, BY SUIUECTIVF SOCIAL CLASSAND READINESS TO IDENTII^ WITH CLASsio
CANDIDATE PREFERENCE
SOCIAL CLAS S
Yes, Mlddle--Class
No, Middle-Class
(Total MiddlG-Class)
Yes, Work.lng-Class
No, Working-class
(Total Working" Class)
JOHNSON
69.4
87.8
75.1
60.6
56.2
59.8
y2 _ -3/
0.184
McCarthy TOTAL
30.6 100% (2020)
12.2 100% ( 913)
24.9 100% (2933)
39.4 100% (4586)
43.8 100% (1107)
40.2 100% (5693)
3df ,8.001 100% (8748)
Secondly
J the strength of partisan Identification, was positively related
to support for Johnson. Those voters iilth a strong Democratic Party attachment
tended to snpport Johnson while those with a v;eak Democratic Party attachment
and independent voters tended to support McCarthy.
TABLE 15.02 CANDIDATE PREFERENCY BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION^-!
PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Independent Democrat
Weak Democrat
Strong Democrat
CANDIDATE PREFERENCE
McCAPvTHY
. 36.8
41.8
26.2
X2 = 170.063; 2df,s.001
C " .147
TOTAL
100% (1455)
100% (3159)
100% (3065)
100% (7679)
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Thirdly, impliciL ±v. t.ha .bovo finding is an additional factor, political"
efficacy, vhich Craig found was related to the utility of being a loyal Democrat
and Johnson supporter or being an independent Democrat and a McCarthy supporter.
TABLE 15.03 CANDIDATE TREFERENCE BY POLITICAL EFFICACY INDEX12
CANDIDATE PREFERENCE
POLITICAL
EFFICACY INDEX JOHNSON McCarthy TOTAL
1 iiOw hij. ?.cacy 37.4 62.6 100% ( 329)
2 62.5 35.5 100% ( 329)
3 70.2 29.8 100% ( 999)
4 34.9 65.1 100% ( 736)
5 Ambivalent 64.3 35.7 100% (155/0
6 80.1 19.9 100% ( 376)
7 62.5 37.5 100% (2617)
8 36.5 63.5 100% ( 170)
9 High Efficacy 83.7 16.3 100% (1714)
X2 = 783.342; 8df .s.OOl 100% (8824)
C = .286
Of the factors, socio-economic status appears to be the most useful in explain-
ing McCarthy's strength in Republican Party dominated communities. In order to
explore this point the correlation between McCarthy's percent vote and the per-
cent family income $15,000 or more for all New Hampshire cities and towns of
2,500 population or more was tabulated. A second correlation for the same
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cities and towns was run for the percent of ir,dividuals who completed four or
more years of high school. The strongest relationship is between McCarthy vot(
and income with education supporting the direction of the income finding as
shown by the following tableu.
TABLE 15. OA
1 3 1 3
% Family Rank Order Rank Order
% Vote Income Vote Family lnc(
Comroimit^ McCarthy + $15,000 McCarthy
-h $15,000
Berlin 51.7 10.3 27 53
Clareuiont 37.9 12.2 58 45
Concord 53.9 19.6 25 20
Derry A7 .
5
20.5 36 18
Dover 48.0 18. 7 34.5 26
Hudson 49.0 21.2 43 17
Keene 46.7 19.0 39 24
Laconia 39,4 18. 8 56 25
Man Chester 31. 0 15.8 61 35
Nashua 40.7 22.3 50 16
Portsmouth 69.1 13.8 5 42
Rochester 51.0 11.4 30 47
Salen 50.5 23.3 21 .
5
13
Aliens town 39.7 16. 2 55 3A
Aialierst 58.8 40.7 16 2
Bedford 48.0 35.0 34.5 5
Boscavo'en 44.3 11.0 42 49
Charles touTi 41.
9
9.6 47 55
Conway 54.6 11.0 24 49
Durham 84.6 35.6 3 4
Exeter 57.5 17.1 20 29
Far"isiington 56.5 9.5 21.5 56
Franklin. 41.3 14.0 48.5 41
Gilford 61.4 29.9 4 6
Gof fstown 41.3 19.3 48.5 21
Gcrham 51.3 10.9 28 52
Hampton 57.9 19.9 17.5 19
Hanover 85.0 44.1 2 1
Haverhill 40.6 14.2 51 40
Hillsborough 63.8 11.9 9 46
HiuF.dale 60.0 15.0 14 36
Hollis 65.9 23c7 8 12
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TABLE 1.S.0-J (Continued)
' 1 3 1 3
% Vote
McCarthY_
% Family Rank Order Rank Order
Community
Income
+ $15,000
Vote
McCarthy
Family Income
+ $15,000
Hooksett 40.7 17.8 50 28
Hopkinton 51.1 39.7 29 3
Jaf f rey 48.9 15.0 31 36
Kingston 46.8 16.9 37.5 31
Lancaster 59.9 13.0 15 44
Lebanon 48.7 16.6 32 33
Littleton 40.3 9.9 53 54
Londonderry 48.1 19.2 33 22
Meredith 100.0 14.8 1 38
Merrimack 46.8 21.1 37.5 10
Miliord 38.0 16.8 57 32
Newmarket 40,4 11.0 52 49
Nev.T^ort 40.1 11.1 54 48
No. Hampton 66.0 28.8 7 7
Pclham 57.9 22.4 17.5 15
Pembroke 42.6 17.1 44 29
Peterborough 57.7 23.9 19 11
Pittsfield 37.7 9.2 59 57
Plaistow 60.3 23.3 18 14
Plymouth 67.7 17.9 6 27
Raymond 45.8 9.1 40 59
Rye 70,8 28.3 4 8
Scabrook 63.0 11.3 11 47
Somersworth 12.5 19.2 45 22
Swanzey 45.5 13.5 41 43
Tiltou 43.4 10.3 4 53
VJalpole 53.1 14.5 26 39
Winchester 36.1 6.3 60 60
Windham 55.1 28.3 23 8
VJolfeboro 63.2 9.2 5 57
RHO = .5397
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TAHLF, 15.05
1 5 1
•J
Rank Order Rank Oi
% Vote % 4 yrs+ Vote 4 yrs"l"
McCarUiy_ High School McCarthy Hlrh S(
Berlin 51.7 41.5 27 61
Clarcinont 37.9 50.6 58 49
Concord 53.9 62.0 25 11
Derry 47.5 61.2 36 31
Dover 48.0 56.7 34.5 37
Hudson 44 .
0
61.0 43 32
Keene 46.7 61.9 39 29
Lacoxiia 39.4 51.6 56 47
Manchester 31.0 47.5 61 56
Nar.hua 40.7 56.5 50 39
Portsmouth 69.1 67.0 5 17
llochester 51.0 46.3 30 58
Salem 56.5 64.9 21.5 24
Mlenstovrn 39.7 37.9 55 61
Amherst 58.8 76.8 16 7
Bedford 48.0 68.6 34.5 13
Boscawen 44.3 47.7 42 55
Charlestovm 41.9 56.6 47 38
Conway 54.6 70.5 24 8
Durham 84.6 92.0 3 1
Exeter 57.5 65.5 20 21
Farraington 56.5 46.7 21,5 57
Frank! ill 41.3 51.9 48.5 46
Gilford 61.4 67.7 4 16
Gof fstovm 41.3 54.2 48.5 42
Gorham 51.3 50.4 28 51
Hampton 57.9 7f'.7 17.5 4
Hanover 85.0 87.6 2 2
Haverhill 40.6 53.7 51 44
Hillsborough 63.8 54.2 9 42
Hinsdale 60,0 50.5 14 50
Hollis 65.9 73.1 8 11
Kooksett 40.7 52.5 50 45
Hopkinton 51.1 77.0 29 6
Jaf frey 48.9 59.4 31 33
Kingston 46.8 64.3 37.5 25
Lancaster 59.9 62.0 15 27
Lebanon 48.7 60.3 32 26
Littleton 40.3 54.9 53 41
Londonderry 48,1 58.6 33 35
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TABLE 15.03 (Continued)
% Vote % 4 yrs-h
Tuff . . * 1McCarthy Hlgji S
liti L CU. J. un 100.
0
65.3
riti JL I. ..Liiic; CJC 46
.
3
66.2
Mi 1 f n-. ri Jo. 0 68.1
/.A /
'4U. 4 49.4
48.1
to . 0 80. 3
P f\ 1 f*> -I TIT c "7 n5 / . 9 61.3
/. 0H C..O 57 .5
* t- JL U t.- i Uf^H J / . / 75 .8
PJ ttsf told "^7 7 49 .
0
P 1 nij OU . J 66. 9
PI ^Ti A 7 7 ^ "7 O67 .
8
Rayiuoud HJ . O ^o . o
Rye 70.8 77.4
Seabrook 63.0 44.0
SomersK'oith 42.5 41.6
Sv/anzey 45.5 55.8
Tilton 42.4 51.3
Walpole 53.1 65.1
Winchester 36.1 74.2
VJindhaai 55.1 74.2
Wolfeboro 63.2 66.6
Rank Order
Vote
McCarthy
1
37.5
57
52
54
7
17.5
44
19
59
13
6
40
4
11
45
41
46
26
60
23
5
Rank Order
4 yrs+
High School
22
20
14
52
54
3
30
36
8
53
18
15
34
5
59
60
40
48
23
9
9
19
RHO = .5205
The voting behavior studies of the University of Michigan's Survey Research
Center, principally The American Voter
, and work by V.O. Key, Study on the New
.En&land Voter and Rg-All^nroent , -^^ have profiled the sccio-econoraic status of the
American voter and are useful as background for the consideration of the effect
on the New Hampshire presidential primary voter. The Republican Party remains
strong In the rural communities of the East and especially in northern New Eng-
laiTd. The studies show that while for "most social characteristics Democrats,
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K.n,>ublic<'.uis, and Independents are very heterogeneous" the social characteristics
of "partisans and independents indicate that in most ways independents look like
Republicans." The studies contend that both Republicans and Independents have
similar levels of education and income, and the proportions of these individuals
from professional and managerial households are about "30 percent" or "almost
identical among Republicans and Independents." The proportion from "manual
worker households among Independents, about 40 percent, is closer to the propor-
tion among Democrats." The summary notes that Independents are high in both of
these occupational categories because they have lower proportions among farmers
and retireid members of the electorate.
The studies found that the majority of strong Democrats have not graduated
from high school, but there are increasingly higher levels of education among
each of the party Identification categories as one moves toward the strong Re-
publlcar.a. Party loyalists derived from various bases such as ethnic group,
religious group and racial group have blurred socio-economic patterns in the
past, but as these groupings begin to orient less toward their background and
wore toward their socio-economic status the impact is less distinct. As
Flanigan notes, "old loyalties die hard and provide a basis for continuing to
appeal to these groups. "^^ A source of political variation in social groups is
the poGsibility that one group may be Democratic in one comjuunity and Republican
in another
c
To suiiUBarizc, the description of the Republican voter in the dominant Re-
publican voting districls tends to conform to the description of the Republican
voter as a homogeneous class. They hiive been found to have higher levels of
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education, higher incomes and to be politically conservative. As a clans, Demo-
crats tend to be the opposite, lower l^.come, less educated and more liberal.
Vnuilc this categorization e..plains traditional voting patterns in general elec-
tions, it is not particularly helpful in explaining the behavior of higher sta-
tus DemotratH voting in the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary.
What does appear is a relationship between higher SES communities (i,e.,
Republican voter dominated) and a higher Democratic vote for McCarthy. The op-
posite appears also to hold in the lower SES Republican or Democratic Party
dominated communities which voted more heavily for President Johnson. What
emerges, therefore, is a picture of a higher SES comBiunity, producing stronger
vote support for McCarthy than lower SES conmmnities. The presidential primary
voters
s
whether Republican or Democrat, tended to vote more strongly by class
related conservaf ivc/liberal orientation much as they might in a general elec-
ti.on, a major conclusion of Robert Craig's analysis.
In summary, the New Hampshire presidential primary of 1968
appears to have been similar to a Presidential election in
many important ways except one; it was not vievred as a
Presidential election by everyone but took place vjithin the
context of the tradition of the New Hampshire Democratic
Party's Presidential primary. Voters behaved rationally
according to their values and their information and under-
standing to that point. ^•'^
VJhat Crsig d^d not examine was the relationship between socio-economic status
and McCarthy's vote output in strongly Republican voting districts.
A clue that when tied to an examination of these higher SES communities,
begins to explaJn McC£';.thy's success in Republican voting conuuunities
.
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Party Identification
The long-run social and political patterns in the American
electorate appear related. On the other hand, the short-
run impact of social groups on voting behavior appears un-
even and insignificant generally. Occasionally social
groups appear important nationally
... and under certain
'
conditions social cross pressures may operate; but normal-
ly v/e do not expect social factors to shov? the same con-
sistent, strong patterns with vote choice that we have
found with partisanship.-^'
Although the conclusion drawn for the American voter may be correct, conditions
in New Hampshire and in the election studies, may not conform to this view of
the electorate. The dominant position of the Republican Pcirty in rural and
suburban New Hampshire voting districts and its long-term dominance of state
political affairs may have produced a particular Democratic voter in these
comiaunities as revealed by the socio-economic status of that voter. To check
this observation it is important to review party identification findings and
the power of party identification as related to the New Hampshire rural Demo-
cratic electorate.
First, voters have been found willing to identify themselves on a scale
as a "strong Democrat, Democrat, Independent, Republican or Strong Republican."
Such identification is useful to the voter as a means of orienting a political
position, responding to political information and creating a voting decision. '^
Partisanship is expressed by the strength of party identification. A weakness
is expressed by a voter's willingness to shift to vote for candidates of the
other party. For primary elections (i.e., New Hampshire), strength of party
identification translates into either ideological patterns of liberal or con-
servative or patterns similar to inter-party contests, of intra-party loyalty
or independence, as Robert Craig found.
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TABLE 15.06 CMDIDATE PREFERENCE BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND SOCIAL CLASS^^
CANDIDATE PREFERENCE
PARTY
IDENTIFICATION
Independent
Democrat
Weak
Democrat
Strong
Democrat
SOCIAL CLASS JOHNSON MoP ARTVIVn.CLi/\Ki.nX TOTAL
Ygg, Middle 73.3 26.7 100% ( 90)
No, Middle 78.0 22.0 100% ( 300)
Ye&, Working 59.5 40.5 100% ( 773)
No, Working 53.8 46 2 IUOa { 260)
iGK, Middle 60. 3 39.7 100% ( 748)
No, Middle 100.0 0.0 100% ( 258)
Yes, Working 54.2 45.8 100% (1662)
No, Working 46.3 53.7 100% ( 434)
Yes, Middle 72.9 27.1 100% ( 922)
No, Middle 83.3 16.7 100% ( 269)
Yes, Working 72.2 27.8 100% (1579)
No, Working 71.8 28.2 100% ( 245)
100% (7590)
As iioted previously, independent voters, either Republican or Democrat,
tend to be socio-economical].y similar to higher socio-economic status Republi-
cans, Given the Republican dominance of rural politics in New Hampshire seve-
ral consequences for Democrats resv.lt. Strong Democratic Party identifiers
do so as the result of some social or economic benefit which carries a reward
or re-enforcement. \>!he.n the Democrats hold the ^/hite House a limited patronage
system prevails that socially and economically carries a reward. In state
politics minority status may have its rewards through a status conveying appoint-
ment as a minority member of a board or commission.
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On the other .ide, dominance, of local Institutious by the Republicans can
r..ean hardship for Democrats who mu.t work with the power structure of a commu-
nity. This social pressure leads some who might otherwise be Democrats to
register as Republicans or to retain Independent status. These Independent
voters are attracted to vote in primaries only when the issues and/or the per-
sonalities involved are of special concern which stimulates their participation.
The question of party identity has been found to extend further to a sense
of the efficacy of participating politically. Miile Independents have been
found to be less interested in campaigns or concerned with which candidate vriLns,
as is the strong parcisan, there appears to be considerable Independent voter
interest iu election contests. They are not apathetic and disinterested as was
once felt. They do view parties and candidates with the same ideological per-
spective a3 do partisans. "The only difference between Republicans and Demo-
crats; Republicans with their higher level of education are more likely to view
politics ideologically. When this conclusion is extended to the notion of
political efficacy, "that is how significantly one views his political activi-
ties," the results show "no difference between independents and partisans, but
Republicans ha\^e a higher sense of political efficacy than do Democrats . "^^
The picture that can now be dra^vn of the New Hampshire rural Democratic
voter who supported McCarthy is that this voter was likely to be an independent
Democrat, of higher socio-economic status, have attained a higher level of
education, and one who shares residency with Republicans of a similar descrip-
tion. The efficacy of being a Democrat, under the circumstances of minority
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party Btatus. i.ust come from ot:hcr than traditional viewn of group associ.t:! on
,
economic reward, or class identification. The source must he an ahility to re-
ceive and process information derived externally from their local residence.
A description of an Independent carries this message most effectively.
The most nearly correct view of the Independent.
.. is that
Independents are not much interested in politics and
government and certainly not much concerned with partisan
politics — they are not emotionally involved in party
clashes. On the other hand, Independents appear to have
the Infoi-raation and the perspective on political affairs
necessary for an evaluation of the issues and candidates
as competent as could be expected of partisans. Indepen-
dents are no wiser or more virtuous than partisans; nor
are Lhey less so.
Information Cost and Voti
A basic assumption of the rational decision making thesis, as applied to
voting, concerns the ability of the voter to receive and process information
pertinent to the decision they are to make. Such information bears a cost which
Anthony Downs has identified as being of two types: "transferable costs" and
"non- transferable costs .
"
1. "Transferable costs" are simply the costs of gathering information
v;hlch is most often accomplished by others such as the newspapers,
television, and other media, at little or no costs to the users.
The Information gathered in this manner v;ould be exceedingly ex-
pensive for the individual to acquire but as it is prepared for
consumption, its cost to the user is limited to the cost of access
— buying the newspaper, having the radio or television, buying the
magazine.
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2, -Non- transferable costs" are those vhich come once the information
h3B been accessed and involve the actual reading, assimilating,
and digesting of the information once it has been collected. In
this situation only the individual who is required to make use of
the infcraiatlon can bear the cost of internalizing and absorbing
the inf ojrmatioii
.
The thesis assumes that the availability of information is not limited and that
the main costs to be borne are those associated with absorbing the information,
not getting the information.
The follov/ing hypotheses arise from the theory that information access leads
to rational decision making.
1. The amount of information an individual has is a function of
one's ability to bear non-transferable cost and to a lesser
degree the transfernble costs of obtaining information.
2. An individual's ability to bear the costs of obtaining infor-
jnation is a function of that person's leisure time — by lei-
sure time is meant that time not spent in pursuing one's
vocational activity.
3. The amount of leisure time an individual has is a function
of that person's position in society — by position is meant
the class position, socio-economic status, expressed in terms
of material resources which the individual has to command.
The consequence of these hypotheses as related to the functioniiig of demo-
cratic governaient may be summarized as follows:
Individuals of a higher socio-economic status will have
higher levels of infonuation and, therefore, are more like-
ly to behave rationally.
Conversely, individuals of a lower socio-economic status
will be less informed and more likely to act irrationally.
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Those of hlcher socio-economic statue will have a groater ability to ac-
quire information as a function of time, and cognitive skills possessed by
tbo.7e individuals. A campaign, therefore, tries to manage both costs. First
the campaign attempts to package and deliver information at little or no cost
to the voter. Secondly, a campaign seeks to organize the information that the
voter receives in a way that will attract attention and be convincing, consider-
ing limited resources and time available for absorption.
Given that the ability to bear the non- transferable cost increases with
Gocio-econoraic status, the ability to acquire infomation for the purpose of
making a vc;ting decision also increases. The implications of this assumption
for a campaign are that it must concentrate its energy and resources upon
delivering low cost, easily absorbed information to those of lower socio-
economic status with limited time, energy or cognitive skills to absorb infor-
mation. At the same time a campaign must presume that those of higher socio-
economic status can better bear the cost of amassing the information they desire
to make their voting decision and, therefore, the campaign need not exert as
much effort to prepare information that can be absorbed quickly. In fact, a
campaign may neglect the preparation of specific materials for the higher
socio-economic voters assuming that the normal news gathering machinery will
provide th;^ information and analysis which will be most useful to these voters.
From this assessment of information cost and the ability to bear such costs
comes a further description of the McCarthy voter. A rural, higher socio-
economic status, upper educated, Democrat v/ould have greater ability to bear
the noa-transf crable cor.t of making a voting decision. That voting decision
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might ba prompted by the information cources which the individual had or could
access easily. These aources would tend to be. local, state, national and even
interaational in range. The sources would carry Information that pertained to
the individual's vote decision which were more extensive than those packaged
for consumption by the campaign. A campaign strategy which targeted the tra-
ditional bases of Deniocratic Party support and neglected areas of traditionally
limited Democratic Party participation, given the foregoing, appears as an ef-
fective and rational strategy. The traditional Democrats, of lower socio-
economic status would be aided in their decision mfiking by the information
packaging of a campaign. The rural Democrats, of higher socio-economic sta--
tus, would gather at somewhat greater cost, the information upon which to make
their o\m voting decisions vjithout being specifically addressed by the cam-
paign. Frcm this analysis emerges an explanation of why the observed relation-
ship batVv'eeu high Republican vote and high percentage vote for McCarthy occurred.
Research Design: Campaign Impact
The invc;stigation of the question concerning the impact of the McCarthy cam-
paign on votes for McCarthy must rely upon a combination of data sources. The
ques1:ion cannot be evaluated through a carefully developed research design which
examines specific populations vjhich are manipulated for the purpose of testing
the effec?:s of the campaign. Vfhat can be examined are relationships validated
by previous enjpirical findings tested through the examination of the election
results and re-examination of pre-election survey results. Mthough this is not
an ideal situation for the determination of causal effects it may be sufficiently
effective to allow inferences to be dravm concerning the effect of the McCarthy
campaign.
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The data sources for this analysis are the aggregate election results (by
voting district) and voter perceptions and attitudes drawn from the pre-election
surveys. Wliilci it is not possible to compare and contrast the tvo principal
data sources (because the level of analysis in the case of the surveys differs
from that of the aggregate election returns), it is possible to subjectively
infer an explanation for a conmiunity result by describing the community's
socio-economic characteristics, characteristics that have been found to be
significantly related to individual level voting behavior. 25
Research Hypothesis
To test the effectiveness of the campaign, five indicators were selected
which represent campaign activities or response to activities that could be
assigned and evaluated for each voting district. The indicators were; 1.
McCarthy campaign visits; 2. local campaign organization; 3. canvassing;
A. celebrity visit or auxiliary campaign activity; and, 5. newspaper activity
relative to the McCarthy candidacy. The indicators were drawn from those as-
pects of the campaign strategy
' that could be assigned according to levels of
impact. The first four were specific treatments of the campaign which v^ere
applied according to the overall campaign strategy of treating in priority
tliose communities with the strongest record of Democratic primary voting.
The fifty, "newspaper activity," was selected as a reactive or re-enforcement
variable that could be measured in accord with the particular stand a given
daily newspaper took or did not take toward the McCarthy candidacy. It was an
important strategy of the campaign to seek attention for the candidacy through
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New Hampshire daily prc.s and, eventually, editorial s^athy with the candidacy.
Together with the tour selected campaign treatments and the reactive variable of
press attention, a series of discrete variables could be drawn that accurately
represented the basic strategy and tactics which put into operation the McCarthy
CcUiipaign„
To test the ytrength of the campaign as may be reflected in the vote re-
sult the following procedure was employed. Each campaign indicator was opera-
tionalized at the voting district level in terms of actual campaign activities,
and, therefore, represents a ''hard" measure of the conceptualized campaign
variables. Vote totals for McCarthy wore examined across each level of cam-
paign activity to determine those factors associated with McCarthy's victory
in New Hampshire.
Independent Campa ign Variables
.
Ao McCarthy campaign visits:
1. Did not visit or campaign in tlie district.
2. Visited area cluster of voting districts.
3. Visited the city or town.
4. Spolre or caBipaigned extensively in the city or towiv.
5. Campaigned in the city or town more than once.
B. Local campaign organisation:
1. Mo local committee or organization in the district.
2. City or tovm represented by an area or county organization.
3. Local organization motivated and staffed from outside.
4. Local organization locally motivated to support candidacy.
5. Local org;:nlzation pre-dated McCarthy candidacy with related
political activity.
C. Caiwassing
1. City or town not canvassed.
2. City or town canvassed.
3. City or tovm canvassed with call-back.
D. Celebrity visit or auxiliary campaign activity^^
1. No celebrity visit or auxiliary activity.
2. Celebrity visit and/or auxiliary activity in the cluster of
voting districts.
3. Celebrity visit to the voting districts.
A. Celebrity visit and auxiliary activity in the voting district.
E. Nev7spaper activity
1. New Hampshire daily newspaper serving the voting district
neutral to McCarthy.
2. New Hampshire daily newspaper serving the voting district
pro-McCarthy.
3. Nev7 Hampshire daily newspaper serving the voting district
anti-McCarthy.
In addition to the five campaign variables previously operationalized
,
sixth factor which measured the priority assigned the voting district was s
died. This variable is operationalized in terms of descending rank, with
higher rankings receiving a greater effort for campaign activities.
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While there were many other activities of the campaign that related to the
campaign strategy, few others could be assigned specifically to voting districts
Much of the other activity, such as radio advertising, either was not sufficient
ly discrete to allow for even gross measurement at the district level, or was
not varied enough to provide a meaningful test of campaign effect.
Using the five indicators as measures of campaign activity, the following
hypotheses should be true.
1. Turnout in voting districts whore the campaign activities occurred
will be significantly higher than in districts where these activi-
ties did not occur.
2. McCarthy's vote is positively related to the amount of campaign
activity on the candidate's behalf.
3. Campaign activities on behalf of McCarthy's candidacy are signifi-
cantly related to vote totals for McCarthy in traditionally Demo-
cratic voting districts.
4. Campaign activities v^ill have the greatest impact on voter behavior
in districts characterized by liigher socio-economic status voters.
The second question to be addressed by this analysis pertains to the
strong shox>7ing McCarthy registered in normally strong Republican voting dis-
tricts. The following hypotheses offer an empirically testable explanation of
the election outcome^
1. Democratic vote perceiitages for McCarthy arc positively related
to Increased voter turnout.
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2. Democratic vote percentages for McCarthy are positively related to
increased Republican percentage of the total primary vote cast
election districts.
3. Democratic voting for McCarthy in traditionally Republican dis-
tricts is a function of socio-economic characteristics of the voter.
A. The percent vote for McCarthy is positively related to campaign ac-
tivities on behalf of the McCarthy candidacy.
The Analysis; McCarthy Vote and Turnout
lixamining the bi-variate relationship between percent vote for McCarthy and
turnout for all election districts we observe a negative correlation (R = -.2369
P- .001). This evidence suggests that the McCarthy candidacy is more closely
patterned after a traditional Republican candidacy in its appeal to Republican
like voters. This conclusion is further supported by the correlation between
percent McCarthy vote and voter turnout in predominantly Republican areas
(R = -f.2801 P~ .001).
Within Republican communities McCarthy received greater Democratic voter
support with higher voter turnouts. As hypothesized earlier (see p. 15-30,
Information Coac and Voting), McCarthy's candidacy had its greatest appeal to
high SES Democratic voters. These voters were fouxid to be residents of pre-
dominate Republican communities, therefore, accounting for McCarthy's relative
strength, i-e., among N.ll. DemooratSj in predominantly Republican communities.
Each of the independent campaign variables was correlated with the percent
Democratic vote for McCarthy and with the vote result in each New Hampshire elec-
tion district (N = 299). 27 i,, addition to the bi-variate correlations, a multi-
variate analysis was employed in order to assess the additive and interactive
effects of these campaign activities on the outcome of the election.
As the following table indicates (Table 13.07) each of the independent cam-
paign variables was significantly related to the percent Democratic vote cast
for McCarthy.
TABLE 15.07 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN McCARTIlT VOTE AND INDICES OF C.^vMPAIGN EFFORT
Campaign Local Campaign Canvassing Auxiliary Newspaper
Or^anir.at ion Activities Activities Activity
.5851-''^
.4562* .5842* ,5054* ' --.1601*
(P Kiguificant at the .05 level)
With the exception of newspaper activities all of the independent measures
of campaign activity were approximately equal in their relationship to the de-
pendent variable. The effect, however^ of local newspaper coverage did not
produce a strong relationship to the McCarthy vote total. As expected, the re-
lationship xjas negative suggesting that the influence of the conservative
Manchester Union Leader, though not substantial, did produce a lower percent
of the vote for McCarthy.
As mentioned, it is possible that each of the campaign variables does not
tap a unique dimension, and thus their collective explanatory power would pro-
duce a misleading impression regarding the effectiveness of the McCarthy cam-
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paign. Though a reasonable intercorrelatlon would be expected between campaign
Indices, it is thought that each activity made a unique contribution to the
McCarthy result in New HaiBpshire. In order to assess the independent effect of
each campaign activity the partial correlation coefficients for each cm^paign
activity and the precent of the vote for McCarthy were examined.
TABLE 15e08 PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BET\JEEN McCARTlIY VOTE Al^ID INDICES OF CWi^IGN
ACTIVITY
—
Campalgrx Local Campaign Canvassing Auxiliary Newspaper
-IlPlJj-g ^^~lj:l§l==- ^c'^^vities Activities Activity
.7615^'
.0231
-.0341
.6573* -.4675''^
*NOTE: Partial coefficients provide for relationships between independent
and dependent variables, controlling for all other independent varJ.-
ablesj in this case, all other campaign activities.
Based on the partial correlations only three coinpaign .-.Indices (i.e., cam-
paign visits, auxiliary activities, and newspaper activity) were analyzed in a
regression model. (Note: Exclusion of the other two v:as based on the absence
of un.^que contribution in the explanation of the dependent variables.)
TABLE 15.09 REGRESSION EQUATION TOR CA>IPAIGN INDICES AND McCARTlIY VOTE TOTAL
IN NEW HAMPSIilPvE
Indlce Beta Std. Error
Campaign Visits
Auxiliary Activities
Newspaper Activity
Multiple R - .6929
Multiple r2 - ,48012
F - Ratio Sign. .000
.4972
.4765
-.106
Significant Level
.005
.113
.203
.005
.003
.003
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As the above table indicate, the three cui.paign indices account for nearly
50 percent of the variation in the dependent variable - percent McCarthy vote.
As Indicated in the previous correlation analysis, cair.paign visits and auxiliary
campaign activity account for most of the explained variance with nev/spaper ac-
tivity accoi.ntins for less than five percent of the variation in McCarthy vote
totals.
For the analysis used in this section it has been possible to select only
five of the numerous activities that are presumed to contribute to the outcome
of a campaign. The five selected offered measures that could be quantified end
related to specific voting district results. Other activities, as described in
the case study, may be more pov/erful, and even more interesting as explainers,
but because they vjcre either too discrete or not discrete enough it has been
necescary to concentrate on the ones that offer quantifiable variation. To
fully explore and, perhaps, understand the impact of a campaign it vjould be
useful to be able to evaluate other variables in a fashion similar to those
considered above. The outcome of such an analysis might permit future campaigns
to be structured more efficiently.
As Senator Eugene McCarthy discussed with his New Hampshire leaders, it was
his hope that his effort in 1968 might change aspects of the campaign in American
politics. He noted that since the earliest campaigns, new practices have been
added to the process vriLth fcvi,', if any, being discarded along the vray. As a
result, he felt, campaigns have become exceptionally complex, expensive, exces-
sively demanding upon the energy of both candidate and campaign, and with little
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concern for how most ef flciontly the conununlcation process misht be facilitated.
To McCarthy it appeared that each campaign invented a new device or activity
that then became grafted to future cairpaigns without son^ething being discarded.
It is hoped that this analysis and the case study of the McCarthy campaign as-
sist in this effort. First by describing how the campaign developed and was
carried out, and second, by analyzing aspects of the campaign in order to test
their impact.
When examining the partial correlation coefficients an interesting pattern
is identified. The relationships between McCarthy's vote total and those cam-
paign activities chiiracterized as purely local in emphasis (i.e., local cam-
paign organization and canvassing activity) failed to produce significant rela-
tionships when controlling for the other campaign indices. Interestingly these
factors v/hich remained significantly related to the dependent variable x^ere
those campaign activities which can be characterized as external or statewide
in impact. Campaign visits and auxiliary activities/celebrity visits were sig-
nificantly related to McCarthy's vote total independent of all other activities.
This would suggest that local campaign activities either were insufficient to
produce a McCarthy vote (independent of other activities) or, more plausible,
that local campaign activities were merely surrogates of the state campaign
strategy and reflected that factor. This hypothesis will be tested later when
geographical and partisan variations on the impact of campaign activities are
examined. (See page 15-48, "The Campaign Variables and Republican Areas.")
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Finally, the effect: of newspaper activities clearly was masked by other
campaign activities. When controllins for the effect of local and state coor-
dinated activities, it was found that newspaper activities were significantly
related to McCarthy's vote. Consistent, however, with the earlier bi- variate
findingG, the impact of newspaper coverage was generally negative for McCarthy
(related by the dominance of the Manchester Union Leader in the principal Demo-
cratic vote produciiig center of the state). The partial correlation which is
substantially larger, reflects the significant negative impact newspaper
coverage had on McCarthy's candidacy when controlling for the otherwise posi-
tive effect of campaign activities.
The five campaign variables accounted for more than 75 percent of the
variation in McCarthy's vote total in normally Republican areas. This repre-
sents nearly a 25 percent increase over the strength of the same multi-variate
model for all voting districts. Interestingly, the beta s, i.e., standardized
partial correlation coefficients, indicate that those campaign variables
characterized by state vride orientation such as campaign visits, auxiliary
activ," ties , '^^ and newspapers, were most explanatory of the dependent variables
— percent vote for McCarthy. This would suggest that the same factors con-
tributing to McCarthy's candidacy statewide were substantially more effective
in adding to McCarthy's electoral showing in predominantly Republican areas.
The effc'ct of newspaper coverage in Republican areas was positively related
to McCarthy's vote total, suggesting that editorial and news coverage in Repub-
lican areas tended to provide McCarthy v/ith a positive voter exposure. This
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finding relates well with the characteristics of New Hampshire's daily and
also, weekly newspaper circulations. The newspapers that circulate in the
higher GGcio-economic conununities tended to be those that either supported
McCarthy or presented hir, candidacy in a favorable light. The Manchester Union
Leader, while being the dominant circulation daily newspaper in New Hampshire,
tends to have its impact in its home area, predominantly Democratic Manchester.
The higher SES areas, aleo normal Republican areas, tend to be served by the
regional daily press as has been discussed earlier. These regional newspapers,
such as the Concord Pp-ily Monitor
.
Lebanon Valley News , Keene Sentinel, and the
Portsmouth Herald, arc the dominant news sources not only in their cities but
within regions that contain many of the normally Republican communities that
supported McCarthy's candidacy heavily. The role of the press is significant
as shown by these findings. The impact of the two other variables, campaign
visits and auxiliary activities, depend upon the press for impact as well.
The effect of campaign activities on McCarthy's vote in predominantly
Democratic areas was significantly less pronounced than either for Republican
areas, or for all election districts.
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RESULT OF KULTIPLE REGRESSION WITH CAMPAIGN VAJUABLES EXPLAINING
PERCENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY VOTE RECEIVED BY McCARTUY INDEMOCRATIC AREAS
Variable Beta Std. Error
Campaign Visits
.109
.187
Loca] Oreanizat i on
. 203
Canvass 991 IT/
. 114
Auxiliary Activity
.104
.307
Newspaper
-.308
.001
Multiple R = .5633 P - .05
Multiple r2 = .44 N = 19
F- Ratio = 13.45
The Campaign Variables and Republican Areas
It was earlier hypothesized that the effect of the McCarthy campaign would
be more pronounced in higher socio-economic status Republican areas. This hypo-
thesis vrould account for the aggregate voter pattern observed earlier. Here,
McCarthy's percent of the Democratic vote v.'as positively related to Republican
30
voter turnout. * The evidence in the table below substantiates the hypothesis
that McCarthy's vote \7as positively related to high status Republican communities.
?31
TARLE 15.1 J psULT OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION WITH CA^ffAIGN VARIABLES EXPLAININGPERCENT OF DEMOCIUTIC PRIMARY VOTE RECEIVED BY McCARTUY IN
REPUBLlCi\N C0MIUNITIES31
Variable Beta Std. Error
Campaign Visits
.5A8'^
.006
Local Organization
.003 ^104
Canvass
.105*
.116
Auxiliary Activity
.472*
.065
Newspaper
.39A'''
.049
Multiple R = .8735 P - .05
Multiple r2 - .7603 N « 38
F- Ratio = 28.76
As in the case of &11 voting districts the influence of newspaper coverage
tended to be negatively related to McCarthy's electoral performance in predomi-
nantly Democratic areas. Other campaign activities tended to have a neutral
(i.e., insignificant relationships) effect on the McCarthy vote total. This
supports the general thesis that McCarthy's New Hampshire campaign was effec-
tive among higher SES voters, which tended to be most numerous in predominantly
Republican areas.
Conclusions
The results of the two Inquiries are now complete. The analysis of the
celectcd campaign variables demonstrated that there was a significant relation-
ship between the treatments of the campaign and the vote output for McCarthy.
Without the information that these campaign activities provided the primary
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vote result for McCarthy would have been slgnif iciuitly less. McCarthy would
have attracted far fewer votes than he did among voters in Democratic areas, the
principal target of the campaign, and among Democrat:ic voters in Republican
areas, the surprisingly productive localities for McCarthy.
The second inquiry was the investigation of the strong McCarthy showing
among Democrats residing in normally Republican districts. This analysis identi-
fied the relationship between higher socio-economic class voting districts and
the increased percentage vote for McCarthy. Since only those registered as Demo-
crats or Independents vrho selected the Democratic Party's presidential primary
ballot, could vote in the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary, the analysis
led to the conclusion that Democrats and Independents residing in normally Repub-
lican voting districts tend to share Republican socio-economic characteristics.
Wlien the analysis was controlled for partisan areas (i.e., Democratic/
Republican) the relationship between campaign activities and McCarthy's vote
V7as positive and statistically significant. In the higher SES normally Repub-
lican voting districts those campaign variables that related to the information
absorbing capacity of higher SES groups v;ere also connected to the vote output
for McCarthy. Newspaper coverage, of the five, was the most powerful in normal-
ly Republican voting districts — a variable that relates closely to the
ability of higher SES groups to bear non-transferable information costs.
From this conclusion it is possible to state that the relationship between
socio-economic status and the ability to bear non-transferable information cost
is proven. Downs' thesis concerning Information costs, when tested in the con-
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text of th. 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary, proved that the ability to
gather and internalize inlor.atiou was essential but also that ability was aided
by the efforts of the campaign. The analysis showed that those with less re-
Bouvce strength, who tended to reside in lower SES, and predominantly Democratic
areas, were less able to bear the non-transferable costs of vote information.
The election returns showed that differentiation. As a result it is reasonable
to extrapolate that higher SES Democrats residing in Democratic areas, with
independent partisan inclinations, were more likely to be attracted to McCarthy,
as w^re those of similar characteristics residing in normally Republican areas.
Information cost and the ability to bear that cost were important aspects
of the McCarthy campaign strategy that the McCarthy leaders devised, although
not fully understood. The energy of the campaign was targeted to reach those
eligible voters who were concentrated in the predominantly Democratic areas or
areas that tended to produce significant Democratic primary votes. The stra-
tegy called for the use of campaign tactics that would maximi;ie information
flow. As the campaign evolved, this strategy was expanded not just to position
paperF>, speeches, brochures and direct mail, but also to interactive canvassing,
auxiliary activities and media programming. While these techniques were concen-
trated within the predominantly Democratic areas of the state, the campaign was
able to reach, both directly and indirectly through the media, most of the more
populous voting districts. VJlthout the foregoing analysis, one might conclude
that the campaign failed in reaching the targeted Democratic population.
McCarthy's percentage of the Democratic vote in the heavy vote producing cen-
ters such as Manchester and Nashua was significantly less than that which
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McCarthy attracted elsewhere. To have reached this conclusion without looking
further at both the i.pact of the ca..paign and the vote output would lead the
casual observer to sumvise that the vote returns for McCarthy were inversely
proportional to the effort assigned by the campaign strategy. This conclusion
fails. The campaign has been shovai to have succeeded. It provided information
for those with the resources to internalize that information and use that infor-
mation to shape a vote decision. The campaign succeeded in attracting voters
through its direct efforts, within the predominantly Democratic areas, though
with loss success than it had within the nomally Republican areas.
In conclusion, the campaign that was devised to support McCarthy's candidacy
was uniquely suited to its task and, as importantly, to the candidate. The ef-
fort v;as properly conceived, effectively operated, and produced the desired
result. If there had been a point of inconsistency in the mix between campaign
and candidate or between campaign and voting population the effort would have
failed. Both the campaign and the candidate were credible and were conveniently
translated into information that was within the capacity of those able to bear
higher non-transferable costs to aboorb. If it had not been able to find this
tone and had not received the interest of those who bear the transferable costs
the result would have been much less than significant.
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• The following table is a
related to the percent vote Podum'^ """"'l?' ^"^^r^" '^'"^ ''"'^ McCarthy as
Ing districts.
^ ""^"^
'"''^ l^ep blican (i.e., the noriT.al vote) by selected vot-
TABLE 15.12 VOTE /iNALYSIS OF DISTRICTS OF 2.500 POPULATION OR MORE BY PERCFNTVOTE MCCARTHY AND PERCENT VOTE N0R11.M.LY REPUBLICAN
'^°5?. ^^^^ Order Rank Order
Vote Normal
McCarthy Re£ub_lican Vote
% Vote
Coniinunity McCarthy (No iTD T \
Berlin 51.7 38. 7
Clareiiiont 37.9 41. 9
Concord 53.9 45.0
Derry 47.5 67.5
Dover 48.0 59.1
Hudson 44 .
0
49.2
Keene 46.7 49.3
Laconio 39.4 49.5
Manchester 31.0 50.8
Nashua 40.7 33.8
Portsruouth 69.1 59.3
Rochester 51.0 54,2
Salem, 50.5 60.8
All tnstowii 39.7 27,4
/uiiherst 58.8 74.0
Bedford 48.0 65.0
Boscawen 44.3 50.4
Charles town 41.9 61.1
Conway 54.6 77.4
Durham 8^1.6 49.2
Exeter 57.5 65.1
Farmington 36.5 66.8
Franklin 41.3 38.9
Gilford 61.4 59.4
Gof f stowii 41.3 60.4
Gorham 51.3 47.6
Hampton 57.9 69.4
Hanover 85.0 39.8
Haverhill 40.6 64.4
Hillsborough 63.8 68.3
Hinr;dale 60.0 59.9
Hoi lis 65.9 75.9
Hooksctt 40.7 60.3
Hopkinton 51.1 56.7
Jaf f rey 48.9 51.9
Kingston 46.8 77.7
Lancaster 59.9 61.4
Lebanon 48.7 37.8
27 55
58 51
25 50
36 17
34.
5
33
43 46
39 45
56 44
61 42
50 58
r
5 32
30 39
21. 27
55 60
16 9
34.5 20
42 43
47 25
24 6
i 46
19
21.5 18
48.5 54
4 31
48,5 28
28 49
17.5 14
2 53
51 21
9 15
14 30
8 7
50 28
29 37
31 40
37.5 5
15 21
32 56
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TABLE 15,12/Foot;iote. #29 (Ccnlinued)
Littleton
Londonderry
Meredith
Herrljmack
Mllford
Newmarket
Newport
No. HaxDpton
Pelhaiu
Pembroke
Peterborough
Pittsfield
Plolstow
Plymouth
Raymond
Rye
Seabrook
Somersworth
Swaiizey
Til ton
Walpole
Winchester
Windham
Wolfeboiro
% Vote
McCarthy
40.3
48.1
100.0
46.8
38.0
40.4
40.1
66.0
57.9
42.6
57.7
37.7
60.3
67.7
45.8
70.8
63.0
42.5
45.5
42.4
53.1
36.1
55.1
63.2
% Vote
Republican
(Normal)
Rank Order
Vote
McCarthy
Rank Order
Normal
Republican Vote
67. 7 J J 16
71. 3 JD 11
74.
0
1 9
60. J/ . _> 29
61.3 Ji 24
37 .5 57
55.7 JH 38
79.2 7 3
51.5 J./ . j> 41
40. 8 52
69.5 i J
61.
1
SQ
64.1 13
79.0 6 4
79.4 40 2
69.7 4 12
74.9 11 8
33.3 45 59
48.6 41 48
57,7 46 36
58.4 26 35
58.5 60 34
64.4 23 21
81. 8 5 1
RUG - .7299
N = 62
^^Rcpublican areas are defined as those voting districts where the normal
Republican vote was 53 percent or greater. For the purposes of the analysis,
the 1960 ^^ereral election was selected to determine the normal Republican vote
by voting districts having a population of 2,500 or more persons, U.S. Census
of the Population 1970.
-^Philip E. Converse, et.al., Elections and the Political Order
,
"The
Concept of a Normal Vote," (New York: John Wiley &~Sons, 1967), p. 9-40.
Studenta of the American political system have marvelled at the success
of the check, and balances built into the tri-partate constitutional structure
of the federal govern.;ent. Recognized as veil has been the ability of the
party system to absorb social change and to avoid doctrinaire positions that
would frag-Tieat aad polarize society. These systems have been credited with
allowing the political structure to change and to respond to an evolving civi-
lization. Unque3tionably a remarkabJe feat given that the government ame
from revolution and revolution has been held as an appropriate recourse should
tyranny sprout from the government.
Uhat has escaped the view of observers are the less obvious safety valves
that have evolved as a consequence of both the constitutional structure and
the party system. In an area where the constitution was notably imprecise,
the selection of the president, there has been continuing democratization.
First the congressional caucus, then the national convention, and most recent-
ly, tha revitalization of the presidential primary. In an earlier period of
crisis, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a series of
major reforms of the political system occurred, i.e., the direct election of
United States senators, women's sufferage, and enactment of the primary elec-
tion. While the primary was widely adopted for the selection of candidates for
lesser offices, its use in the selection of presidential candidates stagnated
by 1920. The fact that one state, New Hampshire, preserved the institution
and modified It to produce an early media event, appeared of little signifi-
cance across the broader spectrum of political institutions. New Hampshire
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kept: the primary because it fit the progressive notioa of the electoral pro-
cess; it could be run offJcier.tly a.s a part of the annual town meeting, and
It offered local politicians access to national politics
. From this combi-
nation of progressivism and pragmatism there survived the New Hampshire
presidential primary; an event because it was the first test of a presidential
nominating season and because it responded well to the thirst of the new
electronic media.
For most, and particularly the political scientists, the primaries and
especially the New Hampshire primary, appeared to contribute little to the
final selection cf a presidential candidate. True there had been important
early tests in New Hampshire for Eisenhower in 1952 and for John F. Kennedy
in 1960, but in the sum total of convention politics, New Hampshire's contri-
bution faded considerably as any nominating season progressed.
1968 began with serious national crises. The Vietnam War, the impact of
the military draft, turmoil in the cities, the earlier promise of the Johnson
administration dimmed, young people were in revolt, and a cloud of repression
seemed about to shade the nation. The massive power of the federal government
was doirinated by what appeared to be an invincible President who headed an
administration that seemed determined not to heed the signs of crisis and dis-
affection. Among many there was a sense of desperation. There seemed to be
no way to attract attention, much less to get the government to change its
policies. Radical groups, radical politics, and talk of direct action became
part cf the political currency of the late 1960's. The political system,
to many, was bankrupt. The political parties were the same. Officeholders
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eit-hcr dldn'L listen or were too frightened to act. The system did not work.
There would be no time for politics. There had to be immediate results.
In the face of such pervasive pessimism and frustration social upheaval
is often the result. Violent actions, venting deeply felt convictions, while
not a part of the American political process, were certainly not beyond possi-
bility.
A safety valve works when the normal processes uf a system do not. There
were safety valves in the American political system of the late 1960's. These
were not automatically functioning devices but political structures that re-
quired the manipulation of individuals. An important, but unrecognized safety
system were the presidential primaries and of these, New Hampshire was the
first.
Like a good safety valve, the New Hampshire primary was ready to serve
and was easily used. Simply, it just had to be recognized for what it might
become. What the New Hampshire primary offered was more than a release of
potentially destructive energy, the primary could also divert energy to a
productive purpose. The New Hampshire presidential primary safety valve was
uniquely suited to its purpose. It was first; it was not expensive to cam-
paign in New Hampshire; the campaign and the results would receive widespread
attention; it was easy to be a candidate in the primary; and it was reason-
ably easy to organize a campaign in the state.
The prerequisites were simple as well. There had to be a candidate or
at least the name of a candidate. There had to be an indigenous organization
for the candidate, and there had to be at least some money with which to sup-
port a campaign. Otherwise the primary offered an open season to the New
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Ha..pshire voter. There were no convoluted party structures, complex rules,
massive signature requirements, or conformance with formal or informal do's
or don'ts to stand in the way of a contest. That was the way the New Hanip-
shirc presidential primary was in 1967 and that Is the way it remains.
When frustration had reached its peak a few individuals, both across the
nation and in New Hampshire, felt that it was woruh trying the political sys-
tem once more. The quadriennal time lock on presidential politics was about
to open.
What is important about the preceeding case study is that while a poli-
tical institution like a presidential primary is a neutral and lifeless form,
it has the capacity to produce results if properly used. The key to its suc-
cess comas from individuals acting alone and together to attract others to
respond and to express their ovm concerns. Without the interpersonal connec-
tions that were made in the early stages, without attracting individuals
knew the New Hampshire political environment, it is possible that the politi-
cal safety valve of the New Hampshire primary might have failed in 1968. It
might liave been too late to make the test in other primaries.
For the future, the New Hampshire presidential primary remains to be
used again to release energy or divert energy, to dissipate ill-conceived
ventures, and to revitc^lize the political system. It may not be called upon
to function as it did in 1968 again, but the fact that it succeeded then has
not only justified its future but has produced a prodgeny of other primaries
and nominating process reforms that may mean redundence for the political
safety system.
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For the political scientist tied to the theories of party responsibility
and convention brokerage, 1968 came as a rude shock. The results of the pri-
maries and the machinations of the Chicago convention uncovered a nominating
system that had lost the capacity to respond to the public. Delegates were
selected through processes that began as much as four years preceding the
convention they would attend. The students of the much taunted responsible
party had failed to examine how the party selected its presidential candidates
and who actually performed its nominating chores. The hodge-podge of caucuses,
conventions, delegate appointments, delegate selection and preferential pri-
maries produced confusion which appeared to defy democarcy. In many states
the few who understood the nominating process often held that information as
a corporate secret.
For political science it may be said that 1968 marked the end of one
era and the beginning of another. During the decade preceeding 1968, poli-
tical scientists had advocated the vertically integrated responsible political
party structure. Almost at the same time as this conception of politics v;as
being pronounced, a noticeable decline in the allegiance of the electorate
to a political party had begun. In place of the party had emerged the candi-
date as an independent; personality, capab]e of translation via the new medium
of television. Instead of being a functionary of the party and the recipient
of its rewards, the new candidate sought a personal identity, often created a
separate campaign organization, solicited separate financial backing, and
relied upon the public relations or advertising specialist as the new cam-
paign manager. The phenomenon of the modern campaign evolved without much
attention from the political scientist.
mes
were novr
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After 1968 things seemed to change. Political science and campaign
management began to see that one had something to offer the other. Voting
behavior research provided a theoretical underpinning for the pragmatism and
applied management of the new campaign professional. Campaign techniqi
that had once been viewed as hucksterism by the political scientist
being subjected to tests of effectiveness. Campaigns became sophisticated,
not simply in their organization and selection of tactics, but also in the
allocation of resources and expenditures of energy. Whether it was the wide-
spread participation of social scientists in the McCarthy campaign that brought
campaigns to the attention of researchers, or simply a natural convergence,
politics before 1968 and after 1968 were viewed differently.
The McCarthy in New Hampshire case study documents events and issues,
and the interaction of personalities and institutions across the total fabric
of the campaign. In this effort it fills a void by going beyond the head-
lines back to the people and actions that shaped the news and produced the
electoral result. The study attempts to capture the mood of the times, the
sense of desperation, and quixotic quest. In hindsight, from the persepctive
of the present, 1968 appears almost as an even unreal time. The American
Broadcasting System's 1978 program title, "1968 A Crack in Time," captures
the essence of that year. Since then there has been a convergence not just
in political science between campaign management and electoral process re-
search, but also a convergence in the social condition of the present era.
The individual emerged from the fray of the late 1960's with a healthy skep-
ticism concerning policies, personalities, institutions, and the capabilities
of. others as well as oneself. Society became both simpler and more complex,
l^ere once institutions were expected to deliver societal benefits the indi-
vidua] found personal responsibility to be as effective. Where problems had
once appeared capable of solution, i.e., eliminate poverty, rebuild the
cities, assure society's benefits to all, there emerged a resignation that
there vlll be a continuing struggle.
As the individual had come to the fore in New Hampshire, the action of
individuals began to replace a sense of helplessness with participation.
From r.he skepticism that generated this new participation has come an era of
change reflected by new legislation and attitudes as diverse as open meeting/
open information laws, environmental protection statutes, campaign finance
disclosure laws, and other evidence of the worth of the individual. The in-
dividucil has standing before the institutions of society, standing that ap-
proaches equity. Since 1968 many safety valves have been inserted in the
American body politic. The prospect of a runaway government that loomed awe-
somely in 1968 is now v/idely constrained. The countervailing force appears
to be the responsible individual. A person much like that which emerged from
the heat of the New Kairpshire presidential primary and went on to become the
phenomenon of the McCarthy movement of 1968.
As the case study documents, transforming a notion of protest into a
viable political force requires an appreciation for the unique political cli-
mate of New Hampshire, the character of the candidate, the mood and recepti-
vity of the voter, and the ability to construct a strategy that would meld
these facotrs into a political canpaign. The nalti-faceted venture that
became the McCarthy New Hampshire campaign relied upon personality, issues,
comm-mications, organization, and especially management. Gaining the atten-
tion, cooperation, and full participation of diverse interests and persona-
lities required not only a deeply shared goal, but a willingness to serve
that goal with conviction and sacrifice. There was from the beginning but
one reward, that being the sense of satisfaction that comes from trying in
spite of what seemed to be insurmountable odds. The difference between 1968
and the campaign years before the campaign years after is the sense of deep
personal commitment that came from within the individual when he or she
decided co join the McCarthy campaign. Before March 12th that commitment
was personal. It could not be said that the candidate was the pied piper.
The issues of war and social disintegration demanded conviction and sensi-
tivity that extended beyond the attraction of a candidate. It is for this
reason that the experience of McCarthy in New Hampshire 1968 was intense.
It is also for this reason that the documentation of that campaign survives.
The event and the time were unique. The methods of the campaign, its stra-
tegy, its tactics, and its management were in many ways similar to hundreds
of campaigns both before and since. For the student of the electoral process
the case study is transferable with evidence capable of further examination in
other con':exti; . For the political historian the case documents an important
political event. For the observer of the American electoral process the case
study affirms the vit:ility of the political system and its ability to absorb
social conflict and to channel that conflict in the direction of institutional
and even societal change.
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Tho ii.pact of the New Hampshire result contained both an inunediate and
a continuing response. The nature of the contest between an obscure United
States senator, an active candidate, and an incumbent president, a write-in
candidate, made a pyrrhic victory possible. In conventional terms 42 percent
against A8 percent of the vote would be a defeat, but in the context of a
presidential primary 42 percent was a victory for the challenger. A victory
that foretold for the incumbent president a trend that would be difficult to
reverse. Understanding that political victory may be less than actual victory
was aa important lesson learned from 1968 in New Hampshire. From a primary,
that many had tnought to be a meaningless contest, came a message. A message
that a distressed public, a substantial minority of the society, had sought
ineffectively tu convey by other means. Votes cast within a recognized elec-
toral event could not be denied. The message became even clearer as the full
results were probed. With Republican ballot write-in votes totalled for both
candidates, the result vras only a few votes short of the President Johnson's
48 percent total. Protest that had been scrugged aside before March 12, 1968,
was now institutionalized as part of the presidential nominating process.
\\fhile it might be enough to document the campaign and to assume that it
led to the electoral result, for a political scientist that would not be an
adequate analysis. There is nothing either i.n the campaign or in the result
that by itself supports the thesis of a cause and an effect. The campaign
was not organized to test empirically the causal nature of campaign activity
but aspects of the campaign did permit such tests.
In face of the puzzling fact that McCarthy received a larger percentage
of his vote from voters residing in predominantly Republican voting districts
one might conclude that a campaign targeted toward Democratic districts had
failed. The theoretical context for this examination was Anthony Downs' the-
sis concerning information costs. A distinction was found between Democrats
residing in predominantly Republican areas and Democrats residing in predomi-
nantly Democratic areas. An examination of the socio-economic characteristics
of these two groups of Democratic voters found that socio-economic factors
determined the ability to absorb Downs' non-transferable information costs.
The Democrat residing in a Republican area shared the higher socio-economic
characteristics of the Republican community although not the political orien-
tation. In spite of the fact that these Democratic voters were not targeted
as part of the McCarthy campaign strategy, they were able to gather their own
vote determining information and in significant numbers voted for Senator
McCarthy.
To test the effectiveness of the campaign, five indicators were selected
representing campaign activities: or the response to activities that could be
assigned to each voting district. The findings supported the contention that
the strategy of the campaign as measured through the indicators was effective
in producing the vote for McCarthy. In other words, without the campaign and
the targets selected for priority attention McCarthy's vote would be signifi-
cantly less.
7 AS
For the student of the electoral process the campaign effectiveness l:Lnd-
ings are iruportant. Wliile other factors such as party identification and
socio-economic status are important determinants of election outcomes, es-
pecially in bi-partisan elections, campaigns and especially quantifiable
campaign activities are seen as also contributing to an electoral result.
This is especially the case in an intra-party contest such as a primary
election.
It is now possible to say that the McCarthy campaign was more than a
quest for headlines or a movement to change public policy. For the political
scientist the campaign demonstrated both the institutional resilience of
the individual American voter. The analysis of the campaign affirmed the
importance of the campaign to the electoral decision. As a result of this
finding and the word that has evolved on campaigns since 1968, the campaign
as a factor in the electoral process must be given a place along with other
empirical findings concerning voting behavior.
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-The following table is a rank cider analysis of the vote for McCarthy -m
^^^^^ " :e^e^::"ioi!
TABLE 15.1?. VOTE ANA]A'SIS OF DISTRICTS OF 2,500 POPULATION OR MORE BY PTRCENTVOTE McCARTFA' AND PERCENT VOTE NOPU^l/VLLY REPUBLICAN
% Vote
% Vote AnV Of ri o t* KanK Ui
£^omi;iunity
Republican iNormai
McCarthy (Normal) Mr r-^r f-hv 1? « 1 ^^ 1 .JKepuDii
Berlin 51.7 38.7 27 JJ
Clarcffiont 37.9 41.9 58 il
Concord 53.9 45.0 25
Derry 47,5 67.5 36
Dover 48.0 59.1 34.5 33
Hudson 44.0 49.2 43 46
Keene 46.7 49.3 39 h5
Lac on i a 39.4 49.5 56 44
Manchester 31.0 50.8 61 42
Nashua 40.7 33.8 50 58
Portsraoutli 69.1 59.3 5 32
Rochester 51.0 54,2 30 39
Salem 50.5 60.8 21.5 27
Aliens to^vTi 39.7 27.4 55 60
Amherst 58.8 74.0 16 9
Bedford 48.0 65.0 34.5 20
Rosca'.i;en 44.3 50.^ 42 43
Charles towri 41.9 61.1 47 25
54.6 77.4 24 6
Durham 84.6 49.2 3 46
Exeter 57.5 65.1 20 19
Faratington 56.5 66.8 21.5 18
Franklin 41.3 38.9 48.5 54
Gilford 61.4 59.4 4 31
Gof f stovm 41.3 60.4 48.5 28
Gorham 51.3 47.6 28 49
Haiipton 57.9 69.4 17.5 14
Har^over 85 .
0
39.8 2 53
Haverhill 40,6 64.4 51 21
Hillsborough 63.8 68.3 9 15
Hinsdale 60.0 59.9 14 30
Hollis 65.9 75.9 8 7
Kook.?etl 40.7 60.3 50 28
Hopkinton 51.1 56.7 29 37
Jeffrey 48.9 51.9 31 AO
Kingsnou 46.8 77.7 37.5 5
Lancaster 59.9 61.4 15 21
Lebanon 48.7 37.8 32 56
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TABLE 15.12/FootuoLe ^^29 (Continued)
ComrannJt
v
Littleton
Londonderry
Meredith
Merrjjnack
Milford
Newinarket
Neijport
No. Hi^pton
Pelham
Pembroke
Peterborough
Pittsf ieid
Plaistow
Plymouth
Rayi^ond
Ilye
Seabrook
Sonersworth
Swanisey
Tilton
Walpcle
Winchester
Windham
Wolfeboro
% Vote
McCarth"",
40.3
48.1
100.0
46.8
38.0
40.4
40.1
66,0
57,9
42.6
57.7
37.7
60.3
67.7
45.8
70.8
63.0
42.5
45.5
42.4
53.1
36.1
55.1
63.2
% Vote
Republican
(Normal ) _
Rank Order
Vote
McCarthy
Rank Order
Normal
Republican Vote
67.7 53 ] 6
71.3 33 11
74.0 1 9
60.0 37.5 29
61.3 57 24
37.5 52 57
55.7 54 38
79.2 7 3
51.5 17.5 41
40,8 44 52
69.5 19 13
61.1 59 25
6^.1 13 22
79.0 6 4
79.4 40 2
69.7 4 12
74.9 11 8
33.3 45 59
48.6 41 48
57.7 46 36
58.4 26 35
58.5 60 34
64.4 23 21
81.8 5 1
RHO = .7299
N - 62
^^Republlcaii areas are defined as those voting districts where the normal
Republican vote was 53 percent or greater. For the purposes of the analysis,
the 1960 general election was selected to determine the normal Republican vote
by voting dlctrictr. having a population of 2,500 or more persons, U.S. Census
of the Population 1970.
^-'-Philip F.. Converse, et.al., Elections and the Political Order , "The
C(3nc.ept of a Konaal Vote," (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 9-40.
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